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THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND CHINA, 1945-1950:
THE POLICY OF RESTRAINED INTERVENTION
Introduction
Until fairly recently, existing interpretations of 
United States policy toward China in the period between 1945 
and 1950 have contended that some form of public opinion and 
congressional pressure constituted important, even decisive, 
factors in the Truman Administration's formulation of that 
policy. Though they vary in attitude and emphasis as to 
episodes and details, two essential and conflicting assess­
ments tended to emerge. One interpretation argued generally 
that the Truman Administration should have done more to save 
China from a communist takeover and that if more had been 
done the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek 
would have been able to survive and eventually defeat its 
Chinese Communist adversary. Alas, the Nationalist govern­
ment did not receive adequate support because, so this argu­
ment runs, "communists," "communist sympathizers," or 
"dupes" of communist propaganda in the State Department and 
the Truman Administration were in charge of deciding policy 
toward China— a policy calculated, or, at the very least, 
naively destined, to promote a Chinese Communist victory.
The other major assessment argued that strong 
American public sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek in general, and 
his congressional backers (the "China bloc") in particular.
forced the Truman Administration to continue to aid the 
Nationalist government after 1946 (subsequent to the Ameri­
can effort to mediate the conflict between the Kuomintang 
and Chinese Communist Parties) despite the Administration’s 
better judgment and policy preferences to withdraw support 
from what it considered to be a losing cause. This view 
further proclaimed that in 1949 and 1950 Chiang's American 
supporters (the "China lobby") kept the Administration from 
severing its ties with the Nationalists on Formosa as a 
necessary prerequisite to the official desire to recognize 
the newly formed Chinese Peoples Republic on the mainland.
Both of those assessments emerged in the period 
prior to the release of those documentary materials bearing 
on the question. Operating essentially in the blind, there­
fore, each faced the problem of speculating on why the 
Truman Administration had remained committed to the Nation­
alist government after 1945 and until Chiang’s regime was 
driven from the mainland by the Chinese Communists in 1949 
even though that commitment was clearly insufficient to save 
the regime; and on why the Administration had professed a 
determination after 1947 to "contain" communism on a global 
basis while at the same time refusing to grant adequate 
resources to do the job in this important region of the 
world.
The first of the interpretations explained this 
contradiction by arguing that pro-Chiang Kai-shek sentiment
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in the United States was sufficient to force the Administra­
tion to continue to give some support to the Nationalist 
government from 1945 to 1950 in spite of the machinations of 
"communist sympathizers" in the State Department. This 
communist conspiracy theory flourished in the climate of 
McCarthyite extremism of the late 1940 ' s and early 1950's 
and is a political interpretation not supported by a review 
of the documents.
The second major interpretation resolved the same 
contradiction by arguing that the Truman Administration 
after 1946 actually wished to extricate the United States 
from the situation in China and to sever its relationship 
with a corrupt and ineffective Chinese government but was 
unable to do so for fear that it would cause a storm of 
domestic protest. Unwilling to "get in", so to speak, and, 
at the same time, unable to "get out", this view saw con­
straints on assistance to Chiang's regime as the means by 
which the Administration sought to negotiate a troublesome 
line between, on the one side, avoiding an excessive waste 
of the nation's resources in a hopeless cause and, on the 
other, holding at bay political opponents and policy critics.
Prior to the recent release of government docu­
ments, this assessment of Truman China policy was compelling. 
Over the past several years, however, the availability of 
many new documents has made it necessary to take another 
look at the problem. Among these are the papers of the
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white House and the State Department for 1945-1950; the 
Departments of War and Navy for 1945-1947; the Defense 
Department for 1947-1950; the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee for 1945-1947; the National Security Council for 
1947-1950; the Treasury Department for 1945-1950; the Office 
of Strategic Services for 1942-1945; the Office of Intelli­
gence Research for 1946-1950; the Central Intelligence 
Agency for 1947-1950.
The accessibility of these documents led the 
author to undertake the present study. The initial intent 
was to determine more precisely to what degree and in what 
ways domestic public opinion influenced the decisions of the 
Truman Administration toward China after World War II. As 
the survey of the documents progressed, however, it became 
clear that at no time in the period from the end of World 
War II to the beginning of the war in Korea did decision 
makers seriously entertain the option of cutting off Ameri­
can support to Chiang and the Nationalist regime and for 
reasons which had virtually no direct relationship to public 
opinion. As a matter of necessity, therefore, the study 
began to shift away from being concerned primarily with the 
question of the effect of public opinion and toward the 
general problem of identifying, to the extent possble, the 
full range of those factors involved in the Administration’s 
formulation of its China policy.
The study begins with a survey of the essentials 
of United States wartime policy toward China after 1943. It 
starts here because decisions made in the last two years of 
the war go a long way toward explaining the Truman Admin­
istration's commitment to assist in resolving China's inter­
nal problems in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. 
Subsequent to this initial commitment, the basic contention 
of this study is that, for military and strategic reasons 
arising out of the concern about Soviet expansionism, the 
Truman Administration never seriously considered withdrawing 
from China prior to the Korean War.
The study terminates with the beginning of the 
Korean conflict despite the fact that increasing numbers of 
previously classified documents concerning China are now 
open for all of 1950 and 1951. This is because Korea 
appeared to confirm Administration officials in their ear­
lier decisions to support the rump Nationalist government on 
Formosa and to refrain from recognizing the newly estab­
lished Communist regime in Peking. The North Korean attack, 
in sum, eliminated flexibility and set in place the basic 
elements of American policy toward China for the following 
two decades.
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CHAPTER I
THE WARTIME ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CHINA POLICY
The fundamental wartime concern of the American 
government toward the East Asian mainland was how to encour­
age the most effective native resistance against the 
Japanese occupation of China. The essential objective was a 
military one and to this end there appeared little initial 
prejudice against considering whatever means might prove 
available and useful. Accordingly, as early as the Fall of 
1943, General Joseph Stilwell, Commander of American forces 
in China, advised Chiang Kai-shek that he should consider 
making use of Chinese Communist military strength in North 
China. ^
By the Spring of 1944 the feasibility of supplying 
the Communists was a serious topic of discussion in Wash- 
ington. But Communist political and military independence 
posed a significant problem for American policy: In view of
the intense animosities and suspicions present between 
Chungking and Yenan, how could use of the Communist forces 
be worked into the existing political and military relation­
ship between the United States and the Nationalist govern­
ment? Accordingly, the Roosevelt Administration determined 
to find some basis for unifying Nationalist and Communist 
forces under the command of General Stilwell, in hopes of
O
prosecuting the war in China more effectively.
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Some foreign service officers in China refused to 
accept the task of creating a unified command as the exclu­
sive problem for American policy. They proposed that the 
United States might supply aid directly to the Communists 
irrespective of American ties to the Nationalist govern­
ment.^ Actually the multiple arguments of these individuals 
have been arbitrarily intermingled to such an extent that it 
appears there was a more strict homogeneity of attitudes 
than was really the case.
Some suggested, out of expediency, that since the 
essential wartime objective was victory over the Japanese, 
then the military resources of the Chinese Communists should 
be tapped to the fullest extent possible. If direct and 
independent aid was the best way to accomplish this then a 
program of support to the Communists should be initiated.^
These foreign service officers did not rest their 
argument on expediency alone however. They interspersed 
their views with complaints about the Nationalist govern­
ment, accusing it of pervasive corruption and of civil and 
military inefficiency and ineptitude. They criticized the 
Nationalist leadership for deliberately avoiding an effec­
tive prosecution of the war against Japan. They suggested 
that Chiang and his generals appeared to want the United 
States to carry the main burden in the Pacific island war 
while the Nationalists stockpiled lend-lease supplies either
—7—
for their own corrupt purposes or in anticipation of a 
future conflict with the Communists. These evaluations were 
basically correct.^
In contrast the Chinese Communists were depicted 
as organizationally effective. They were seen as honest 
administrators who commanded military forces which displayed
n
some greater willingness to fight the Japanese. This 
proposition may not be altogether accurate. Communist 
underground operations behind Japanese lines were more 
imaginative and extensive than Nationalist efforts. Commu­
nist guerilla operations were more effective. Yet on a 
purely quantitative basis Nationalist forces suffered the 
brunt of fighting the Japanese. And, the Chinese Communists 
appeared to be just as intent as the Nationalists in con­
serving their energies for a future show-down —  an event 
which both not only expected, but undoubtedly always inten-
O
ded should take place.
Be that as it may, this group of foreign service 
officers thus argued that, because of its corruption and 
inefficiency, the question of aid to the Nationalists ought 
to be carefully reviewed. Was it in the best wartime inter­
est of the United States to continue to give aid exclusively, 
or even at all, to the Nationalist government? In order 
better to achieve the military goal of victory over the 
Japanese, might it not be wise to give aid outright to the
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Communists or at least threaten to do this, so as to pres­
sure the Nationalist government into a more effective fight­
ing posture? Generally they counseled that the United 
States should not tie itself rigidly to Chiang Kai-shek. 
Nothing was sacrosanct about the power structure of the 
Nationalist government. If the regime refused to comply 
with the priorities of American policy there ought not be 
any inhibition against giving aid to some other political 
figure or group in China - including the Chinese Communists 
- which demonstrated a greater willingness to do the job.^
A third aspect of this line of argument related 
more to the issue of American postwar policy toward China 
and the question of the nature of the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. American aid 
to the Communists might disrupt an otherwise cozy postwar 
relationship between the Soviets and the Yenan rebels, some 
suggested. The argument was that the prospect of American 
aid would prove appealing to the patriotic sensibilities of 
the Communists. Through continuing association with Yenan, 
Washington might be able to tie the Communists into its 
postwar aims for China. This proposal was designed to 
counter the prospect of future Soviet aid to the Chinese 
Communists by buying the goodwill on Yenan with American 
dollars.
A few in this group of foreign service officers, 
it is true, did tend to sustain more sanguine opinions about
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the "democratic" propensities of the Chinese Communists than 
were warranted by the facts.^^ But such opinions were 
understandable enough given the wartime situation which 
pitted the forces of "democracy", including the Communists, 
against the forces of "fascism". Indeed, certain charac­
teristics of the Nationalist regime did bear an uncomfort­
able resemblance to the attitudes and practices found so
12unpalatable in the Axis governments!
In measuring the miserable wartime conditions 
under which the common people lived against the nearly 
complete disregard of the Nationalist government for their 
plight, it was not surprising that some American Embassy 
officials saw the Communists, who seemed to take a greater 
interest in the welfare of the people in areas under their 
control, as the more decent social and political alterna­
tive. The fact that Yenan's political procedures and social 
and economic policies had the appearance of being signifi­
cantly more egalitarian than those of the Kuomintang seemed 
to some to warrant, at least in a strictly Chinese context,
the use of the label "democratic" in describing the Chinese
13Communists.
The arguments of these several foreign service 
officers are reproduced here to underscore the fact that 
policymakers never seriously considered accepting this 
series of related arguments and concomitant policy pro­
posals. Actual policy resulted from a quite different set
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of assumptions. However, this is not to say that the 
reporting of this group of American diplomatic officers in 
China was totally without effect on high echelon thinking. 
The criticisms of the Nationalist government which appeared 
to derive in part from political objections to the regime 
were not persuasive. The ant i- author i tari an attitudes of a 
few foreign service officers undoubtedly proved consistent 
with the personal political proclivities of some Washington 
officials. Such views, however, were too "soft" to be 
allowed to subvert the harsh reality of expediency in the 
process of wartime decision-making.
The political tendencies of a particular govern­
ment, Right or Left, were an inconsequential issue in the 
presence of the need to utilize all resources available in 
the war against the Axis.^^ Washington's support of Chiang 
Kai-shek derived from an assessment —  as we shall see —  of 
his indispensability to the war effort, the same pragmatic 
calculation which led Roosevelt and his advisers by 1944 to 
seek to utilize Communist power in North China. By the same 
token, in this manner of thinking, American support could be 
withdrawn from Chiang in the event Administration officials 
deemed it necessary to find a more effective alternative. 
They never did.
The less subjective assessments that the Nation­
alist government displayed gross functional ineptitude and 
inefficiency, that the regime was pervasively corrupt and
— 11 —
prone to chronic maladministration, had more effect. How­
ever, this was the general thrust of reports reaching Wash­
ington from the entire American diplomatic and military 
establishment in China. American journalists submitted 
corroborating stories to their stateside publications.
There is little doubt these criticisms began to 
fit into the attitudes and assumptions of officials involved 
in the process of developing American policy toward China. 
Even as the war continued, some in Washington questioned the 
advisability of giving certain types of aid to the Nation­
alist government unless it demonstrated some greater will­
ingness to revise deficient monetary policies. Treasury 
officials felt that Chinese procedures of fiscal account­
ability would have to be tightened and reliable officials 
appointed to administer the government's financial outlay if 
the Nationalists were to have any hope of controlling ram­
pant inflation.
The necessity of keeping Chungking in the war, 
however, moderated the harshest implications of these criti­
cisms of corruption and inefficiency. There was no question 
but that expediency required sufficient American assistance 
to sustain the military-strategic function of the National­
ist government. To what degree American aid might be tied 
eventually to the requisite promise of fiscal and admini­
strative reform by the Nationalist government was an issue, 
for the moment, held in reserve until after the war.^^
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The idea that the attitudes and affiliations of
the Chinese Communists could be significantly influenced by
American aid also had its impact on official thinking in
Washington. The effect though, was less than unequivocal.
On the one hand, it appears that whatever optimism existed,
in high official circles regarding the prospect of achieving
an integration of Nationalist and Communist forces under a
unified command, was predicated in part on the view that the
Communists would find the idea of United States aid attrac- 
17tive. And this same argument would prove important after 
the war in reviewing the possibilities for achieving a 
political settlement in China aiming toward a coalition 
government. Officials hoped the promise of American eco­
nomic aid to China as a "reward" for the Kuomintang and 
Communists settling their differences peacefully might 
divert the latter from seeking to overthrow the Nationalist 
government by force.
But officials in Washington were never able to 
accept as more than a dubious proposition the concept that 
direct American aid to the Chinese Communists might subvert 
their real or imagined political affiliation with the Soviet 
Union. The question of the possible effects of direct aid 
to the Chinese Communists is, in retrospect, an intriguing 
one. And, it should be observed, those State Department 
personnel in China were perfectly in accord with their 
official responsibilities in making this suggestion to
-13-
Washington. It was an option which should have been ex­
plored. But whatever the merit of such a policy suggestion,
it could not hope to fit in to the higher decision-making
18pattern which then prevailed in Washington.
There were compelling reasons why direct or inde­
pendent aid to the Chinese Communists was not considered 
seriously as a workable option for American policy; why 
American policy makers did not respond to the suggestion of 
threatening to cut off aid in order to pressure Chiang to 
move in more preferred directions; or, why the idea of 
dropping Chiang in favor of supporting another personality 
or political faction in China did not generate much enthu- 
siam in Washington.
Of major importance was the fact that throwing 
support to Yenan ran counter to established American policy 
toward China. The Nationalist regime enjoyed international 
recognition as the legal government of China and had since 
1928. Since its inception, that government had been the 
sole repository for all American support. During the war, 
Roosevelt referred to the Nationalist government as one of 
the "Big Four" in context of innumerable statements alluding 
to the principal role that China was expected to play in 
helping to create stability in East Asia after the war. 
There was a powerful momentum of propriety and legitimacy in 
these aspects of the fifteen year existence of the Nation­
alist government which American decision-makers found diffi­
cult to ignore in their deliberations over China policy.
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Chiang Kai-shek's prestige as a loyal ally and 
national leader of the resistance against Japanese aggres­
sion within and outside of China continued to be enormous. 
Chiang Kai-shek was the Nationalist government. There were 
no other political personalities in China of anywhere near
comparable stature, including the Communist leadership.
20Even the Soviets agreed with this and said so repeatedly. 
What if Chiang Kai-shek were eliminated from his dominant 
position in Chinese politics? Whatever cohesion the govern­
ment possessed derived from the complex set of relationships 
based on obligation, expediency, convenience, advantage, and 
personal loyalty that in critical times so often tradi­
tionally characterized the Chinese political experience and 
which now focused on his indispensable presence. In 
Chiang's absence the whole edifice of the Nationalist gov­
ernment was likely to come tumbling down. The arguments of 
a few State Department personnel in China that Chiang was
expendable did not find a large audience among decision-
21makers in Washington.
Besides, so long as the war continued not all the 
political leverage in the Washington-Chungking relationship 
rested with the former. Beyond the obvious consideration of 
just how successfully the foreigner could expect to manipu­
late and revise the internal power structure of China there 
was also the question of what Chiang Kai-shek's reaction
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would be to such manner of meddling. If sufficiently 
alienated by an excess of American pressure, might he not 
consider making an independent peace with Japan? Such a 
development would have catastrophic effect on plans for an 
invasion of the Japanese home islands. And, as a device by 
which to sustain American attentions, it was not beyond the 
keen Chinese sense of the value of images in the art of 
political maneuver to allow such a threat to tease the 
perceptions of American officials in China until the end of 
the war.^^
Moreover, this series of pragmatic calculations
concerning the necessity of continued support to Chiang and
his regime was re-enforced further by long-standing and
well-cultivated images and illusions about the Generalissimo
and his government which convincingly affected the views of
many Americans. Placing severe qualifications on aid, to
cease giving it all together, or to redirect it, would be
denying a government which appeared to many Americans to
symbolize the whole array of ties between China and the
western world: intellectual, political, economic, social,
23even religious ones! Such perceptions, marvelously over­
drawn and largely ignoring the degree to which classical 
Chinese orientations continued to prevail in Chiang and the 
Nationalist government, overwhelmed the subtle irony that it 
was the Chinese Communists who accepted enthusiastically a 
philosophy of society and history more thoroughly Western in 
its cultural provenance.
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As Kenneth Shewmaker has wonderfully illustrated, 
many Americans who had direct contact with the Yenan during 
the war did sense there was something in Communist attitudes 
and practices compatible with their own political experi­
ence.^^ But however much the progressive qualities of the 
Chinese Communists might be extolled they still appeared to 
be a subsidiary quantity in Chinese politics and there was 
no denying the Marxism-Leninism to which they professed. 
Indeed, despite the suggestion of some, there never devel­
oped any sustained inclination in either the Roosevelt or 
Truman Administrations to believe the Chinese Communists 
were anything other than Marxist revolutionaries. Further­
more, Washington never accepted as accurate the logic of 
those reports from certain American diplomatic personnel in
China describing the Communists as "democratically" inclined
25and therefore fit recipients for American aid.
Nonetheless, it is important to add, though 
Marxism-Leninism had been rejected by American tradition and 
culture as revolutionary and a dangerously inappropriate 
political philosophy, this did not rule out entirely direct 
and independent aid to the Chinese Communists. Though it 
would be very different after the war, so long as the con­
flict continued, there was no political-philosophical 
inhibition in Washington to the grant of aid to Yenan if the 
goal of victory appeared to demand it. For example, it 
might happen that Chiang would refuse to sanction any formal
-17-
Nationalist association with the Communists. Yet there was 
a distinct possibility it would prove necessary to land 
American forces in the coastal northeast in conjunction with 
an invasion of the Japanese home islands. In this event, 
and if Chiang refused to cooperate, direct and independent 
aid to the Communists might be given if it could be deter­
mined that such aid would enhance the success of American
26operations in North China. The landing, though, was not 
made and independent aid was never given. If this had 
happened, the course of East Asian history after 1945 might 
have moved in a dramatically different direction.
These considerations, then, set limits to policy 
options. Chiang Kai-shek in particular and the Nationalist 
government in general were the indispensable determinants of 
the United State's equation for China. The seemingly un­
assailable legitimacy of both demanded their recognition as 
the central focus of American policy. The question remained 
in the Summer of 1944, therefore, how the problem of the 
political and military independence of the Communists might 
be solved and a unified command of all Chinese forces be 
created.
There was also a related consideration of extra­
ordinary importance. Communist independence was not simply 
an obstacle to a unified command and more effective prosecu­
tion of the war in China. It was also a dramatic manifesta­
tion of the many years of bitterness that had passed between
—18—
Nationalists and Communists and the reflection of a mutual
awareness that the finale of their violent competition was 
27close. Civil war would have a disastrous effect on the 
strategic planning of the Pacific war against the Japanese. 
Nationalists preoccupied in a conflict with the Communists 
would release the supposed powerful Japanese Kwantung army 
in Manchuria as well as other units for defense of the home 
islands. The cost of the American assault might exceed the 
already projected million casualties. Unified command was 
important, therefore, not only to enhance resistance against 
Japan but as well to avoid the chaotic disruption of civil 
war.
But there were obstacles to military unification. 
Stilwell and the Generalissimo did not get on well. Indeed, 
hostility between the two by 1944 probably had reached 
unbridgeable proportions. Both the Generalissimo and the 
Communist leadership profoundly distrusted one another. 
Neither found the idea of a unified command attractive.
Despite these distractions the plan was important 
and in the Spring of 1944 Vice President Henry Wallace
traveled to China in an effort to induce Chungking and Yenan
28to begin productive negotiations. In the Fall Roosevelt 
sent his special representative, Patrick J. Hurley, to 
mediate the feud between Stilwell and Chiang and to arrange 
for the former's effective assumption of command of all 
Allied forces in China including the Communists.
-19-
Hurley clearly understood that the organizational 
problem of unifying the military forces of both sides would 
also require a political settlement between the two. To 
this end Hurley also sought to assist in developing some 
basis for a compromise leading toward the formation of a
coalition government, a goal which was a part of the oral
29instructions given him by Roosevelt.
But an extensive consideration of the postwar
implications of a lasting political settlement was not
included in Hurley’s preoccupation with more immediate
tasks. His were wartime objectives, specifically, how to
get Stilwell in command of all Allied forces. So long as
the war continued the question of American postwar China
policy was left largely in the realm of generalities. First
military victory and then the problem of a lasting political
settlement seemed in Hurley's (and the American) view the
30logical order of business.
There were statements of hope and aspiration for 
the postwar era: Roosevelt's "Big Four" references; how
welcome a peaceful world would be, and, in this regard, how 
China would prove to be the stabilizing influence in Asia. 
To this end there was talk about an American postwar policy 
which would promote stability, unity and democracy in China. 
And stability, unity and democracy could be achieved through 
the creation of a coalition government to which all politi­
cal factions in China, including the Communists, would have
31effective access.
—20—
But this was talk and had little bearing on the 
purpose and methods of the American presence in China prior 
to August 1945. High echelon preferences for postwar China 
were linked only marginally to specific wartime efforts to 
manipulate conditions there. There was little or no thought 
as to what kind of American involvement in China might be 
necessary after the war in order to guarantee, or even 
promote, stability, unity and democracy. Consequently, 
Hurley's efforts to achieve a political settlement between 
Chungking and Yenan never went beyond the preliminary stage.
Nonetheless, American officials did have a sense 
of what general international pattern of affairs they wanted 
to prevail in East Asia after the war. The Japanese defeat 
would create the need for a rearrangement of the interna­
tional power structure in the region. The idea of a stable, 
unified and democratic China was an important element in 
this thinking. The Chinese ingredient was especially impor­
tant in view of the projected Soviet entry into the war 
against Japan. From that point on. East Asian politics 
would have to contend with a Russian military and political 
presence of an even greater magnitude than that experienced 
before the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905. Because of 
this anticipated condition, in the absence of a stable and 
unified postwar China, and short of an extended American 
military occupation, the Soviet Union could be expected to
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attempt to extend its influence, possibly even direct con­
trol, throughout China and, as a consequence, indeed the 
entire East Asian mainland. Such an eventuality would not 
reflect the many specific American interests in the area nor 
indeed fulfill the general goal of achieving international
stability based on a reasonable balance of national 
32interests.
It was at Yalta in February of 1945 that the 
Roosevelt Administration first sought to translate the 
American concern for postwar China and East Asia into some 
more solid agreement between the Great Powers. The partici­
pants of the Conference intended to settle a variety of 
issues relating to Europe and Asia. In East Asia, the major
question was that of the Soviet entry into the war against 
33Japan.
American officials assumed, once Germany was 
defeated in Europe, that the Soviet Union would move quickly 
to press its advantage against the shambles of the Japanese 
empire. In the presence of the inevitable, however, the 
Roosevelt Administration sought to expedite Soviet involve­
ment in the Asia war. American military planners argued 
that it was vital to ensure that Japanese armies on the 
Asian mainland not be available for defense of the homeland. 
The Chinese by themselves - even under a unified American 
command - could not be expected to keep the Mikado's troops
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stationed in China sufficiently preoccupied during an Ameri­
can invasion of Japan. Even with Soviet support, casualty 
estimates were alarmingly high. Unless Soviet strength 
could be counted on to contain Japanese forces in Manchuria 
and Korea the projected invasion could prove to be a Pyrrhic 
victory.
However, resolving this matter of strategic neces­
sity created political dilemmas. Because participation in 
the war against Japan would provide the Soviets with a major 
influence in East Asia, and in the processes of a postwar 
political settlement, the essential problem was how to 
accommodate this influence in a manner recognizing all 
relevant factors requisite to establishing political stabil­
ity in the region.
The outcome at Yalta in part reflected the pre­
liminary effort by the Roosevelt Administration to develop 
some reasonable diplomatic basis aiming toward negotiation 
of a more permanent East Asian settlement. In response to 
the Soviet demand, Roosevelt's willingness at Yalta to grant 
territorial concessions and special rights in the area was, 
in the immediate circumstance, an enticement to insure the 
Russian entry into the war as quickly as possible. But, it 
was also a reflection of a desire to define and agree more 
clearly upon a reasonable relationship between the realities 
of Soviet power and the political consequences of its exer­
cise; to adjust properly the perceived inclinations of
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Soviet policy to the essence of the American interest in
35East Asia.
In this regard, the granting of territorial con­
cessions and special rights was the American concession to 
the Soviet claim of its national interest in the region. In 
return the Soviets did confirm plans to enter the war 
against Japan, thereby fulfilling the necessities of Ameri­
can military strategic planning. Equally important, however, 
Stalin also agreed to recognize and support, materially and 
morally, the ruling legitimacy of the Nationalist government 
in China.
Soviet recognition of the Nationalist government 
accommodated the several disparate levels of the American 
wartime concern for China and East Asia. In context of 
combat necessity Yalta appeared to reinforce Hurley’s 
efforts to unify all Chinese military forces. In addition 
to promises made to American officials by Stalin and Molotov 
in Moscow in the Fall and Spring of 1944 and 1945, it was 
another form of reassurance that the Russians would not seek 
to exploit the Soviet-Chinese communist connection - what­
ever its nature - to the disadvantage of American wartime 
policy.
The Soviet recognition also seemed to validate the 
preponderance of official thinking that Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Nationalist government were indispensable components of 
the American approach to China. In another respect Stalin’s
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acquiescense on the question of the legitimacy of the Nation­
alists appeared to imply that he was satisfied the conces­
sions received at Yalta were sufficient recognition of the 
Soviet interest in East Asia. At the very least, and even 
if the Far Eastern accords failed to achieve little else, a 
formal recognition of the government in China established
limits in a situation which otherwise would prove more
37convenient to Soviet aggrandizement.
Finally, the Yalta concessions to Stalin and his 
pledge of support to Chiang appeared to establish the provi­
sional foundation for a postwar international settlement in 
East Asia. If Stalin was indeed satisfied with the Yalta 
councessions, then Chiang could be satisfied to have Soviet 
as well as American backing after the war. And if both 
leaders proved well enough pleased with this state of af­
fairs, the Roosevelt administration could feel reasonably 
comfortable in guessing that the Yalta accords went a long 
way toward creating the prerequisites for an acceptable 
postwar balance of national interests in East Asia - a
condition which American officials believed imperative for
38stability and lasting peace in the region.
Roosevelt agreed to convince Chiang Kai-shek of 
the merits of the Soviet-American arrangement at Yalta. The 
Generalissimo would be told the particulars at the proper 
time and encouraged to reproduce them in a formal agreement 
with the Soviet government. Roosevelt’s death in mid-April
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changed nothing. The fledgling Truman Administration would 
advise the Nationalists to enter into negotiations with the 
Soviets. Accordingly the Chinese were encouraged to send 
representatives to Moscow for discussions in the Summer of 
1945 and a Sino-Soviet treaty was signed in August.
In fact the Truman Administration appeared to 
accept without much question the entire complex of estab­
lished official thinking on China and East Asia. But that 
was not surprising. There was no inclination to alter 
policy orientations. There was substantial continuity of 
decision-making personnel responsible for policy. Nor, in 
the critical context of an ongoing world war, was it a 
proper time to change directions. The composite precedent 
of strategic and tactical planning, and the momentum of 
operations commensurate with planning, constituted an over-
OQ
whelping image of necessity.
In summary, by the time of the Japanese surrender, 
the essentials of postwar American China policy were already 
present. The Nationalist government would continue to exist 
as the central institutional focus for the Truman Administra­
tion approach. Effort would be made through the personnel 
of the American Embassy to facilitate bringing the Kuomin- 
tang and Communists together within a Nationalist government 
revamped so as to provide genuine coalition opportunities. 
An effective coalition government would then operate to 
achieve and maintain those conditions of unity, stability 
and democracy —  the general goals of American China policy.
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The outcome of the Yalta Conference and the Sino- 
Soviet treaty constituted the Soviet pledge of support for 
this general American intention. The Yalta and Russian- 
Chinese agreements would exist also as the postwar founda­
tion for a final amicable political adjustment of all 
relevant interests in the region. These agreements together 
with a general thrust of United States policy appeared to 
American decision-makers to recognize the essential compo­
nents of the situation: the Soviet territorial and stra­
tegic interest in East Asia; the interests of Chiang Kai- 
shek and the Nationalist government in the fact of Major 
Power backing; the interest of the Chinese Communists 
mirrored in the mediation efforts of Ambassador Hurley; and, 
as a result, the American interest contained in the apparent 
existence of a basis for achieving American priorities in 
China and for creating a reasonable balance of the several 
national interests in the region. The necessary ingredients 
being present, all that remained was for the interested 
parties to bring these separate threads of American policy 
together by negotiating a satisfactory arrangement of the 
details.
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CHAPTER II
EARLY POSTWAR CHINA POLICY:
INITIAL OPTIMISM AND OMINOUS DEVELOPMENTS
Stability, unity and democracy were the general 
postwar American goals for China and policymakers expected 
that these ends would be achieved through political- 
diplomatic means. Although creating stability and unity 
within China was important enough, it was not simply an end 
in itself. In one sense China represented something of a 
microcosm of all East Asia in terms of a postwar settlement. 
Just as communist and non-communist interests could be 
adjusted satisfactorily within China so would the American 
and Soviet governments work to compromise their broader 
interests in East Asia.
But the China solution was also the prerequisite 
for a Great Power accommodation in East Asia. In fact 
Truman Administration officials conceived a proportional 
ratio to exist between the level of success in achieving a 
settlement in China and the degree of potential for achiev­
ing a more general regional arrangement with the Soviet 
Union. It would be impossible to accomplish the latter if 
instability and disunity came to prevail in China.^
Immediately following the war, the Truman Admini­
stration, it appears, was inclined to view the question of a
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postwar settlement in a somewhat fragmented fashion. Each
region of the world had a significance conceived largely in
terms of its own necessities. Settlement in any one area
would be achieved on the basis of discussion and negotiation
which included those parties with a relevant interest in the
outcome. This expectation was predicated on the then still
compelling conviction that specific diplomatic mechanisms
for compromising diverse interests could be developed on the
foundation of mutual confidence, good faith, cooperation and
some hard bargaining either through the auspices of the
infant and as yet unorganized United Nations or between the
2
Great Powers themselves.
From the Administration's perspective the China 
situation contained its own requirements. Officials deter­
mined as a matter of course that the American military 
presence in China would be used in support of the Nationlist 
government's effort to re-establish its control in all 
areas. This followed from the fact that Chiang and his 
regime continued to be just as indispensable for many of the 
same reasons after August 1945 as before.
There simply was no substitute political personal­
ity of comparable stature. Chiang's enormous prestige 
within China and internationally at war's end was an irre­
futable and compelling political condition. His importance 
derived from several sources. One was the mere fact of his 
presence at the head of the Chinese government after eight
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years of war. Another was the condition that between the 
Great Powers there was no equivocation on the question of 
the political legitimacy of Chiang and his government. It 
was not a mere figment of the American imagination. Another 
source was the residue of the laudatory and supportive 
statements and actions of the American wartime policy. And, 
in significant measure, still another source of Chiang's 
prestige was the favorable reporting of substantial segments 
of the American press, most notably in the case of Henry 
Luce's Time and Life publications. None more than these 
popular magazines led the way in conveying the illusion that 
Chiang represented the moral and intellectual bond between 
oriental and occidental culture; that the Nationlist govern- 
ment represented the hope of democracy in China.
But, in the last months of the war and after, the 
importance of Chiang and his regime inherited a new dimen­
sion. As a result of Yalta, the Generalissimo and the 
Nationalists became the principal measure of the ability of 
Washington and Moscow to achieve a resolution of their 
conflicting national interests in Asia. Pledges of support 
by both to his government constituted the fundamental act of 
postwar political compromise between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in East Asia. In view of this, dispensing 
with Chiang was impossible unless there emerged some effec­
tive and acceptable alternative to his leadership. But 
there was no alternative in the Administration's view.
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Thus, it was senseless to talk about eliminating the touch­
stone of good faith and compromise between the Great
A
Powers.
Certainly these were more important considerations 
than the complaint by some that Chiang's regime was corrupt 
and inefficient and therefore undeserving of American aid. 
Indeed, the attributes of Chiang's political preeminence 
appeared together so compelling as to negate any suggestion 
that Chiang was dispensable, or that it was not incumbent 
upon Administration policy to give its support to the gov­
ernment which he headed. Happy in the presence of an inter­
nationally agreed upon device for a postwar political 
settlement in China, war-weary officials were not inclined 
to dwell upon the possibility that the corruption and in­
efficiency of the Nationalist government might reduce its 
effectiveness in fulfilling such a role.^
Besides, it did not seem unreasonable to believe, 
as some argued, that Kuomintang organizational and admini­
strative deficiencies were the result of the chaos produced 
by the Japanese invasion, which, after 1937, also eliminated 
any opportunity for Chiang to implement necessary reforms. 
Although such thinking tended to overlook the Nationalist 
government's almost studied inattention to social and econo­
mic reform in the decade prior to 1937, confidence remained 
that peace would provide those conditions which would allow 
the Generalissimo to move in more progressive directions.
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The conditions of corruption and inefficiency were subject 
to corrective revision given the presence of proper organi­
zational and managerial expertise - after all, one of Ameri­
ca's finest resources and easily exportable.®
In addition, the Nationalist government appeared 
to be the only available organization in China capable of 
reasserting control over the whole of the country. There 
could be no extensive consideration of the Chinese Commu­
nists, the only alternative, and after the Japanese defeat 
there was none. The Communists received no consideration at 
all. None of the arguments for supporting the Nationalist 
government applied to the Communists.
Legally, they had never been more than a force in 
rebellion against an internationally recognized regime. 
None of their leaders had the stature of Chiang Kai-shek. 
Not even the Soviets were inclined to press the cause of the 
Chinese Communists, let alone suggest they become the focus 
of Great Power political accommodation in China. Throughout 
a series of confidential diplomatic exchanges with American 
officials, several summit conferences, and a treaty arrange­
ment, Stalin virtually ignored his opportunity to promote 
Yenan's political status. He consistently professed com-
7
plete approval for the Nationalist regime.
Some have suggested that the Truman Administration 
accepted the view that the Chinese Communists were not 
communists at all in the Russian sense of the term but were
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actually agrarian reformers with strong nationalistic incli-
O
nations. Whatever the extent of official wondering about 
the actual depth of the Chinese Communist commitment to 
orthodox interpretations, the diplomatic dispatches reaching 
Washington from China after VJ day assumed overwhelmingly
Û
that Yenan's political coloration was "communist". More­
over, the Chinese Communists themselves continued to insist 
they were in fact communists committed to the revolutionary 
import of Marxism-Leninism.^® In view of the corroborating 
information coming from the American Embassy in China there 
was no good reason to doubt the authenticity of their claim. 
For this reason alone there was no real possibility of the 
Chinese Communists becoming the exclusive focus of American 
policy in China.
The end of the world war eliminated the necessity 
for concealing competitive national interests. The coming 
of peace ended the wartime immunity of policy-making from 
ideological complications. While there was as yet no clear 
reason to believe communist and non-communist interests were 
mutually exclusive and ultimately incompatible, nevertheless 
they had to be differentiated one from the other, and surely 
subject to some formal manner of adjustment and reconcilia­
tion. No identifiable American official involved in policy­
making believed the interests of "communism" so defined were 
naturally compatible with those of "democracy". This was 
equally true for both Russian and Chinese communism.
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Accordingly, in 1945 American policy sought to 
establish a balance of communist and non-communist interests 
in China and in East Asia. United States recognition of the 
several levels of communist aspiration, i.e., that of Moscow 
in the Yalta and Sino-Soviet agreements and of Yenan in the 
goals of the Hurley mission, presupposed a willingness on 
both their parts to recognize the American interest which 
was non-communist and to be distinguished as such.
In China the non-communist interest resided in the 
continuing existence of the Nationalist government headed by 
Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of policy it was simply incon­
ceivable at the time that Washington promote non-communist 
interests so defined through the use of a communist organi­
zation. Despite the Administration’s knowledge of the 
patriotic sentiments displayed by certain factions within 
the Chinese Communist Party, officials never showed much 
inclination to interpret this information as having any more 
than marginal significance for policymaking.
Titoism belonged to the future. Even had Admin­
istration officials been favorably disposed to consider the 
prospect, they could not have been sure that encouraging the 
nationalistic propensities of the Chinese Communists through 
the use of direct American aid would promote the United 
States' interest in China. There simply were no grounds in 
the view of Administration decision-makers for believing 
that the patriotic sloganeering of the Chinese Communists
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reflected a purpose apart from the ideological authority of 
Moscow and from the ultimate political aims of Marxism- 
Leninism.^^
Officials were never able to accept the idea that
American aid would buy Chinese Communist independence from 
13Moscow. This prevailing evaluation of the Chinese Commu­
nists in association with an official assumption that Soviet 
cooperation was the key in reaching a political solution in 
China, produced the rather satisfying, though as it turned 
out, vain hope that the Communist leadership in China would 
have no choice but to accept their fate as determined by an 
American-Soviet agreement.
After the war, officials did not merely distin­
guish between communist and non-communist interests. They 
also conceived they had a firm responsibility to push in 
favor of the non-communist position whether with regard to 
the Soviets on all matters or specifically in the case of 
China. It was, without question, an essential American 
interest that China not come to have a communist-dominated 
political system. Indeed, after VJ day, this was the major 
reason why the Nationalist government appeared to be the 
only available serviceable device for realizing American 
interests in China. Not only did Chiang’s government exist 
as the mutually agreed upon focus of Great Power accommoda­
tion, but its acceptability to the Administration in that 
regard also reflected a natural American affinity for its 
non-communist character.
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In a very real sense, officials believed they were 
competing with the communists in China. But the nature of 
the Administration's intentions in this regard, were, in 
1945, still a far cry from the rigidities and limitations of 
a later anti-communism with its straight-laced commitment to 
victory in the Cold War. The respective national interests 
of the United States and the Soviet Union were not yet 
conceived in Manichean fashion as belonging to mutually 
exclusive and unbridegable categories.
So long as this more flexible policy atmosphere 
continued to last, what it meant in the case of China was 
that Administration officials wanted to ensure that the 
nature of the political settlement, while granting represen­
tation for all political interests, would continue to guar­
antee the non-communist position its fair measure of respon­
sibility in the formulation of government policies. In 
other words, competing with the communists did not mean 
defeating them, nor did competition preclude compromise.
There were essentially two reasons why competing 
with the communists did not appear in American thinking to 
be inconsistent with the more hopeful rhetoric of coopera­
tion in solving postwar problems. For one thing, the mix­
ture of competition and cooperation undoubtedly seemed 
natural to decision-makers in view of their varied involve­
ments and experiences in domestic American politics. It was 
a give and take game; the degree of concession or demand
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depending on the relative strength of one's political posi­
tion vis-a-vis another. Once this relative strength, or the 
image of such, became apparent subsequent to the rhetoric 
and maneuver in the congressional and governmental pro­
cesses, then some appropriate compromise of the respective, 
competing interests would be reflected in the legislative 
outcome.
As this American sense of the nature of the polit­
ical game related to conditions in China, it was not really 
a solid expectation so much as it was a preliminary notion 
based on a preference that the process of solving postwar 
problems develop in an uncomplicated fashion. Convenience, 
naturally enough, was conceived in terms of what was 
familiar.
Another reason officials did not believe that the 
requirement of competing with the communists subverted the 
possibility of cooperation in resolving postwar problems 
rested on related assumptions concerning the Soviet Union. 
Administration officials believed that success in reaching a 
peaceful political settlement in China and East Asia, would 
depend on the ability of the United States to carry on a 
sustained and effective diplomatic relationship with the 
Soviet Union. However, officials did not think that the 
mere desire for postwar diplomatic cooperation with the 
Kremlin could be expected to translate naturally into real­
ity without some degree of American manipulation of the 
negotiating environment.
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On a fundamental level the Administration would 
have to promote a situation in China with which the Soviets 
and the Chinese Communists could be relatively satisfied in 
terms of their respective interests. The Yalta accords, the 
Sino-Soviet treaty and the American purpose in supporting 
the postwar creation of a coalition government unquestion­
ably fulfilled this requirement from the Administration's 
standpoint. However, it was also important, to the extent 
possible, to create through the Administration's use of 
energetic negotiating tactics a set of prevailing political- 
diplomatic conditions which the communists would be forced 
to accept as compelling. The import of this assessment did 
not reflect at all favorably on the character of the Soviet 
leadership.
The principal source of the analysis concerning 
the requirements of dealing with the communists appears to 
have derived from the implications of the diplomatic report­
ing of the American Embassy in Moscow. The Embassy's inter­
pretations were largely concurred in by the State Depart­
ment's Division of East European Affairs, including the 
Division's Chief, Elbridge Durbrow.^^
From Moscow, both Ambassador W. Averell Harriman 
and Charge d' Affairs George Kennan provided Washington with 
less than sanguine views concerning Soviet foreign policy 
behavior. They argued convincingly that Stalin and his
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associates would accept the essence of a particular inter­
national political situation only to the extent it was in 
the Soviet interest to do so. If it should appear to the 
Soviet leadership that greater advantage might be obtained 
otherwise they would not hesitate to move in the required 
direction, even to the extent of disregarding prior treaty 
arrangements.
Both Harriman and Kennan suggested there was 
nothing gratuitous in the agreements which Stalin made with 
other governments. He and his inner circle of advisers were 
pragmatic power brokers obsessed with the prospect of pro­
moting Soviet international advantage in their presumption 
of conforming to Marxist-Leninist teaching. The Soviet 
leadership could not be trusted to honor some abstract 
notion of ethics which paid attention to the values of trust 
and good faith or to sense the value of developing more or 
less permanent working relationships with other governments. 
They could be expected to act in an entirely self-serving 
fashion paying attention only to their own perception of 
necessity in achieving the ultimate goals of world revolu­
tion.^®
These not very reassuring estimates of Soviet 
behavior set some in the Truman Administration to wondering 
about the prospect for postwar Soviet-American cooperation 
even before the conflict was over. Some officials were 
close to believing the Soviet Union was involved in an
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opportunistic effort to extend its influence, even domi­
nance, beyond those limits which could serve as a reasonable
point of compromise in East Asia between Moscow and Washing- 
17ton. However, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the 
overwhelming desire that Washington and Moscow find some way 
to cooperate in solving postwar problems continued to con-
T O
trol the tenor of decision-making attitudes.
In effect, what decision-makers needed to locate 
was an operational assumption, a conceptual middle ground, 
which would allow them to accommodate both the doubts raised 
by the reporting of the State Department's Soviet experts 
and the hope that American and Russian leaders would be able 
to develop a successful diplomatic association with one 
another. They found that assumption implicit in the further 
argument of the Soviet experts that Russian compliance with 
American postwar aspirations, specifically Stalin's willing­
ness to honor the Far Eastern stipulations of the Yalta 
accords and the articles of the Sino-Soviet treaty, would
depend on the degree to which the political situation pre-
1 9sented Moscow with little alternative.
What this meant in the several months after the 
war was that the Administration would continue in its will­
ingness to respond to the legitimate demands of Soviet 
diplomacy. At the same time, however, officials would have 
to demonstrate to the Russians, both in their personal 
diplomatic bearing and by an unequivocal display of energy
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in implementing United States policy, that the Soviet leader­
ship could not expect to gain any further international 
advantage and that it was therefore in the Kremlin’s best 
interest to compromise. In a word, officials settled on the 
view that the Soviets could be forced to cooperate with the 
United States to the extent Stalin and his associates were 
made to recognize they were dealing with a tenacious adver­
sary fully prepared to brook no double dealing in the pro-
20cess of solving postwar problems.
This contributes, in significant measure, to an 
explanation of the "getting tough with the Russians" atti­
tude which Administration officials increasingly displayed 
in the months near the end of the war and after. In this 
regard, it may be suggested, that the now famous Truman 
"dressing down" of Molotov in the Oval Office in April of 
1945 was probably less a spontaneous display of Presidential 
frustration than it was a calculated maneuver designed to
relieve the Kremlin of any illusions that American leaders
21could be pushed around.
Some scholarly evaluations of the origins of the 
Cold War have argued that the Truman Administration's 
"getting tough" approach with the Soviets significantly 
reduced the opportunities for postwar cooperation and there­
fore constituted a major cause for deteriorating rela- 
22tions. However, officials at the time did not view the 
situation in that way. Rather they hoped that a forceful
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manner would facilitate a peaceful, political resolution of 
postwar problems by shocking Soviet bluster into a mood of 
diplomatic compliance.
Be that as it may, the tough image in direct 
dealings with the Russians had its parallel requirement - a 
display of firmness and single-minded purpose in implement­
ing American policy. In the specific case of China, the 
question was: how were Administration officials to encour­
age the development of this condition? First of all, it was 
essential that the Administration preserve, without ques­
tion, the internationally acknowledged preeminence of the 
United States in determining China's postwar disposition. 
The level of American wartime involvement and association 
with the Nationalist government established a clear trend in 
this direction as did Stalin's aforementioned proclamations 
of support for American policy toward China. Furthermore, 
in discussions with American officials, the Soviet dictator 
conceded that only the United States owned sufficient re­
sources to promote postwar economic recovery and to create 
stability and unity in China. Continued Soviet acceptance 
of American predominance in China, so it seemed, would be 
determined by how resolutely the Administration retained its 
initiative.
The image of American enterprise and energy in 
promoting its interests in China would be developed in 
several ways. It would not equivocate in backing the
-52-
Nationalist government. Accordingly, United States military 
forces stationed in China during the war would be used to 
aid the Nationalists in occupying all parts of the country. 
Assertion of Nationalist control was important for several 
reasons. As the recognized legitimate government, the 
Nationalists naturally had the responsibility for accepting 
the Japanese surrender in China as well as that of repatri­
ating them. Despite the ^  jure character of the Nation­
alist government, inability to fulfill these obvious respon­
sibilities in any part of the country would raise serious 
questions about its ^  facto status. In that eventuality, 
the political prospects of the communists - Chinese and 
Soviets - would be enhanced, especially in North China and 
Manchuria, and those of the Nationalists and Americans 
damaged.
It was vital that the authority of the Nationalist 
government come to exist throughout the country in fact as 
well as in theory for another reason. Failure to achieve 
this condition would seriously impair prospects for achiev­
ing unity and stability in China. It was especially impor­
tant to fill the void in North China and Manchuria. In the 
absence of an effective Nationalist presence in those areas,
the Chinese Communists, in collusion with the Soviets, could
24be expected to establish independent control. The result 
would be a divided China, a condition which American 
decision-makers believed would prove inherently unstable and
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hence, a major, if not decisive, obstacle to achieving a
25regional postwar settlement.
To the extent that reassertion of Nationalist 
power in Northern China would impress communist sensibili­
ties, it would be reinforced on the positive side by Ambas­
sador Hurley continuing efforts to find some political basis 
for achieving unity, stability and democracy in China. To 
this end, it would be American policy to encourage the 
restructuring of the Nationalist government so as to make it 
truly accessible to the representatives of all political 
groups in China. Hurley's efforts to promote this policy 
would reveal that the interest of the Truman Administration 
was not merely in furthering the fortunes of Chiang Kai-shek 
and the Kuomintang Party to the exclusion of the political 
aspirations of the Chinese Communist Party.
If the Chinese Communists could be maneuvered into 
participating in a coalition government, then the prospect 
for unity and stability would look much brighter. Such a 
coalition would force the Soviets to accept their inability 
to exploit the situation to further advantage. They would 
have little alternative but to remain satisfied with the 
extent of concessions already obtained at Yalta and in the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty. If the Soviets could be "constrained" 
in this manner, then American national interest also would 
be well served. Consequently, the vital problem of success­
fully balancing Soviet and American power in East Asia would
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be much nearer to a final satisfactory resolution. The
Administration counted big stakes in the outcome of Hurley’s
26anticipated mediation efforts.
Although no one could be sure, there were reasons 
for thinking the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang could 
be brought together in a coalition government. As already 
suggested, a display of American sincerity in promoting this 
outcome would be one means of convincing the Communists that 
the Truman Administration was determined to be as fair as 
possible with regard to the interests of all parties in­
volved. A coalition government, if properly arranged as an 
effective receptacle of Communist interests, would prove
attractive to the Yenan rebels who were as war weary as any 
27Chinese. To the extent it might be a factor in attracting 
the Communists, the Americans could be trusted in this 
matter.
Officials also thought that the image of American 
reliability in Communist eyes would be re-enforced in the 
Administration’s determination to place qualifications on 
its support to the Nationalist government. In the months 
after the war, limits on aid were based on Washington’s 
discomfort with the well-documented fiscal irresponsibility 
of the Kuomintang. But constraints also existed because 
officials believed that unreasonable or excessive American 
largesse to the Nationalist government would have the effect
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of encouraging an uncompromising belligerency in the atti­
tudes of the Kuomintang leadership. Moderation and 
restraint in grants of aid to the Nationalists not only made 
good sense in view of Kuomintang corruption, but from the 
American standpoint such an approach also promised to put 
pressure on Chiang to initiate reforms requisite to a polit­
ical settlement (as the suggested pre-condition for more
aid) while simultaneously encouraging Communist confidence
29in the Administration’s approach.
There was another factor in this regard, though it 
was distinctly speculative and peripheral in importance, to 
American thinking about the prospects for bringing the 
Chinese Communists into a coalition government. Decision­
makers generally believed that in the event of civil war 
Yenan would be forced into a position of utter dependency on 
the Soviet Union. Officials simply assumed the Chinese 
Communists would require substantial supply from external
sources if they hoped to achieve military success. Only the
30Kremlin could be expected to satisfy that need. Further, 
Stalin could be expected to demand and receive Chinese 
submission to Soviet authority as the price of aid.
But officials were aware also of the nationalistic 
inclinations displayed by the Chinese Communists. Because 
the nature of American assistance to a coalition government 
would honor the principle of self-determination for the 
Chinese people, the question was at least implicit; might
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some Chinese Communists find this alternative more attrac­
tive than the one of civil war and absolute dependency on 
31the Soviets? The idea that the Yenan communists might 
feel sufficiently confident to follow the option of seizing 
power by military force pretty much on their own and that 
they had the capacity to do so, does not appear to have had 
the greater influence in promoting the final arrangement of 
decision-making assumptions in late 1945.
More important in American thinking, however, was 
the belief that Yenan's course of action ultimately would be 
determined by Soviet policies. For one thing, officials 
thought that so long as Stalin continued to abide by his 
promise to support the Nationalist government then Yenan's 
room for maneuver would be significantly reduced. Without 
the immediate option of receiving Soviet support, the Chi­
nese Communists thus would find the prospect of entering a 
coalition government an imminently more attractive alterna­
tive than the one of being isolated and in danger of losing
what political advantage they already possessed or which
3 2they might acquire in entering a coalition government.
Indeed, on this last point, there was widespread 
speculation among American officials that both Moscow and 
Yenan in 1945 saw a political settlement as the ideal means 
by which a communist seizure of power in China could be 
accomplished. Thus, in this view, Stalin was quite happy to 
allow the United States an opportunity to create a government
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in which the Chinese Communists would be permitted an effec­
tive political voice and also quite willing to encourage
Yenan to follow this line so long as it portended to serve
3 3the Kremlin’s interests. But, if this is true, then the 
obvious question arises: if American officials suspected
that the Chinese Communist motive in entering a coalition 
government ultimately was to seize power for themselves, 
then why did the Administration go ahead with its plan to 
encourage a political settlement?
The more complete answer to this question is 
reserved for later chapters. Suffice here to say that in 
addition to the hope that Yenan for its own reasons might 
genuinely desire a political settlement,officials were 
not yet prepared in 1945 to act on their emerging suspicions 
of communist duplicity. Moreover, decision-makers thought 
that in developing their policy they were being fair with 
regard to communists interests, both Russian and Chinese, 
and that the latter especially would be favorably impressed 
by this fairness.
At any rate one should not proceed necessarily 
from these observations to the conclusion that the Truman 
Administration was foolish in attempting to mediate the 
conflict between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. 
The record does not indicate that naivete pervaded the 
official sense of the prospect for policy success in China. 
Granted there was some. However, officials were well aware
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of the risk of failure. In fact, even if the more optimis­
tic scenario did not work out in all its details, officials 
were still prepared to seek the political solution in China. 
Their determination in this regard followed from the per­
ceived necessity of doing something despite the known risk 
of failure; because of their frustrating assessment that 
there were no good alternatives to this course of action; 
because of the view that the prospects for obstructing an 
intrusion of Soviet power in Asia would be much greater if 
the Chinese Communists joined a coalition government; and 
that these prospects would be minimal in the event of civil 
war.
In summary, in the several months after the Japa­
nese surrender, American officials were set to allow events 
to run their course on the basis of the diplomatic structure 
settled on by the end of the war. Nationalist troops would 
continue to be transported throughout the whole of China and 
Manchuria and supported in some key areas by the American 
military establishment under the command of General Albert 
C. Wedemeyer, who had been chosen to replace General Stil- 
well in the Fall of 1944. Ambassador Hurley, temporarily in 
the United States, would return to China. There he would 
resume his role as mediator between the Communists and the 
Kuomintang while encouraging the development of a lasting 
political solution in the form of an effective coalition 
government.
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For the time being. Administration officials would 
have to continue to assume the Soviets, as promised, would 
support the Nationalist government in reasserting its con­
trol in Manchuria, refrain from giving any support to the 
Chinese Communists, while encouraging the thrust of American 
China policy which was to achieve a negotiated political 
settlement. By the end of the year Soviet armies would 
evacuate Manchuria in favor of establishing their postwar 
collaboration with the Nationalist government on the basis 
of those beneficial concessions contained in the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty previously signed in August.
By November of 1945, this more hopeful picture 
faced troubling developments. Reports on the situation in 
China sent back to Washington by General Wedemeyer were 
disturbing. There was extensive fighting between the Nation­
alist and Communist troops in North China, he advised, and 
it was spreading. He noted that Communist military strength 
in the area was substantial and that Chiang's forces would 
not be adequate to offset rebel power if the Nationalists 
continued in the effort to reoccupy Manchuria. Wedemeyer 
was convinced that reoccupation of Manchuria would make it 
impossible to deal effectively with the Communists because 
Nationalist power simply would be spread too thin. In fact 
the American commander had suggested to Chiang that he 
abandon efforts to reoccupy Manchuria until the Nationalist
O Ç
position could be consolidated first in the North.
—60—
For political and economic reasons, Chiang proba­
bly had to ignore such advice, however sound from a military- 
strategic point of view. And, though Washington could agree 
that Wedemeyer's suggestion made good sense from a military 
point of view, top level officials could not feel comfort­
able with the General's advice from a political standpoint. 
Wedemeyer's proposition ran counter to the Administration's 
effort to create unity in China. Chiang's disavowal of 
Manchuria, even implicitly in the form of temporary military 
expediency, would damage the Nationalist image even as the 
de facto government of China.
Even more seriously such a tactic would allow the 
Chinese Communists, with Soviet support, to consolidate 
their position in Manchuria with the result of a divided 
China. To repeat, not only was this counter to United 
States policy because the Administration believed that 
internal division would mean a nearly inevitable and hence 
unacceptable extension of Soviet influence into areas under 
Chinese Communist control, but officials also believed that 
a divided China would prove inherently unstable in a contin­
uing conflict between Communists and Nationalists. In the 
American view this would destroy the basis, established at 
Yalta and in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, for a reasonable and 
balanced adjustment of American and Soviet interests in the 
region. Only a unified China could overcome the related 
banes of American China policy —  internal political insta-
O C
bility and the extension of Russian communist influence.
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In addition to this unsettling consideration, the
General's reporting created other worries for Washington.
Wedemeyer expressed alarm that the armed clashes between
Nationalists and Communists were making it impossible for
American forces to carry out their assigned mission of
helping the Nationalist goverment to reoccupy the country
without themselves being drawn into what was emerging as an
open civil war. Direct United States involvement in combat
hostilities was sure to complicate the problem of achieving
an internal political settlement. It was difficult enough
justifying American support of the Nationalist reoccupation
of the country, but there was no way the credibility of the
Administration's commitment to helping achieve a political
settlement could be sustained if American and Communist
3 7forces began fighting one another.
Wedemeyer and the American Embassy advised, fur­
thermore, that Soviets in Manchuria appeared to be violating 
their agreements. Though the withdrawal of the Soviet army 
from Manchuria was postponed beyond the time earlier agreed 
upon at the behest of Chiang Kai-shek, Russian compliance 
with the Yalta accords and the Sino-Soviet Treaty appeared 
minimal. In fact, the Soviets seemed to be acting contrary 
to the spirit and the letter of those agreements.
The Soviet Red Army Command was creating numerous 
obstacles in the way of a quick and effective Nationalist 
reoccupation of Manchuria. Not only were the Russians
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keeping the legal government out by refusing it ports of
entry, but at the same time did not appear to be inhibiting
the expansion of Chinese Communist forces throughout the
area. There were even a few unverified reports that the
Chinese Communists were seizing substantial quantities of
surrendered Japanese weapons and ammunition with Soviet
complicity. Such actions appeared to contravene clearly the
Soviet promise to support morally and materially only the
38Nationalist government in China.
In the last weeks of November, the absence of 
Ambassador Patrick Hurley from his post in China (he was in 
the United States) further endangered this increasingly 
critical situation. Hurley’s projected role as mediator 
between the contending forces was the essential means by 
which Washington intended to maintain the all important 
image of controlling the initiative in China. The longer 
clashes between Nationalist and Communist troops continued, 
the more the prospect for gaining and maintaining that 
initiative would diminish. If civil war in China could not 
be averted then the whole equation for achieving a lasting 
postwar settlement throughout the region was likely to prove 
unworkable.
Secretary of State Byrnes was anxious that Hurley 
return. The critical moment required a swift reassertion of 
American energies if the situation in China was to be held 
in check. But Hurley was reluctant to go. He admitted to
—63—
being tired and ill and complained about perceived ambigui­
ties in American China policy: he wondered if the Admin­
istration’s policy accorded with his own interpretation and 
if perhaps a new Ambassador ought to be considered. Byrnes, 
however, appeared to convince the Ambassador that he had the 
Administration's full support in his efforts and that the 
President wished him to continue on in his post. Despite 
his reservations. Hurley agreed to return.
Then, without warning and for reasons which still 
promote controversy, Hurley resigned in late November. He 
publicly charged that United States China policy was being 
subverted by State Department officials. He accused certain 
Foreign Service Officers who had been or were still in China 
of siding with the Chinese Communist Party in a manner con­
trary to his own efforts to fulfill the principal require­
ment of American policy which was to support the Nationalist 
39government.
Hurley's resignation and public statements consti­
tuted a serious turn of events for Administration officials. 
The episode could not have occurred at a worse time in view 
of the unsatisfactory situation in China. It greatly com­
pounded the difficulty. The manner of his resignation could 
be expected to have possible damaging effect on certain 
essentials of China policy. It was a blow to the appearance 
of the American capacity to hold the initiative in the 
situation. His charges against other American officials
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implied there might be some serious disagreement within the
Administration over the proper direction of China policy.
It was possible the Chinese Communists might
interpret the resignation and statements of Hurley as a sign
the Administration was still open to an alternative policy
which paid greater attention to their own priorities.
Possibly Yenan would be encouraged to consider some new
independent action designed to enhance the influence of
American officials more sympathetic to the Communist cause,
thereby subverting the trend toward a coalition govern- 
41ment.
Furthermore, Soviet leaders might view the events 
of Hurley's resignation as an indication of indecision and 
irresolve in American policy and that the Administration was 
incapable of generating any firm initiative in China. If 
the Soviets believed the Administration was confused and 
unsettled about China, the Kremlin, ever prepared to take 
advantage of an opponent's weakness, so the State Depart­
ment's Soviet experts warned, might be led into thinking the 
time was ripe for a more aggressive and uncompromising 
posture. And, what might be the effect on Nationalist
morale if questions continued to be raised about the
42strength of the American commitment to that government?
At the end of November and early in December the 
Administration faced a perplexing problem in the question of 
American policy toward China. On the one hand existed the
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complex edifice of policy logic upon which rested the belief 
that postwar issues in East Asia could be settled through 
negotiation and compromise. On the other hand, by the end 
of 1945 the trend of events in China and East Asia clearly 
was beginning to subvert the hope of earlier expectations 
and to produce increasing concern in American decision­
makers about the prospects of achieving a peaceful solution 
of East Asian problems.
Here was the emergence of a real dilemma for 
American officials. They were aware of the contradictions 
involved. Decision-makers understood that postwar policy 
toward China and elsewhere rested heavily on a genuine 
desire by all peoples to do what was necessary to resolve 
postwar problems by diplomatic means. By any reasonable
assumption everyone should have been tired of conflict, 
excited with the prospect of peaceful reconstruction, and 
fully prepared to seize the opportunity to settle their 
differences amicably. Soviet actions, however, did not 
appear very reassuring. Possibly George Kennan was right in 
suggesting the Russians were poised, somewhat irrationally, 
to extend their influence and control in the world by taking 
advantage of the social, economic and political shambles 
wrought by the great world war.
And even granting the accuracy of the proposition 
that the Russians respected power, or its image, and that 
they would compromise if compelled to do so, there remained
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the disturbing fact that because of domestic public demands 
for military demobilization and conversion to a peacetime 
economy, the real power available to Truman was limited. In 
view of the declining relative power status of the United 
States, was it possible, as the Soviet experts surmised, 
that the ideologically motivated and eminently expedient 
Russian leadership would no longer think it important to 
moderate their ambitions?
So it was that by the end of November and early 
December of 1945, initial postwar optimism regarding the 
potential for achieving a successful diplomatic solution of 
the China problem began to encounter a series of unsettling 
problems. As a result, American policymakers prepared to 
assess the adequacy of established China policy and to 
settle on the best course of action.
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A mid-April 1945 statement on United States policy toward China 
which had been prepared for the Secretary of State for use at the 
upcoming San Francisco conference on the United Nations, stated the 
long-range American objective as, "...the establishment of a strong and 
united China as a necessary principal stabilizing factor in the Far 
East." Contained in. Memorandum for the President, 27 April 1945, 
Truman Papers, Presidental Secretary Files, Box 73, IKTL; A late Octo­
ber 1945 report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, stated 
that, "The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to 
China is based on the need to have China a principal stabilizing factor 
in the Far East as a fundamental condition for peace and security in 
that area." Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 
October 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 585. (Note: State-War-Navy Coordinat­
ing Committee will hereafter be cited as SWNCC); The Assistant Chief of 
the Division of Chinese Affairs wrote in March, 1945, "...a China 
divided... would be a constant invitation to international intrigue. 
Our principal political objective is a strong, stable and united China, 
which— (in the post-war) — will cooperate whole-heartedly in the 
maintenance of peace and security." Memorandum by the Assistant Chief 
of the Division of Chinese Affairs, 1 March 1945, ibid., 60.
2
The aforementioned October 1945 SWNCC report, observed that, 
"...recent informal but authoritative expressions of Russian opinion 
indicate that the U.S.S.R. is for the present at least prepared to deal 
with us on a partnership basis in the Far East. It is to our interest 
to encourage and support this position on the part of the U.S.S.R. It 
is likewise the general policy of the United States to consider common 
problems on a consultative basis." Ibid., 588-589; A good treatment of 
the subject of American expectations concerning post-war Great Power 
cooperation may be found in, Robert A. Divine. Second Chance : The
Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: 
Atheneum, 1971), See, Chapter 12.
3
See, Tuchman, Stilwell, 238; May, The Truman Administration,
24-25; Ross Y. Koen. The China Lobby in American Politics. (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publ., 1974), 88-89; Shewmaker, Persuading Encounter, 
176-177; See, especially, the wonderfully entertaining, Theodore H. 
White. In Search of History; A Personal Adventure. (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publ., 1978), 214-221.
4
While the war continued, the Administration's stated position on 
China policy did allow that, "While favoring no political faction, we 
continue to support the existing Government of China, headed by Chiang 
Kai-shek, as the still generally recognized central authority which 
thus far offers the best hope for unification and for avoidance of 
chaos in China’s war effort. However, with regard to our long-term 
objective and against the possible disintegration of the authority of 
the existing Government, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of 
flexibility to permit cooperation with any other leadership in China
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which may give greater promise of achieving unity and contributing to 
peace and security in east Asia." Memorandum for the President, 27 
April 1945, President's Secretary Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL; 
After the war, however, with Chiang still in power, it was no longer a 
matter of looking for an alternative to his leadership. Rather, the 
Administration's predominate concern was to pressure Chiang —  who it 
was assumed would remain in power —  in such a way as to force a liber­
alization of his regime —  this as the essential basis for a political 
settlement of China's internal problems. See, Report by the State-War- 
Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 October 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 583-590.
^See, China White Paper, 126.
^This attitude is clearly displayed in a December 1945 report on 
the prospects for post-war economic assistance to the Nationalist 
government by President Truman's Personal Representative in China, 
Edwin A. Locke, Jr. Locke wrote, "Above all else China needs help in 
making the political and economic changes and improvements which will 
provide a basis for her peaceful development. The government of China 
finds difficulty in getting things done, even when it wants to do them, 
because of a lack of the quality which America calls 'know-how'. In 
order to progress rapidly toward democracy and rising living standards, 
China must have detailed knowledge of what to do and how to do it. I 
strongly feel that the chief ingredient of American aid to China at 
this time ought to be 'know-how' which will be of practical help in 
changing basic governmental organization and policy and in assuring 
effective administration." Mr. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Represen­
tative of President Truman, to President Truman, 18 December 1945, 
F.R., 1945, VII, 1364.
^In the months following Yalta in 1945 both before the end of the 
war and immediately after, no public Soviet statement about China even 
remotely hinted that other than Chiang Kai-shek should be considered 
the central focus for political authority in China, see, "Sino-Soviet 
Relations", Ibid., 851-1054, esp. see, 851-852, 887-891, 897-898.
g
See, for example, Anthony J. Kubek. How the Far East Was Lost: 
American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chica­
go; Henry Regnery, 1963), 322-323, 335; Freda Utley. The China Story. 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951), 11; Tang Tsou, America's Failure,
356-357.
9
It would be an altogether arbitrary exercise to cite specific 
documents in support of this contention. There simply was no discus­
sion, so far as revealed by the available documents, concerning the 
issue of whether or not the Chinese Communists were or were not "commu­
nists". See, for example, "Political conditions in China following the 
Japanese surrender", F.R., 1945, VII, 445-491; Moreover, American
observers in Yenan, reported, " —  that the structure of the Communist
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Government is a replica of that of the Soviet Government." Memorandum 
by the Chief of the Division of Eastern Europan Affairs, 10 may 1945, 
ibid., 864.
^^In the Fall of 1949, in an appearance before an assembled meet­
ing of experts on Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, General 
George C. Marshall recalled that during his China mission beginning in 
December 1945, "The Chinese Communists made no pretense about being 
aloof from the Soviet Union, they had Stalin's picture and Lenin's 
picture over the theater.; They were Marxist Communists and bitterly 
resented implications they were agrarian communists of the new stripe. 
They were Marxist Communists. I remember Chou En-lai startled my wife. 
He was telling her just what he was. They did not make any pretense of 
not being associated with the Communists of Russia; that was rather 
natural, they were Communists, they were Marxists...." Minutes of the 
Meetings of the Roundtable Discussions of 6, 7 & 9 October 1949, Presi­
dent's Secretary Files, Box 174, p. l40, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^^Already before the end of the war, officials in Washington not 
only assumed that an extension of Soviet influence or power in Chinese 
affairs was unacceptable from the American point of view but that in 
the absence of a political settlement between the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese Communists, the Soviets would be able successfully to use the 
latter as a medium for this very purpose. In other words, American 
officials assumed that in the absence of a political settlement, it 
would be an irrelevant exercise to distinguish between the interests of 
Russian and Chinese communism —  the one would be synonymous with the 
other. See, Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 19 April 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 341; The 
Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 23 April 1945, 
ibid., 342-344; The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China, 23 
April 1945, ibid., 344-345; See, also. Secretary of State Byrnes, that 
if the Chinese Communists were not brought into the Nationalist govern­
ment, "...we could expect Russia to ultimately take control of Man­
churia and maintain a dominate influence in North China." Memorandum 
of Conversation by Lieutenant General John E. Hull, War Department 
General Staff, 10 December 1945, ibid., 762; Memorandum by the Acting 
Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary 
of State, 13 November 1945, ibid., 620.
12
It is true, and of some considerable interest to note, that the 
Tito-Chinese Communist comparison was being used already in 1944. John 
Stuart Service wrote from Yenan in October that, "The parallel with 
Jugoslavia has been drawn before but it is becomming more and more apt. 
It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity,... (and).. .the use of the 
Communist forces.. .by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone 
as it was to seek the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch 
and King Peter's government in London, ignoring Tito." Memorandum by 
the Second Secretary of the Embassy in China, 10 October 1944, F.R., 
1944, VI, 710; See, also. Ibid., 431, 473, 639.
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13See, May, The Truman Administration, 5-8.
14The O.S.S. in an early September 1945 report did suggest that 
the "net effect" of the Sino-soviet treaty in August "has been to 
strengthen Kuomintang's position vis-a-vis the Communists"; that it 
"may be true" the treaty had rendered "the Communists more receptive to 
terms" offered by the Kuomintang; that the "most obvious result of the
treaty is to deprive the Communists of bargaining strength ." The
report did equivocate, however, by pointing out that the treaty also 
might represent the Soviet "feeling that the Chinese Communists are 
strong enough and astute enough to fend for themselves as an indigenous 
movement." Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, 
"Implication of the Sino-Soviet Agreements for the Internal Politics of 
China." 7 September 1945, R & A Report No. 3248, 11/23, UFA; The 
Embassy in Moscow also equivocated on the implicatons of the Sino- 
Soviet treaty, agreeing on the one hand that "...Soviet Govt assurances 
to (the) Chinese Govt undoubtedly prejudice Yenan's ability to bargain 
on (the) basis of implied Soviet military support (to the National 
government)...." At the same time the Embassy argued, generally, that 
the substantative implications of the treaty would be only s good as 
subsequent Soviet actions. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the 
Secretary of State, 4 September 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 982-984.
^^See, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European 
Affairs, 10 May 1945, ibid., 863-865.
^^See, for example. Memorandum of Converstaion by the Deputy 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 19 April 1945, ibid., 
341-342; The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 23 
April 1945, ibid., 342-345; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the 
Secretary of State, 4 September 1945, Ibid., 982-984; See also, Kennan, 
Memoirs, 248-251; It is of some interest to note a memorandum to the 
President in February of 1946 which outlined General George C. Mar­
shall's view of the requirement of achieving a political settlement in 
China, to wit, "The Only hope of maintaining a sovereign China appeared 
to lie in a political settlement which would present a unified nation 
to the world and force any other power that might be intent upon creat­
ing a puppet China to do so by overt aggression." Memorandum for the 
President by James Shepley, Attache to General Marshall, 28 February 
1946, President's Secretary Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^^At least in one major respect, it would be an arbitrairy exercise 
to cite specific documents in support of this contention because, as 
already suggested, virtually all American thinking about the necessity 
of achieving a unified China was predicated on the assumption that a 
divided China would mean automatic extension of Soviet power in the 
region. See, for example, the assumptions implicit in a late November 
1945 discussion of various problems in China for American policy by the 
Secretaries of War and Navy. Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and
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Navy to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 
670-679.; Dean Âcheson notes the intrusion of Kennan's less than san­
guine assessments of Soviet behavior into the policymaking environ in 
late 1945, Dean G. Acheson. Present at the Creation; My Years in the 
State Department (New York: Norton Co., 1969), 202-203; President
Truman notes also the effect of Kennan's reports on the Soviets. Harry 
S. Truman. Memoirs: Year of Decisions, Vol. I (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday Co., 1955), 84-85; For confirmation on this point, see. Notes 
on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL. (In 
an exchange with Acheson, Herbert Feis makes the comment, " —  the 
reason for sending Marshall out (to China) with new instructions was 
the alarm of those signs of possible soviet aggressiveness."; and with 
respect to the "possible unreliability" of "Soviet agreements" with the 
Nationalists.)
18See Truman's comment, "The preceding months had shown us that 
Stalin and his colleagues did not view matters in the same light we 
did. The delicate balance in China between the forces of Chiang Kai- 
shek and those of the Chinese Communists had been the subject of many 
discussions among our policy experts. But the opportunity of the 
moment was to put an end to the years of war. A dictator can use his 
soldiers as soulless pawns, but in a government like ours, the voice of 
the people must be heeded; and the American people wanted nothing more 
in that summer of 1945 than to end the fighting and bring the boys back 
home." Truman, Year of Decisions, 435; See, also, Athan G. Theoharis. 
Seeds of Repression: Reality and Rhetoric in Foreign Policy (Chicago:
Quadrangle Press, 1971), 37-39.
19Kennan in April 1945 described Soviet policy as "...a fluid, 
resilient policy, aimed at the achievement of maximum power with mini­
mum responsibility on portions of the Asiatic mainland lying beyond the 
Soviet border." The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of 
State, 23 April 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 343; The Chief of the Division 
of Eastern European Affairs observed in May 1945, that in the Far East, 
"...the Soviet government will undoubtedly endeavor to use, if they are 
permitted to, the same unilateral methods which they have so effective­
ly applied in eastern and central Europe." Memorandum by the Chief of 
the Division of Eastern European Affairs, 10 May 1945, ibid., 865.
20
On this point, see Harriman's account of early meetings with 
Truman concerning the Soviets shortly after Roosevelt's death in, 
Harriman, Special Envoy, 447-457.
21
Ibid., 447-454; For a good account of American thinking on this 
point, see, Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 200-204.
22
See, Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, 28 May 
1945, F.R.. 1945, VII, 889.
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23On this rather touchy subject of the Nationalist government 
having exclusive responsibility for accepting the Japanese surrender in 
all parts of China —  with the Chinese Communists expressly obstructed 
from legally participating in this, see, Feis, The China Triangle, 
355-361; See, also, "Questions involving the Japanese surrender", F.R., 
1945, VII, 492-526.
24It is instructive to note that in early December in context of 
planning for the mediation mission of George C. Marshall to China, 
there developed some disagreement on this point of the U.S. transport­
ing Nationalist troops into North China and Manchuria. The Chief of 
the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, argued
against this in anticipation of the attempt to bring the Kuomintang and 
Chinese Communists together in a political settlement. Vincent saw the 
question of a U.S. movement of Nationalist troops into the region as 
the chief point of pressure available to the U.S. which could be
brought to bear on both sides. If the Chinese Communists refused to 
cooperate, Vincent advised, then as something of a punitive measure 
Nationalist troops could be ferried north. If the Kuomintang refused 
to cooperate, then the U.S. in conjunction with the Communists would 
evacuate all remaining Japanese troops from the north, in effect leav­
ing the Kuomintang to its own devices. Vincent's counsel was not 
followed. Whether rightly or wrongly, and based largely on the report­
ing of the Soviet experts it appears, the decision was made to move
Nationlist troops north first. This decision followed from the assump­
tion that the Chinese Communists (influenced by the Soviets) could not 
be trusted to submit to a political settlement unless compelled to by 
the force of circumstances. In this view, in other words, unless 
Nationalist military power was introduced into the north, the region 
likely would be detached by the Chinese Communists and the Soviets and
consolidated under a puppet region very much like Outer Mongolia, (it
is well here to stress, as it will be again, that whether in 1945 or in 
1950, American China policy cannot be understood except with reference 
to the Soviet factor.) For Vincent's position on this matter, see. 
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the 
Secretary of State, 9 December 1945, ibid., 759-760.
25See, for example, an early November 1945 meeting between the 
Secretaries of the State, War and Navy Departments, concerning the 
prospects in the event the Nationalists proved unable to secure ade­
quate control especially in North China and Manchuria. Officials were
worried about the destabilizing factor of a "still very cocky" Japanese 
army and worried that if the Nationalists could not extend its control 
in Manchuria, "...then the whole agreement with Russia might fall 
through and give the Soviet(s) an excuse to remain in Manchuria." 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 6 
November 1945, ibid., 606-607; See, also, the late October 1945 SWNCC 
report on China policy that the only way in which American objectives 
in the region could be achieved would be through the emergence of "...a
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friendly, unified, independent nation with, a stable government...." 
Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 October 1945, 
ibid., 584; See, also, this chapter, ante., p. 26., fn. 1.
26
For a good survey of the policymaking situation concerning China 
in October and November of 1945, see, Buhite, Hurley, Chapter 11; Feis, 
The China Tangle, Chapters 35 & 36.
27As a related matter. State Department intelligence sources were 
reporting in late 1945 that with the war now over the Chinese Commu­
nists appeared to be quite preoccupied with the task of postwar recon­
struction and economic development. A December 1945 report noted that 
"The Communists look to the United States as the best source of capital. 
They consider that Russia herself has extensive needs of her own and 
that Britian is not in a position to make investments at present. The 
Communists apparently believe that they can attract the attention and 
interests of American investors." State Department, Interim Research 
and Intelligence Service, Research and Intelligence Branch, "Economy of 
North China, 1937-1945", 11 December 1945, R & A Report No. 3024.2, 
11/28, UFA; See, also the comments of the Commanding Officer of the 
Yenan Observer Group, "Slight hint in U.S. policy has quickly brought 
out a desperate cry to stop the civil war earliest and successfully 
conclude negotiations. I detect a new low assurance and believe the 
Communists ready to make greater concessions than ever before and at 
the same time if General Marshall's reactions favorable to throw them­
selves in the lap of United States." Commanding Officer of the Yenan 
Observer Group to Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 20 December 
1945, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., 
1969), VII, 794.
28
Any number of documents could be cited as a measure of the 
Administration's sincerity of purpose in the matter of encouraging the 
development of a postwar government in China genuinely open to all 
political factions. (This "sincerity of purpose" rested on the one 
major assumption, not that the Chinese Communists were democratically 
inclined and would thus welcome the opportunity to join a truly repre­
sentative government, but that if the postwar government in China 
proved inaccessible and unrepresentative, the Communists would refuse 
to join and civil war and chaos would ensure. This is a matter which 
will be discussed in detail later.) See, the SWNCC October 1945 state­
ment on China policy, that, "There are political groups of varying 
strength and importance which are opposed to the present Kuomintang- 
controlled National Government." One of these groups is, "The Chinese 
Communist Party which, during the past ten years and in spite of the 
efforts of the National Government to liquidate its members, has devel­
oped into a dynamic force controlling considerable areas...(and exer­
cising) — political and military control over a population variously 
estimated to range from twenty to fifty million people." With respect
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to this situation, the report went on, it was "...of the upmost impor­
tance that our support of the present Kuomintang-controlled Nationalist 
Government should be realistically alert to these political factors 
...(and that efforts should continue to be)...made to induce the lead­
ers of the present National Government to take rapid and concrete 
measures to effect the establishment of constitutional government and 
to bring about the internal unity and solidarity which is essential to 
the development of China as a strong nation capable of maintaining 
peace and security in the Far East." Report by the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee, 22 October 1945, ibid., 586-587; Even before 
the end of the war, it is clear that officials were attempting to 
develop a sense of "balance" with respect to both political factions, 
this as necessary in order to bring about a successful peaceful settle­
ment in China. The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, John 
Carter Vincent, wrote a month before the end of the war that, "While 
the United States seeks internal unity in China, it is obvious that the 
United States does not seek unity in China at the sole expense of the 
National Government or to promote the ambitions of the Chinese Commu­
nists, but in order to foster the prosecution of the war and to bring 
about stability in China." Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of 
Chinese Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, 16 July 1945, ibid., 
435.
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See, the SWNCC October 1945 report on China policy that "The 
extent to which political stability is being achieved in China under a 
unified, fully representative government is regarded by the United 
States as a basic consideration which will at all times govern the 
furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance to that nation. 
The question of continuing such assistance should be reconsidered 
preiodically in relation to this basic consideration." Ibid., 584; 
See also the report on a December 1945 meeting between Secretary of 
State Byrnes and General George C. Marshall. "When asked by General 
Marshall the question —  What if the... Central Government refuses to 
give ground? —  Secretary Byrnes stated that in this case the Central 
Government would be informed that the assistance which we would other­
wise give to China would not be given, such as loans, supplies, mili­
tary and civilian...." Memorandum of Conversation by Lieutenant Gen­
eral John E. Hull, War Department General Staff, 10 December 1945, 
ibid., 762.
30
In early 1946, James Shepley, just returned from China and 
having served as attache for General Marshall, prepared a memorandum 
for the President outlining Marshall's estimate of the situation in 
China. Marshall, he noted, assumed "That neither the National nor the 
Communist Armies had the capability to bring about a military decision 
with their own resources, and accordingly, without the intervention of 
foreign powers, a stalemate was likely to result and produce a China 
divided between at least two independent governments...." Memorandum 
for the President by Mr. James Shepley, 28 February 1946, President's 
Secretary Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL.
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31It should be stressed this consideration was strictly specula­
tive and highly inchoate and should be understood as of only marginal 
significance. In a word, information concerning the implications of 
nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese Communists was so equivocal 
that it never played any important role in policymaking. The Charge in 
the Embassy in Moscow wrote in January of 1946 that while "We are quite 
prepared to believe that (the) Chinese CP like other CP's is subservi­
ent to Moscow", at the same time, "...we hesitate to accept such an 
interpretation as definitive." Kennan went on to observe, that the CCP 
had "little reason to be grateful" to the Soviets; that the CCP had 
survived and grown "not because but despite" its relationship with 
Moscow; that on the basis of their own efforts the CCP had its own 
political and military organization and was not dependent on Soviet 
support; and, that the CCP not only had "developed its own brand of 
Marxism" but the Party had also "taken on (a) nationalist coloration." 
Kennan, on the other hand, also acknowledged the close ideological 
affinity between Yenan and Moscow and doubted, as a practical matter, 
that the former had much independence of the latter. The Charge in the 
Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1946, in U.S. Dept, 
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 
1972), IX, 118-119. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1946, IX; See, also, 
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 
15 April 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 334-338; The ambivalence present in 
American impressions concerning the Chinese Communists perhaps is well 
enough illustrated by a mid-July 1945 observation by the Chief of the 
Division of Chinese Affairs, John Carter Vincent. While on the one 
hand, Vincent thought it "scarcely tenable" to argue that the national­
istic sensibilities of the Yenan leadership would allow them "willingly 
to alienate Chinese territory to the Soviet Union", nonetheless Vincent 
could not avoid that, "There is reason to believe that the Chinese 
Communists have a close ideological affinity with the Soviet Union...." 
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Under 
Secretary of State, 16 July 1945, ibid., 435.
32
It was George Kennan from the Embassy in Moscow who in January 
1946 suggested, "...it should be remembered that Yenan has had no 
latitude of choice in its foreign affairs. Events have tended to keep 
Yenan in —  or force it back into —  (the) Soviet orbit." While Kennan 
would not speculate on the prospect this condition might have for 
success in achieving a political settlement in China, the implication 
of his observation was obvious: so long as the Soviets were disposed
to allow the U.S. to continue in its efforts to encourage a political 
settlement, the Chinese Communists had little alternative but to follow
the Kremlin's lead. Kennan concluded that, " Moscow's possibilities
for making its influence effective in Yenan in decisive moments are 
enormous and need not be too closely related to (the) subjective senti­
ments of (the) Yenan Communists." The Charge in the Soviet Union to 
the Secretary of State, 10 January 1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 119. See, 
also, ante., p. 34, fn. 3.
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33See, for example, comments by the Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Averell Harriman, "...that Marshal Stalin apparently endorsed 
the initiative we had taken in attempting to bring about political and 
military unification in China; that Marshal Stalin would in all prob­
ability continue to endorse our efforts...."; but that, "...statements 
made by Marshal Stalin endorsing our efforts in China did not necessar­
ily mean that the Russians would not pursue whatever course of action 
seemed to them best to serve their interests." Memorandum of Conversa­
tion, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 19 
April 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 341-342; The Charge in the Soviet Union 
wrote in late April 1945, "Stalin is of course prepared to affirm the 
principle of a unification of the armed forces of China. He knows that 
such unification is practically feasible only on terms acceptable to 
the Chinese Communists.— "; 'Stalin's courteous reference to Chiang is 
gratifying, but in no sense binding for any practical purpose." The 
Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 23 April 1945, 
ibid., 343; See, also. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in 
China, 23 April 1945, ibid.. 345.
34A State Department intelligence report of mid-December noted 
what appeared to be considerable Chinese Communist confidence in their 
own ability to compete successfully with the Kuomintang in a coalition 
government, granting that the latter was genuinely representative. 
See, State Department, Interim Research and Intelligence Service, 
Research and Analysis Branch, "Estimate of the Implications of the 
Present Situation in China For Possible American Programs", 14 December 
1945, R & A Report No. (?), III/25, UPA; At the behest of the former 
President in 1954, General George Marshall submitted a brief resume of 
his mission to China in 1946. He recalled that, "It seemed to me the 
Communists felt they could win their battle on political grounds more 
easily than on tactical fighting grounds because they had a more tight­
ly held organization, whereas on the Nations list side there were many 
contentious elements. The Communists continued on this line quite 
definitely, in my opinion, until early in June...." Memorandum on 
China by General George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954, 
President's Secretary Files, Box 74, p. 5, Truman Papers, HSTL; See, 
also, Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 74-75.
35
The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, to the Chief 
of Staff, United States Army, 20 November 1945, F.R., 1945, 640-660; 
China White Paper, 131-132.
36
See, for example, a late November 1945 memorandum by the Secre­
taries of War and Navy, that "...General Wedemeyer's estimate passed to 
the State Department creates the impression that the achievement by the 
Chinese Government now recognized by the United States, of control of 
North China and Manchuria is remote. The War and Navy Departments con­
sider this should not be accepted as a basis for United States action
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without the most serious consideration, and further exploration to 
determine whether further steps are practicable. The stated objectives 
of the United States...have included a unified China and particularly 
the return of Japanese-held areas including Manchuria, to the Chinese. 
It appears undesirable, now that the war has been won at considerable 
cost, to retreat from any of the stated objectives without the most 
careful examination"; "It is probably that delay in National Government 
assumption of control in North China and Manchuria will permit the 
Chinese Communists to strengthen materially their positions in these 
areas. Such delay will also influence Soviet reaction to the problem 
which will involve moral support for the Communists at all times and 
may involve material assistance. There is also the question as to how 
long the Soviets will consider their present agreements with the Chi­
nese binding if Manchuria  continues without a stabilized govern­
ment." Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary 
of State, 26 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 671.
37The Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater, to 
the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 23 November 1945, ibid., 662- 
665.
38
Ibid., 665; The Charge in China to the Secretary of State, 28 
November 1945, ibid., 686-687; The Commanding General, United States 
Forces, China Theater, to the Chief of Staff, United States Array, 26 
November 1945, ibid., 683; The Charge in China to the Secretary of 
State, 9 December 1945, ibid., 694-695; The Charge in China to the 
Secretary of State, 23 December 1945, ibid., 705-707; The Charge in 
China to the Secretary of State, 9 October 1945, ibid., 578-579.
39The best discussion of this episode of the Hurley resignation is 
in Buhite, Hurley, 253-271; See also, Feis, The China Tangle, 405-412.
40Note, for example, the Secretary of State's concern aout what 
Hurley might say in hearings before a congressional committee, Memoran­
dum of Telephone Conversation (with Patrick J. Hurley), by the Secre­
tary of State, 3 December 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 727-728; Indeed, one 
of Hurley's charges was that American Chinese policy was in a state of 
"confusion", see. The Ambassador in China to President Truman, 26 
November 1945, ibid., 722-726.
41
One of the charges Hurley made in resigning, and which caused 
considerable consternation in the State Department, was that in the 
months before the end of the war in the Pacific, certain American 
diplomatic officers had displayed extraordinary sympathy for the Chi­
nese Communists; that they had advised Yenan that Hurley's support of 
the Nationlist government did not reflect American policy; and that 
they had counseled Yenan against unifying its armed forces with those 
of the Kuomintang. Such accusations had explosive import both inter­
nationally and domestically as did his rather ambiguous references to
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these same diplomatic officers being aligned with a British, French, 
Dutch "imperialist bloc" which sought to overthrow the Nationalist 
government. See Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Legal 
Adviser, 7 December 1945, ibid., 729-730; See, also. The Acting Politi­
cal Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State, 7 December 1945, ibid., 
731-732.
^^In mid-December 1945, the Embassy in the Soviet Union reported 
an upswing of Russian criticism of American China policy further link­
ing it with the Hurley resignation. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union 
to the Secretary of State, 20 December 1945, ibid., 702-704; Several 
days later the Charge of the Embassy in China observed that "Soviet 
procrastination in dealings with (the) Central Govt rests on ample 
precedent and in this instance Russian interest in possible significant 
changes in American policy may be responsible." The Charge in China to 
the Secretary of State, 23 December 1945, ibid., 706; See also, Feis, 
The China Tangle, Chapter 36, esp. 412, and, Buhite, Hurley, 272.
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CHAPTER III
MARSHALL'S APPOINTMENT;
THE EFFORT TO RESOLVE CONTRADICTIONS
An official review of China policy actually began 
prior to Hurley's resignation. Wedemeyer's discouraging 
reports, the revelations of Chinese Communist military 
strength and wide popular appeal in the North, greater 
Nationalist administrative and military deficiency than 
anticipated and Soviet machinations in Manchuria, were 
factors which seemed to some officials to raise serious 
questions about the adequacy of the Administration's policy. 
Could officials reasonably expect that established policy 
would be adequate in view of deteriorating conditions in 
China and in the presence of fading prospects for American- 
Soviet cooperation?
Policymakers were alarmed and wondered whether, in 
view of the circumstances, both the means and the goals of 
policy continued to be valid; whether it was realistic to 
believe that the Nationalists and Communists would agree to 
form a coalition government which granted effective access 
to all political groups in China; or, whether unity and 
stability could be achieved through a peaceful, political 
compromise. Some asked if the critical nature of the situa­
tion might not require a different manner of American
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involvement in China than previously believed necessary. 
Might the realization of American interests necessitate a 
more extensive commitment than implied by the established 
policy which, in aiming to achieve a political solution to 
China's internal problems, envisioned only a rather limited 
American role in the process to that end?^
Though officials were deeply impressed by these 
unsettling questions and by the potential shortcomings of 
policy, they nonetheless continued to be encouraged by the 
fact that no one yet could say with any degree of assurity 
as to what was or was not possible in terms of postwar 
cooperation —  an ultimate resolution of the question 
awaited some more conclusive signal. Consequently, the 
Administration's decisions on China were made in circumstan­
ces characterized by the conflicting and offsetting images 
of prospect and risk. Here is a crucial point. Because of 
this ambiguity, officials could not avoid some degree of 
equivocation in their decisions concerning China policy.
In the absence of sufficient evidence for offi­
cials to conclude that the established formula finally had 
failed, there emerged in the decision-making process a 
natural tendency to opt for the path of least resistance. 
In this case, it meant continuing in the already charted 
policy direction. To the extent that the preference for 
convenience prevailed in determining the best possible 
approach to the situation in China, the conceptual basis.
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and as a result, the goals, of that policy remained largely 
intact.
This official impulse included the intense desire 
to achieve an uncomplicated postwar settlement through 
peaceful diplomatic means. The strong inclination remained 
to hold on to that policy and to give it every opportunity 
to succeed before throwing it over as useless.
But if there were multiple reasons why officials 
could not bring themselves finally to the point of thinking 
that all prospect for a peaceful political settlement was 
gone or that established policy was a failure, it cannot be 
denied that officials also were restricted by circumstances 
from choosing other policy alternatives had they wanted to. 
Certain factors in late 1945 had a coercive impact on the 
decision-making process and placed limits on the American 
potential for involvement in China.
In calculating the requirements of China policy, 
decision-makers could not ignore the extraordinary domestic 
public clamor for full-scale demobilization of the wartime 
military establishment and the associated demand to dis­
mantle the restrictive wartime economy. Subsequent to the 
Japanese defeat, there was absolutely no justification in 
the public mind for keeping the troops overseas. The war 
was over. The forces of aggression were defeated. Now it 
was time to "bring the boys home" and return to the normal 
state of human existence which was the peaceful attending of
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each citizen to his own affairs. The government naturally 
would concern itself with the task of reconversion to a 
peacetime economy. As a matter of fiscal responsibility, 
federal expenditures would be curtailed. The nation's 
resources, for several years drained by the requirements of 
war, would be reallocated to individual Americans, whose 
right it was now to develop their own fortunes on the basis 
of their hard earned due.
Officials recognized these unavoidable pressures 
and understood they constituted constraints on the Admin­
istration's decision-making latitude in the foreign policy 
realm generally and specifically in the case of China. For 
example, officials knew that while the Marines probably 
could be left in China in order to complete the low cost 
mission of supporting the reassertion of Nationalist author­
ity throughout the country, the Administration reasonably 
could not expect that domestic opinion would show any enthu­
siasm for an expansion of the American military commitment. 
Administration officials could justify the continuing pres­
ence of American troops in China for only so long and while 
there only to the extent the Marines were able to avoid 
becoming involved in combat situations. In the eventuality 
United States forces were drawn into some serious incidence 
of fighting there was sure to be a public outcry for their 
immediate evacuation.
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In December 1945 there simply was no basis in the 
public attitude to which the Administration, if it wanted, 
could hope to appeal in building support for an American 
involvement in China inconsistent with that public's obses­
sion to enjoy the full advantage of a life unencumbered by 
the risk and sacrifice of war. Now with the defeat of the 
Axis, peaceful endeavor, without inconvenience, was the 
public right. Following from this, officials knew that the 
situation in China could not be justified in the public 
interest as so compelling as to warrant the death of more 
American soldiers or to justify an expenditure of resources 
in support of an expanded military commitment.^
In addition to placing limits on the Administra­
tion's military options, the public disposition toward 
economic reconversion and retrenchment in government spend­
ing also promoted the Administration's caution in granting 
credits, loans, indeed financial and economic assistance 
generally, to the Nationalist government. But here, and 
this appears was the more important consideration, the 
Administration's parsimonious attitude also reflected what 
would have been true under any circumstances, namely the 
natural exercise of fiscal and administrative responsibility 
by the Executive and interested government agencies. The 
fact that public pressures substantially reduced the avail­
able resources which could be deployed in support of foreign 
policy of objectives simply helped to "streamline" the
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Administration's reticence to act generously in the case of 
Chiang's regime.
Administration officials believed the Nationalist 
government, as run by the Kuomintang party, was enormously 
inefficient and pervasively corrupt. There was no dearth of 
information on this score. Journalists, missionaries, 
businessmen and members of the diplomatic and military 
community, offered evidence concerning Kuomintang maladmin­
istration.^ Just as they had before the end of the war. 
Treasury and other officials continued to raise questions 
about the desirability of granting loans, credits, or extend­
ing direct aid to Chiang's regime in the absence of some 
greater guarantee that American assistance would be used 
wisely and efficiently.^ Pouring money down a "rathole" 
simply could not be justified as a matter of good sense. 
There was no question but that Washington could not extend 
unqualified or immoderate grants in aid short of some con­
crete Nationalist effort to establish reliable and pre­
dictable financial policies, particularly in view of domes­
tic public attitudes about government spending.
But here is a key point. The Administration was 
not inclined in late 1945 to escalate the American military 
presence in China or to expand gratuitously its program of 
economic assistance to the Nationalist government and for 
reasons quite independent of the knowledge that public 
pressures would not allow it in any event. Indeed, as it
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will be shown later in this chapter, there were a series of 
other, related reasons why the Administration thought it a 
good idea to maintain as low an American profile in China as 
officials deemed the circumstances would allow and still 
grant policy its best chance to succeed.
Consequently, those public demands which forced 
retrenchment of military and government spending generally 
and which reduced available deployable resources in November 
and December existed more in the realm of hypothetical 
constraints on policy-making for China. This remained the 
case so long as the established policy —  which did not 
anticipate an obtrusive American role in helping to solve 
China’s internal problems —  appeared to retain some pros­
pect for success. Only when the Administration finally 
determined that the policy founded on the Yalta accords and 
the Sino-Soviet treaty could no longer be expected to 
achieve desired results, were officials faced with the 
concrete problem of defining what they could do in China in 
terms of available resources.
By the end of 1945 officials simply had not yet 
been forced by international circumstances to deal exten­
sively with the problem of determining the precise strategic 
importance of China to the United States' national interest. 
Nor, as a result of having measured the extent of China's 
importance, had officials yet faced - as a primary policy 
consideration - the concomitant problem of available and
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deployable resources and possible limits on what the Admin­
istration could do to ensure preferred policy outcomes. 
Once officials faced the necessity of dealing with this 
series of related foreign policy issues in a later inter­
national environ characterized by American-Soviet hostility 
and belligerency, then those public demands which reduced 
deployable resources became a more important factor in
determining the range of the Administration's commitment in
China.
There was no question but that an American with­
drawal from China was a completely unacceptable alterna-
n
tive. The Administration's washing its hands of the situa­
tion would almost assuredly precipitate open civil war. It 
would encourage Soviet opportunism and aggression and open 
the way for an expansion of communist influence in East and
Q
Southeast Asia. The onset of civil war in China would 
destroy the essential basis, and any remaining chance, for
achieving a political settlement throughout the region. In
late 1945, officials were cautious lest their actions result 
in damage to the prospect for avoiding this unwanted result. 
Postwar public and official aspirations continued to rest on 
the expectation of a political-diplomatic solution to inter­
national problems and consequently the policy designed to 
facilitate that goal in East Asia also remained very impor-
9
tant.
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In December, 1945, there was really little else 
Administration officials actually wanted to do differently. 
There was an official feeling of having to continue with 
established policy. However, the nature of the American 
commitment continued to be molded primarily by the Admini­
stration's preference to maintain the design of established 
policy and by a sufficient measure of parallel official 
confidence, mixed with hope, that the policy would succeed. 
It is accurate to say that officials were persuaded this was 
the best possible course of action. This was so principally 
because it could still be argued convincingly that more 
would be lost in dispensing with existing China policy than 
by keeping it. There were several reasons for believing 
this.
For one thing, although the Truman Administration 
was beginning to have serious doubts about the potential of 
generating a good working relationship with the Soviets, 
officials were not yet prepared to assume in November and 
December that a diplomatic settlement of postwar problems 
was impossible. It was still possible to argue, without 
overwhelming contradiction, that the United States and the 
Soviet Union ultimately would find some basis for a politi­
cal solution to their problems. This was true even though 
opinion polls indicated a significant decline of public 
confidence over the prospect of postwar cooperation with the 
Russians throughout the course of 1945.^® There were obvious
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difficulties including the ominous question of Soviet reli­
ability especially in view of demobilization and cuts in 
military spending, trends which the State Department's 
Soviet experts predicted would produce a more intractable 
Russian diplomatic posture once the latter perceived the 
essentials of American policy were no longer based on the 
compelling presence of actual power. But this did not yet 
add up to a scenario in which American policy would have to 
be calculated in reference to an implacable foreign enemy.
It was this very condition, only a few months 
departed, which the Administration, indeed the whole world, 
strained to leave behind. Though officials were wary of 
Soviet motives, decision-makers did not want to be the first 
to move in a belligerent direction in a world desperate for 
peace. Peace had to be given the chance to succeed and that 
meant retaining existing policy —  the one forged on the 
presumption of international good will and mutual commitment 
to peaceful relations and on the expectation that diplomacy 
eventually would resolve all postwar issues.
Even those who were suspicious of the Kremlin’s 
behavior still granted that the Soviet people suffered 
grievously during the war and that they longed for peace as 
much as anyone else. It was still hard for many to believe 
the Soviets would not cooperate eventually in solving prob­
lems peaceably especially if the Administration acted deci­
sively and forcefully to stake the American claim in its 
dealings with the Kremlin.
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In view of the horrible destruction left in the 
wake of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, it continued 
to be reasonable for many Americans to assume that the 
Russian leaders would be compelled to maintain international 
peace and stability as the prerequisite to their own social 
and economic reconstruction. Or, that Stalin would not fail 
to see the higher merit of sustaining a good relationship 
with American leaders as the natural price for receiving
generous outlays of economic assistance for Soviet recon-
12struction.
In view of the uncertainty, therefore, officials 
were still inclined to rely on the Yalta and the Sino-Soviet 
agreements; agreements which limited Soviet influence in 
East Asia, which obligated the Kremlin to support exclusive­
ly the Nationalist as the government of China, and, more 
specifically, which appeared to encourage a political solu­
tion of the Chinese Communist problem by eliminating their 
option of independent Soviet aid.
Dispensing with a policy which included a diplo­
matic pattern still satisfying to the American national 
interest on the basis of suspicion of Soviet motives would 
have amounted to a decision which was sure to be challenged 
as foolish both at home and abroad. The Administration 
would have found itself hard pressed to justify a posture of 
belligerency toward its former ally in view of all the 
laudatory wartime propaganda concerning the Russians and in
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the face of the public's ecstactic relief that hostilities
13were finally over. It would have divided the country.
Open and excessive censure of the Soviets would 
have been vaguely comparable to the ethical and procedural 
implications of a presiding judge expressing sure confidence 
in a defendant's guilt at the outset of a trial, except 
that, in the case of Administration belligerency toward the 
Soviets, the magnitude of the consequences would have been 
far more serious. Not only would a contentious policy have 
diminished the remaining chances for achieving a peaceful 
political solution to postwar problems, it might have re­
duced the intensity of commitment on the part of the world 
community in making meaningful contributions to an effective 
and ongoing United Nations. The Administration could hardly 
ignore that it had the chief responsiblity for doing all it 
could to insure success of that organization.^^
A concerted Administration attack on Soviet for­
eign policy seemed unwise for the time being for another 
reason. If the Soviets countered these criticisms by drop­
ping any remaining inclination to cooperate, the Administra­
tion would then be faced with the prospect of making criti­
cal decisions affecting the nation's security.
However, in the presence of definite ceilings on 
deployable resources and with the prospect of further future 
reductions. Administration officials were not prepared to 
make these decisions. Though in private already upset at
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Soviet machinations, policymakers continued to display 
considerable caution in their public statements. There was 
no sense in provoking the Soviets unnecessarily or prema­
turely into acting in a manner which was likely to place 
enormous strains on the nation's increasingly scarce resour-
ces.15
In sum, because the decision-making environ was 
characterized, on the one hand, by an international yearning 
for lasting peace and stability, and, on the other, by a 
Soviet government whose actions could not yet be unequivo­
cally identified as dangerously aggressive, and, given the 
presence of a diplomatic structure which still retained the 
glimmer of potential, there was no significant official urge 
to move in a new policy direction. Under the circumstances, 
it seems inappropriate, now in retrospect, to criticize the 
Truman Administration for not accepting its suspicions of 
Soviet motives as the more compelling determinant of policy 
than the then present desire to work through all possibili­
ties to a peaceful solution of postwar problems before 
accepting the inevitability of conflict with the Kremlin.
Beyond these aspects of the decision-making 
environ in late 1945 there was another unavoidable domestic 
consideration which, to Administration officials, appeared 
to further justify the wisdom of their decision to continue 
with the policy of political compromise. Some Americans 
thought United States meddling in Chinese affairs, or anyone
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else's, would be unacceptably imperialistic. Consistent 
with the strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonial strain in 
the American intellectual tradition ; many argued that the 
principle of self-determination of peoples, recently incor­
porated in the United Nations Charter, in 1945 more than 
ever precluded American interference in the domestic affairs 
of other people. Some suggested that a unilateral United 
States presence in China would contravene the spirit of 
collective action through the United Nations to settle 
international disputes. If the United States persisted in 
this it could destroy the future utility of that organiza­
tion so recently established at the San Francisco Confer­
ence.
The import of these several arguments was not lost 
on Administration officials. The nation's historic commit­
ment to anti-imperialist ideals, also argued in justifying 
the United States entry into the war against Germany and 
Japan, made it almost imperative, if the United Nations was 
to develop into an effective organization as visualized, 
that the Administration's foreign policies not be construed 
as flagrantly inconsistent with the hopes and aspirations 
surrounding the San Francisco meeting. Sustained commitment 
to the formation of the United Nations on the part of the 
international community realistically could not be expected,
if convincing charges of imperialism were to be directed
17against one of that organization's principal authors.
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Thus policymakers were strongly disposed to avoid any 
appearance of an excess of American pressure on the Chinese, 
some indelicate over-involvement in China likely to produce 
the accusation of United States hypocrisy with respect to 
the principle of national self-determination. Since this 
need coincided with the essence of the established policy 
toward East Asia, which included the key assumption that a 
significant American presence in China would not be required,
decision-makers naturally felt reluctant to dispense too
18quickly with the familiar policy pattern.
But if the existing policy was worth retaining 
despite a deteriorating performance, certain of its com­
ponents would have to be altered. To begin with, Patrick 
Hurley would have to be replaced. News of the Ambassador's 
resignation reached high Administration officials while 
attending a scheduled Cabinet luncheon. The President's 
announcement was the first that any had heard of the epi­
sode. Still in the meeting, it was the Secretary of Agri­
culture who declared that General George C. Marshall ought 
to be asked to fulfill the role vacated by Hurley. This 
initial advice that Marshall be approached appears to have 
been spontaneous. Yet it could not have been a more apt
suggestion in view of the necessities of the time and appar-
19ently was enthusiastically accepted.
Marshall's appearance on the scene would bring a 
level of vitality and credibility to policy which the person
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of Hurley could never have been expected to generate. 
Marshall was an important American. On the foundation of 
his wartime service his public stature was extraordinary and 
not only in the United States. His appointment, as few 
others, would give the Administration an excellent chance to 
repair the damage done by Hurley's criticisms.
On the home front, Marshall's association with 
policy would effectively subvert whatever tendency might 
exist among political opponents who were prepared to use 
Hurley's resignation as a basis for criticism of the Admini­
stration. A solution in China was going to be troublesome 
enough as it was without the irksome distraction of the 
President having to defend his policy at home.
But, more importantly, Marshall's appointment 
would introduce a badly needed imagery into the situation. 
The assumption of responsibility for American policy by a 
man of such enormous prestige would be an indication to the 
Soviets that the Administration continued to be keenly 
interested in Chinese affairs. His appointment would 
announce that the American government still intended to 
assume the initiative in carrying through as planned. 
Marshall's association with policy would strongly imply that 
the Soviets ought carefully to consider before attempting to 
take advantage of deteriorating conditions in China. Like­
wise, it would be a sign to both Nationalists and Chinese 
Communists that the Administration still perceived that a
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political solution in China was imperative and that it was
20vital to avoid a civil war.
Beyond this, certain other policy alterations 
would be well advised. In view of the expanding conflict 
between Communist and Nationalist forces, the process of 
repatriating the Japanese was going more slowly than expec­
ted. Moreover, Nationalist troops had yet to be transported 
into Manchuria. As fighting spread, American officials 
increasingly were disturbed that unless the remaining Japa­
nese troops were evacuated from the country as quickly as 
possible, their presence might disrupt prospects for a 
negotiated settlement of China’s problems. There were 
reports that Japanese troops were being utilized by both 
Nationalists and Communists to enchance their own military 
advantage. The longer the Japanese stayed the more likely 
it was that, in being used by one side against the other, 
the effort to create some more effective political balance
2Tin the situation could be seriously upset. Also, the 
longer the period before the Nationalist government exerted 
its effective control in Manchuria the less likely were the 
prospects of achieving stability in the area and the more 
likely the Soviets would find an excuse for imposing their 
own administration.
The Administration's view of the need to get the 
remaining Japanese (and Russian) forces out of China, though, 
rested on more than this practical consideration. The need
-96-
to remove foreign influence also rested on the not very 
novel American idea that there was a causal relationship
between foreign meddling and internal divisiveness and
instability.
The notion derived from the traditional United 
States concern for that country manifest in long-standing 
expressions of commitment to the "Open Door" principles of 
international free trade and the territorial and administra­
tive integrity of the "Middle Kingdom". More explicitly, 
this view derived from American intellectual traditions of 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism and from the broad 
commitment to the political principle of self-determination 
for all peoples. In late 1945, therefore, the absence of a
foreign presence was important, for only then, so ran the
logic, could a natural balance of forces native to China be 
expected to result in a lasting condition of unity and 
stability.
So American Marines would have to stay in China 
longer than planned in order to achieve Japanese repatria­
tion and to ensure effective Nationalist control of Man­
churia. This, a second modification in China policy, the 
Administration believed imperative despite Wedemeyer's 
warning that so long as United States troops remained in the 
present volatile circumstances, they ran the risk of becom­
ing involved in the fighting.
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Keeping the Marines in China created a related 
dilemma. The United States China Theatre Command was not 
above allowing armed Japanese troops to continue to maintain 
order in certain areas of China until Kuomintang forces 
could be transported in to assume effective responsibility. 
But this was not a condition amenable to the sensibilities 
of the Chinese Communists who, in view of their self­
supposed political legitimacy, saw no reason why they should 
not be allowed to accept the Japanese surrender, especially 
in those areas in North China which they had long controlled.
Yet this American use of Japanese troops, surely 
galling to Yenan in view of its own contributions to the war 
of resistance against Japan, was in accord with the Admini­
stration’s policy which was designed to re-enforce the
legitimacy of the Nationalist government by assisting in its
2 3assumption of direct control in all parts of the country. 
The prospect of having to continue to do what might prove to 
create friction between the United States and the Chinese 
Communists was not a pleasant one for Administration offi­
cials concerned to achieve a genuine political settlement. 
The more quickly the task of Japanese repatriation could be 
accomplished, the sooner this unwanted situation could be 
eliminated.
Despite these real dangers, there was the addi­
tional factor of the Soviet presence in Manchuria. Although 
it created another delicate problem for the Administration,
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officials thought it important that the Marines also remain
as a counter to Soviet power until the latter evacuated the 
25region. On the one hand, this would have to be calculated 
carefully so as not to appear provocative to the extent of 
alienating the Soviets, prompting them to subvert a negotia­
ted settlement. At the same time the Administration could 
not expect to leave American forces much beyond the Soviet
evacuation for fear of being left open to the charge of
26imperialistic interference in China's internal affairs.
The time seemed right for a further adjustment in 
policy which officials hoped would dissipate effectively the 
internecine forces at work in China. Earlier in September 
Truman promised Chiang that the United States would be 
willing to help China create an armed force of sufficient 
size for use in maintaining internal peace and stability. 
The essential qualification was that this support in the 
form of training and equipment not be used for the purpose
of engaging in "fratricidal warfare" or to support the
27continuance of an "undemocratic administration".
Now in December, as a third modification in poli­
cy, the President prepared to go further in order to induce 
the Nationalists and Communists to settle their differences 
peaceably. Marshall would carry with him on his mission to 
China the pledge of substantial American economic aid, in 
addition to the earlier promise of military assistance, if 
the two would put an end to their fratricidal conflict and
-99-
come together in a genuine effort to create an effective 
coalition government open to all political factions. Offi­
cials hoped the prospect of such aid would prove a more 
attractive alternative than the one of continuing civil 
war.^®
In a related vein, Marshall also was authorized to 
voice the threat of a reduction, even withdrawal, of Ameri­
can support to the Nationalist government if the Kuomintang
leadership proved unwilling to contribute a political
29settlement and to establish a coalition government.
Secretly, however, the President, Secretary of State Byrnes
and Marshall were agreed that this threatening posture was a
mere bluff tactic. In the eventuality the Kuomintang proved
intransigent in these matters, the Administration, it had
been decided, would have no option but to continue some form
30of support to Chiang's regime.
The Administration's assumption of responsibility 
in this regard originally obtained from the mosaic of rea­
sons which earlier had produced an official unwillingness to 
look to any other than Chiang Kai-shek and his government as 
the central focus of American China policy. But by the end 
of 1945 Washington's sense of obligation was joined by an 
official logic which dismissed the option of the United 
States completely withdrawing its support to the Nation­
alists or pulling out of China altogether even if a politi­
cal settlement could not be achieved.
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The elimination of this policy alternative fol­
lowed from a series of related propositions which decision­
makers in 1945 were beginning to suspect were true and after 
the Spring of 1946 were convinced possessed an axiomatic 
validity. As it related to China, the Administration’s 
presumption was: in the event of a United States withdrawal
of support from its non-communist ally, the Kremlin would 
assume the action reflected a more general American timidity 
in international affairs, and, hence, a clear signal that a 
more aggressive Soviet posture in the world likely would 
have the effect of producing a United States capitulation 
elsewhere. Already in 1945, decision-makers had begun to 
toy with the notion that there was a sliding, proportional 
ratio between the degree of foreign policy irresolve dis­
played by the Administration and the level of Soviet inter­
national aggressiveness and belligerency. On the other 
hand, the more forceful and resolute the Administration 
appeared, the more circumspect the Kremlin could be expected 
to act.
The origin of such thinking undoubtedly must be 
considered complex. There is little question but that the 
experience with the Axis powers in the 1930's played a major 
role in encouraging the idea that a display of weakness 
merely encouraged the forces of aggression. Even the domes­
tic experience of decision-makers where the images of bra­
vado and bluff constituted an intricate part of the process
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of competition with political adversaries may have had some 
impact on this assessment of the Kremlin.
Most importantly, however, the formulations of 
this increasingly convincing analysis of Soviet behavior 
once again came from influential State Department personnel
in the Division of East European Affairs and those attached
3 Xto the American Embassy in Moscow. So far as it affected 
the directions of Truman Administration China policy, there 
is no way the importance of this view may be overemphasized. 
It is not possible to identify a single more important 
determinant of the nature of American China policy in the 
years intervening between the Second World War and the 
Korean conflict.
Already by the Fall of 1945, the tenor of deci­
sions on China policy was shaped by the official belief that 
the necessities of American foreign policy demanded continu­
ing some form of support to Chiang Kai-shek for fear that, 
if it were withdrawn, it would encourage the international 
irresponsibility of the Kremlin. The question of what 
impact the Administration's actions in China would have on 
the planning and policies of the Kremlin or what effect this 
or that American maneuver in China would have on the United 
States-Soviet strategic equation subsequently remained the 
salient issue of decision-making about China until the North 
Korean attack on the South in late June of 1950. It pro­
vides the essential explanation as to why officials never
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seriously considered the alternative of withdrawing from 
China in the immediate aftermath of the war and why the 
Truman Administration never conceived it possible to disso­
ciate itself entirely from the Nationalist regime during the 
period 1945-1950.
In summary, in planning the Marshall mission, 
officials determined that the existing policy pattern, while 
generally worth preserving, would require certain modifi­
cations. The most obvious need was to replace Hurley. 
Because Marshall appeared to add a new vitality and cred­
ibility to policy in assuming responsibility for its direc­
tion, his appointment, in effect, amounted to one major 
renovation. A second was the decision, based on several 
considerations, to retain American Marines in China beyond 
the time previously thought necessary. A third alteration 
consisted of a new promise of substantial American technical 
advice and assistance if the Kuomintang and Chinese Commu­
nists settled their differences peaceably although coupled 
with the implied threat, in actual fact a bluff, of cutting 
off aid if they did not. The Administration did not con­
sider it necessary or feasible to go beyond these several 
modifications.
However, if officials were correct in thinking 
they had adequately compensated for certain deficiencies 
within the established policy pattern, they also understood 
that the negotiating environment could be expected to remain
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attractive only if the nature of the American involvement in 
China reflected the Administration's seriousness of purpose 
in the pursuit of its goals. This meant sustaining those 
limits to the American involvement which naturally followed 
from the earlier official expectation that solution of 
China's internal problems would not require a major United 
States involvement —  limits which at the end of 1945 had to 
be reaffirmed so as to encourage a political settlement.
This is a very important point. In November and 
December of 1945, officials assumed the necessity of retain­
ing limits on the American economic and military involvement 
in China, not principally because domestic public demands 
reduced available deployable resources, but because limits 
were necessary in order to convince all concerned that the 
Administration sincerely wanted the Kuomintang and the 
Communists to achieve unity and political stability in 
China. In a more negative vein, officials also conceived of 
the fact of limited American assistance as a condition they 
could manipulate for the purpose of pressuring both groups 
to negotiate.
For one thing, officials thought it necessary to 
limit American involvement, specifically on the level of aid 
to the Nationalists, in order to assure the Chinese Commu­
nists that the Administration genuinely intended to encour­
age the development of a firm basis for political compromise. 
Administration actions, therefore, would have to sustain as
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much of the image of fairness as possible. The appearance 
of such could not hope to survive an excess of unqualified 
American support for Chiang's regime. Under those circum­
stances, the Administration's and Marshall's credibility
would be destroyed as would all prospect for the General
3 2playing an effective mediating role.
Overcommitment to the Nationalists also might have 
reduced the Soviet willingness to support American purposes 
in China by appearing to the Kremlin as though the Admin­
istration was moving in a direction contrary to the spirit 
of compromise. A large and gratuitous expansion of American 
assistance to the Nationalist government at the end of 1945 
would have seemed a clear departure from the tenor of the 
American involvement since the end of the war. In that 
event, Soviet suspicions might have translated into some
countering maneuver at the expense of Great Power coopera-
3 3tion on the problem of China.
An excess of aid to Chiang and his regime, offi­
cials also were convinced, would strengthen the hand of 
those high Kuomintang officials who were less inclined to 
negotiate with the Communists. Even more seriously, offi­
cials surmised that large outlays of support to the Nation­
alists might encourage Chiang and his generals to seek the 
destruction of the Communists by military means —  from the 
Administration's standpoint a most unwanted result.
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Officials also believed the Kuomintang could not 
survive as a vital force in Chinese politics if it developed 
an overdependence on American support. An excess of unqual­
ified American aid to Chiang’s regime was sure to produce 
the charge of imperialistic meddling. It would do no good 
for the Nationalist cause, already closely associated with 
the American presence in China, for United States policy to 
be condemned in this manner. The nationalistic credibility 
and political fortunes generally of Chiang's regime would 
not be well served under any circumstances if it became 
identified by the invidious image of being a reactionary and
undemocratic regime whose only basis of continued existence
3 5was the presence and support of Western military power.
Overdependence on American support, officials 
thought, would more than merely tarnish the Kuomintang’s 
nationalistic credentials. It also would eliminate the 
incentive for the Kuomintang utilizing its own imagination 
and resourcefulness in dealing with problems it alone had to 
solve before it could expect to compete successfully with 
the Communists on a continuing basis. Not only did the 
Kuomintang need to rid itself of its own pervasive corrup­
tion and inefficiency, but this as a prerequisite to helping 
carry through an extensive program of genuine social and 
economic reform.
Only to the extent the Kuomintang became identi­
fied with progressive trends in China could it expect to
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generate sufficient popular support to offset the wide 
appeal of the Communists. Administration officials were 
convinced that too much American aid would encourage the 
Kuomintang reactionaries who were not only opposed to 
internal reform which would disturb their power base but as 
well to the price of social and economic amelioration gen­
erally.3*
Finally, officials hoped that the fact of limited 
American aid to the Chinese, coupled with the promise of 
substantially greater aid in the event a coalition govern­
ment was formed, would encourage the Kuomintang and the 
Communists to settle their differences at the conference 
table and not on the field of battle.
It would be useful to consider and eliminate those 
factors which some have suggested had a signficant influence 
on policy formation but which actually did not. There are 
reasons advanced to explain the Truman Administration's 
unwillingness to go all out in its support of the Nation­
alist government.
Assuming there was no valid excuse for the Admin­
istration not giving full and unqualified support, one 
interpretation suggests that limitations on American support 
for Chiang resulted from the considerable sympathy which 
some responsible State Department and Administration offi­
cials had for the Communist cause in China. As earlier
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noted there were some lower echelon State Department per­
sonnel, who, on the basis of their diplomatic service in 
China during the war, concluded that the Communists were a 
better political alternative for the Chinese people than the 
corrupt, inefficient and socially unresponsive Kuomintang. 
Among these individuals, a few also exhibited a tendency to
see the Communists in a more favorable political-
38philosophical light than the existing regime. However, 
sympathy for the Communist cause among those in the State 
Department in Washington concerned with China, or in 
decision-making circles generally, simply did not exist.
In a related vein, there is no evidence to suggest 
the Truman administration limited its support to Chiang 
Kai-shek because his regime was believed by its nature to be 
politically unacceptable, i.e., a right wing, fascist-type 
government which did not merit American support. It is true 
that high echelon officials were uncomfortable with the 
undemocratic character of the Nationalist government. Yet, 
as has been demonstrated, this was primarily because the 
Administration believed this aspect of the regime was an 
important obstacle to creating an effective coalition govern­
ment and to achieving unity and stability in postwar China. 
This was not a complaint with the Nationalists, however, 
which proved to be an effective deterrent to extending 
support in any and all event. Chiang's regime would have to 
be sustained in some form, as the only available non­
communist alternative in China.
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The Administration did hope that the prospect of 
aid could be construed so as to encourage Kuomintang reform 
—  a trade, one for the other. To reiterate, it was impor­
tant that the Kuomintang become an energetic and progressive 
political organization if it expected to be able to compete 
effectively with the Chinese Communists. And it was impor­
tant that the .Nationalist government be reformed to the 
point of allowing genuine coalition opportunities. The 
question of aid could be used to encourage this change as 
well. But at the decision-making level it was never argued, 
so far as the record shows, that aid to Chiang be limited 
because his regime was right wing in nature, because it was 
"fascist". In this case, the Administration did not con­
ceive it had the luxury of making decisions on China which 
satisfied the logic of some more liberal political- 
philosophical preference.
As discussed earlier, it is correct that Admin­
istration officials accepted the accuracy of reports the 
Kuomintang-dominated Nationalist government was administra­
tively inefficient and possessed of serious corruption. It 
went without saying, there would be no granting of carte 
blanche to such a regime. Fiscal propriety required that 
responsible officials request some prerequisite for the 
extension of certain types of American aid. It was only 
reasonable to presume that the Nationalist government ini­
tiate those reforms which would insure that American aid be 
used to effective ends.
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But here also it must be stressed that the Admini­
stration was determined to extend support to Chiang's regime 
despite the discouraging evaluations of Chinese fiscal 
reliability and the urging of some agency officials that the
Administration require substantial Nationalist reform as the
39price of further American grants in aid. In this case as 
well, the Administration was not above attempting to use the 
prospect of aid as a means to pressure the Nationalist 
government into making the perceived necessary fiscal re­
forms. But American officials never conceived the issue of 
aid was characterized by a simple duality - either aid to be 
used responsibly or no aid at all. Rather, it was a ques­
tion of how to get the best results in the process of grant­
ing assistance. As it turned out, in a relatively short 
period of time, because of higher policy necessity, the 
Administration extended aid to Chiang's regime even though 
the Generalissimo only promised to initiate reforms. 
Despite continuing aid of one sort or another, he never did.
A knowledge of Chinese corruption and ineffi­
ciency, and a demand for reform as the prerequisite to aid, 
then, were not, a priori, key determinants in the policy of 
American assistance to the Nationalist government. Rather a 
sense of the regime's deficiencies existed more nearly as 
one in a series of criteria for monitoring and, as it turned 
out, moderating the details of aid but in context of already 
established policy which was to support the Nationalists as 
the only possible government of China.
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Though it may seem likely to suppose that pro- 
Chiang Kai-shek public opinion in the United States was 
something of an influential consideration in determining 
Truman Administration China policy at the end of 1945, in 
fact it was not. There is no denying that Chiang's prestige 
in this country had by 1945 reached considerable proportions 
especially on the foundation of favorable reporting in the 
American press such as, for example, in the case of Henry 
Luce's Time and Life magazines.
The editorials of the Luce and other publications 
portrayed Chiang as the hero of the resistance against 
Japanese aggression in East Asia and as the loyal American 
ally after 1941. Chiang was characterized further as a 
repository of Christian and Western democratic values. And 
this manner of portrayal was effective to the extent that it 
coincided with the belief by many Americans that the influ­
ence of such values was essential to the future development 
of Chinese society. On the more negative side he was 
already being touted as the great bastion in China, right­
eously poised against the spread of revolutionary communism. 
Generally, Luce (and others) argued that the United States, 
a virtuous nation in the fact of the character of its citi­
zens, victorious in the world war and now with unprecedented 
power, had to face its unavoidable responsibilities in the 
world. In China that meant giving full support to Chiang
Kai-shek. Only he could hope to achieve what was best for
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China which in Luce's opinion was also best for the United 
40States. ^
These and other enthusiastic evaluations of Chiang 
were present in the public media in 1945 and reflected the 
interest of some persons in Congress and the public at large 
in seeing the American government take a more unequivocal 
stand in support of the Nationalists.^^ Thus, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the intensity of this pro-Chiang 
sentiment created a factor which the Truman Administration 
had to reckon with in the process of calculating the essen­
tials of its China policy. But the utility of this observa­
tion would depend largely on the question of whether or not 
the Administration actually was interested in finding some 
alternative to the policy of supporting Chiang and his 
regime. It has been argued already at length that the 
record shows this was not so.
The Truman Administration was committed to the 
support of the Nationalist government for reasons quite 
independent of pro-Chiang public sentiment in the United 
States. It does not appear, therefore, that public sympathy 
for Chiang limited Administration policy options. There is 
no evidence in the available record to suggest the Truman 
Administration formulated its China policy in 1945 in defer­
ence to a pro-Nationalist public opinion; that the Admin­
istration, because of this public attitude, acted in a 
manner toward China which it might not have otherwise.
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This is not to say that some Administration offi­
cials were unaffected by the argument that the United States 
did have obligations to Chiang as a former ally. Nor is it 
to ignore that some officials undoubtedly accepted the 
validity of the media-created image of Chiang Kai-shek - a 
symbol of what was, by certain American standards, fine and 
decent in Chinese society. But though such feelings were 
present in the Administration, sentimentality was not the 
trigger in the decision making process on China. Rather, as 
it has been suggested, the Administration's approach rested 
on a series of calculations which together appeared to offer 
little alternative to the policy of dealing with the prob­
lems of postwar China through the continuing political 
presence of Chiang and the Nationalist government.
Moreover, it is also instructive to observe that 
domestic public support for Chiang and the Nationalists did 
not go unchallenged. Chiang did not receive a uniformly 
good press in the United States. Many Americans with pre­
war and wartime experience in China had developed consider­
able antipathy toward the Generalissimo and his regime. 
Already in 1945 many individuals showed little hesitation in 
criticizing the various shortcomings of the Nationalist 
government.
These often quite accurate complaints were in turn 
used by various individuals and groups for their own purpo­
ses. Certain members of Congress used such criticisms to
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argue that the United States could not afford to underwrite 
the poor-risk Nationalist government. In view of the charge 
that the regime was corrupt and inefficient, there was 
concern that the extension of aid would constitute an un­
necessary and unacceptable drain on American resources.
Others in Congress and in the public at large 
argued that the Nationalist regime was undemocratic and 
authoritarian and were bothered by the prospect of giving 
aid to a government which by its nature seemed to contravene 
those principles for which the United States supposedly had 
gone to war in 1941. Left-wing and communist groups, the 
latter dutifully following the Party line, revealed dis­
satisfaction with what they believed was the Nationalist 
responsibility for political affairs in China not moving in 
a more peaceful and "democratic" direction, calling either 
for the Administration to force Chiang's regime to carry out 
reforms and seriously negotiate with the Chinese Communists
or to withdraw all American support if his government failed
42to comply.
The point is, although the Administration's formu­
lation of China policy did not recognize the preferences of 
Chiang's critics any more than those of his supporters, 
pro-Chiang sentiment advocating stronger backing of the 
Nationalists was nullified by a good deal of contrary argu­
ment in late 1945. If the Administration had been intent on 
severing its ties with the Nationalists at this time, a
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government induced publicity campaign to this end would have 
met with considerable support.
Moreover, an Administration intent on getting out 
of China in 1945 could have tapped the reservoir of tradi­
tional American isolationism in developing effective domes­
tic political justifications for a policy of withdrawal. 
And, it should not be forgotten that a significant number of 
Americans, some with a philosophical commitment to the 
principle of self-determination for all peoples, many with 
strong anti-imperialist sentiments, and others determined to 
see that no foreign American involvement contravened the 
principles of the United States Charter, were in late 1945 
opposed to interference in China's internal affairs. Offi­
cials also would have been able to count on this segment of 
the public to applaud an Administration disavowal of its 
commitments to the Nationalist government.
In 1945 public opinion provided neither a strong 
basis for supporting the Nationalist government nor for 
abandoning it. So far as the record indicates no clear 
signal of public attitudes forced the Administration to 
avoid some particular policy or to produce one, which, in 
either case, would eliminate the issue of China as a liabil­
ity in domestic politics. To this extent, then, public 
opinion does not appear to have had any significant influ­
ence on decision-making.
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So, in late 1945, though some officials responsi­
ble for China policy were dubious of the prospects for suc­
cess and though all were aware of the risks, the Truman 
Administration, in continuing in the existing policy direc­
tion, was determined to use every last opportunity to influ­
ence the Chinese to settle their differences peaceably. 
American energies to this end would be concentrated in a 
special mission commanded by General Marshall. Officials 
believed the mission was the best response to the situation 
in China which the Administration could hope to produce 
under the circumstances and in sight of the full range of 
policy-making considerations. If anyone could succeed in 
the venture Marshall could and indeed, in the Administra­
tion’s view, his mission, as calculated, maximized whatever 
potential remained in the established and preferred approach 
to China.
In conclusion, it may be instructive to suggest 
that in late 1945 the requirements of the Marshall mission 
were calculated during the process of "crossing over" be­
tween two very different decision-making environments. The 
first was not only characterized by the overwhelming desire 
for peace but included the principal assumption that nego­
tiation and compromise eventually would be successful in 
resolving the major postwar issues. And, cooperation be­
tween the Great Powers, especially the United States and the 
Soviet Union, continued to be accepted as a possibility, 
even probability,by a large number of Americans.
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In the second, and superseding, environment there 
was no diminished yearning for peace. But the principal 
assumption was it might not be possible to have peace, as it 
was surely the case that negotiation and compromise could no 
longer be expected to resolve all postwar problems. The 
United States would not be able to cooperate diplomatically 
with the Soviet Union. Because of presumed Soviet oppor­
tunism and aggression, the Administration determined it 
would have to take a firm stand in the face of the Kremlin's 
international irresponsibility. That was sure to cause 
hostility and conflict, possibly even war.
But in November and December 1945 American offi­
cials were only beginning to contemplate the still vague 
outlines of this more ominous contingency. They did not yet 
accept the policy-making requirements of that international 
condition which eventually came to be labeled the Cold War. 
The desire to find some peaceful way to resolve issues 
remained strong. That the Marshall mission was patched 
together in the "space" between these two decision-making 
environments, each with its own somewhat exclusive set of 
policy priorities and strategies, goes a long way toward 
explaining what appears to have been profound contradictions 
in American China policy at the time.
It explains why Marshall was sent despite an 
official suspicion the Soviet leadership would not prove 
supportive of the mission's intent; why the mission was
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dispatched despite serious questions concerning the nature 
of the Soviet-Chinese Communist relationship and how this 
might detract from Marshall’s mediation efforts; why he went 
despite accumulating American doubts as to the staying power 
of the Kuomintang in the face of adversity; why the mission 
was sent - as it turned out - with a virtual absence of 
resources to guarantee success; why so much of the potential 
for successfully achieving a political settlement was predi­
cated on the necessity of good faith from all parties in­
volved when actually officials suspected there might be an 
insufficiency of that vital ingredient. It explains why so 
much American thinking about the prospect for success 
appears to many observers in retrospect to have been naively 
optimistic when in fact officials were well aware of the 
considerable risk for failure.
Officials intended that Marshall's successful 
handling of the situation would have the effect of smoothing 
over these visible contradictions in the decision-making 
environ. They hoped Marshall’s stature and energy would 
bridge the widening gap between the existing policy which 
sought a political-diplomatic solution in China and the 
developing awareness of risk in thus continuing —  a risk 
predicated on the emerging view that many international 
issues, including the problem of China, might not yield to a 
negotiated settlement. The fact that the effort to recon­
cile these contradictions eventually failed does not appear
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to diminish the merit of the attempt in view of the then 
enormous public desire that government officials find some 
way to create an international foundation for lasting peace.
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^See, Feis, The China Tangle. Chapters 32 & 35; See, also, the 
series of documents, "General Situation", F.R., 1945, VII, 578-721.
2
This public demand constituted the major policymaking factor in
1945 after V-J day. Opportunities are endless for documentation on 
this point, thus, the following are altogether arbitrary citations. 
See, for example, Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 91; In an oral 
history interview, George M. Elsey (in 1945 a member of the White House 
Staff) noted that in the aftermath of the war, "The Congress and the 
country were hell-bent to get out of Europe, get home, get the war over 
with." Oral History Interview, George M. Elsey, February/March 1964, 
July 1969, April/July 1970, p. 347, HSTL; See, also. Notes on China, 23 
July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
3
A cursory reading of White House mail (letters and telegrams)
for the months after V-J day in 1945 and into 1946 reflects not only
considerable criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as corrupt and not 
worth supporting, but reveals also an overwhelming sentiment in favor 
of demobilizing American troops in China —  a large number of "bring 
the boys home" letters. See, Truman Papers, Official File, Box 632,
Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; Truman Papers, President's
Secretary Files, Box 173, ibid.; See, also, Varg, Closing of the Door, 
234-235.
4
In 1953 in a discussion concerning U.S. China policy for the 
years 1945-1952, which included Dean Acheson (in 1945 who was an Under 
Secretary of State) and Herbert Feis, among others, the late 1945/early
1946 period was recalled as one in which domestic public opinion would 
never have allowed American intervention in China on a scale sufficient 
so as to guarantee some preferred outcome. Notes on China, 23 July 
1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL; See, also, Varg. 
Closing of the Door, 242-243; In reporting on American public opinion 
in the latter part of December 1945, Under Secretary of State Acheson 
wrote to General George C. Marshall in China that mail to the White 
House was "practically unanimous in opposing U.S. participation in the 
Chinese Civil War."; "In light of this and other types of evidence, the 
conclusion is that the use of U.S. troops in China is unpopular with 
the American people." The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in 
China, 20 December 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 786.
^See, Steele, The American People and China, 27-31; Paul A. Varg. 
Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats; The American Protestant Movement 
in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958),
275-276, 288-289, 292-293; Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton 
Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL. (In this last citation, the point is 
made that at war's end a number of American military personnel were 
none to happy with the Chiang regime; there was no attitude that 
"Chiang played ball with us, now we'll play with him."); See, also, a 
memorandum from Owen Lattimore to Ambassador Edwin W- Pauley (Personal
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Representative of the President on the Reparations Commission), that, 
"It would...be incautious to take it for granted that the present 
strong anti-Russian trend in America means that there will be strong 
support for...heavy intervention in China. On the contrary there is a 
danger that the Administration may run into increasingly heavy criti­
cism. There are two sources of criticism that should be especially 
watched for danger signals: a) civilians getting back into China —
especially missionaries and others who get into the interior away from 
the ports and in touch with the common people; b) returning servicemen 
from China, who almost universally have a strong dislike for Chungking 
officials and Chinese regular officers." Memorandum from Owen Latti­
more to Ambassador Pauley, 28 November 1945, President’s Secretary 
Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^Memorandum by the Treasury Department Representative in China and 
the Assistant Commerical Attache in China to the Charge in China, 19 
December 1945, F.R., 1945, Vll, 777-783; The Charge in China to the 
Secretary of State, 8 October 1945, ibid., 1165; The Consul-General at 
Shanghai to the Secretary of State, 13 November 1945, ibid., 1175-1177; 
See, also. The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in China, 19 
December 1945, ibid., 1376-1377; The Consul-General at Shanghai to the 
Secretary of State, 20 December 1945, ibid., 1377-1378.
^The available documentary evidence does not reveal that any 
government official concerned with China policy after V-J day advocated 
an American withdrawal from China.
g
See, for example, General Marshall's remarks, that the longer the 
delay in getting Nationalist troops into North China and Manchuria —  a 
task officials knew could not be accomplished without American assis­
tance, "...the less probability of the Generalissimo's being able to 
establish a decent semblance of control over Manchuria, and the conse­
quent certainty that the Russians will definitely build up such a con­
trol." Memorandum by General of the Army George C. Marshall to Fleet 
Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy, 30 November 1945, ibid., 748.
9
See, a draft War Department statement of late November 1945, "It 
is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, peaceful, united 
and effective China is of the utmost importance to the success of this 
United Nations organization and for world peace. A China disorganized 
and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by 
the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influ­
ence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The U.S. 
Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of 
internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign 
nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach 
of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. 
It is thus in the most vital interest of the U.S. and all sovereign
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nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust 
their internal differences without resort to violence." Draft State­
ment Prepared in the War Department, no date, (late) November 1945, 
ibid., 749.
^^See, Theoharis, Seeds of Repression, Appendix I, "Popular Atti­
tudes Concerning Foreign Policy."; Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 
289.
^^See, Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson 
Papers, HSTL. (On this point, the comment is made that at war's end 
there was the quetion of "the frame of mind of the non-Soviet world", 
i.e., the question was, would the public accept a hard stand in China 
with respect to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists before other 
techniques were first given a chance?); See, Gaddis, Origins of the 
Cold War, 206; It is of some interest to note that despite considerable 
suspicion of Soviet motives, probably the most hardline of any top 
officials, the Secretaries of War and Navy, in late November 1945 were 
suggesting that the United States approach the Soviets for the purpose 
of obtaining clarification and agreement on a series of questions 
concerning Manchuria and the occupation of that province by the Nation­
alist government. See, Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and Navy 
to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 677; 
Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 27 Novem­
ber 1945, ibid., 685; Secretary of State Byrnes still was inclined to 
give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt in January of 1946. He 
observed, "My estimate is that at this time he (Stalin) intends to live 
up to his treaty with China and will not intentionally do anything to 
destroy our efforts for (a) unified China", 4 January 1946, F.R., 1946, 
IX, 18; See, also, Steele, American People and China, 32; In late 
January of 1946, Stalin reiterated to the American Ambassador, Averell 
Harriman, as the latter was leaving Moscow for the last time, his 
(Stalin's) implied support for the American policy of mediation between 
the KMT and CCP. Harriman, Special Envoy, 531-532.
12
On this matter of using the prospect of American economic assis­
tance as a device by which to encourage Soviet cooperation on various 
postwar diplomatic questions and for American expectations as to the 
projected utility of this device, see, Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 
Chapter 6, 215-224; Harriman, Special Envoy, 450.
^^Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 224-243; In the planning of 
Amrican policy toward China in the late months of 1945, the factor of 
public opinion and potential criticism of an excessive American in­
volvement in China's internal affairs was a common consideration in the 
minds of policymakers. See, for example. Memorandum by General of the 
Army George C. Marshall to Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of 
Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 30 November 1945, 
F.R., 1945, VII, 748.
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14
See, Seyom Brown. The Faces of Power; Constancy and Change in 
United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Colum­
bia University Press, 1968), 31-33; Virtually all of the arguments 
present in 1945 after V-J day against a significant increase in nature 
of the American presence in China included the expectation that it 
would be criticized as "intervening unilaterally, contrary to national 
policy, in the internal affairs of China...." Memorandum by the Direc­
tor of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 19 November 1945, F.R., 1945, 
VII, 640.
^^Brown, Faces of Power, 36; One reason that policymakers were 
determined to maintain limits on military assistance to the Nationalist 
government in 1945 was to ensure that the Soviets did not see it as an 
attempt by the U.S. to establish a military foothold on the East Asian 
mainland. Report by the State-Way-Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 
October 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 588-589. (In this SWNCC report, the 
comment is made, "...one must keep the U.S.S.R. in mind...as a competi­
tor in the event that we do supply materials and advice on a scale 
which the U.S.S.R. might interpret as threatening." Ibid., 588); The 
Commanding General of U.S. Forces in China, Albert C. Wedemeyer, ob­
served in latter November 1945, that American, "Interference in the 
internal affairs of China... might involve the U.S. in a serious dis­
pute or possibly war with Soviet Russia." The Commanding General, U.S. 
Forces, China Theater to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 20 
November 1945, ibid., 658.
^^See, for example, questions raised by members of Congress con­
cerning American interference in China's internal affairs. The Under 
Secretary of State to Representative Hugh DeLacy, 9 October 1945, 
ibid., 577-578; Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, 16 October 1945, ibid., 580- 
581; A reading of White House mail in 1945 after V-J day reveals a 
number of letters and telegrams which argue against unwarranted U.S. 
interference in China's internal affairs. See, Official File, Box 632, 
Truman Papers, HSTL; See, also, Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton 
Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL. (In discussing this period, an uniden­
tified source suggests, "...I think if you look back to the public 
press of 1946, you find a great deal more comment among American publi­
cists on the degree to which we were intervening in China, than you 
would complaint about the shortgage of intervention in China."); The 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, 
observed in mid-October 1945, that one advantage to withdrawing Ameri­
can military forces from China (he did not support this option), would 
be "...to silence widespread criticism that we were interfering in the 
internal affairs of China by supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the 
Chinese Communists." Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, 19 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 640; See, also. 
Brown, Faces of Power. 32, 36.
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It is of some significance to note in this regard that Represen­
tative Mike Mansfield's remarks concerning the dangers of American 
interference in China's internal affairs was given full play in the 
Soviet press, this reported to Washington by the Embassy in Moscow. 
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 17 Octo­
ber 1945, F.R., 1945, Vll, 581-852.
18
See, for example, Draft Prepared in the Department of State, 8 
December 1945, ibid., 757; A SWMCC report on China policy in the latter 
part of October 1945, argued that "In granting any military assistance 
to China we should.. .exercise care to give no basis for a suspicion 
that we are creating a ^  facto colonial army in China under our offi­
cial aegis." Report by the State-War-Mavy Coordinating Committee, 22 
October 1945, ibid., 589; General Wedemeyer wrote in the latter part of 
November 1945, that American, "Interference in the internal affairs of 
China would...be repugnant to U.S. foreign policy recently enunciated 
in the President's Navy Day Speech wherein the principle of self- 
determination was reaffirmed...." The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, 
China Theater to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 20 November 
1945, ibid., 658; See, also, the concern of the Director of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, that if the U.S. were to 
send too large a military advisory group to the Nationalist government, 
it might raise the question, "...as to whether we are not moving toward 
establishment of a relationship with China which has some of the char­
acteristics of a de facto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese 
army under our direction." Vincent went on to suggest that such a 
situation could well "occasion serious difficulties for us", it might 
put the U.S. in "an uneviable, and perhaps untenable position", that it 
might disturb, "... our international political relations to the point 
that might negate the assumed security advantages of our military 
position in China." Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, 12 November 1945, ibid., 615, 616-617.
19For an account of this cabinet meeting in which Marshall's name 
was suggested as a replacement for Hurley, see, John M. Blum, ed. 
The Price of Vision; The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 519-522; See, also. May, The Truman Admin­
istration and China, 56-57; Melby, Mandate of Heaven, 38; See, also, H. 
Bradford Westerfield. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor
to Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 252; (In this
regard Westerfield also reports Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg's state­
ment to the effect that because Marshall was one of the most able men 
in the nation, he (Vandenberg), for one, would not question Marshall 
until the latter had an opportunity to work out a plan for China." 
Ibid., 247.); In a 1967 oral history interview, Edwin A. Locke, Jr., in 
1945 an economic adviser to President Truman, recalled that the only 
way Truman could have topped Hurley's resignation was to appoint a man 
of Marshall's stature. With respect to the problem of getting the
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Kuomintang and Chinese Communists to settle their differences peace­
fully, Locke further noted, that under the circumstances, the best 
possible appointment was a "military" man with Marshall's stature. 
Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Oral History Interview, 5 April 1967, pp. 79-81, 
HSTL.
20
Fais, The China Tangle, 412; Buhite, Hurley, 272; See, also, the 
American concern expressed by the American Embassies in Moscow and 
Chungking concerning the Soviet reaction to the Hurley resignation. 
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 20 Decem­
ber 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 702-704; The Charge in China to the Secre­
tary of State, 23 December 1945, ibid., 706.
21See, Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy, 6 November 1945, ibid., 606-607; Memorandum by the Secretaries of 
War and Navy to the Secretary of State, 26 November 1945, ibid., 672; 
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, 8 December 1945, ibid., 
756; Memorandum of Conversation by Lieutenant General John E. Hull, War 
Department General Staff, 10 December 1945, ibid., 762.
22
It is almost impossible not to draw this conclusion in view of 
the constant use of "Open Door" terminology on the part of American 
officials, especially as they attempted to obtain Soviet acceptance of 
the "Open Door" principles of equal commercial access for all nations 
in China and of the territorial and administrative integrity of China 
in coming to concrete agreements concerning Manchuria. See, for exam­
ple, Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Secretary 
of State, 28 July 1945, ibid., 950-951; Memorandum by the Secretary of 
War to President Truman, 16 July 1945, ibid., 943; Memorandum of Con­
versation by the Minister Counselor to the Soviet Union, 8 August 1945, 
ibid., 960-965; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of 
State, 22 August 1945, ibid., 979; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union 
to the Secretary of State, 24 August 1945, ibid., 981; The Ambassador 
in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 27 August 1945, ibid., 
981; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 4 
September 1945, ibid., 984-985; See, also, China White Paper, 118.
23
See, Truman. Years of Trial and Hope, 62.
24A State Department intelligence report of mid-December 1945, 
observed that, "Implementation of U.S. commitments to remove Japanese 
troops from China has involved the use of U.S. forces...in a manner 
which has been of important and direct advantage to the National Gov­
ernment in its position relative to the Chinese Communists." The 
report went on, "The successes achieved by the Chinese Communists,... 
without assistance from the United States, and in the face of American 
assistance to Chungking may be considered to have affected an apprecia­
ble reduction of American influence upon Yenan." State Department, 
Interim Research and Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch,
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"Estimate of the Implications of the Present Situation in China for 
Possible American Programs," 14 December 1945, R & A Report No. (?), 
pp. 1, 4, UPA.
25
On this particular point, official logic proceeded along the 
lines that if U.S. military power were withdrawn from China, the Nation­
alist government would not be able to maintain its position in North 
China and Manchuria, Japanese troops would remain unpatriated, chaos 
would ensue, and the Soviets would use this as an excuse to stay in 
Manchuria indefinitely. Thus, the decision to keep the Marines in 
China longer than anticipated so as to ensure successful repatriation 
of the Japanese was made in direct relation to the continuing fact of 
Soviet power in Manchuria and the estimate of what would happen in the 
event the Nationalists proved unable to complete successfully the task 
of repatriation. In the American view, a Nationalist failure on this 
score would mean "open season" on Manchuria so far as the Soviets were 
concerned; See, for example, the arguments of the Secretaries of War 
and Navy. Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secre­
tary of State, 26 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 672-674, 676; See, 
also, Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 
27 November 1945, ibid., 685; Memorandum by General of the Army George 
C. Marshall to Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 30 November 1945, ibid. , 748.
26
See, for example, the late October 1945 SWNCC report on U.S. 
policy toward China which links the degree and nature of American mili­
tary assistance to the Nationalist government directly in relation to 
the manner of the Soviet presence in East Asia. Report by the State- 
War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 October 1945, ibid., 588-589; See, 
also, the concern of officials in the first several months of 1946 
concerning public criticism of the Marines staying in China and this 
relative to Soviet pronouncements of the intention to withdraw their 
troops from Manchuria. The Secretary of State to General Marshall, 27 
February 1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 849; General Marshall to Lieutenant 
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 24 March 1946, ibid., 855.
27
See, Feis. The China Tangle, 368-372; See, also, Oral Statement 
by President Truman to Dr. T. V. Soong Concerning Assistance to China, 
14 September 1945, in China White Paper, 939.
28
See, Feis. The China Tangle, 421; Draft of Letter from Presi­
dent Truman to General Marshall, no date (early December) 1945, F.R., 
1945, VII, 765.
29Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall, 11 December 
1945, ibid.. 767-769.
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30Marshall met with the President and Secretary of State on Decem­
ber 11 on Marshall's request for the purpose of resolving all questions 
as to the implications concerning his directives for the mediation 
mission he was about to undertake. Having discussed means by which 
Marshall might pressure the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 
the direction of a political settlement, Marshall then asked the Presi­
dent and the Secretary, what, "...if the Generalissimo...failed to make 
reasonable concessions, and this resulted in the breakdown of the 
efforts to secure a political unification, and the U.S. abandoned con­
tinued support of the Generalissimo, there would follow the tragic 
consequences of a divided China and of a probable Russian resumption of 
power in Manchuria, the combined effect of this resulting in the defeat 
or loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific. Under these 
circumstances. General Marshall inquired whether or not it was intended 
for him, in that unfortunate eventually, to go ahead and assist the 
Generalissimo in the movement of troops into North China. This would 
mean that this Government would have to swallow its pride and much of 
its policy in doing so."; The President and Mr. Byrnes concurred in 
this view of the matter; that is, that we would have to back the Gen­
eralissimo to the extent of assisting him to move troops into North 
China in order that the evacuation of the Japanese be completed." 
Ibid., 768; This point was reiterated 3 days later in another meeting 
with President Truman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 
Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall, 14 December 1945, 
ibid., 770.
^^Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 296-298; Harriman, Special En­
voy, 447-454; Truman, Year of Decisions, 82-84; It is of interest and 
significance to note the inclusion of Moscow Embassy reporting of 
Patrick J. Hurley's visit with Stalin in mid-April 1945, reports which 
cautioned against accepting Hurley's more optimistic account of his 
meeting with the Soviet leader, in the China White Paper, 96-98; Buhite, 
Hurley, 221-222; Feis, The China Tangle, 287-288; Brown, Faces of Power, 
33-35; The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secreatry of State, 23 
April 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 342-343; The Chief of the Division of 
Eastern European Affairs wrote in mid-May 1945, that in East Asia, "In 
its efforts to attain considerable influence in this area, the Soviet 
Government will undoubtedly endeavor to use, iÆ they are permitted to, 
the same unilateral methods which they have so effectively applied in 
eastern and central Europe." (emphasis added). Memorandum by the Chief 
of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, 10 May 1945, ibid., 865; 
In May 1945, the Charge of American Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan, 
wrote this about the Soviet leadership: "...no one in Moscow believes
that the Western world, once confronted with the life-size wolf of 
Soviet displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow the 
house in, would be able to stand firm. And it is on this disbelief 
that Soviet global policy is based." Kennan, Memoirs, Annex B, 582.
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See, Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall, 11 December 
1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 767-768; See also the late October 1945 SWNCC 
report on China policy which established that U.S. aid to the Nation­
alist government would have to be calculated so as to encourage reforms 
which would honor the political fact of the Chinese Communist Party, 
described by the report as, "a dynamic force controlling considerable 
areas...and population— ." Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee, 22 October 1945, ibid., 586-587.
33
Ibid., 588-589. This same late October 1945 SWNCC report clear­
ly argued that American aid to the Nationalist government would have to 
be calculated with respect to Soviet sensibilities in order to preserve 
whatever prospects for postwar cooperation which might still exist; The 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, in surveying the mili­
tary options for American policy in mid-November 1945, argued that an 
increase in the American military presence in China, "would probably be
resented by Russia " Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs, 19 November 1945, ibid., 641.
34See, Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 22 
October 1945, ibid., 589; Memorandum by the Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs, 12 November 1945, ibid., 616-617.
35In arguing against sending any large American military advisory 
mission to the Nationalist government, the Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs wrote in November 1945, that care should be taken 
not to generate the impression the U.S. was,"...moving toward estab­
lishment of a relationship with China which has some of the character­
istics of a de facto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese army 
under our direction." Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 12 November 1945, ibid., 
615. It is true the Director of OFEA had principally in mind to avoid 
the accusation of imperialism being directed against the U.S. in making 
this point. However, American officials also knew that Chiang Kai-shek 
himself was adamantly opposed to an excess of American interference in 
China's internal affairs. See, Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton 
Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL; See, also, Tang Tsou, America's Failure, 
103-105; Officials were also clearly aware of Chiang's extreme sensi­
tivity on his image as an ardent Chinese nationalist, see, Office of 
Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "China's Destiny - by 
Chiang Kai-shek", 15 July 1943, R & A Report No. 951, 1/15, UP A.
36See, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs to the Secretary of State, 12 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 
616-617; Of course, this assumption that too much American assistance 
would reduce the Kuomintang's incentive to reform, formed the basis for 
a major component of Administration China policy in 1945, to wit, that 
the degree of American aid be tied directly to the extent the Kuomin­
tang leadership demonstrated a willingess to undertake genuine economic
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and political reforms. See, Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee, 22 October 1945, ibid., 586-587, 589; The Charge in China to 
the Secretary of State, 29 December 1945, ibid., 1198.
37See, Forrest Davis and Robert A. Hunter. The Red China Lobby 
(New York: Fleet Publishing Corp., 1963), 45, 47, 48, 51, 52; Kubek,
How The Far East Was Lost, 319, 322; Freda Utley. The China Story,
ix-x.
38
See Chapter I, pp. 5-6.
39See, Memorandum of Conversation by General Marshall, 11 December 
1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 767-769 ; In a mid-December meeting with Presi­
dent Truman, General Marshall sought confirmation on his directives 
prior to leaving on his mediation mission to China. Marshall again 
raised a question concerning the full implications of American backing 
of the Nationalist government in the event Chiang refused to make 
concessions necessary to a political settlement in China. Marshall 
recorded the following exchange, "I stated my understanding of one 
phase of my directive was not in writing but I thought I had a clear 
understanding of his (the President's) desires in the matter, which was 
that in the event that I was unable to secure the necessary action by 
the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and desirable, it would 
still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me, to continue to 
back the National Government... through the Generalissimo within the 
terms of the announced policy of the U.S. Government."; "The President 
stated that the aforegoing was a correct summation of his direction...; 
The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, confirmed this...." Memo­
randum of Conversation by General Marshall, 14 December 1945, ibid., 
770.
40See, White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure, 214-
222, 251-252; Varg, Closing the Door, 232-234.
^^Ibid., 232-233.
^^Ibid., 234-235; Steele, American People and China, 30-31; West­
erfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 254; Varg, Missionaries, 
Chinese and Diplomats, 289, 290-292, 293-298; United States Congress, 
Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 July 1946, 10223- 
10228; Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, 
HSTL; A reading of White House mail (telegrams and letters) reveal 
extensive criticism of the Nationalist government, some are from pri­
vate individuals, missionaries or other persons with experience in 
China, some obviously from left-wing groups with a distinctly political- 
philosophical repugnance for the Chiang regime, some are from members 
of Congress. See, Truman Papers, Official File, Box 632, Harry S. 
Truman Library, Independnece, Mo.; Memorandum by the Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 19 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 640;
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The Under Secretary of State to Representative Hugh DeLacy, 9 October 
1945, ibid., 577-578; Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, 16 October 1945, 
ibid., 580-581; The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in China, 
20 December 1945, ibid., 786.
43For examples of this sort of thinking reaching the White House,
see. Official File, Box 632, Truman Papers, HSTL.
44Officials in late 1945 saw no realistic option to the Marshall
mission as designed hopefully to establish unity and stability in China
on the basis of a political settlement. Officials knew they could not 
go in "all the way" and guarantee a preferred outcome in China. Like­
wise, they knew they could not withdraw the American presence from 
China altogether because civil war was sure to result with a consequent 
extension of Soviet power in Asia. In discussing this situation years 
later —  a discussion which included Dean Acheson (in 1945, Under 
Secretary of State and General Marshall's Washington liaison) and 
Herbert Feis —  the comment is made by Feis, with respect to this 
policymaking situation on China in late 1945, that, "...you had to do 
something in between. Not that you thought it was logical; not that 
you thought it was the best of anything, but it was all that was open 
to you, and that was to work out something along the lines of the 
Marshall program." Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, 
Acheson Papers, HSTL; In mid-December 1945, in a last "word of encour­
agement and appreciation" to General Marshall on his departure to 
China, President Truman revealed clearly his Administration's view of 
the limited options in the situation, "I believe the development of a 
strong, united and democratic China is essential. The alternatives 
seem to me clearly to be disunity or prolonged civil war, neither of 
which would be in our interests nor in the interests of international 
peace." President Truman to General Marshall, 15 December 1945, F.R., 
1945, VII, 773; in his Memoirs, Truman later described the policy 
problem this way: "The problem of Communism in China differed consid­
erably from political problems elsewhere. Chiang Kai-shek was not 
confronted by a militant political minority scattered throughout the 
population but by a rival government that controlled a definite portion 
of the territory, with about one fourth of the population."; "Our posi­
tion in China offered us little choice. We could not simply wash our 
hands of the situation. There were still nearly three million Japanese 
in China, over one million of them military. Unless we made certain 
that this force was eliminated, the Japanese, even in defeat, might 
gain control of China simply by their ability to tip the scales in the 
contest for power."; "The other alternative was equally impracticable. 
That would have been to throw into China unlimited resources and large 
armies of American soldiers to defeat the Communists, remove the Japan­
ese from the mainland, and compel Russian withdrawal from Manchuria by 
force. The American people would never stand for such an undertak­
ing."; "We decided, therefore, that the only course of action open to
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us was to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China, to 
support the Generalissimo politically, economically, and, within limits, 
militarily. But we could not become involved in a fratricidal war in 
China." Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 63.
*^In a 1974 oral history interview with Philip D. Sprouse, during 
the Marshall mission attached to the Embassy in China, he comments that 
Marshall, "...himself knew that this was an almost impossible mission, 
but it was worth the effort because the alternatives were so horrible 
for China and the world-at-large." Philip D. Sprouse, Oral History 
Interview, 11 February 1974, p, 27, HSTL.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MARSHALL MISSION, JANUARY - APRIL, 1946;
THE END OF SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION 
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA
In late 1945 the Tnunan Administration saw no 
alternative to a political-diplomatic solution in China. So 
important was the political, as opposed to the military, 
solution that, as Akira Iriye correctly argues, the Admin­
istration's sending of the Marshall Mission constituted an 
American interference in internal Chinese affairs beyond 
what Washington earlier envisioned would be necessary. 
However, that interference not only seemed unavoidable but 
necessary given the high stakes involved.^
Only a political resolution would allow the Admin­
istration to sustain a satisfying balance of the multiple 
factors which determined China policy; that would grant 
policy some margin of safety in which to succeed. Only the 
political solution would satisfy the strong official urge to 
proceed with the most ine3q>ensive and uncomplicated option 
in promoting the transition from war to lasting peace in 
China and East Asia. Only the political solution would 
satisfy the strong public desire for an end to international 
conflict.
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Consistent with the Administration's desire to 
remain as aloof as possible from assuming direct responsi­
bility for China's internal problems. President Truman's 
December 15th statement on policy served notice that the 
United States would not become involved in the implementa­
tion of political agreements between the Kuomintang and the
2
Chinese Communists.
Shortly after his arrival, however, Marshall soon 
found that his chief priority - helping to achieve a cease 
fire between the two - was not exclusively a military 
problem; it was intricately bound up with a series of rela­
ted political questions. As a result, Marshall agreed to 
broaden the nature of his involvement, assuming direct 
mediation responsibilities with respect to Kuomintang- 
Communist controversies.
In this capacity, Marshall was determined to 
maintain an open mind, to remain fair toward both the Kuo­
mintang and the Chinese Communists and to do all that he 
could, to exploit every opportunity, to help foster a polit­
ical settlement between the two. Marshall never relin­
quished this particular interpretation of his role. His 
activities, from beginning to end, constituted a genuine 
mediation effort and the fact that his role in these matters 
eventually drew criticism from both sides provides a measure 
of his sincerity of purpose. Even in the frustration of 
failure, Marshall continued to display an even temperament
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by heaping blame on the leadership of both the Kuomintang
and the Chinese Communists for their unwillingness to settle
4differences peaceably.
Maintaining an attitude of fairness, though, did 
not mean that Marshall represented a purely neutral position 
in the matter of achieving a political settlement in China. 
Indeed he made no effort to hide the fact of his lack of 
neutrality from the Communists. The Marshall Mission was 
the cutting edge of American China policy and both Washing­
ton and the General assumed that a primary American interest 
was to foster the development of a non-communist China. But 
Administration planning of the Marshall Mission was in large 
measure predicated on the assumption that non-communist 
interests, American and Chinese, would be best served by a 
political settlement which also recognized the interests of 
the Chinese Communist party. Marshall’s desire to fulfill 
the non-communist aspiration, therefore, required that he 
remain accessible to Communist negotiators and sensitive to 
their political concerns. An immoderate display of partial­
ity toward the Kuomintang in his role as mediator would have 
wrecked in short order the American purpose to facilitate a 
political settlement.
The multiple concerns which produced the American 
desire to achieve a political settlement also rested on the 
belief that this was the best option for the Nationalist 
government; any effort to resolve China's internal problems
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through military means would work to the disadvantage of 
Chiang and his regime. Marshall shared the view of offi­
cials in Washington that the Nationalists simply could not 
be expected to defeat the Chinese Communists in a military 
contest and that over the long term the Kuomintang might in 
fact lose.^
It is true, that in early 1946 the Nationalist 
government possessed superior military force by conventional 
standards. It commanded substantially greater numbers of 
troops, had access to comparable levels of armaments and 
munitions and controlled the urban industrial and communica­
tions facilities. Because of this, no one at the time 
really questioned at length the ability of Chiang and his 
armies, if it became necessary, to put up an effective 
resistance against Communist forces for some indefinite 
period of time. But how long the Kuomintang could hold out 
and under what circumstances remained unanswered questions.^
Decision-makers recognized that the Kuomintang was 
deficient in military leadership, organization and troop 
morale. As a result, American officials concluded that, in 
view of known Communist organizational and military compe­
tence, generally high troop morale, and an increasingly 
secure political and military base of operations in North 
China and Manchuria, the best Chiang and his regime could 
hope for in a civil war would be a divided China with the 
Communists in the north and Nationalist consolidation in
-135-
central and south China. Gradually, however, because of 
Kuomintang civil and military deficiencies, through continu­
ing conflict the Nationalists would begin to lose control in 
these regions.
Just as was the case during the war of resistance 
against Japan, Chiang would be unable to initiate needed 
reforms with the result that existing military incompetence 
and corruption in the Nationalist army command structure 
merely would be exacerbated. The militarist dominated 
Kuomintang political organizations would remain the same and 
as a result social and economic reform also would go wanting 
with the consequence of the regime increasingly isolated by
n
virtue of mounting popular dissatisfaction.
There was also the related view that, subsequent 
to the start of hostilities, the Communists would possess a 
distinct advantage in the fact of their unofficial status. 
Economic and social deterioration was certain to follow as a 
concomitant of civil conflict. The Communists would be free 
to employ tactics designed to further this declining state 
of affairs and much to their own good fortune. For one 
thing the Kuomintang, with responsibility for administering 
the recognized government, would be forced to accept full 
blame for the disintegration of economy and society. Not 
only that, but since the Communist organization did not draw 
its material sustenance from the established order, as did 
the Kuomintang, a collapse of the traditional economic and
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social sectors could only work to the disadvantage of the 
Nationalist government.
But if all these facts went a long way toward 
producing in officials considerable doubt that Chiang's 
armies would be able to challenge successfully the Commu­
nists, they had another reason for thinking a Nationalist 
defeat probably unavoidable in the long run. Decision­
makers believed the Chinese Communists would turn to the 
Soviet Union for supply and support in the event of civil 
war. Administration officials not only assumed the Chinese 
Communists would require external support in order to 
achieve final military success but that Yenan, because of 
the international alignment which would prevail at that 
time, would have no choice but to seek Russian aid. Offi­
cials further assumed that the Soviets would give it, 
thereby eliminating whatever deficiency might exist in the 
Chinese Communist arsenal. Once this happened it would seal 
the doom of the Nationalist government unless the United 
States were to counter with a substantial commitment of its 
own manpower and resources —  something which decision-
Û
makers had concluded was out of the question.
With the advantage of hindsight it is now known 
that the manner and degree of Soviet interference in the 
Chinese civil war never reached proportions which Admini­
stration officials anticipated. Its seems virtually certain 
that Yenan received only modest material assistance from the
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Russians throughout the course of the civil war. The mis­
taken expectations, though, do not diminish the fact that 
decision-makers in 1945 and for a good part of 1946 were 
convinced their predictions would prove accurate. Officials 
did begin to discard this view in its particular form by the 
end of 1946 and early 1947 when it became apparent that the 
Soviet-Chinese Communist relationship was not developing as 
earlier anticipated.^®
Decision-makers were deeply disturbed by the pros­
pect of a possible Communist triumph in China. Particularly 
odious was the official expectation that a Chinese Communist 
victory would result in Soviet dominance in Manchuria. In 
this regard, the documents reveal a considerable number of 
official references to the "Open Door".^^ The frequency of 
this language easily might lead one to the conclusion that 
traditional American economic ambitions toward China may 
have played a major role in determining the Administration's 
policy. Care must be exercised, however, in assessing the 
significance of this rhetoric and in evaluating the meaning 
that decision-makers attached to the "Open Door" concept as 
it related to China after World War II.
Despite the strong economic implications of the 
"Open Door" idea, the use of this terminology in the docu­
ments does not appear to suggest an official expectation of 
great commercial and investment opportunities for American 
business in Manchuria and China as a whole. Nor, in a
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related vein, do the documents reveal that Administration
officials sought to prevent a Communist takeover so as to
preserve the country's commercial opportunities for American
capitalism. On the contrary, officials well understood that
the underdeveloped nature of the Chinese economy, including
that of Manchuria, could not be expected to provide for some
time to come extensive opportunities for American commerce
and investment even granting the continuing administrative
auspices of the Nationalist government.
This expectation of only modest future economic
opportunities in East Asia, a prognosis confirmed by the
President's special economic adviser on China, Edwin Locke,
Jr., was joined by the fact that on a worldwide basis there
12was no critical margin for American commerce. As the re­
ports of the Export-Import Bank indicated, from the end of
the war through 1946 American goods found world markets 
13insatiable. In view of all the other opportunities there 
was no immediate reason for the Administration to be con­
cerned, commercially, with the disposition of a nation which 
did not possess sufficient resources to pay for American 
goods or to be concerned, financially, with an area charac­
terized by political instability and economic uncertainty.
Moreover, it is relevant to note that the Admini­
stration supported Chiang's regime in 1945 and 1946 in spite 
of considerable dissatisfaction with what, from the point of 
view of American business interests already located in
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China, officials considered were thoroughly unacceptable 
Nationalist economic policies, e.g., insufficient currency 
stabilization devices, unrealistic monetary exchange rates, 
and improper utilization of gold reserve sales as^  counter 
inflationary m e a s u r e s . A n d ,  this support continued right 
up to the time of the Nationalist retreat to Formosa in 1949
V
despite substantial official pessimism that Chiai^g would 
ever prove willing to initiate economic and social reforms 
which seemed necessary to attract greater foreign investment 
and encourage increased commercial interchange with other 
countries.
All this strongly implies that something other 
than the economic factor determined American China policy in 
1945 and early 1946. The question then is what significance 
did officials impute to their use of "Open Door" language at 
the time? For one thing, it probably had emotive signifi­
cance for some officials who found it more satisfying to 
discuss the specific issues of American China policy in 
context of an idealistic assessment of the historic United 
States relationship with China. Or, it may have appealed to 
those who genuinely believed the Administration had a re­
sponsibility to assist the Chinese on the basis of the 
presumption that the nature of the traditional relationship 
between America and China produced a moral obligation to 
continue to do so.^^
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There was also a certain amount of convenience in 
using "Open Door" terminology. The historic "Open Door" 
advocacy of the territorial and administrative integrity of 
China was consistent with the official desire to achieve 
unity and stability there in 1945 and 1946. This was more 
than mere coincidence, however. As outlined in an earlier 
chapter, the Truman Administration's approach to East Asia, 
in part did rest on the long sustained American notion, 
often found in association with other "Open Door" concepts, 
that only a China free of outside interference could hope to 
achieve a lasting internal condition of unity and stability 
through a balance of all political forces native to that 
country.
This natural inclination to employ tradtional lan­
guage should not be taken to imply necessarily that concept­
ual carelessness and analytic shallowness predominated in 
decision-making attitudes about China. The Administration's 
public invocation of the revered tradition of the "Open 
Door" undoubtedly was deliberate and had its practical 
importance. The concept as it related to China had a sym­
bolic quality comparable to that of the Monroe Doctrine in 
the matter of American attitudes about the Western Hemis­
phere. Both of these creations, in their multiple connota­
tions of such breadth as to suit the fancy of many political 
imaginations, could be invoked to legitimize a considerable 
range of policy purposes. Both concepts not only granted to
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the American government righteous justification for involve­
ment but moral obligation to do so. This license in the
image of the "Open Door" could be enormously useful in
countering public doubt about the propriety of American
1 7involvement in China.
It is further suggested that public use of "Open
Door" rhetoric was simply another means that officials could
use to make clear to all concerned, but especially to the
Soviets, the importance which the Administration attached to
its policy of unity and stability in China. Or, in a more
negative vein, another way officials could convey, without
question, their view as to the unacceptability of a direct
1 8extension of Soviet power into Manchuria.
However, "Open Door" references in the official
record were also a product of the policy-making environment 
on China, one reminiscent of those decision-making circum­
stances which American officials had faced on the question 
of United States policy toward China even before the turn of 
the 20th Century. The simple fact of the matter is that, 
because domestic public pressures reduced available deploy­
able resources, Truman administration officials were not 
dealing from a power base sufficient to guarantee policy 
preferences for China. Thus the use of "Open Door" rhetoric 
must be understood as a verbal compensation for the Admin­
istration’s unwillingness or inability to commit an adequate 
level of American resources in order to insure preferred 
policy outcomes.
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This tendency, to substitute some higher moral 
authority verbally in the absence of the will to actively 
manipulate circumstances in the direction of policy goals, 
constitutes one of the predominating characteristics of 
American China policy in the 19th and especially the 20th 
Century. Developing Administration suspicion concerning 
Soviet behavior in combination with the rapidly declining 
relative international power status of the United States in 
1945 and 1946, therefore, only made resurrection of the 
venerated "Open Door" concept that much more useful to 
decision-makers determined to convince all concerned to 
support the requirements of the American policy for China.
Truman administration officials were not opposed 
to a Communist takeover in China and especially Soviet 
domination of Manchuria because it would eliminate economic 
opportunities for American business. Rather decision-makers 
opposed this for the same reasons they favored the policy of 
settling China's internal problems through political diplo­
matic means; a failure to prevent civil war in China would 
mean the failure of peace elsewhere in Asia. A Communist 
victory in China would result in an extension of Soviet 
power in East Asia unacceptable from the point of view of 
the American national interest. Policymakers simply did not 
want to have to deal if at all possible with this or any of
the other pernicious effects which they anticipated might be
20spawned by a Chinese civil war.
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However, the desire to place limits on Soviet 
power and influence in East Asia constituted the darker side 
of the policymaking picture in late 1945 and in the early 
months of 1946. And, as the more negative impulse, it still 
coexisted with the one positive which was to create some 
firm basis for achieving a stable and enduring regional 
political settlement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. It is argued here that, the latter of these 
impulses was not only important but in fact continued to be 
a prevailing one in the decision-making environment at the 
time.
For the first several months of 1946 the course of 
events in China appeared to vindicate the Administration’s 
decision to send the Marshall Mission. Marshall’s sincerity 
of purpose to proceed in such a way so as to maximize pros­
pects for a political settlement seemed to be paying off. 
And by March, at least on paper, there appeared to be 
grounds for thinking that a political settlement was well on 
the road to realization.
A flurry of political activity in China, in the 
last days of December 1945 and the first few days of the new 
year, culminated on the 10th of January in two signficant 
developments. First, both the Kuomintang and Chinese Commu­
nist leaders announced their agreement to a cease fire and 
halt to all troop movements. It was designated to go into 
effect at midnight on the thirteenth. The arrangements
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stipulated that a Committee of Three would oversee the 
details of the cease fire. General Marshall was asked and 
agreed to serve as chairman of the committee which also 
included a Kuomintang and a Chinese Communist representa­
tive. The committee would command an Executive Headquarters 
to be located in Peking which had the responsibility of 
supervising several hundred field teams (composed of one 
American, one Kuomintang representative and one Communist)
which, in turn, would operate to implement and maintain the
2Xcease fire in all regions of China.
On the basis of a proposal worked out before the 
Japanese surrender, a process which incidentally had inclu­
ded Ambassador Hurley’s participation, Chiang Kai-shek also 
revealed on the 31st of December that a Political Consulta­
tive Conference (PCC) would be convened on January 10th. 
The PCC would be the negotiating forum to which all politi­
cal interests and parties in China could expect to have 
access and which in its proceedings and final arrangements 
would exist for the purpose of establishing the essential 
foundation for achieving a lasting political settlement and 
creating a coalition government. On the day of its conven­
ing the PCC did bring together representatives of the Kuo­
mintang, those of the Communists as well as minority party 
or "third force" elements in Chinese politics, e.g., members 
of the Youth Party and the Democratic League, the latter
designated to represent the more liberal attitude on the
22political spectrum.
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The PCC worked through until the end of the month, 
resting its case in the form of a series of resolutions and 
proposals. The result was rather vague. But it was a 
beginning. The PCC reviewed various problems relating to 
economic and social reconstruction in the aftermath of war 
and provided that this would be a first priority of the 
coalition government. It also discussed organizational 
reform of the government structure. Delegates paid atten­
tion to the question of a constitution and a national assem­
bly and agreed that the Nationalist constitutional draft 
proposal of 1936, which included provisions for a national
assembly, should exist as the basis for further arrangements
93and renovations in this regard.
The PCC also addressed the problem of Communist 
military reorganization as it related to the previously 
agreed upon plan that, as part of the political settlement, 
Yenan's forces would be integrated into the Nationalist Army 
which, then, on the basis of promised American training and 
supply, would exist to maintain internal order under the 
auspices of the new coalition government. As a result of 
PCC's resolutions on this question, a Military Commission 
was established to work out the details of military reorga­
nization and integration. The commission was composed of 
three individuals, a Kuomintang and a Communist representa­
tive, and again. General Marshall agreed to sit as the third 
member. The commission worked for several weeks and on
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February 25th announced the results of its work by issuing a 
rather elaborate set of proposals for accomplishing the 
task.^^
By March, the prospect for further movement in the 
direction of a political settlement looked good. Not only 
had both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist leadership 
appeared to endorse enthusiastically Marshall's purpose in 
coming to China but, in accord with his presence and that 
purpose, had since followed through to establish preliminary 
agreements of considerable significance. The Chinese people, 
to the extent they were able to express their feelings,
displayed genuine relief and satisfaction with the cease
25fire and the extent of success in political consultations.
Chiang Kai-shek himself openly and officially 
endorsed the resolutions of the PCC as did the Chinese 
Communist leadership (the Central Executive Committee of the 
Kuomintang formally endorsed the resolutions in mid-March 
and the Communist Central Committee was scheduled to convene 
for this purpose at the end of the month). Both also ac­
knowledged their support for the plan of the Three Man 
Military Commission for the reorganization of Communist
2 Aforces and their integration into the Nationalist Army.
As a result, Marshall determined he would return to Washing­
ton to consult with high administration officials about 
economic assistance to the Chinese on the basis of President 
Truman's earlier promise of American generosity in the event
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the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists worked out their 
differences peacefully.
Marshall intended this economic grant as a reward 
to the Chinese for the progress thus far achieved in politi­
cal negotiations and hopefully as a spur to achieving a 
final settlement. However, his purpose also derived from 
the fear of the political consequences if the Chinese 
economy continued its steady deterioration. Marshall hoped 
that an infusion of American aid would have an ameliorating 
effect on this trend. If the slide could not be reversed, 
it could not help but exacerbate an already alarming level 
of social instability. Getting the two antagonists together 
to resolve their problems peacefully would be difficult 
enough under the best of circumstances but, in context of a 
crisis situation, characterized by social and economic 
instability, it would be next to impossible for the Kuomin­
tang and the Communists to carry on successful negotia­
tions.^^
Even those in the Kuomintang and the Chinese 
Communist parties who were genuinely committed to achieving 
a political settlement would find the pressures of societal 
breakdown an overwhelming and disruptive intrusion on the 
necessity of calm and deliberation in the negotiating en-^  
viron. Besides, as Marshall suspected, there were "extre­
mist" elements in both parties who did not want to see a 
political settlement and who could be expected to play on
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popular dissatisfaction with disintegrating social and
economic conditions as a way to undermine the course of
negotiations in favor of using violent means to settle old 
28scores. Despite Chiang’s endorsement of the PCC propo­
sals, already the American Embassy had information that 
"right wing" groups in the Kuomintang were attempting to 
sabotage all political efforts to date by hiring thugs to 
assault Communists and minority party representatives, to 
incite riots and generally engage in disruptive tactics.
Some in the Embassy counseled against Marshall’s 
returning to the United States. They argued that the reso­
lutions of the Political Consultative Conference were vague 
and superficial, mere lip service to deep seated and complex 
problems and that real progress in the direction of a polit­
ical settlement was still wanting. They suggested that 
Marshall’s continued presence in China was needed as an 
incentive to both sides for renewing their efforts to engage 
in serious negotiations. If Marshall left, it would merely 
encourage further action by the Kuomintang extremists, sure
to be countered in kind by the Communists, all to the disad-
29vantages of the forces of moderation and compromise. 
Nonetheless, Marshall thought his return necessary and he 
departed for Washington in the early part of March.
Marshall’s return to the United States coincided 
with an important shift in the Administration's attitude 
about American-Soviet relations —  a shift which had a
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significant impact on China policy. Though distmist of 
Soviet international aspirations had been building for some 
time, several events in the first months of 1945, joined in 
early March by the crisis over the continuing presence and 
the threatening posture of Soviet troops in Iran, appear to 
have produced the belief in Washington that the United 
States would not receive Moscow's cooperation in resolving 
postwar problems peaceably.
Stalin’s public address on the 9th was the first 
of the major episodes which helped to trigger this change in 
official opinion concerning the Russians. In his speech, 
Stalin explained that the capitalist and communist systems 
were incompatible, that capitalist economic procedures would 
in the future inevitably cause wars and that the only solu­
tion to this dismal prospect was the elimination of all 
vestiges of capitalism to the accompaniment of triumphant 
communism. This appeared to signal to many Americans, 
including high Administration officials, that the Russians 
had dropped all pretense of sustaining the wartime spirit of 
cooperation and thus seemed to eliminate the possibility of
genuine international compromise on postwar problems between
30the two countries.
This interpretation of Stalin's statements seemed 
to be confirmed when in mid-February the Canadian government 
revealed it had arrested twenty-two members of a Soviet 
espionage network involved in obtaining information about
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the atomic bomb. Not only did this indicate that the Sovi­
ets were no longer interested in postwar cooperation but 
were actually involved in an insidious effort to obtain
atomic technology with which to facilitate the Kremlin's
31supposed malevolent international designs.
Then, near the end of the month, in response to a
State Department request for his opinion, George Kennan, in
charge of the embassy in Moscow since Ambassador Harriman's
return to Washington, sent his now famous 8000 word telegram
analyzing the power obsessions of the Russian leadership and
the essence of the ideological and nationalistic impulses
which determined Soviet international behavior. Much of
what Kennan said in late February was merely a reiteration
of what he had been arguing in his reports to Washington
over the previous year. But what he had done piecemeal he
now pulled together in a more coherent statement of his 
32views. As Kennan himself has suggested, his assessment 
reached Washington at precisely the time when high Admin­
istration officials were searching for some compelling 
rationale not only to explain cogently the reasons for their 
frustrations with the Soviets but to establish some intel­
lectual basis for developing new strategies to deal with 
them.^^ The content of Kennan*s telegram did just that.^^ 
Within days of the receipt of Kennan's telegram 
there occurred the crises in Iran. For some time. Admin­
istration officials had been concerned that the Kremlin
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might attempt to transform the Soviet wartime occupation of 
northern Iran into some more permanent arrangement, espe­
cially to the point of annexing those areas in which were 
located extensive oil deposits. This anxiety appeared to be 
confirmed when the previously agreed upon date for all 
foreign troop withdrawals from Iran, March 2nd, passed with 
Soviet forces still in place. In fact, in the next several 
days substantial movements of Red Army units seemed to 
indicate a possible Russian intention to move south in the 
direction of the Iranian capital. Might the Kremlin be 
planning to assume control of the entire country, thus to 
position itself to exert greater pressure on Turkey (and the 
Straits situation), indeed to force the course of affairs in 
all of the Mid-East in a direction acceptable to Soviet 
foreign policy priorities? Whatever was the actual extent 
of Moscow's intentions in Iran, Washington assumed the worst 
and officials were convinced this Soviet maneuver, following 
so close to the provocative episodes of the previous month, 
was simply a manifestation, an early warning, of what George 
Kennan advised the Kremlin was up to —  exploiting every
perceived opportunity to expand Russian power in an effort
3 5to undermine capitalist societies.
From the point at which American decision-makers 
concluded the Soviets were incorrigibly aggressive and 
opportunistic, and in the presence of the presumption that 
there was no further possibility of cooperating successfully
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with the Russians on the diplomatic level, Administration 
officials were compelled to begin to measure the essentials 
of their policy in terms of what the United States was in a 
practical position to do in China. And, in this regard, 
policymakers concluded they had little alternative except to 
continue to implement the existing policy though their 
motives in doing so had been substantially altered by their 
unrelieved distrust of Soviet behavior.
After the Spring of 1946, the Administration was 
determined to continue its efforts to achieve a political 
settlement in China for three principal and associated 
reasons. First, creating unity and stability in China was 
the only way left in which the Administration could hope to 
limit effectively the extension of Soviet power and influ­
ence in East Asia. Officials were sure the disunity and 
chaos of civil war was bound to provide opportunities in
this regard which they further doubted the United States
3 6could prevent the Kremlin from successfully exploiting.
The Administration had allocated about all the 
available resources it could to the China situation in late 
1945 so as to maximize Marshall's chances to succeed in his 
mission. Officials knew that if a political solution failed 
they would not be able to move much beyond the extent of 
this earlier American commitment. Thus, and here is the 
second reason, a political solution was the only means by 
which Russian expansion could be contained in a manner
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consistent with the moderate expense of the American commit-
37ment to China since the end of the war.
The third major reason a political settlement was 
still important was the most obvious. A peaceful settlement, 
if successful, would save the Administration from having to 
formulate the necessities of its China policy in context of 
a civil war. For a variety of reasons officials already 
believed that the Administration would not be able to formu­
late a truly satisfactory policy toward the condition of 
civil conflict in China. So much did officials prefer to 
avoid being forced into this position that they concluded 
the Administration had nothing to lose and everything to 
gain in continuing to find grounds for a political settle­
ment even though they believed that Moscow's maneuverings
38undoubtedly would reduce the potential for success.
A series of unavoidable policymaking considera­
tions determined the Administration's decision to proceed in 
China as planned. Of fundamental significance was the 
factor of limited resources. Chapter III explained that 
postwar ceilings on military expenditures and on government 
spending reduced the resources available in support of 
United States foreign policies. Dwindling resources meant a 
decline in the actual power of the nation. And, in the 
Spring and Summer of 1946 there seemed small possibility of 
reversing American fiscal policies.
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Even granting the need to try, officials could not 
expect that an Administration campaign to reorient the 
public would have much chance to succeed. Not only would 
the process of re-educating public priorities and expecta­
tions run counter to the force of the domestic political 
climate, but in a Congressional election year the Democratic 
administration would not be able to expect necessary Repub­
lican Party cooperation in this task.
Republicans were already engaged in calculated
political criticisms of the White House. On the one hand,
in the early months of 1945, Republican leaders complained
about the Administration’s coddling of the Russians, calling
instead for the government to develop sterner attitudes and
procedures in relations with the Kremlin. At the same time,
the opposition continued to excite the public's parsimonious
sensibilities through early hints of congressional election
campaign rhetoric calling for more cuts in federal taxes and
39in government spending. This Republican charge of Admini­
stration timidity in dealings with the Soviets while advo­
cating policies which would further reduce American resour­
ces must have seemed hollow, even irresponsible, preachment 
to officials who were by now disturbed that the Kremlin 
would view declining American power as an opportunity to 
behave more aggressively in international affairs.
However, despite the inconsistency between 
advocating firmness with the Russians and retrenchment of
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government spending, there was no reason to expect the 
Republicans would relinquish their stand on this issue in 
view of the pervasive popular sympathy for conservative 
fiscal policies. Moreover, Democratic congressmen and 
senators also were aware of this and, on the basis of their 
own conviction of political and fiscal necessity, were not 
at all strongly disposed to argue the p o i n t . I n  addition, 
the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Council 
of Economic Advisers were quite prepared to restrict the 
amount of spending in areas directly related to foreign 
policy if deemed necessary in order to assure maximum poten­
tial for postwar growth of the nation's economy. For exam­
ple, it was not until 1949 that a reinterpretation of eco­
nomic requirements allowed the Administration to move beyond 
the dictum that if military expenditures were allowed to 
rise above a 15 billion dollar ceiling, it was sure to
produce severe inflationary consequences for the peacetime
42converted economy.
In fact, with respect to the problem of estab­
lishing a global balance of power, in the 1945-1950 period 
the Administration generally thought that the example of the 
American system of political economy, by virtue of its 
success, would prove decisive in convincing the people of 
the world which model they should follow in ordering their 
own affairs and in developing their international asso­
ciations. Policymakers saw the factor of raw military
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capabilities as having secondary importance in the competi­
tion for international prestige.
However, as this fact of limited resources which 
could be applied in direct support of foreign policy priori­
ties related to the situation in China, it must be seen in 
relation to a second major policymaking component —  the 
problem of resource allocations. Opportunism and aggression 
appeared to Administration officials to be the general 
tendency of the Kremlin's foreign policy and the challenge 
appeared to have global proportions. As a result, the 
decisions of the Truman administration began to reflect a 
sense of the need to coordinate the various components of 
American foreign policy into an integrated whole. This was 
not a development which happened overnight and even in 1947 
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would complain about the 
lack of coordinated foreign policy planning and the necess­
ity to institute more systematic procedures. Nonetheless, 
throughout the course of 1946, officials began not only to 
conceive of the requirements of foreign policy as part of an 
interrelated global strategic complex but also one in which 
each of its parts would have to be assigned a relative level 
of importance.
Thus, in contrast to the planning of the Marshall 
Mission in late 1945, after the Spring of 1946, the condi­
tion of limited resources became one of the most important
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considerations in determining the nature of the Admini­
stration's China policy. Finite resources applied to 
counter international Soviet aggression required that for­
eign policy priorities be assigned in a programmatic manner. 
In the presense of perceived Soviet malevolence the essen­
tial questions were: where should, and in what ways could,
the Administration respond to counter the spread of Russian 
communism? Answering these questions forced officials to 
undertake the process of distinguishing vital American 
interests from non-vital or peripheral ones or more impor­
tant from less important interests. International circum­
stances demanded that the Administration determine, in 
absolute and relative terms, what strategic significance 
various areas of the world had for the United States.
By way of these deliberations, officials concluded 
it was necessary to reduce the China area to a level of 
secondary importance in the overall strategic pattern of 
American foreign policy. Whatever areas of critical impor­
tance might emerge as a result of Soviet aggression, and 
Western Europe and the Middle East clearly were developing 
as front runners in this regard, the Truman administration 
determined that it could not risk an excess of scarce Ameri­
can resources on a Chinese situation fraught with such
enormous complications or on a Nationalist government whose
4*6obvious deficiencies continued to raise so many doubts.
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Of course, the need to conserve limited resources 
for deployment in areas of the world strategically more 
important than the East Asian mainland would not work neces­
sarily to deprive the China area if only the Kuomintang and 
the Communists would settle their differences peacefully and 
together proceed on with the task of creating unity and 
stability in their country. Unity and stability in China 
would prevent serious problems for American Asian policy. 
And, to the extent available means would allow. Administra­
tion officials were prepared to entice the Chinese into a 
political settlement with the promise of generous outlays of 
economic aid in association with a variety of military and 
technical assistance and training programs. On the other 
hand, the onset of civil war would immediately activate all 
the more penurious policy implications which followed from 
the Administration’s attitude concerning the relative global 
importance of China and the continuing fortunes of the 
Nationalist government.
In advance of the event, Administration officials 
speculated and not altogether accurately, that short of a 
significant commitment of American manpower and resources, a 
civil war likely would produce certain consequences. As 
noted earlier in the chapter, decision-makers believed that 
civil conflict would force the Chinese Communists to seek 
outside support in order to achieve final victory. Offi­
cials assumed Yenan would turn to the Soviets not only
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because of ideological considerations but as well for the 
practical reason that no alternative source of supply would 
be available.
Policymakers thought that once the Kremlin became 
involved in support of the Chinese Communists, in context of 
deteriorating internal conditions an expansion of Soviet 
influence, even direct control in some areas was virtually 
certain. As compensation for Soviet aid, Stalin would 
demand and obtain Chinese Communist subservience. Yenan 
would face a situation in which, despite the nationalistic 
inclinations within the Party, room for independent maneuver 
would be nearly eliminated by virtue of their absolute 
dependence on Soviet support. The extent of Soviet influ­
ence would thus develop in a manner commensurate with the 
expansion of areas under Communist control.
In addition the Kremlin could also be expected to 
move quickly to consolidate its position in Manchuria. Any 
vestige of Chinese Communist independence would be liquida­
ted in short order. In a manner comparable to Outer Mon­
golia, the Russians would force their control on the pro­
vince through a native communist puppet regime composed only 
of those Chinese whose submission to Moscow was absolute. 
Consolidation of Manchuria’s raw resources and industrial 
potential would grant the Kremlin a power base of enormous
porportions in East Asia and create an intolerable imbalance
48of power in the region.
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civil war in China, so continued the Administra­
tion's logic, invariably would promote instability elsewhere 
in East and Southeast Asia. Chaos in the region would work 
merely to encourage further the malevolent and aggressive 
side of Soviet nature, a side held in check, officials 
assumed, only so long as their leadership believed that 
there was no opportunity to expand Russian power or that it 
was too dangerous to attempt to do so. In sum, policymakers 
feared that a Chinese civil war at minimum would result in 
conditions not only conducive to an expansion of Soviet 
power and influence in East and Southeast Asia but that the 
Russians undoubtedly would prove capable of successfully 
exploiting the opportunity.^^
To reiterate, what disturbed officials most about 
the failure of a political settlement was their belief that 
the Administration would not be in a position to formulate a 
very satisfying policy response to the anticipated conse­
quences of a civil war in China. On the one hand, policy­
makers knew they would not be able to involve the United 
States in China's internal affairs in such a way so as to 
assure the prevention of a Communist takeover. At the same 
time, officials did not see any alternative to the prospect 
of the Administration continuing to give some form of sup­
port to the Nationalist government throughout the gradual 
course of its possible even probable defeat. In other 
words, in the event of civil conflict, the Administration's
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China policy would have no other goal than to maintain a 
posture of plastic resilience toward an uncertain course of 
events and, in doing so, to incur considerable degree of 
risk. In sum, officials were not in the least enthusiastic 
in their knowledge that a civil war would force the Admin­
istration to follow a course of action which in presence of 
more conventional policymaking sensibilities would have 
virtually no meaning.
Administration expectations on this score were 
bound by multiple considerations. To begin with, officials 
determined that, consistent with global-strategic necessity, 
one of their chief responsibilities in responding to a 
Chinese civil war would be to guard against an over commit­
ment of American resources and to prevent the United States 
from assuming combat responsibilities toward the conflict 
itself. By mid-1946 there already appeared in Administra­
tion thinking that China was simply an area where the extent 
of the American commitment would have to be strictly con­
trolled. United States involvement in the extraordinary 
magnitude of the China problem could not be allowed to get 
out of hand. Officials based this estimate on the view that 
there were limits to what the United States could do by way 
of influencing events in China; that ultimately the Chinese 
would have to solve their own problems; that, if Chinese 
affairs could not be managed successfully within certain 
defined limits to the American involvement, there was little
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the Administration would be in a practical position to do 
otherwise.
It was not until 1947 and 1948, and then in a 
decision-making environ preoccupied with a full scale civil 
war, that the State and Defense Departments and the Central 
Intelligence Agency compiled concrete estimations of what 
level of American support would be necessary in order to 
save the Chiang regime from a projected defeat. Although in 
1948 Defense tended to be a bit more sanguine about the 
prospect of substantial returns on a somewhat limited in­
vestment of support, the prevailing calculation then, as it 
seems to have been in the Spring of 1946, was that the cost 
of saving the Nationalist government would be enormous and
CO
therefore a prohibitive drain on American resources.
Genuine fiscal and administrative reform of the 
Nationalist government, political reform of the Kuomintang 
party, a decisive program of economic and social reform and 
strict measures designed to enhance the government's mili­
tary effectiveness might have made a difference. If offi­
cials had been able to expect there was some reasonable 
assurance of a return on their investment, there might have 
occurred an upswing in American generosity and confidence to 
become more deeply involved in support of the Nationalist 
regime. But Chiang's government remained impervious to 
reform and, as a result, the regime was never able to shed 
its image as a high risk venture for an investment of Ameri­
can aid.
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There was a related consideration which derived 
its significance from the obvious and unabated corruption, 
inefficiency and unpopularity of the Nationalist government. 
The nation's international prestige could not help but 
suffer severely, if, in a civil war, the Administration's 
policy appeared to have little substance beyond that of 
backing a reactionary regime possessed of virtually no 
redeeming social, economic or political value and seemingly 
with small chance of surviving in the absence of foreign 
support. If the Administration were to be drawn into a 
major underwriting of this type of regime and against an 
undeniably energetic and increasingly popular Chinese Commu­
nist organization, there would be no avoiding the charge, 
and a very convincing one, of imperialistic American inter­
ference in China's internal affairs.
The international aggressions of the Soviet Union, 
which American officials, by definition, referred to as 
imperialistic, now more than ever required the Administra­
tion to be cautious lest its own foreign involvements too 
severely damage American credibility by appearing uncomfort­
ably similar to those of the Russians. No where in the 
world was it of greater importance that the Administration 
develop its foreign policies in such a way so as to guard 
against the charge of imperialism and to preserve the na­
tion's anti-colonialist credentials than it was in the
CO
fading epicenter of modern European imperialism.
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The Administration would have to be careful about 
the nature and extent of its commitments for other reasons. 
Officials knew that because of Nationalist organizational 
and administrative deficiencies they could not commit Ameri­
can resources to China with the idea of counting on the 
success of its Nationalist proxy in some test of national 
and ideological prestige with tiie Soviets. Superior Chinese 
Communist forces in combination with more convenient supply 
capabilities because of geographic proximity would give the
Kremlin an undeniably and undoubtedly decisive advantage in
54such a contest.
There was a another possibility, so serious that 
it did enter into policymaking calculations. Officials 
considered it possible that if the United States did become 
significantly involved in China’s internal affairs, to 
include the pressure of American military forces, the Sovi­
ets, so as to counter the American escalation, might decide 
on a commensurate expansion of their own involvement in 
support of Yenan.
Administration officials foresaw a very dangerous 
situation if this led to a conflict between the two. An 
American-Soviet confrontation in China would be very diffi­
cult to contain. In all probability it would spread into a 
more general conflagration, perhaps precipitating a third 
world war. Decision-makers could not conceive of a more 
undesirable possibility and were determined that no American
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action should be of the sort so as to provoke such a devel­
opment.^^
However, it is important to understand that policy­
makers in 1946 were pretty well convinced that the Soviets 
in all probability would avoid an overt and large-scaled 
intervention in support of the Chinese Communists. Moscow's 
tactics, officials thought, would be indirect and insidious, 
relying on various means of patient subversion, especially 
in the process of achieving dominance in Manchuria. The 
Russians, in other words, could be expected to be careful 
not to disturb their own highly useful image, however 
specious, as a champion of anti-imperialist and anti­
colonialist ideals.
How the Kremlin would supply the Chinese Commu­
nists, and to what extent, remained open questions in 
advance of the event. After the Spring of 1946, though. 
Administration officials believed that Soviet acquiescence 
to Yenan’s acquisition of large stockpiles of captured 
Japanese weapons in Manchuria was merely a harbinger of what 
could be expected with the outbreak of civil war. American 
officials generally concluded that under the circumstances 
in 1946 the Soviets would maintain a low posture and play a 
waiting game in China on the basis of their expectation that 
time and events would ultimately favor Russian interests. 
It was with respect to this eventuality that officials 
calculated their need to conserve resources in order to
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combat possible Soviet aggression in more important areas of 
the world, even if, in limiting American aid to the Nation­
alist government, it meant risking the possibility of an 
eventual Chinese Communist victory in China.
The interesting question is: What might have been
the Administration's response to a direct and massive Soviet 
involvement in support of the Chinese Communists? So far as 
the documents reveal there was no specific contingency 
planning in anticipation of this prospect. However, there 
is no doubt that the Administration would have viewed a 
Soviet intervention as extremely serious; serious enough to 
have required a major reassessment of the American postwar 
posture in Asia and undoubtedly to have prompted the formu­
lation of a significantly more forceful policy throughout 
57the region. But whether this would have included a mas­
sive American counter involvement in China is not clear. 
The same disadvantages would have been present which pro­
duced the Administration's general reluctance to become over 
committed in any event.
Policymakers also believed that, if the United 
States were to become inextricably embroiled in a Chinese 
civil war, it was the Soviet interest which likely would be 
well served. Not only would this reduce the already dimin­
ished relative international power status of the United 
States even further by causing an indefinite drain on the 
nation's resources, but, with the United States tied down in
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Asia, it could well encourage the Kremlin to develop bolder 
policies toward the Middle East and Western Europe. And, 
Administration officials were quite convinced this was 
precisely the sort of situation the Russian leadership would 
be most happy to see develop and work to encourage, i.e., an 
American frittering away of valuable resources on inter­
national projects of lesser significance to the point of 
being unable to attend effectively to those more impor­
tant.^®
However, as suggested earlier, there was another 
side to the continuing official desire to achieve a politi­
cal settlement in China besides the need to conserve the 
nation's power, i.e., the realization that the Administra­
tion would not be able to extricate itself entirely from 
having to continue its association with Chiang's regime 
despite the risks of a civil war.
This aspect of official thinking also derived from 
the Administration's conclusion that worldwide Soviet 
aggression required a systematic American policy planning 
response. In this case, the question was; What was the 
relationship between the nature of events in China and the 
course of American policy toward other areas of the world? 
Although officials in 1946 already were settled on the 
question of China's relative strategic importance, it was 
still much a matter of preliminary and abstract contingency 
speculation toward the yet unknown course of international
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events and concomitant policy need. It was not until the 
Summer and Fall of 1947 that this question of China's sig­
nificance was resolved in context of specific American 
policy responses to world developments.
It will be recalled that, because of the demands 
of the global policy-making design, decision-makers could 
not see much beyond the necessity of reducing China to a 
secondary level of importance in the scheme of assigning 
foreign policy priorities. It is vital to understand, 
however, that in allocating a lesser importance to China, 
the Administration never gave an exclusive value to higher 
priority areas. Administration officials continuously 
assessed the Nationalist situation and events in China as it 
might affect the potential success of American policy other­
wise. As it turned out in the case of China, secondary 
importance, in effect, meant supplementary importance, for 
in the period prior to the Korean War Administration offi­
cials never seriously considered cutting off aid to the 
Nationalists for fear that, if they did, it would have a 
deleterious effect on other foreign policy requirements.
Decision-makers were convinced that if the Nation­
alists were left to fight their own civil war battles, i.e., 
if American support was abruptly withdrawn, non-communist 
morale would collapse and a total Communist victory in China 
would follow in short order. Although officials expected 
that the Communists probably would win in the long run
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anyway, they nonetheless believed that, no matter how slight 
the chance for success, it would still be necessary to make 
the effort to prevent a Communist victory in view of the 
high stakes involved. At the very least, it would be neces-
eg
sary to delay the event for as long as possible-
The Soviets would view a disavowal of the Nation­
alists as an American surrender in China as a signal to drop 
all pretense of restraint in support of the Chinese Commu­
nists. There would follow a swift Nationalist defeat which 
might have the effect of creating such a convincing specta­
cle of communist momentum in Asia that non-communists would 
feel their future unavoidably depended on finding some means 
of accommodation with this seemingly powerful new force. 
Communist success in China would enhance the prestige and 
credibility of other communist organizations throughout East 
and Southeast Asia. In addition, the long standing Chinese 
Communist association with anti-imperialist and nationalist 
causes would become a most attractive and compelling model 
for Asian patriots interested in developing organizational 
and tactical procedures with which to destroy the remaining 
vestiges of Western power in Asia.
Victory in China would prompt the Chinese Commu­
nists and the Soviets to encourage insurgency movements 
throughout the region and to extend support for the purpose 
of achieving independence from colonial rule. The Europeans 
in Southeast Asia could not hope to hold the line alone in 
the face of this combination of forces.
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Many in the Administration were not especially 
sympathetic to the imperial presence of Europeans in the 
region and thought the principle of self-determination of 
all peoples would require its elimination over time. 
Decision-makers nonetheless concluded that United States 
acquiescence was necessary in view of the importance of 
Southeast Asian resources to the process of postwar European 
economic recovery and because of the European obsession they 
be allowed to reassemble their pre-war colonial struc­
tures —  an act which some American officials believed 
represented a frantic, even decadent, effort to restore Old 
World national and cultural self-esteem. Economic recon­
struction and reassertion of West European confidence and 
morale in 1946, in other words, was more important than 
applying the principle of self-determination in Asia.
In a related vein, successful insurrection in 
these colonial empires was sure to have a deleterious effect 
on already unstable domestic conditions in the Metropolitan 
countries. Two world wars already had affected severely the 
established foundations of Western civilization and, with 
European national self-confidence in serious decline, the 
loss of their colonies might irreparably damage their will 
to reassert worthy traditions in the process of postwar 
reconstruction. To the extent Soviet prestige would be 
enhanced by association with communist success in East and 
Southeast Asia, Russian proximity to societal demoralization
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in Western Europe undoubtedly would spur the vigor and 
popularity of European communist parties with a consequent 
extension of the Kremlin's influence and relative inter­
national power.
There were strategic considerations in supporting 
a continued European presence in Southeast Asia, i.e., the 
desire to place restraints on an expansion of Soviet power. 
A European collapse in the region would eliminate the pre­
ferred influences of Western civilization in Asia leaving 
the area open and unopposed to the malignant inspirations of 
communism. However, the documents also appear to reveal in 
the attitudes of a number of officials a certain cultural 
condescension, possibly even racism, in the assessment that, 
notwithstanding the longevity and richness of the native 
cultural experience, the future growth and development of
Asian society depended on association with, and assimilation
62of, the benefits of Western civilization.
Moreover, a communist triumph in China could not
help but promote a more aggressive communist posture in
Korea and Japan, with the simultaneous decline in non-
62communist morale and will to resist. Communist success on 
 ^the mainland undoubtedly would have a serious effect on the 
tenor of the American Occupations Program of democratization 
and demilitarization in Japan, the feasiblity of which 
initially drew a good deal of its sustenance from the Admin­
istration's goal of achieving unity and stability in China
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under the auspices of the Nationalist government, from the 
related anticipation of being able to cooperate with the 
Soviets and from the consequent calculation that a major
postwar commitment of American power in Asia would not be
64necessary.
Cooperation with the Soviets clearly was no longer 
possible, but this would not necessarily require wholesale 
alterations in Occupation policies if unity and stability 
could still be achieved in China. If China, the result of a 
political settlement, did emerge as a stabilizing factor on 
the mainland, then Soviet power and influence would be 
effectively proscribed. Under these circumstances, the 
process of Japanese demilitarization could be continued as 
planned and there would be no immediate need to undertake 
the unwanted cost of expanding American power in the Western 
Pacific.
In sum, officials believed that an abrupt American 
withdrawal from China would precipitate pervasive crises 
throughout East and Southeast Asia. And in 1946 the policy 
options for responding to a general crisis were bleak. 
Subsequent to a precipitous Communist triumph in China, and 
following a collapse of Western power in Asia, only the 
United States would stand in the way of an otherwise clear 
path for Communist penetration. Yet, under the circumstan­
ces of demobilization, reductions in government spending and 
the need to conserve resources for use in areas with a
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higher strategic priority than Asia, the Administration 
would not be in a strong position to respond at this or that 
point to Communist pressure.
If each pale American effort was likely to 
collapse in the face of communist inspired provocation, the 
appearance of American authority and prestige would deteri­
orate, finally to be destroyed altogether as successive 
victories generated a communist courage to expand and inten­
sify their aggressions. The alternative to this gradual
retreat would be complete withdrawal from East and Southeast 
Asian mainland. But just as in the case of the piecemeal, 
this wholesale acquiescence to Russian expansion would have 
the same result only in a shorter period of time.^^
Decision-makers worried about this for the same
reason they worried about other related policy matters, 
i.e., the cost would not be confined to the Far East alone. 
A weak-kneed American response to Soviet aggressions in Asia 
would have global consequences. American capitulation in 
Asia would result in a significantly more opportunistic
Soviet foreign policy and the Administration would find 
itself severely pressed in areas where the vital interests 
of the nation would be directly at stake and by an enemy 
with small respect for American ability to respond force­
fully. Short of becoming involved in a shooting war with 
the Russians this was about the most undesirable development 
which officials could imagine. They much preferred that
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Soviet power be challenged and successfully confined on the 
outer surface rather than at the core of the nation's most 
important international interests.
In conclusion, by March of 1946 policymakers were 
convinced that the Communist leaders in Russia could not be 
expected to develop foreign policies in accord with the 
normal standards of international conduct. There was no 
longer any need, as there had been only months before, for 
equivocation on the question of Soviet reliability or on the 
issue of continuing to find some grounds for postwar diplo­
matic cooperation with the Kremlin in solving postwar prob­
lems. Soviet machinations had swept away all ambiguity on 
this score. It was clear that the Kremlin could not be 
trusted and American foreign policy henceforth would have to 
be formulated in strict accord with this disheartening fact 
of interaational life.
As a result, after the Spring of 1946, the Admini­
stration's China policy no longer rested essentially on the 
design that a political diplomatic settlement in China would 
lead as a result to a successful postwar accommodation of 
American and other national interests in East Asia. Now a 
political settlement, which prevented a Chinese civil war, 
and its undesirable consequences, was primarily important 
not because it had intrinsic value as the rational and 
proper course of action in the aftermath of the Great War. 
Instead, Administration officials found themselves faced
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with the necessity of defining the importance of achieving a 
political solution in China primarily because of a series of 
global-strategic considerations. The Cold War in Asia had 
begun.
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National nor the Communist Armies had the capability to bring about a 
military decision with their own resources...." Memorandum for the 
President, 28 February 1946, President's Secretary Files, Box 73, 
Truman Papers, HSTL; A State Department intelligence report of December 
1945, advised that, it "...is...unlikely that the Kuomintang even 
without side aid can totally suppress the opposition. The Communists 
can be squeezed into a smaller area but probably can continue to resist 
indefinitely." Department of State, Interim Research and Intelligence 
Service, Research and Analysis Branch, "Politico-Military Situation in 
China", 11 December 1945, R & A Report No. 3461, p. 8, 11/28.
^See, the December State Department intelligence report that, 
"Kuomintang military superiority in military equipment, though already 
existing before the war, has been increased by aid from the U.S. Since
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the surrender this superiority has been further increased by the accre­
tion of booty from the Japanese and puppets. The Kuomintang possesses 
more troops than do the Communists, and has more men trained to use 
modem equipment."; Kuomintang superiority in men and material is such 
that the Kuomintang is in general capable of winning individual pitched 
battles with the Commmunists. It is probably able to take any single 
point held by the Communists. Its offensive capabilites are probably 
not, however, sufficient to take and hold all Communist territory." 
Ibid., 4-5. A good deal has been made of the fact that the Chinese 
Communists received a considerable boost to their military capabilities 
when, in the months following V-J day and with Soviet connivance, they 
were able to seize substantial quantities of Japanese arms and muni­
tions in Manchuria. It is of interest to note that it was extimated 
the Nationalists, at the same time, received 1,235,000 arms and $3.6 
billion in Japanese property stockpiled in Indochina ! This information 
was found in notes which Secretary of State Dean Acheson used in com­
menting on China policy to a group of concerned congressmen in late 
February 1949. Handwritten notes by Secretary of State Acheson, 24 
February 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL; See, also, Tang Tsou, 
America's Failure in China, 401; "Letter on Transmittal" in China White 
Paper, xi.
^See, State Department, Interim Reserach and Intelligence Service, 
Research and Intelligence Branch, "Politico-Military Situation in 
China", 11 December 1945, R & A Report No. 3461, 11/28, UPA; See, also 
Marshall's comments on his 1954 memorandum to former President Truman, 
that, "Always in my conversations with...(Chiang Kai-shek)... I put for­
ward my military opinion that the use of force at that time by the 
Nationalist Government could not be productive of more success than 
that of the capture of cities —  that the long lines of communication 
made military operations for the Nationalist Government far more diffi­
cult than they were prepared to meet. So long as the Communists con­
fined themselves to attacks on the line of communications and the 
breakdown of the influence of the National Government with the Chinese 
people, their eventual success seemed to me to be assured." Memorandum 
on China by General George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954, 
President's Secretary Files, Box 74, Truman Papers, HSTL; Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, 81; See, also. State Department intelligence 
concerning a major D.S. military effort to assist Nationalist troops in 
North China, that, "Without regard to the problems which such a program 
might raise in U.S. public opinion or in U.S.S.R. reaction, success in 
rapid establishment of secure Nationalist control in North China and 
Manchuria even with direct and major assistance from U.S. forces would 
be highly improbable. The military and political capabilities of the 
Chinese Communists as demonstrated in the period since the surrender of 
Japan have been adequate to enable them to secure important territorial 
gains in North China and Manchuria and must be considered adequate for 
major and protracted resistance to any forces which might conceivably 
be employed against them." State Department, Interim Research and 
Intelligence Service, Research and Analysis Branch, "Estimate of the
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Implications of the Present Situation in China for Possible American 
Program", 14 December 1945, R & A Report No. (?), p. 1, III/25, UPA.
8
See, two reports by Edwin A. Locke, Jr., who in 1945 with re­
spect to several important projects being on Chinese economic questions 
was designated as "Personal Representative" of the President, in which 
he talks at length about how civil war would have disastrous impact on 
the National government, implying that the advantage, in the event of 
civil war, would go to the communists. Memorandum by Hr. Edwin A. 
Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President Truman in Charge of 
the American Production Mission in China to President Truman, 20 August 
1945, F.R. , 1945, VII, 448-453; Mr. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal 
Representative of President Truman to President Truman, 18 December 
1945, ibid., 1363-1376; But it should be pointed out that this assump­
tion was bound up inextricably in all American thinking about the 
effect of a civil war, namely, that the Nationalist government would be 
at a distinct disadvantage, the Communists with considerably greater 
advantage.
9
See, for example, a February 1946 memorandum concerning General 
Marshall's views on the situation in China, that, "...neither the 
National nor the Communist Armies had the capability to bring about a 
military decision with their own resources, and accordingly, without 
the intervention of foreign powers...."; It was his (Marshall's) opin­
ion that the communist forces which lay across the throat of the stra­
tegic areas of North China and controlled the vital north-south rail­
ways, could not be liquidated without full-scale American intervention 
both in the movement of Chinese forces with American equipment and the 
use of American personnel, possibly even combat forces."; "Since this 
was utterly out of the question the Generalissimo would be left unable 
to eliminate Communist Armies, which, with their backs to Soviet 
Siberia, could easily be supplied and equipped and led under cover by 
the Soviets, "Memorandum by the President by James Shepley, Attache to 
General Marshall, 28 February 1946, President's Secretary Files, Box 
73, Truman Papers, HSTL; Varg, Closing of the Door, 235-236; Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, 81.
^^Several years later, in commenting to a group of experts on Asia 
assembled by the State Department in October 1949 to contribute their 
views on U.S. Far Eastern policy. General Marshall recalled, "I had 
officers pretty much all over North China, along the Yangtze and in 
Manchuria. ... Always I was trying to find out anything you could put 
your finger on that was authentic as to the Soviet influence or Soviet 
help in all this; I never got anything except the influence of what I 
would call the spiritual, or something akin to that." Minutes of the 
Meetings of the "Roundtable Discussions" of 6, 7 & 8 October 1949, 
President's Secretary Files, Box 74, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^^Numerous documents may be cited which include reference to the 
"Open Door", see, "Sino-Soviet Relations", 851-1054, F.R., 1945, VII, 
esp., 979, 980-982, 984-985, 950-951, 960-965; China White Paper. 118.
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12
Varg. Closing of the Door, 199-200, 216; See, also Edwin A. 
Locke, Jr.'s report to President Truman in mid-December concerning what 
the U.S. was going to have to do for China in the economic realm, not 
vice versa, and this for political, not economic, reasons. Mr. Edwin 
A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President Truman to President 
Truman, 18 December 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 1363-1376.
^^Varg. Closing of the Door, 243-244, 254/fn#30.
14For an American estimate of needed economic and social reforms, 
see. The Acting Secretary of State, 17 January 1946, in U.S. Dept, of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, d.C., 1972), 
X, 920-921. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1946, X; The Acting Secretary of 
State to the Embassy in China, 25 January 1946, ibid., 926; The Coun­
selor of the Embassy in China to the Secretary of State, 29 January 
1945, ibid., 930-931; See, also, Mr. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal 
Representative of President Truman to President Truman, 18 December 
1945, F.R.. 1945, VII, 1363-1376.
^^It is of considerable interest, and relevance to this point I 
would suggest, to note that the China White Paper devotes an entire 
initial chapter to establishing the historical antecedents of American 
China policy, plus an annex section of pertinent documents, in effect, 
its seems, in an attempt to place U.S. policy toward China from 1941- 
1949 within the context of the "Open Door" tradition. See, China White 
Paper, 1-37, 413-591.
^^See Chapter III, 76-79.
^^Use of "Open Door" language, i.e., concepts associated with this 
foreign policy tradition, can be seen, for example, in President Tru­
man's public statement concerning the Marshall Mission issued on 15 
December 1945. In his statement, the President used such "Open Door" 
concepts as "astrons, united" China, "self-determination", "to elimi­
nate armed conflict within its territory", "peace and unity", "the 
development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade 
relations between China and the United States." China White Paper, 
607-609.
18This seems almost assuredly was the case in view of the fact 
that in 1945, American diplomats in discussions with Soviet leaders 
about China made continuous use of "open door" terminology as a means 
by which to convey to the Russians the importance which the U.S. 
attached to achieving "peace and unity" in China, i.e., to achieving 
the condition of the territorial and administration integrity of China. 
See, "Sino-Soviet Relations", F.R., 1945, VII, 851-1054. See,
especially the memorandum by the Ambassador in Moscow, in advising that 
"open door" language ought to be used in discussions with the Russians 
as a means by which to reenforce the Chinese bargaining position 
against any Soviet efforts to gain further concessions in Manchuria
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beyond those established by the Yalta accords. While it is true that 
reference is made to the possibility that American commerce might be 
denied to the area if the Soviets were granted further concessions, 
nonetheless the memo is clear that the primary purpose in approaching 
the Soviets about the "open door" was to deter any Russian effort to 
entrench themselves in Manchuria which might result in the failure of 
the Nationalist government to reassert its effective control in the 
province, thus to produce a disunited China and therefore subject to an 
unwanted extension of Soviet power. Memorandum by the Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1945, ibid., 950- 
951.
19See, Cohen, America’s Response, 211-213.
20This point is clearly revealed in a State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC) report of early June 1946, that, "Although the United 
States is attempting to maintain its position as respects the Open Door 
Policy in Manchuria, as in the remainder of China, it can be assumed 
that trade with Manchuria will not for decades assume real iotportance 
to our economic structure except as Manchurian resources can be util­
ized to strengthen China, improve her standard of living, and make her 
a better customer for our products. While such an eventuality would be 
of considerable importance, it is the benefit to China itself which is 
of most importance to the United States in terms of our present policy 
toward China and in terms of our basic interests, which appear to 
require an Asiatic counter-poise to Russia."; "...without substantial 
control of Manchurian resources, China may increasingly become an 
economic and political vacuum into which a powerful and aggressive 
Russia may inevitably be drawn, regardless of American deterrent action 
short of war." Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee 
for the Far East, no date (late May?) 1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 945. 
(Another section of the same SWNCC report, made the same point, only 
slightly differently, "...the United States will be continuing its 
historic policy of insisting upon the territorial and administrative 
integrity of China, upon non-interference in China's internal affairs, 
and upon the equal opportunity of all nations in China's commerce and 
economic development. This traditional policy coincides with the vital 
interest of the United States that Manchuria remain an integral part of 
China and not be utilized by Russia to create a powerful force in 
Eastern Asia that would constitute a grave threat to the United States." 
Ibid., 937.)
China White Paper, 136-138.
^^Ibid., 138-139.
^^Ibid., 139-140.
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^^Ibid., 140-143.
^^Ibid., 143-144.
26
Ibid., 144; Da these KMT-CCP negotiations concerning political 
and military matters in the early months of 1946, see, "Negotiations 
leading to the ceasefire agreements of January 10, 1946"; "Discussions 
pertaining to the Political Consultative Conference"; and "Negotiations 
respecting military reorganization and integration of communist forces 
into the National Army", F.R., 1946, IX, 1-341.
27
See, the late February 1946 memorandum concerning Marshall's 
views on the situation in China, that, "The Chinese Government must 
have in the next few years generous quantities of American money, 
American machinery and equipment and personnel, and American guidance, 
or it is almost certainly foredoomed to collapse."; "If the efforts to 
make this coalition Government effective should fail we can reasonably 
expect that China will revert to political and economic chaos and break 
up into many small autonomous war-lord-dominated areas, which would be 
easy prey for the Soviet if it is her intent to make a puppet of China 
and a great temptation for the Soviet if that is not her present in­
tent." Thus, the memorandum went on in so many words, was the vital 
necessity for Marshall returning to Washington to consult with the 
President on the matter of assistance to China. Memorandum for the 
President from James Shepley, Attache to General Marshall, 28 February 
1946, President's Secretary Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL; In 
1954, in a brief resume of his 1946 mission, Marshall recalled his 
thinking about the importance of economic assistance. He particularly 
wanted to complete arrangements for the transfer to the Nationalist 
government of American war surplus property in the Pacific area because 
of his belief that its value would "secure for the Government a tremen­
dous cash return."; would "promote trade"; would "provide labor for 
many engaged in its modification or repair."; and, thus to afford "a 
reasonably practical method of combating inflation...." Marshall also 
thought it important to complete transfer of surplus American shipping 
to the Chinese government as quickly as possible so as to "provide an 
effective method of promoting trade relations throughout the river 
valleys of China." Memorandum on China by General George C. Marshall 
to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954, President's Secretary Files, Box 74, 
Truman Papers, HSTL; See, also, China White Paper, 145.
28It was Marshall's view that the, "...'diehard' elements of the 
Kuomintang present one of the Generalissimo's most serious problems at 
this time. It is likely that the Generalissimo can handle them, but 
before the progress in China that is now promised becomes certain, 
there will undoubtedly be many tense movements precipitated by the 
'diehards'." Memorandum for the President from James Shepley, Attache 
to General Marshall, 28 February 1946, President's Secretary Files, Box 
73, Truman Papers, HSTL.
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Melby. Mandate of Heaven, 99.
3 0
See, Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 299-301; See, also, "Re­
ports on developments of significance within the Soviet Union of con­
cern to relations with the United States and other countries.", F.R.,
1945, VII, 695fn.
^^Gaddis. Origins of the Cold War, 301-302.
32
The complete text of the "8000-word telegram" can be found in, 
"The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 22 February
1946, F.R., VII, 696-709; See, also, Kennan, Memoirs, Annex C, 583-598.
33Kennan noted that the telegram's effect in Washington "was 
nothing short of sensational", it being reproduced and passed around to 
virtually all who would count in any major foreign policy decision. 
Kennan then observed that, "Six months earlier this message would prob­
ably have been received in the Department of State with raised eyebrows 
and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later it would probably 
have sounded redundant, a sort of preaching to be convinced. This was 
true despite the fact that the realities which it described were ones 
that had existed, substantially unchanged, for about a decade, and 
would continue to exist for more than a half-decade longer. All this 
only goes to show that more important than the observable nature of 
external reality, when it comes to the determination of Washington's 
view of the world, is the subjective state of readiness on the part of 
Washington officialdom to recognize this or that feature of it." 
Kennan, Memoirs, 310; There is ho doubt of the impact of Kennan's 
telegram on thinking in Washington about the Soviets. See, Gaddis, 
Origins of the Cold War, 303-304; Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield, eds. 
The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 135-140; See,
also, a State Department, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use 
in Connection With Military Studies," which included the comment, "For 
the purpose of this paper there is no value in attempting any exhaus­
tive interpretation or analysis of the possible motives or reasons 
which underlie present Soviet policy. Recent dispatches from the 
Embassy at Moscow (especially nos. 511 of February 22 and 878 of March 
20) have set forth in full the most probable explanation of present 
Soviet policies and attitudes." Memorandum by the Acting Department of 
State Member to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 1 April 
1946, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(Washington, D.C., 1972), I, 1167. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1946, I. 
Dispatch nos- 511 and 878 from Moscow were both Kennans, no. 511, the 
"8000 word telegram". For a cite on no. 511 see, post, fn31. For a 
cite on no. 878, see, "The Soviet Union", in U.S. Dept, of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1969), VI,
721. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1946, VI.
-183-
^^See, Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 302-304.
3 5
Ibid., 309-312; See, also. Brown, Faces of Power, 36-38; Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, 95-97; On this sequence of events in February- 
March 1946 and the effect on Washington, see, also, Harriman, Special 
Envoy, 546-549.
36
See, Memorandum by the Acting Chairman of the State-Way-Navy 
Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, 13 November 1945, 
F.R., 1945, VII, 620; See, also the view by Secretary of State Byrnes, 
that, " —  a strong unified China was essential to the interests of the 
United States; that it is necessary to bring the Chinese communist 
elements, other dissident elements and the National Government of China 
into a unified government; that if this were not done, we could expect 
Russia to ultimately take control of Manchuria and maintain a dominate 
influence in North China. His view was that there was no other step 
the Russians could be expected to take if China could not, itself, 
control Manchuria." Memorandum of Conversation by Lieutenant General 
John E. Hull, War Department General Staff, 10 December 1945, ibid., 
762; American officials saw this eventuality not only in light of their 
emerging presumptions concering the Russian propensity for opportunism 
and aggression, but as well in relation to vital Soviet strategic 
interests in East Asia. It is of considerable Interest to note a State
Department intelligence estimate concerning the Soviet purpose in late
1946 and early 1946 in stripping Manchuria of its industrial equipment. 
The report suggested, "While these acts may point to some doubt in the 
minds of the Soviet leaders as to the degree of control that Russia may 
ultimately be able to secure over Manchuria, their significance lies 
not only in contributing toward Soviet strength in the Far East, but 
also -- and primarily —  in delaying the mobilization of Manchurian 
resources for the reconstruction of China until the nature of the
evolving regime (in China) and policies become crystallized." State 
Department, Office of Intelligence Research, "Recent Developments 
Concerning Manchuria", 15 March 1946, DIR Report No. 3618, p. 66,
III/6, UPA.
37On his way back to Washington from Moscow in early 1946, Averell 
Harriman stopped off in China to give Marshall his views on Soviet 
foreign policy priorities. In the course of that visit, Harriman also 
talked with Nationalist leaders, including T. V. Soong, then President 
of the Chinese Executive Yuan. Although Harriman had "personal mis­
givings" about Marshall's mission to China, he "...told Soong it was 
absolutely essential that the National Government "make a deal for the 
unification of China" with the communists. "Whether it is right or 
wrong," Harriman added, "the American people would not support a civil 
war and the communist movement...could be combatted only by strengthen­
ing the main body of China economically through a liberal and aggres­
sive economic policy to improve the living conditions of the Chinese 
people." Harriman, Special Envoy, 541; See, also, Marshall's views 
that American intervention in a Chinese civil war "was utterly out of
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the question...." Memorandum for the President by James Shepley, 
Attache to General Marshall, 28 February 1946, President's Secretary 
Files, Box 73, Truman Papers, HSTL.
38
As already argued at length, the essential reasoning behind the 
Marshall mission was that, left to themselves, the Chinese would resort 
to civil war as the means by which to settle their internal political 
differences. The result, at minimum, would be a divided China, there 
was a good possibility that the Nationalists would be defeated entire­
ly, in any event, there would occur an extension of Soviet influence 
and power, a condition contrary to American interests, yet one which 
the U.S. would not be in a position to prevent. At the time, and in 
view of this prospect, Marshall felt "that no international situation 
which involves this country is more important than that which will 
exist for the next 18 months in China." Ibid. Marshall's Attache, 
James Shepley (actually Shepley was leaving the service), discussed 
this late February memorandum concerning Marshall's views of the situa­
tion in China with President Truman in early March 1946, a discussion 
in which the President "agreed completely" that "it is of paramount 
importance to the United States that the unification...(of China)... 
must succeed." (emphasis added) Mr. James R. Shepley to General
Marshall, 7 March 1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 511.
3 9
See, Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 290-296; Brown, Faces of 
Power, 39; See, also, Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 
Chapter 10.
40
Westerfield makes the following pertinent point that, "The
Republicans played a valuable role in helping to impel a "get tough 
with Russia" policy in 1945 and 1946, but in matters of national
defense they were generally not constructive on those occasions when 
they opposed administration proposals; their resistance served to
impair rather than to promote the strength which would be needed to get 
really tough." Ibid., 201. (It seems clear that Westerfield imputed 
too much congressional influence on Administrative officials in their 
development of "get tough" attitudes concerning the Soviets, attitudes 
which appear to have developed almost wholly internal to the Admin­
istration. By way of contrast to Westerfield's assessment, and as a 
measure of the emerging disparity in 1945 and 1946 between official and 
public attitudes concerning postwar cooperation with the Soviets, see. 
Brown, Faces of Power, 33-37.); Note also, Gaddis' comment that "James 
Reston noted in early 1946 that those congressmen who shouted loudest 
for a tough anti-Russian policy were the least willing to vote the 
money and manpower necessary to implement such a policy." Gaddis, 
Origins of the Cold War, 262.
Ibid., 262-263; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 
196-200, 201, 203, 207, 209-210; Brown, Faces of Power, 39.
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^^Ibid., 48.
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Millis, Forrestal Diaries, 192.
an oral history interview, George M. Elsey, in 1946 a member 
of the White House Staff, recalled that in 1946, "The President, in 
July, talked with Clifford and said he was concerned at the fact that 
the Russians couldn't be trusted and didn't keep agreements that they 
had made, and he wanted a list of the agreements that the Russians had 
violated or broken. Clifford asked if I could obtain or work up such a 
list and, of course, the answer was in the affirmative, yes."; "We 
talked about it a good deal and I said that I thought that that was 
entirely too narrow a question, that the President seemed to be basing 
too much of his attitude towards the Russians at that point, on this 
rather narrow point of whether they did or did not adhere to agree­
ments. I thought the whole question of our relations with the Soviet 
Union at that point was a much more comprehensive, much broader, matter 
than this technicality of agreement breaking or agreement keeping, that 
there were far more fundamental issues involved, that the nature of 
these issues didn't seem to be clearly understood in large parts of the 
executive branch (witness the fiasco of Henry Wallace), I recommended, 
and Clifford did then agree, that it would be much better if he, Clif­
ford, would do a report on the totality, if you will, of U.S.-Soviet 
relations, and if the President found that report acceptable, it could 
be used, judiciously, because it would necessarily be highly classi­
fied, it could be used judiciously by the President, giving copies to 
individuals in the executive branch or elsewhere, using it as a basis 
for discussion with people so that we wouldn't have any more Henry 
Wallace kind of blowups." Oral History Interview, George M. Elsey, 
February/March 1964, July 1969, July 1970, pp. 263-264, HSTL; The 
report to which Elsey refers was completed and forwarded to President 
Truman by Special Counsel Clark M. Clifford in late September 1946. 
The report urged that, "Our policies must...be global in scope. By 
time honored custom, we have regarded "European policy", "Near Eastern 
Policy", "Indian Policy", and "Chinese Policy" as separate problems to 
be handled by experts in each field. But the areas involved, far re­
moved from each other by our conventional standards, all border on the 
Soviet union and our actions with respect to each must be considered in 
light of over-all Soviet objectives."; "The United States cannot afford 
to be uncertain of its policies toward the Soviet Union. There must be 
such effective coordination within the government that our military and 
civil policies concerning the USSR, her satellites, and our allies are 
consistent and forceful. Any uncertainty or discrepancy will be seized 
immediately by the Soviets and exploited at our cost."; with respect to 
this need to coordinate policy on a global basis, the report argued a 
continuation of existing policy, "In the Far East...this country should 
continue to strive for a unified and economically stable China...." "A 
Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President", (24) 
September 1946, Chapter VI, pp. 79 and 81, file 75/139B, DDRS.
-186-
46
Of course, this assumption was implicit in the whole purpose of 
the Marshall mission which in one respect officials hoped would succeed 
because they knew in the event of civil war, Chiang, in the final 
analysis would either sink or swim on his own because the U.S. would 
not be able to support him to the extent necessary to defeat the Chi­
nese Communists. However, already by the Summer of 1946, one can see 
emerging in the documents a concern on the part of U.S. military offi­
cials about the problem of ensuring that they be able to maintain 
sufficient stocks to ensure their capacity to fulfill commitments 
worldwide. Actully ranking of countries on a priority basis would not 
come until 1947. Nonetheless, see, the Acting Secretary of War's 
concern, that, "At the present time the War Department is confronted 
with enormous problems in deciding what equipment and supplies should 
be held...to meet approved foreign commitments and in determining its 
responsibility toward implementation and support of these programs. 
This is especially true of the Chinese programs." The Acting Secretary 
of War to the Secretary of State, 4 June 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 743; See, 
also, the concern of the Departments of Way and Navy that any U.S. 
agreement with the Nationalist government on the matter of setting up 
an American military advisory group in China would have to include the 
stipulation that the Nationalists not be able to enter into military 
services agreements with a third government, this in order to prevent
the Chinese using the, " desires of other governments to furnish
military aid as (a) lever to increase (the) magnitude of assistance 
from the U.S. beyond that which would otherwise be in the best U.S. 
interest." Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall, 18 July 
1946, ibid., 840.
47Generally speaking, American officials assumed that civil war or 
not, the essential purpose of Soviet policy toward Manchuria was to 
maximize Russian influence in the area. See, for example, the State 
Department intelligence report, that, "...basic Soviet policy with 
regard to Manchuria appears to be directed toward promotion of such 
arrangements in the region as will permit the USSR, or forces fundamen­
tally friendly to it, to play a decisive part in regard to the future 
status and development of the Northeastern Provinces." State Depart­
ment, Office of Research and Intelligence, "Recent Developments Con­
cerning Manchuria," 15 March 1946, O.K.I. Report No. 3618, p. 66, 
III/6, UPA; The Charge of the Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan, agreed, 
arguing that even short of a civil war the, "...USSR is presumably 
working for eventual realization of a Manchurian regime which no matter 
what its form or nominal relationship to (the) Chinese Central Govern­
ment will be fundamentally more responsive to Moscow's wishes than to 
Chungking's or Nanking's." With respect to the rest of the country, 
ultimately, Kennan believed, and no matter what the circumstances 
internal to China, the Soviets, "...can be satisfied only with influ­
ence eventually amounting to effective control." The Charge in the 
Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1946, F.R., 1946, 
IX, 116, 118; See, also, the SWNCC report, that "In Manchuria 
especially the U.S.S.R. is expected to seek to foster the establishment
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of aa autonomous state dominated by the Soviet Union." The only way to 
avoid this, the report went on, was to achieve a political settlement 
in China, the assumption being that civil war inevitably would produce 
the expansion of Soviet power into Manchuria and beyond. Report by the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, no date 
(late May?) 1946, ibid.. 935.
^^The same SWNCC report established that, "...a Manchuria integra­
ted into the Russian economy would prove a grave threat to the United 
States as well as to China. The resulting self-sufficiency of the 
U.S.S.R. in the Far East would, taken together with her western indus­
tries, place under the control of the Soviet Union the greatest agglom­
eration of power in the history of the world. China without Manchuria 
would be no effective counter-poise to maintain the balance of power in 
the Far East." Ibid., 935.
49The Commander of American Forces in China, General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer, wrote in November 1945, that, "China represents a bridge 
between East and West. Today, as the result of the emergence of a 
powerful Soviet Russia, China is also a political and economic arena of 
the world's two greatest powers, Soviet Russia and America. If China 
was to become a puppet of the Soviet which is exactly what a Chinese 
Communist victory would mean, then Soviet Russia would practically 
control the continents of Europe and Asia. Domination of so great an 
expanse, particularly by a totalitarian power, would jeopardize world 
peace. We were determined to prevent Japan from making China a puppet 
power. It is believed even more important, if we are to realize our
policies with reference to China, that Russia not be permitted to do 
so." The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, to the Chief 
of Staff, United States Army, 20 November 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 659; 
The Secretaries of War and Navy, acknowledged that, "...General Wede­
meyer' s message is a balanced evaluation of the problem of Russia and 
China in the Far East." The Secretaries also argued that the only way 
to assure "against turmoil and outbreak of war in the Far East", would 
be through the emergence of a "unified" China "friendly" to the U.S. 
Memorandum by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of 
State, 26 November 1945, ibid., 672-673.
^^The Secretaries of War and Navy in the same late November 1945 
memorandum already hinted at this fundamental problem for American 
China policy. On the one hand they noted the consequences of a com­
plete American withdrawal from China : possible negative world opinion
the result of American "desertion of an Ally"; loss of the support of 
China for the U.S. in world affairs; the degeneration of China into 
civil war and chaos; and, following from this, a "resultant threat to 
world peace, and other adverse factors." At the same time, the service 
secretaries readily granted that a policy of continued American in­
volvement in China was "a matter for political decision" which would 
have to be calculated on the basis of the "material cost" involved in 
maintaining the commitment in China ; any number of difficulties arising
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from a possible civil war; public criticism in the U.S. concerning 
American interference in China's internal affairs; and "possible diffi­
culties with Russia." Ibid., 673.
^^All this, of course, followed from the implications of the fact 
of demobilization, postwar retrenchment of government spending and 
domestic public opposition to American intervention in China's internal 
affairs. Although this point will be developed at greater length in 
the next chapter, in this regard it is of interest to note, for example, 
that in the Summer of 1946, congressional leaders warned the Admin­
istration that any effort to get a bill passed for the purpose of 
extending military advisory assistance to the Nationalist government 
was sure to run into hot debate and probably would be defeated. Thus 
the decision was made to grant military advice to the Chinese through 
the President's war powers so as to avoid this prospect. The point is, 
officials were keenly aware of severe limits on their ability to become 
involved in China. See, Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall, 
23 July 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 754; General Marshall to Colonel Marshall 
S. Carter, 24 July 1946, ibid., 755.
^^See, Chapters VI and VII.
53It is quite clear that American officials, even by late 1945, 
were beginning to consider the disadvantages to the American position 
in the world, in the event that U.S. policies were to be effectively
labeled as imperialistic. And, this American concern did not follow
merely from a consideration of what negative effect such criticism
might have in undermining the United Nations or in prompting domestic 
public criticism of the Administration. Increasingly, in 1946, offi­
cials began to see this problem in relation to the question of how the 
U.S. could best gain the competitive edge in the emerging struggle with 
the Soviet Union. As early as September 1945, the Office of Strategic 
Services observed that the Russian pledge in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
August of "non-interference in the internal affairs" of China and, as 
well, to respect the "sovereignty and territorial entity" of China, 
placed the Soviets in a position, "...which will enable them more 
effectively to charge that the Kuomintang is propped up by U.S. influ­
ence and to exploit an 'anti-imperialistic', 'China-for-the-Chinese' 
theme." The report went on, that such Soviet pledges of "non­
interference", did not really, "...change the community of interests 
between the Chinese Communists and the USSR, a community of interests 
which both can exploit by propaganda. The agreements do, however, by 
demonstrating the indigenous character of the Chinese Communists, make 
the Soviet Union's propaganda more effective with world opinion." 
Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, "implica­
tions of the Sino-Soviet Agreements for the Internal Politics of 
China.", 7 September 1945, R & A Report No. 3248, pp. 1 & 4, 11/23, 
UPA; The Charge of the Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan, wrote in 
January of 1946, that, "In seeking to achieve its aims (the) USSR had
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always followed and will continue to follow tactics confusing to out­
side observers  In general Soviet endeavors to obtain actual but
concealed domination of neighboring regimes are characterized by "non­
intervention", obfuscation of real issues by special interpretations of 
such key terms as "democracy", "Fascist", "cooperation", "loyalty", 
"intervention" and "free elections"; tactical elections"; tactical 
retreats which are wishfully greeted (in) the West as omens of basic 
Soviet goodwill but which turn out to be temporary respites or are 
followed by other more effective tactics." The Charge in the Soviet 
Union to the Secretary of State, 10 January .1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 
116-117; The major and systematic study of Soviet foreign policy, along 
with suggestions for effective American counterpolicies, which members 
of the White House Staff began in the Summer of 1946 including the 
following series of related comments: "The basic Soviet objective in
China, Korea and Japan is to ensure that these countries remain intern­
ally divided and weak until such time as the USSR is in a position to 
exert greater influence there than any other country."; "The USSR is 
seeking wherever possible to weaken the military position and influence 
of the United States abroad, as, for example, in China."; The report 
argued that the greatest "danger" to the U.S. position in China was 
Soviet propaganda which was, "...designed to discredit American forces 
in China, to convince all political groups in China that American 
forces should be evacuated at once and to arouse suspicions as to 
American postwar aims in the Far East."; Generally, the report argued 
that, "The United States should realize that Soviet propaganda is 
dangerous (especially when American "imperialism" is emphasized) and 
should avoid any actions which give an appearance of truth to the 
Soviet charge." "A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to 
the President, Clark M. Clifford", (24) September 1946, Chapter I/pp. 2 
& 17, Chapter V/p. 5, Chapter VI/p. 79, file 75/139B, DDRS.
54
See, Memorandum by Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman to 
Colonel J. Hart Caughey, 10 December 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 606.
55
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter 
Vincent, wrote in September 1946, that, " it is felt that if we re­
frain from rendering open military support to Chiang's forces we can 
avoid development of a situation which we earnestly desire to avoid; 
that is, an ill-disguised military contest between ourselves and the 
Russians over China." Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 September 1946, 
ibid., 228; An officer of the Division of Chinese Affairs observed in 
early 1947, that, "Uppermost must be the effort to prevent China's
becoming a major irritant in our relations with Soviet Russia ."
Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse of the Division of Chinese Affairs 
to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, no date (early?) 
February 1947, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States (Washington, D.C., 1972), VII, 786. Hereafter cited as F.R., 
1947, VII.
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In a September 1946 memo, Vincent, noted that, "It is believed 
that...(the Soviets)...would be loath to have a situation develope in 
China where they would find themselves ranged against us in open mili­
tary support of the warring Chinese factions." Ibid., 228. Earlier in 
the year, George Kennan had written from Moscow that "Toward China thus 
far (the) USSR has been patient and cautious in its tactics: patient
because (the) USSR is in many respects playing a waiting game in China 
—  with confidence that events will some day play into Soviet hands." 
The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 10 January 
1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 117. (This estimate of the Soviet approach to 
China remained largely the same through the remainder of the Chinese 
civil war.); See, also. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the 
Secretary of State, 29 November 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 569.
draft policy memorandum prepared by the Embassy in China in 
September 1946, included that, "Should it become at any time that the 
Soviet Union is giving effective assistance to the Communists, it 
would, of course, then become necessary to reconsider our position and 
set our course of action accordingly." Draft Policy Memorandum 
Prepared in the Embassy in China, 6 September 1946, ibid., 150; The 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, echoed the possibility 
several months later, i.e., "Should, of course, we find evidence of 
material support for the Chinese Communist armies from the Soviet 
Union, an immediate reassessment of our position would be necessary." 
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of 
State, 7 February 1947, F.R., 1947, VII, 792.
^^See, Kennan's warning concerning Soviet policy, that, "Every­
thing must be done to advance (the) relative strength of (the) USSR as 
(a) factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must 
be missed to reduce (the) strength and influence, collectively as well 
as individually, of (the) capitalist powers." The Charge in the Soviet 
Union to the Secretary of State, 8 February 1946, F.R., 1946, VI, 698.
59It appears this is the only explanation which can be placed on 
the fact, that by the Fall of 1946 and after, when it had become obvi­
ous to virtually all that the Marshall mission had virtually no possi­
bility of success, no official concerned with China policy advocated an 
American withdrawal from China as the alternative to Marshall's failure 
to achieve a peaceful settlement in China. For example, the Minister- 
Counselor of the Embassy in China, W. Walton Butterworth (who in the 
Summer of 1947 would succeed John Carter Vincent as Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs) argued from Nanking that, "The primary 
and most urgent factor is that the existence of a state of civil war 
will inevitably encourage and increase the interest of the Soviet Union 
in the Chinese conflict and stimulate its hope that the United States 
may be persuaded by events to get out of China. Soviet political 
expansion into China would constitute a threat to the national security 
of the United States. It is, therefore, of primary importance that the 
United States remain in China and, concomitantly, that it maintain its
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policy objective, the creation of a united China, the first step toward 
which being a cessation of hostilities. It is merely the tactics to be 
employed to accomplish the immediate objective that are now subject to 
review and modification in the light of recent developments."; "In my 
opinion, it would be as impractical for the United States to withdraw 
all aid from the recognized government of China and adopt a so-called 
policy of neutrality as it would be for it to accord all-out support to 
that government, giving it the wherewithall to solve the Communist 
problem by force of arms. The former course would discriminate against 
the effective government of most of China and would ultimately result 
in a chaotic condition in which the Chinese would find themselves at 
the mercy of Soviet machinations. The second course would discriminate 
against a large section of the Chinese people and would almost inevita­
bly result at a certain stage in open or covert Soviet support of the 
Communists in order to advance their own intersts, eventually leading 
to the possibility of a serious clash between the Soviet Union and the 
United States." Draft Policy Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in 
China, 6 September 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 148.
^^For the American sense of the consequences of an American with­
drawal and ensuing civil war, see. Memorandum by the Chief of the Divi­
sion of Chinese Affairs, 16 November, 1945, F.R., 1945, VII, 630; The 
Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater to the Chief of Staff, 
United States Army, 20 November 1945, ibid., 647, 659; The Secretaries 
of War and Navy saw the result of a civil war in China as producing, 
" —  turmoil and outbreak of war in the Far East." Memorandum by the 
Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, 26 November
1945, ibid., 672; See, the interesting, though highly speculative
intelligence report that a "captured" document, " intimates that both
the Soviets and the Chinese Communists will "lie low" for a period of 
about two years, disarming suspicion of ultimate aims, but then after 
we have been sucked in, in pur scheme of giving China.. .billions in 
loan and relief, draining our resources, then the Soviets will launch 
their active campaign to rob us of our gains and will use China as a 
base for sovietizing all Asia." The Commercial Attache in China to the 
Charge in China, 3 January 1946, ibid., 721; Memorandum by the Second 
Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 10 July 1945, ibid., 
931-932; See, the official assessment by Marshall’s military represen­
tative in Washington in 1946, that, "The obvious Soviet aim in China is 
to exclude U.S. influence and replace it with that of Moscow. The 
major concern is that, should the U.S. for any reason or reasons with­
draw from China, the result would be a triumph for Soviet strategy in 
an area of global importance."; "Our exclusion from China would prob­
ably result, within the next generation, in an expansion of Soviet 
influence over the manpower, raw materials and industrial potential of 
Manchuria and China. The U.S. and the world might then be faced in the 
China sea and southward with a Soviet power analogous to that of the 
Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be 
perhaps overwhelmingly strong in Europe and the Middle East as well." 
Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall, 14 August 1946, F.R.,
1946, X, 27-28.
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See, the comment by Edward R. Drachman, that, "Since most 
Frenchmen saw their empire as a symbol of France’s strength and unity, 
the State Department considered support of the French in Vietnam essen­
tial for the maintenance of a strong, stable, French Government." 
Edward R. Drachman. United States Policy Toward Vietnam, 1940-1945 
(Rutherford, N.J.; Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970), 126; 
Edwin 0. Reischauer. Beyond Vietnam: The United States in Asia
(Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, Co., 1967), 20. Reischauer writes, "In
1945-46 I was temporarily in the State Department and I remember very 
clearly that those of us with a strong interest in Asia felt that the 
U.S. should not support the restoration of colonial regimes where these 
had been swept away by Japanese conquest....; The Pentagon Papers: The
Defense Department History of United States Decision-making on Vietnam, 
Vol. I. The Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1971),
28-29; Ellen J. Hammer. The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955, (Stan­
ford University Press, 1954), 202; See, also, the interesting statement 
of the American dilemma by a SWNCC Subcommittee on Rearmament report 
that, "Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it 
is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her 
traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in 
the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The 
recruiting and equipping of French military forces would be a natural 
corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be por­
trayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a 
proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation." However, with 
respect to this policy, the report went on, "Due to the unsettled 
conditions at present prevailing in Indo-China, the Department of State 
finds itself in a somewhat difficult position. As indicated above, it 
believes that as a general principle, the United States should support 
the armed forces of France with military supplies. On the other hand, 
it does not at this juncture desire to strengthen the hand of the 
French Government in its current attempt to restore by force the pre­
war position of France in Indo-China." The report also noted a similar 
dilemma for the U.S. in the case of the Netherlands and her Indonesian 
colony. Report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament to the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee, 21 March 1946, F.R., 1946, I, 1154-1156; Note, 
also the reticence of the State Department to push the issue too far in 
complaining about the French effort to re-establish its position in 
Indo-China for fear that such criticism might enhance the political 
position of the powerful French Communist Party which at that time was 
"harping" on the theme of "foreign intervention" in Indo-China's in­
ternal affairs which were properly a French reserve. Memorandum of 
Conversation by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Division of Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 31 December 1946, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Rela­
tions of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1971), VIII, 83. Here­
after cited as F.R., 1946, VIII.
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See, the statement by the Secretary of State, that, "The Vietnam 
Government is in control of a small Communist group possibly in indi­
rect touch with Moscow and direct touch with Yenan."; "French influence
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is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence but to protect 
Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism." The Secretary of 
State to Certain Missions Abroad, 17 December 1946, ibid., 72-73; The 
available documents clearly reveal considerable concern in Washington 
over the possible affiliations of Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh with 
Moscow and Yenan. See, The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at 
Saigon, 9 September 1946, ibid., 57; The Consul at Saigon to the Secre­
tary of State, 17 September 1946, ibid., 59; The Ambassador in France 
to the Secretary of State, 29 November 1949, ibid., 63; See, Under 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson's message to Abbot Low Moffat, Chief of 
the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, in late 1946 on a fact finding 
mission in Indo-China, that, "Assume you will see Ho in Hanoi.... Keep 
in mind Ho's clear record as (an) agent (of) international communism, 
(and) absence (of) evidence recantation of Moscow affiliations...and 
support Ho receiving (from the ) French Communist Party." The Acting 
Secretary of State to the Consul at Saigon, 5 December 1946, ibid., 67.
63
For American concern about the Japanese Communist Party, see. 
Memorandum by the First Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 
10 August 1946, ibid., 285; See, also, the comment that, "Japan is 
groping for a new ideology to replace the shattered one which was so 
carefully and deliberately constructed during the years of military- 
feudal control. The old has been discredited and the new is attrac­
tive. Liberalism is vague and difficult to define. Communism is 
positive and concrete. It will be favored by the present serious 
economic insecurity. It will take at least moral encouragement from 
Soviet participation in control of Japan." This particular report went 
on to suggest that communism in Japan was not that significant a polit­
ical movement, "But they will grow stronger." The Acting Political 
Adviser in Japan to President Truman, 4 January 1946, ibid., 88-89; 
See, also, "The USSR has a well disciplined political instrument of 
Soviet policy in (the) Jap Communist party."; "Accordingly, every 
effort sould be made to avoid bolstering Jap Communists who in (the) 
final analysis support Soviet attempts to undermine American prestige 
and position in the immediate occupation and in the longer accomplish­
ment of our Pacific policy." Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the 
Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State, 10 April 1946, 
ibid., 193; For an understanding of the American view of the require­
ments in Korea, see. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Occupied Areas to the Operations Division, War Department, 6 June 1946, 
ibid., 693-699; Generally speaking, American policy by end of 1946 
sought to offset the assumed fact that, "The basic Soviet objective in 
China, Korea and Japan is to ensure that these countries remain inter­
nally divided and weak until such time as the USSR is in a position to 
exert greater influence there than any other country." A Report to the 
President by the Special Counsel to the President, Clark M. Clifford, 
(24) September 1946, p. 17, file 75/139B, DDRS.
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64See, the revealing comment on this point made in late 1946 by 
George Kennan, that, "The basic ideas with which we entered on the 
occupation of Japan apparently did not take into account the possibil­
ity of a hostile Russia and the techniques of communist political 
penetration." Memorandum from George F. Kennan to the Secretary of 
State, "Resume of the World Situation", 6 November 1946, file 75/43C, 
DDRS.
^^George Kennan's "8000 word telegram" argued this line of think­
ing as it applied on a worldwide basis in the effort to respond effec­
tively to Soviet expansionism. As his warning and suggestions applied 
to Asia, the following series of comments from the telegram are perti­
nent: "Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet
policy ...will be directed toward weakening the power and influence and 
contacts of advanced Western nations, on (the) theory that insofar as 
this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will 
favor Communist-Soviet penetrating." With respect to this situation, 
as in all others concerning the Soviet effort to advance its power and 
influence, Kennan argued, it would have to be, " —  approached with 
(the) same thoroughness and care as (in the) solution of (a) major 
strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in 
planning effort." Generally, Kennan advised that in planning an Ameri­
can response. Administration officials should keep in mind that, 
"Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic 
nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take 
necessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly 
sensitive to (the) logic of force. For this reason it can easily 
withdraw —  and usually does —  when strong resistance is encountered 
at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes 
clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations 
are properly handled there need be no prestige engaging showdowns." 
The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 22 February 
1946, F.R., 1946, VI, 702, 707.
^^As a measure of this type of thinking, see Secretary of the 
Navy, James Forrestal's recollection of an August 1946 meeting with 
then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Truman in 
which the main topic of discussion was Turkey. Acheson observed that 
if the Soviet Union were allowed to pressure Turkey, then Greece would 
be next, "...with the obvious consequences in the Middle East and the 
obvious threat to the line of communications of the British to India." 
Forrestal then noted that, "The President replied that he was perfectly 
clear we should take a firm position both in this instance and in 
China; that we might as well find out whether the Russians are bent on 
world conquest now as in five or ten years." Millis, Forrestal Diaries, 
192.
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CHAPTER V
THE MARSHALL MISSION, APRIL 1946 - JANUARY 1947;
IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY OF LIMITED WITHDRAWAL
When Marshall returned to China in mid-April after 
a month-long stay in Washington his goal of achieving a 
peaceful political settlement had become important for 
little more than the dismaying reason that the Administra­
tion was anxious to avoid the consequences of a Chinese 
civil war. Decision-makers were not prepared to implement 
some specific policy toward China if Marshall proved unsuc­
cessful in his mission.
If the special envoy failed to arrange a political 
settlement, however, officials wished to avoid the appear­
ance of an ineffectual United States presence in China. 
They knew they would not be in a position to implement a 
future policy of helping the Nationalist government to win a 
civil war. Rather, policy-makers would have to be satisfied 
with the more negative intent of preventing a dramatic 
communist success for as long as possible and, by holding 
the line in China, of obstructing to the maximum extent a 
convenient expansion of Soviet power and influence into 
other areas of Asia.
Such a policy would be necessary because, though 
the Administration would need to sustain the Nationalist
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government in its military operations against the communists 
for an indefinite time, perforce it could be no more than a 
program of limited assistance in view of the requirement 
that the nation's energies and resources would have to be 
conserved for deployment elsewhere. The Administration at 
that point would find itself in the very ambiguous position 
of being able neither to guarantee the future of Chiang and 
his regime nor to abandon the Kuomintang to its fate. 
Reserving some middle ground for American China policy, 
which precluded both over commitment and under commitment to 
the non-communist cause, would be the only way the Admin­
istration could expect to maintain a strategically necessary 
but tactically safer relationship to a Nationalist govern­
ment locked in mortal combat with the Chinese Communists.^  
Marshall's activities after the Spring of 1945 
naturally reflected his and the Administration's most imme­
diate and overwhelming concern to facilitate a political 
settlement and to avert a civil war. As a result, through­
out the full course of the American mediation effort, virtu­
ally all of the calculations and decisions of the General 
and his staff were made in light of this primary interest. 
However, since decision-makers viewed the nature of the 
American involvement in China as it might affect other 
foreign policy priorities, and since policy-makers believed 
it was going to be necessary to continue to give some form 
of support to the Nationalist government whether Marshall
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succeeded in his mission or not, officials were also com­
pelled to recognize the necessity of creating the sort of 
American presence in China that would keep to a minimum the 
risk which the Administration could expect to incur in 
continuing to support Chiang's regime subsequent to the 
outbreak of civil war.
This latter consideration was actually the other 
side of the policy of seeking to encourage a political 
settlement. In other words, the more remote a political 
settlement, the more urgent it was that the Administration 
undertake to initiate a program of limited withdrawal, 
thereby reducing the nature and extent of the American 
presence in China. Only in this way would the Administra­
tion be better able to insure that the American relationship 
to China and the Nationalist government did not develop in a 
manner that would prove to be a liability under the circum­
stances of civil conflict.
These related purposes were reflected in the 
Administration's decisions concerning economic and financial 
assistance to Chiang's regime. For most of 1946, however, 
the more dominant consideration was : When and how could
assistance be given so as to maximize prospects for achiev­
ing a political settlement? American officials, therefore, 
displayed a constant attention to the question of timing in 
their willingness to engage in substantive discussions with 
the Chinese.
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For example, at the beginning of 1946, the 
National Advisory Council decided, in accord with General 
Marshall’s request that, short of certain essential forms of 
assistance for which the Nationalist government had indi­
spensable need, the Administration would refrain from taking 
action on any major program of economic and financial aid to 
China, until Marshall’s mediation efforts demonstrated some 
degree of success. This decision had no other significance 
than to enhance his bargaining advantage with the Kuomintang 
leadership and to encourage Communist interest in a politi­
cal settlement. Consequently, a series of aid questions re­
mained in abeyance and unresolved in the first months of 
1946.2
By March however, the Administration was prepared 
to act. General Marshall's return to Washington for the 
primary purpose of obtaining economic assistance for the 
Chinese produced results. In view of the apparently con­
structive trend of political events in China, Marshall 
received prompt and favorable consideration from the Export- 
Import Bank (EIB) on a series of previous Chinese applica­
tions for assistance totaling almost $70 million in credits. 
He also requested, with National Advisory Council approval 
that, as a reward for Chinese efforts to achieve peaceful 
settlement, the EIB consider making available a further $500 
million in credits to be used for a variety of projected 
postwar reconstruction purposes. Bank officials agreed to
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earmark the sum running for a period ending in June of
1947.3
Unfortunately, the timing of Marshall's and the 
Administration's decision to extend these forms of assis­
tance did not have the desired effect. In fact, although 
the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference and 
the reorganization proposals of the Three-man Military 
Commission appeared to take a healthy step in the direction 
of a political settlement, the hiatus in hostilities between 
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists did not long 
survive General Marshall's early March departure for Wash­
ington. His month long absence from China probably had 
little bearing on what would have occurred anyway. The 
leaders of neither party were ever partial toward the con­
dition of political pluralism and undoubtedly never con­
ceived their ultimate goal as any other than exclusive 
predominance. The legacy of intense bitterness produced by 
almost 20 years of conflict created such inordinate sus­
picions on both sides that, despite a mutual display of
peaceful purpose in the early months of 1946, a political
settlement never had any good chance to succeed.^
The situation in Manchuria proved to be the imme­
diate catalyst in upsetting the fragile ceasefire. Because 
the area had great strategic importance for both the Kuomin­
tang and the Communists, the Soviet announcement that their 
troops would be withdrawn completely by the end of April
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produced an undisguised race for position and control be­
tween the two. By the time Marshall returned to China on 
April 18th, the January ceasefire was in a shambles. Large- 
scale battles resulted in the fall of the Manchurian capital 
to Communist forces on the day of Marshall's arrival. By
the end of the month fighting had spilled over into the
provinces of North China.^
From the point at which the January ceasefire 
disintegrated in the presence of the Kuomintang-Chinese 
Communist competition for Manchuria and North China and 
until the end of 1946 and General Marshall's return to 
Washington in early 1947, his mission of mediation an admit­
ted failure, there were no really meaningful breaks in the 
fighting. There was a two-week ceasefire in early June, 
later extended to the end of the month. However, this was 
not matched by genuine concessions on either side with an 
eye to carrying through to a peaceful political settlement. 
Fighting resumed in July and continued to one degree or 
another into the fall.^ Another ceasefire went into effect 
in the early part of November. But by mid-month there were 
obviously no grounds left for discussion and with negotia­
tions terminated, the Communist delegation headed by Chou 
En-lai returned to Yenan on the 19th. By the end of Novem-
her, the fight to the finish had begun.
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In context of this steady deterioration toward 
civil war Marshall and his staff found no further substan­
tive opportunity to use effectively the tactic of giving 
economic aid as a reward for Chinese progress in achieving a 
political settlement. The Administration's decision in 
mid-June to grant to the Nationalist government slightly 
over $50 million in credits through the so-called Lend-Lease 
"Pipeline" Credit Agreement and in late August to sell, 
under extremely favorable terms, some $900 million in war 
surplus properties located in India, the Western Pacific and 
in China, therefore must be understood more as indicative of 
the already established American inclination which was to 
continue to support the internationally recognized govern-
O
ment of China even if a political solution failed. The 
October creation of a joint Chinese-American agricultural 
mission, the November signing (subject to ratification) of a 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the Decem­
ber concluding of a Civil Air Transport Agreement, all with 
the Nationalist government, were further testimony of the 
Administration's unquestioned intention to remain affiliated 
with Chiang's regime.^
However, the Administration clearly was disposed 
to control the extent of that relationship. When EIB offi­
cials agreed in March to earmark $500 million in credits, 
they did so provided only that the Chinese meet the Bank's 
statutory criteria for the granting of loans. In other
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words, internal conditions in China had to be conducive to 
economic growth and development, which meant political 
stability was imperative, and the Nationalist government 
would have to demonstrate a reasonable capacity for fiscal 
and administrative responsibility.
But none of these EIB criteria were fulfilled and 
consequently the Chinese failed to obtain any actual grants 
of aid under the Banks* $500 million earmarking.With the 
prospect of a political settlement all but eliminated by the 
end of November, Marshall was willing to support Chinese 
requests for certain "preliminary" and limited EIB loans for 
specific and pressing needs. However, he was generally of 
the opinion that any Nationalist request for a major program 
of assistance to the EIB should be decided essentially on 
the basis of its "commercial and technical" merit, parsimo­
niously concluding that the question is "just how much of 
any loan should be granted in the light of the present 
political and military attitude of the government.
Even at the end of 1946 Marshall's attitude still 
included the hope that the prospect of receiving extensive 
economic aid could be used to induce the Nationalist leader­
ship to return to the negotiating table. In this regard 
though, the General simply was continuing to fulfill prop­
erly his responsibility as a mediator, i.e., forever retain­
ing optimism until the point of formally terminating the 
12role. Realistically, there was virtually no chance for a
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political settlement by this time and more practical ques­
tions already had begun to dominate in official calcula­
tions: What kind of aid could be granted under the danger­
ous circumstances of a civil war; when and how could it be 
extended so as to maximize the prospects for the Administra­
tion achieving the full range of its foreign policy goals;
or conversely, when and how so as to avoid vitiating the
13full measure of that prospect?
However, if the associated goals of encouraging a 
political settlement while developing a "safe" United States 
involvement on the East Asian mainland were manifest in the 
Administration’s policy of limited economic and financial 
assistance to Chiang's regime, the policy's objectives were 
even more dramatically apparent in official calculations 
concerning the issue of granting military aid. This was 
true for the simple reason that the problem of military 
assistance included the process of creating a military 
advisory mission to the Nationalist government, the type of 
United States involvement which ran the highest risk of 
becoming mixed up in combat hostilities and thus the type of 
presence most subject to possible future pressures to esca­
late the American commitment.
In late February, President Truman announced that 
the United States Army in the China Theatre —  the wartime 
designation for the American military presence in China —  
which had remained in existence after the war to help
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Chiang's regime reoccupy the country and to aid in the 
repatriation of Japanese troops, would be deactivited final­
ly in favor of creating an American military advisory mis­
sion to the Nationalist government.
This decision reflected the desire to facilitate a 
political settlement in several ways. Since the Nationalist 
government's reoccupation of the entire country was complete 
and a good deal of the task of repatriating Japanese troops 
had been fulfilled, or arrangements made to return those 
which remained, the justification for continuing the China 
Theatre command was significantly diminished. However, the 
announcement by the Three-Man Military Commission —  of 
which Marshall was a member —  of proposals for the military 
integration of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist forces,
created the most immediate reason for establishing of an
,  .  14advisory mission.
This had been promised earlier by the President 
once the Kuomintang and Communists agreed to unify their 
armies, i.e., an advisory mission to train and advise an 
American equipped Chinese military force to serve a coali­
tion government for the purpose of maintaining internal 
order and stability. Also, since the related processes of 
reoccupation and repatriation were nearing completion, the 
Chinese Communists were more likely to interpret a continua­
tion of the China Theatre command as an indication of calcu­
lated impartial American support for the Kuomintang and
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hence possible grounds for ending their participation in 
negotiations concerning a coalition government. Administra­
tion officials hoped that the White House statement announc­
ing the decision to go ahead with the military advisory
mission would have the effect of reinforcing the apparent 
movement in early 1946 in the direction of a political
settlement. Officials also intended the creation of the 
mission as part of a reward to the Chinese for having made 
this effort.
Subsequent to the Administration's proposal to
establish the mission, Marshall and his staff continued to 
use the question of its creation in order to stimulate
political negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chi­
nese Communist Party. In mid-June, the White House submit­
ted to Congress a China Aid Bill to authorize extension of 
American military advice and assistance to the Nationalist 
government, this to replace the wartime Lend-Lease authori­
zation which was due to terminate at the end of June and 
under which all previous military aid had been legally 
administered.
It quickly became clear, however, that the Bill 
had little chance of passing the 79th Congress short of a 
strong appeal on the part of Marshall himself. Moreover, 
the Administration was informed by certain knowledgeable 
Congressmen that the effort to pass the Bill was sure to 
bring substantial criticism from those members of Congress
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opposed to the American involvement in China. There was
17even a possibility the Bill could be defeated.
In response to requests from Washington as to what 
should be done on the matter. General Marshall replied that 
the Administration should neither withdraw the legislation 
nor urge its passage. Marshall based his directive on the 
view that if the China Aid Bill passed it would encourage 
those "reactionary" elements in the Kuomintang who favored 
using military force against the Communists. Conversely, if 
the Bill did not pass, Marshall reasoned, it might have the 
effect of frightening the Kuomintang leadership more in the 
direction of serious political negotiations because they 
were banking on the United States being forced eventually 
into supporting the Nationalist government no matter what 
happened.
On the other hand, there was the consideration 
that if the Aid Bill did come up for a floor vote, and in 
the midst of substantial criticism was defeated, the Commu­
nists would interpret its demise as an indication of weak 
domestic American support for Chiang Kai-shek and his regime, 
and hence a signal they could expect greater advantage for 
themselves by acting in a more belligerent fashion. Mar­
shall thus preferred to let the Bill die quietly (and so far 
as the interested Chinese parties were concerned, ambiguous­
ly) in congressional committee. The Military Advisory 
Mission could go forward, officials decided, under authori-
1 ftzation from the President's emergency war powers.
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Marshall and many of his staff conceived that the 
introduction of a military mission might stimulate a politi­
cal settlement in another way. After the Spring of 1946, 
the more it seemed that the two sides were moving further 
away from a political settlement, the more important the 
question of the Kuomintang*s popular image seems to have 
become for many American officials. Marshall appears in­
creasingly to have been prone by the summer months to admon­
ish the Kuomintang leadership on the necessity of far reach­
ing reform —  party reorganization and meaningful social and 
economic legislation —  as vital in order to promote a 
political settlement.
Marshall's thinking on this score derived from 
several considerations. He felt that the party needed 
reorganization to broaden its dwindling popular base of 
support and to bring more progressive elements into the 
decision-making levels of the party while, at the same time, 
eliminating in the Kuomintang the increasingly prominent 
role being played by those "reactionaries" opposed to a 
negotiated settlement with the Communists. He also believed 
that "extremist" factions within the Chinese Communist Party 
were exerting greater influence on policy matters on the 
basis of their argument that Kuomintang corruption and 
maladministration was so alienating the government from 
popular sympathies that a civil war likely would result in 
the regime's quick defeat.
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Marshall thought that the only way this latter 
view could be countered effectively was if the Kuomintang 
through genuine and far reaching reform proved able to 
refurbish its image as a vital, energetic and progressive 
alternative to the Chinese Communists. His assumption,
shared by other American officials, was that many
politically-aware Chinese were opposed to the Kuomintang not 
because they were committed communists but because the
Chinese Communist Party posed a much more attractive option 
to the unprogressive and moribund Kuomintang. It followed 
in this thinking that the Chinese, like any thoughtful 
people, would always choose to support a progressive non­
communist alternative if a genuine opportunity were to 
present itself. Thus, granting the fact of government 
reform and the anticipated swing of popular sympathy to the 
Kuomintang, the Communists would be substantially less 
inclined to consider that a civil war would work to their 
advantage and more willing to perceive the necessity of
joining a coalition government.
The favorable consequences of this plan, however, 
would be substantially offset unless the nationalistic- 
patriotic credentials of the Nationalist government appeared 
impeccable. And in 1946 officials thought this would re­
quire a significant reduction of the United States military 
presence in China. Patriotic Chinese sentiment was so 
sensitive on the point of foreign interference in China's
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internal affairs that any large and continuing American 
military involvement was sure to draw criticism as imperial­
istic meddling and to tarnish the regime’s image by implying
it would be unable to continue governing in the absence of
20outside support. Kuomintang leaders, it seems, were fully 
in accord with American thinking on this particular point 
and welcomed the creation of a military advisory mission 
which the President initially limited to no more than 1000 
total personnel.
The essence of the Administration's calculations 
on the matter of the military advisory mission, however, 
which went beyond the effort to stimulate a political solu­
tion to China’s internal problems. Of major significance 
was the belief of decision-makers that any large-scale 
American military presence in China was going to have to be 
eliminated in quick order once the Soviets began to withdraw 
their troops from Manchuria. Because of developing American- 
Soviet hostilities and the need to protect the nation’s 
international prestige, this had become especially important 
so as to remove the more convenient grounds for charging
that the American involvement in China was neo-colonial or 
21imperialistic. Since the publicized justification for 
American troops remaining in China was fading quickly, i.e.. 
Nationalist reoccupation was complete and the task of Japa­
nese repatriation well under control, the unaltered continu­
ation of the China Theatre command would have no chance of
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avoiding such criticism. Consequently, although American 
Marines not part of the advisory mission did remain in China 
for various guard duty purposes until mid-1947, from a peak 
high of 73,000, their number was reduced gradually to 5,000 
by the end of 1946.
The threat of all-out civil war made the reduction 
of American military forces even more important, especially 
when viewed in conjunction with Kuomintang corruption and 
maladministration and the continuing intransigence of Nation­
alist leaders in response to American entreaties to carry 
through necessary reforms. Administration officials were 
convinced that once engaged in conflict with the Communists, 
if it had not done so already, the Kuomintang would find it 
impossible to undertake a significant program of reform, 
and, as a result, whatever popular support which still 
favored the Nationalist government would gradually drift 
away.
Under those circumstances, any continuing large- 
scale American military involvement would prove very embar­
rassing to an Administration which had already determined 
that once engaged in a civil conflict the Nationalist gov­
ernment was going to have to be satisfied with a program of 
limited assistance. Officials would be faced with one of 
two unsettling options with respect to a civil war and the 
existence in China of a large American force: either a
precipitous withdrawal of those troops with a disastrous
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effect on non-communist morale, a favorable impact on that 
of the Chinese Communists and with the possible further 
result that Soviets might interpret withdrawal as a faint­
hearted American retreat thus precipitating a more aggres­
sive China policy on their part, or, retention of those 
troops in China thereby running the danger of their becoming 
involved in hostilities. In the latter case, moreover, the 
Administration would find itself maintaining a substantial 
military relationship to the Kuomintang with popular support 
steadily gravitating to the Communist rebels because of 
government corruption —  a nearly indefensible position in
light of the anti-imperialist principle of national self-
22determination for all peoples. This was precisely the 
type of no option situation which officials hoped the Admin­
istration would not be faced with if the Marshall mission 
were to fail.
However, it was this constant risk of American 
troops becoming involved in combat hostilities which had 
Administration officials especially worried. And, the 
larger the number of American soldiers stationed in China, 
the greater the danger of this happening. Even before his 
return to the United States in early March, Marshall was 
anxious to remove this potential hazard and suggested that 
Washington should begin to formulate arrangements to dis­
solve the China Theatre command. State Department officials 
were equally concerned on this score. Movement in the
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direction of planning for an advisory mission in January and 
February, thus, was predicated on the desire to reduce to a 
minimum any future possibility of the United States being 
drawn directly into a Chinese civil war.
When the subject of creating a military advisory
mission began to be discussed in Washington in early January
of 1946, the State Department raised immediate objections
both as to the size and function of an earlier tentative
military mission proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
23(JCS). The Secretary of State, drawing his cue from the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, complained that the JCS plan 
of 4600 American military personnel was roughly equivalent 
to the size of the British peacetime force in India. The 
Secretary's allusion was obvious. If the JCS proposal were 
put into effect without modification, the American military 
presence in China would run the risk of being compared to 
British imperialism in South Central Asia and of being 
condemned as just another example of a Western power attempt­
ing to establish a military foothold on the Asian mainland. 
The Secretary also objected that the JCS did not specify 
definite restrictions on United States military personnel 
from becoming involved with Nationalist forces at the opera­
tional level, thus running the danger of American forces 
becoming directly involved in combat hostilities.^^
Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer and Chiang Kai- 
shek in China apparently all were agreed with the Byrnes'
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assessment. Wedemeyer, having consulted with Chiang, sug­
gested that the mission should include 750 Army and roughly 
150 Navy personnel. He further observed that the mission 
should be allowed to operate only in an advisory-planning 
capacity at the General Staff level or in a training capac­
ity at the Chinese service academies, but strictly in all 
cases to refrain from any involvement at the operational 
levels.
The Presidential order to the JCS in the latter 
part of February, directing that a military mission be 
established, incorporated these suggestions with only slight 
alteration, to wit, that the mission could be as large as 
but should not exceed a total of 1000 officers and men. The 
White House, emphasizing the importance which it attached to 
the specifics of its directive, added the further proviso 
that the stated limits on the mission were not to be ex­
ceeded except by a direct order from the President him­
self.
Administration decisions regarding the nature of 
the military advisory group resulted from the desire to 
create a mission that could continue to operate during, but 
not become directly involved at the combat level, should a 
civil war occur. This required that the scope of the mis­
sion not be allowed to exceed manageable proportions. Thus 
the size and the defined function of the mission created
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minimal risk of American troops becoming involved in hostil­
ities and would present small problem in case it became 
necessary to withdraw them in a hurry. It was the kind of 
involvement which would eliminate the more convincing 
charges of United States imperialistic interference in 
Chinese affairs and also the type which would reduce the 
dangers of future pressures to increase the American commit­
ment or to cause some significant counter-escalation by the 
Soviets.
The decision in late July to prohibit the issue of 
export licenses for the purpose of shipping arms and ammuni­
tion to the Nationalist government also reflected the goals 
of the Administration's policy of limited withdrawal. In 
context of Marshall's mediation efforts, the immediate 
purpose of this embargo on munitions to China was to dis­
suade Chiang and his generals from pursuing further a policy 
of force against the Communists and to persuade the latter 
of the continuing sincerity of the American purpose in 
promoting a political settlement. The American ploy did 
not have the desired effect as fighting continued to one 
degree or another through the summer and into the fall.
However, beyond this, officials more broadly
conceived the arms embargo to be, as they put it, in the
29"American interest". What policy-makers wanted to avoid 
was the appearance of giving substantial outlays of military 
aid to a "reactionary" regime insensitive to the need for
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far reaching political, economic and social reforms and
seemingly without any regard for the further chaos and
misery which a civil war would bring to an already
beleaguered Chinese people. Not only was it important to
discourage the Kuomintang in its policy of force but to
avert the precedent of the Administration gratuitously
giving military aid to this kind of regime as well. It was
vital that the Administration early place qualifications on
its willingness to grant military assistance so as to create
a sustained and compelling argument against future pressures
to escalate the American commitment. The longer unqualified
military aid continued to be granted while the two sides
fought, the more difficult it would be to justify what the
Administration already determined would be necessary under
the circumstances of civil war —  a program of limited
3 0assistance to the Nationalist government.
With respect to the period 1945 through 1950, 
there is no less room for debate concerning the question of 
the effect of American public opinion on the nature of 
Truman Administration China policy than for the year 1946. 
As outlined in an earlier chapter, a series of public atti­
tudes, which many policy-makers shared, did have influence 
on the formative process of planning the Marshall mission. 
However, subsequent to the formulation of the mission's 
priorities and goals and Marshall's departure for China in 
the latter part of December of 1945 and until his return to
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Washington in early January of 1947, American public opin­
ion, so far as the documents reveal, had absolutely no 
bearing on the essence of China policy. In fact, for the 
year 1946 it is a rather simple process to identify the 
source of decision-making on all major policy questions. 
General Marshall himself was that source and his instruc­
tions with respect to virtually all policy matters were 
treated as sacrosanct, both by the American diplomatic and 
military communities in China and by all interested govern­
ment agencies in Washington. The White House backed his 
decisions without the slightest murmur of objection. In a 
word, Marshall's views constituted American China policy in 
1946.31
Marshall's nearly absolute control over the course 
of affairs may have been prompted in part by the desire to 
avoid the sort of controversy which had developed on the 
question of American China policy during the war and immedi­
ately after. Marshall possibly wanted to prevent the type 
of conflict which had characterized the relationship between 
Generals Stilwell and Chenault or later which had produced 
the exchange between Patrick Hurley and certain China-based 
Foreign Service Officers, both episodes in some measure the
O  O
result of ambiguity in the chain of command. On the other 
hand, his recognized preeminence on policy matters also may 
be understood as a consequence of his role as mediator. He 
had to be given free rein to operate with respect to what he
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understood the necessity of the moment required. The 
success of his effort, to a significant degree, might depend 
on this ability to seize some fleeting opportunity in the 
flow of negotiations, an opportunity which might be hope­
lessly compromised if he were somehow subject to extraneous 
and complicating demands and pressures not associated with
O O
the immediate requirements of the situation in China.
Despite Marshall's pervasive predominance in China 
policy matters in 1946, several comments on the factor of 
public opinion nonetheless are worthwhile. He did appear 
before a combined meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee the month 
he was in Washington in early 1946. No formal record was 
kept of the appearance and it apparently amounted to little 
more than an informative briefing for interested members of 
Congress. Years later in another appearance before a con­
gressional committee investigating various aspects of 
American Far Eastern policy, Marshall recalled that no one 
present in the earlier gathering had raised any question as 
to the manner of his handling the situation in C h i n a . I n  
this regard, though, it ought to be remembered that the 
members of the two committees in 1946 were dealing with a 
revered public official in the person of General Marshall 
and at a time when events in China appeared to be headed in 
the direction of a successful political settlement. There 
simply were no grounds for complaint or debate concerning 
the Administration's China policy under the circumstances.
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By the Summer of 1946 and continuing through to 
the end of the Marshall mission, there was a general concern 
on the part of American officials both in China and in 
Washington about the possible effects which the publicized 
attitudes of certain segments of American opinion might have 
on the prospects for achieving a political settlement. For 
example, there was the problem of responding to Communist 
questions about criticism of the Chinese Communist Party 
reported in the American press. On more than one occasion, 
Marshall found himself explaining to Communist negotiators 
that the Administration had no control over attacks made on 
the Chinese Communists by private American citizens, further 
assuring them that the attacks did not reflect Administra­
tion thinking nor did it indicate any diminishing of the
intent of American policy which was to help in the creation
3 5of a coalition government.
By the Fall and Winter of 1946 the media campaigns 
of Henry Luce in Time, Life and Fortune magazines and Roy 
Howard in the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, calling for 
full American support to Chiang Kai-shek to defeat communism 
in China and what effect this could have on last ditch 
American efforts to avert all-out civil war were of concern 
to policymakers. Marshall complained that Luce's viewpoints 
concerning the situation in China were rather "shallow" and 
that his argument that the United States should give unqual­
ified support to Chiang's regime would have the consequence
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only of encouraging those "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang 
who were opposed to a political settlement. It also would 
fortify the belief of Kuomintang militarists that pro-Chiang 
Kai-shek public opinion in the United States eventually 
would force the Administration into backing a Nationalist 
military effort to defeat the communists.
To the extent this type of thinking did exist
within the Kuomintang, it could not have been based on a
more erroneous estimate of the Administration's impressions
regarding the necessity of responding to the pressures of
American public opinion on the issue of its China policy.
By August, Administration officials were more worried about
how they were going to be able to justify a policy of giving
support to the Nationalist government in view of continuing
internal strife in China. In fact, throughout the course of
the Marshall mission, decision-makers clearly considered
that their most important task with respect to public opinon
was how to avoid provoking those domestic American pressures
which might force the Administration to pull out of China 
3 7altogether-
Secretary of Navy James Forrestal, was "deeply 
apprehensive" that incidents involving American Marines in 
hostilities might result in "an aroused public opinion" at 
home which would compel the Administration to withdraw all 
United States forces. He was convinced that if this hap­
pened it would create a power vacuum in China which the
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38Soviets would be only too happy to fill. It was a fear 
shared by other Administration officials, and, as noted 
earlier in the chapter, this was one of the major reasons 
for reducing the level of American forces in China as soon 
as circumstances permitted.
On numerous occasions General Marshall observed to 
Kuomintang leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek himself, that 
the continuing maladministration and corruption evidenced by 
the Nationalist government and the authoritarian and oppres­
sive manner in which the Party reacted to its political 
opposition, including the use of assault and assassination, 
were hurting the Kuomintang cause in the eyes of the Ameri­
can people. He suggested that public attitudes in the 
United States were much more disturbed by the Kuomintang's
"reactionary" tendencies than by any objection to communist 
39ideology.
By late 1946 Marshall worried that any media blitz 
by Henry Luce or Roy Howard designed to create public pres­
sures to force the Administration to give greater support to 
Chiang's regime would have the opposite effect of what was 
intended. Marshall speculated that a pro-Chiang Kai-shek 
publicity campaign would prompt a like response from those 
who were either opposed to American involvement in China 
generally or specifically who were against the United States 
giving aid to the corrupt and undemocratic Chinese govern­
ment. The resulting public debate, Marshall thought, would
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simply air that much more unsavory information about the 
Kuomintang, further discrediting the regime, and in doing so 
only make it more difficult for the Administration to jus­
tify continuing a program of support to the legal government 
of China.
By the Fall of 1946, the Adminstration was begin­
ning to encounter what was to become its essential problem 
over the next several years with respect to domestic public 
opinion, namely, a growing divergence between what the 
public believed American China policy ought to be and what 
decision-makers thought policy had to be. Public attitudes 
concerning the question of the United States relationship to 
the situation in China already tended to gravitate toward 
two basic positions, one side arguing in favor of all-out 
American support to Chiang Kai-shek's regime and the other 
calling on the Administration to cut its ties with the 
Nationalist government, withdraw from China altogether and 
leave the Chinese to work out their own affairs. Both sides 
in the debate anticipated correctly that the Marshall mis­
sion would prove unable to avert full-scale civil war.
By late November and early December, Administra­
tion officials also shared this view though some continued 
to display, including Marshall himself, the hope that by 
some miracle civil war could still be avoided. In any case, 
there was no question but that the public's "either-or" 
suggestions on what kind of American policy should replace
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that embodied in the Marshall mission did not accord with 
the Administration’s intention to continue to give limited 
assistance to the Nationalist government.
There was some suggestion in the late Summer of 
1946, chiefly from the Secretary of the Navy, that possibly 
the Administration ought to recognize that the Chinese were 
not going to be able to settle their differences peacefully, 
that Marshall ought to be recalled and that the time had 
come to decide on what sort of commitment to Chiang ’ s regime 
the United States could afford to undertake. However, the 
prevailing opinion was to allow the Marshall mission to run 
its course through to a final failure before making any such 
decisions. Most officials believed a political solution so 
important that, no matter how slight the odds of pulling it
off, the chance was well worth the taking.
As fall approached winter though, the odds on
reaching a negotiated settlement steadily deteriorated. The 
Communist delegation returned to Yenan in the latter part of 
November, the formal negotiations with the Kuomintang car­
ried on since January at an end. General Marshall's request 
that the Communists indicate to him what their attitude
would be about his continuing on in a mediatory role did not 
receive any response. By early December he assumed the
A O
Communists considered him persona non grata in the matter.
By late December Marshall was convinced the situation was 
beyond solution and on the 28th he communicated to President
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Truman his desire that the American mediation effort be 
terminated and that he be recalled to W a s h i n g t o n . T h e  
almost steady fighting between Kuomintang and Chinese Commu­
nist forces since the spring had eliminated any grounds for 
one side trusting the capacity of the other for political 
moderation, even granting there had been some potential in 
this regard at the beginning of the Marshall mission.
Marshall's patience had run out. He thought the 
Communists had become victims of their own suspicion laden 
propaganda, actually believing that the United States and 
the Kuomintang all along had conspired to defeat the Chinese 
Communist Party, neither ever intending that the Communists 
be given an effective voice in a coalition government. 
Marshall affirmed that, since the Spring of 1946, the Commu­
nists had contributed their share of unreasonableness which, 
in combination with Kuomintang instransigence, had precluded 
any meaningful movement in negotiations leading toward a 
political settlement. Communist truculence, Marshall con­
cluded by the end of his mission, was the work of Party 
"extremists" who were determined to use political and eco­
nomic subversion and military force to destroy the Nation­
alist government, and who for sometime, he assumed, probably 
had been in full command of Party policy.
However, Marshall was particularly frustrated with 
the Kuomintang leadership. He not only believed theirs was 
the greater responsiblity for the slide toward civil war but
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that it had been chiefly within their power to do what was 
necessary in order to achieve a political settlement. Even 
more significantly, Marshall thought the Kuomintang, in an 
act of sheer stupidity, was fatally compromising its own 
future by refusing to find some grounds for political com­
promise with the Communists.
He believed the Kuomintang leadership for some 
time had dramatized an interest in his mediation efforts 
merely to disguise their actual intention which was to deal 
with the Communists by military means. Marshall thought 
that Chiang himself had become the prisoner of his long-term 
association with the Party’s militarists, persuaded by their 
counsel that the Chinese Communist Party could be eliminated 
by force. He repeatedly told the Generalissimo and other 
Kuomintang representatives they were foolish to think this 
possible, that the effect of civil war would not be the 
defeat of the Communists but the collapse of the economy and 
the financial ruin of the government. Marshall pointed out 
that the government already was spending nearly three- 
quarters of its budget on military operations. Not only was 
this causing severe inflationary pressures, but, in doing 
so, rapidly eroding Nationalist financial credibility by 
draining the government’s treasury at an alarming rate. In 
view of this, he was thoroughly disgusted with the refusal 
of Kuomintang leaders to understand the necessity of far- 
reaching reform; their apparently easy acceptance of the
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military alternative over that of making a sincere effort to
settle their differences with the Communists peacefully; and
their almost cavalier disregard for the misery which the
consequences of civil war would bring to the Chinese 
45people.
Yet the General could understand Kuomintang suspi­
cions of the Communists, because he shared them. By the end
of 1946 there was no question in his mind anymore but that 
the Chinese Communists would have no other motive in enter­
ing a coalition government than that of eventually displac­
ing the Kuomintang altogether in favor of assuming absolute 
political control for themselves. However, Marshall was 
equally firm in his conviction that the Kuomintang had its 
best chance of survival, in fact of achieving its own polit­
ical dominance, under the circumstances of peace, unity and 
stability, and of operating in context of a coalition gov­
ernment.
At the beginning of 1946, some Administration
officials perhaps entertained a more idealistic vision of a 
coalition government, and the Chinese potential to achieve 
that ideal, than some others were willing to concede.
Although the Administration did employ the term "democratic" 
to describe the projected character of a political coalition 
in China, it appears that a number American officials, cer­
tainly most of those in China, were under few illusions as
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to the actual democratic propensities of either the Kuomin­
tang or the Chinese Communist Party. Many undoubtedly 
understood the convenience and usefulness of the term^ it 
being one of wide-ranging popularity but at the same time, 
of sufficient ambiguity, to be acceptable to all parties 
involved.
Assuming that an effective coalition government 
could be established, Marshall at first seems to have con­
ceived it as a mechanism for balancing competing political 
interests, in short, a balance of power device and hopefully 
a long-lasting one.^^ However, as he and other American 
officials rather soon began to lose confidence in Kuomintang 
and Communist good faith and peaceful intentions and subse­
quent to the Administration’s determination that the Soviet 
Union was involved in an expansionist foreign policy, the 
goal of creating a coalition government increasingly took on 
a somewhat different significance. At that point, it 
appears the earlier hope that a coalition government would 
serve to promote unity and stability in China, and, in doing 
so, create the foundation for working out a balance of Great 
Power interests in East Asia, began to be displaced by an 
assessment of the importance of a political coalition as the 
best means by which to preserve the non-communist position 
in China. By the summer months, Marshall not only warned 
Kuomintang leaders that a civil war would work to the dis­
advantage of their party but on the more positive side
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suggested that they could expect substantially greater 
advantage in competing with the communists by agreeing with 
the latter to enter into a coalition government.
Any such advantage was, in Marshall's view, con­
tingent on the prerequisite of organizational and political 
reform of the Kuomintang and the government and as well the 
association of Chiang's party with geniune social and eco­
nomic reform. He and most American officials were rather 
pessimistic that Kuomintang leaders were capable spontane­
ously of understanding the intrinsic value of reform. 
However, Marshall believed Chiang and his advisers would be 
forced to acknowledge its necessity subsequent to the Kuo­
mintang becoming a part of a coalition government. At that 
point, the identification of the Kuomintang with a forward- 
looking program or reform would be the only way in which the 
Party could hope to create the kind of public image that 
would begin to attract popular support away from the Commu­
nists.
Marshall argued that a reformed and reformist- 
oriented Kuomintang Party could be confident in its ability 
to do this, though only under circumstances of political 
stability, provided by the existence of a coalition govern­
ment, and the concomitant of this condition, equilibrium in 
the social and economic realm. Marshall's attitude undoubt­
edly may be attributed in part to the somewhat common Ameri­
can notion that under normal and prosperous social and
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economic conditions most peoples would prefer to have a 
non-communist form of government. And, subsequent to the 
formation of a coalition government, the Administration's 
plan to give financial and technical assistance so as to 
ensure for successful Chinese economic reconstruction and 
development, was tied to the idea that communism was an 
"unnatural" phenomenon which flourished mainly under the 
conditions of political instability and social and economic 
chaos.
Whatever the validity of this concept, however, it 
would be a mistake to ignore Marshall's other reasons for 
counseling against the Kuomintang's pursuing a policy of 
force against the Chinese Communists. For one thing, he 
accurately and pragmatically observed that the Chinese 
economic and financial structure was in such deteriorated 
condition that it would not be able to survive the chaotic 
circumstances of civil war and the enormous costs of mili­
tary operations. He told the Chinese that it would not be 
humanly possible to avert this result under prolonged condi­
tions of civil conflict and, he advised, this was precisely 
what the Kuomintang could expect in fighting the Communists. 
The latter were too powerful, politically and militarily, to 
be defeated prior to the occurrence of economic collapse. 
There clearly was no way around the absolute necessity of
creating peace and stability in China in order to stave off
48fatal economic disintegration. Also, he was, in effect.
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warning the Chinese, though he could not tell them this 
candidly for reasons of higher policy and national security, 
that the Administration would not be in a practical position 
to replace its policy of limited withdrawal, carried out 
over the course of the Marshall mission, with any more than 
a program of limited assistance. Marshall knew that, under 
the circumstances of civil war, limited American assistance 
meant a highly uncertain short-term future for Chiang's 
regime and over the long-run an almost certain defeat.
Marshall thought his series of arguments in favor 
of a peaceful solution to China's problems were so unques­
tionably correct, he found it incomprehensible that the 
Kuomintang leadership would opt to have it out with the 
Communists on the battlefield. He was quite dismayed with 
the Kuomintang's unwillingness to reform and considered its 
policy of force profoundly irresponsible, the work of an 
ignorant, venal and petty warlord mentality. Civil war, 
Marshall believed, would play right into the hands of the 
Chinese Communists who could not hope for any more favorable 
circumstances in which to realize their political ambition 
to achieve absolute control over China.
Marshall's return to Washington in early January 
did not produce any new decisions on what to do about China. 
American officials simply were not sure what they would be 
able to do. It was essentially a question of precisely 
where between the extremes of avoiding both over commitment
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and under commitment to Chiang's regime that the Administra­
tion eventually would decide was a proper resting place for 
its China policy. However, the question of "where" was con­
tingent on the further problem of when the Administration 
would need to adjust its relationship to the Nationalist 
government and the latter determination could only be made 
in response to the implications of the course of events in 
China and with respect to the evolution of the broader re­
quirements of American foreign policy. It appears officials 
were almost unanimous in their thinking that the Administra­
tion ought to adopt a "wait and see" attitude before making 
any important policy moves. This passive approach remained 
in effect until the Summer of 1947 when serious inter­
national developments forced the Administration to begin to 
contemplate the necessity of making alterations in its 
policy toward China. Why this happened and what the Admin­
istration determined it had to do is the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Reserving a "middle ground" for China policy is clearly revealed 
in a September 1946 conversation between an official of the British 
Embassy in Washington and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs, John Carter Vincent. Vincent observed that the U.S., " had
no intention of following either of two suggested courses; we had no 
intention of giving "all-out support" to the National Government in 
prosecuting a civil war and we had no intention of "washing our hands" 
of the China problem, explaining that our interest in the maintenance 
of peace and security in the Far East far transcended any feeling of 
disappointment we might have over a temporary setback in bringing peace 
and unity to China. In short, I said that we had every intention of 
staying with the problem in China and at the same time of staying out 
of China's civil war." Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of 
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 3 September 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 
116.
2
See, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China, 14 
January 1946, ibid., 911-912; The Acting Secretary of State to The
Embassy in China, 17 January 1946, ibid., 919; Note: The National
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems was 
created in the months after the war in 1945 and consisted of The Secre­
tary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, The Secretary of Commerce
and the Chairmen of the Export-Import Bank and of the Federal Reserve 
System; The report by Edwin W. Locke, Jr., to President Truman in 
mid-December 1945 which advocated economic and financial aid to the 
Nationalist government was not made public for fear that it would 
embarrass Marshall's efforts to achieve a political settlement and 
reduce his bargaining leverage with Chiang's regime. Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State to the President, 3 January 1946, President's Secre­
tary Files, Box 173, Truman Papers, HSTL.
3
See, "Financial Relations Between the United States and China", 
F.R., 1946, 911-945; China White Paper, 145, 226; Melby, Mandate of 
Heaven, 98-99.
4
John Leighton Stuart thought that Marshall made a tactical error 
in returning to Washington in March of 1946, that the prestige of his 
presence in China was needed in order to keep the extremists of both 
the KMT and the CCP in check. Stuart was not alone in this estimate. 
Apparently some in the American Embassy in China also thought his 
absence would encourage the militants of both parties to wreck all the 
work of the Political Consultative Conference over the previous two 
months. See, Stuart, John Leighton. Fifty Years in China (New York: 
Random House, 1954); See, also, Melby, Mandate in Heaven, 99. In an 
oral history interview in 1974, Philip D. Spouse, in 1946 the Second 
Secretary of the American Embassy in China, disagreed, and did not 
think that Marshall's return to Washington was a decisive factor in the 
breakdown of KMT-CCP negotiations and outbreak of civil war. Philip D. 
Spouse, Oral History Interview, 11 February 1974, pp. 44-45, HSTL.
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Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation," F.R., 1946, X, 1227; 
"Negotiation of Civil Air Transpot Agreement", ibid., 1228-1260; "Tech­
nical Collaboration in Agricultural and Forestry", ibid., 1268-1295.
^^China White Paper, 226-227; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 79.
^^Memroandum by General Marshall to Colonel Marshall S. Carter, 30 
November 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 1027.
12Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Mr. Butterworth, 
18 November, 1946, ibid., 1020.
13Having rejected the option of pulling out of China altogether if 
a political settlement could not be achieved, as well as the option of 
giving "all-out support" to the Nationalist government, a late August 
memorandum on American policy toward China prepared in the Embassy in 
China proposed that, "The alternative policy is conditional support of 
the National Government, using such support as a remaining lever to 
influence the Central Government toward some reasonable compromise in 
the overall political situation. In continuing a measure of support to 
the Government, it should be understood that the Generalissimo is the 
master in his own house and has practical control over the political 
situation in Kuomintang China. This being the case, and in view of his 
previous record and present position, there is no good reason to sup­
pose pressure on him will cause him to undergo and fundamental change 
in his basic political philosophy and outlook. We must, therefore, 
take him as he is, but by our actions refrain from giving such support 
as will encourage him to think he can obtain a settlement of the Chi­
nese problem by force. He must also be convinced that there are cer­
tain limits beyond which he cannot go and still continue to receive 
American assistance." Draft Policy Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy 
in China, 23 August 1946, ibid., 148; The Director of the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, wrote in early October 1946 that, 
"...we cannot, just because of a breakdown in our mediatory effort, 
delay for long efforts to bring about an improvement in economic condi­
tions in areas of China unaffected by civil war."; "...we should make 
it clear to the Chinese and to our own public that we mean to stay with 
the problem but stay out of involvement in the civil war." Memorandum 
by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 3 October 1946, 
ibid., 277.
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Ibid., 338-340; General Marshall thought that deactivation of 
the China Theater Command, was, "...very important to my mission as 
demobilization and integration procedure of Chinese Armed Forces car­
ries Executive Headquarters action into Manchuria." General Marshall 
to the Chief of Staff, 23 February 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 849.
^^China White Paper, 340.
^^See, Colonel Marshall S. Carter to General Marshall, 23 July 
1946, F.R., 1946, X, 754.
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19After the Spring of 1946 and in the presence of the assumptions 
that the U.S.S.R. would not cooperate with American efforts to bring 
about a peaceful settlement in China and that the Chinese Communists 
merely would use entry into a coalition government as the means by 
which ultimately to obtain exclusive power for themselves, the only way 
to understand Marshall's continuing efforts to achieve a political 
solution in China is to realize the importance of this manner of think­
ing on the part of American officials. For example, see, the early 
June 1946 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) report which 
included that, "It is felt that communism is in opposition to the basic 
Chinese way of life and that the present Communist party has won a 
following, not because of real devotion of the people to Communist 
doctrines emanating from Moscow, but rather because of the ability of 
Soviet-trained leaders to exploit popular opposition to the reactioary 
and oppressive one-party rule of the Kuomintang. For that reason, the 
United States should give every encouragement to middle-of-the-road 
groups,...and should continue its efforts to convince the National 
Government of the vital necessity for broadening its base of participa­
tion so that other political elements may secure adequate representa­
tion." Report by the State-Way-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the 
Far East, 1 June 1946, F.R., 1946, IX, 935; The Director of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, noted a mid-Augut 1946 
exchange between himself and several officials of the Chinese Embassy 
in Washington in which the Chinese Ambassador observed that, "...the 
principal and long-range objective of dealing with the present situa­
tion in China should be the prevention of China's coming within the 
orbit of Russia." To this Vincent responded, that, "...our policy in 
endeavoring to promote the emergence of a strong, united, democratic 
China was obviously calculated to achieve the same objective.... I 
stressed the point that we had hoped these developments could be 
brought about under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the National 
Government. I told him I did not share his fears that a coalition 
government would mean the end of the Kuomintang as the principal party
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and political influence in China provided that party was alive to its 
own responsibilities." Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of 
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 13 August 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 24; A 
month later, again in a conversation with a member of the Chinese 
Embassy in Washington, Vincent made the point succinctly: "I expressed
the view that a reduction in the influence of the Communists might be 
more readily achieved if the Government "took them in" (in more senses 
than one) on a minority basis rather than try to short them all. I 
felt, and I was sure General Marshall felt, that a National Government 
moving ahead with American support in the job of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction would have a better chance to cut the ground out from 
under the Communists, even though they were in the Government, than it
would have of doing so by keeping them out of the Government and en­
deavoring to eliminate them by force." Vincent concluded by saying, 
that, "If the Party (i.e., the Kuomintang) showed as much zeal for 
bringing good government to China as it was showing for eliminating 
opposition there would be no question but that it could "out compete" 
the Communists in gaining support of the Chinese people who did not
favor Communism but simply wanted some evidence of government 'for the
people.'" Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs, 9 September 1946, ibid., 164-165; See, also, Tru­
man, Years of Trial and Hope, 91.
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The Office of Strategic Services observed as early as September 
1945 that the Soviet pledge of non-interference in China's internal 
affairs in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of the previous month would allow 
the, ".. .Communists... (to more effectively).. .charge that the Kuomin­
tang is propped up by U.S. influence and to exploit an 'anti- 
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State, 29 January 1946, F.R., 1946, VI, 684-685; The Charge in the 
Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1946, ibid., 702,
-235-
705; See, General Marshall's belief in the Summer of 1946 of the impor­
tance of eliminating a certain provision in the proposed military 
advisory agreement between the U.S. and the Chinese government, because, 
as he put it, "...I am more concerned in (the) anti-American reaction 
should the article, either included in the contract or in a separate 
agreement, become widely known." General Marshall to Colonel Marshall 
S. Carter, 26 July 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 840; See, also, the concern of 
the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, 
in early November 1946, that remaining American troop levels in North 
China be further reduced so as to eliminate the basis for criticism of 
the U.S. for unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs —  
criticism from the Soviets in the U.N., from the Chinese themselves and 
from the American public. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, 5 November 1946, 
ibid., 880-881.
22See, the Embassy's view in the late Summer of 1946 that it was 
going to have to be made perfectly clear to Chiang that there were 
definite limits on the extent to which the U.S. would be able to go in 
supporting his regime under the circumstances of civil war and so long 
as there was no change in his basic political philosophy and outlook. 
Draft Policy Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in China, 23 August 
1946, ibid., 148; See, also. General Marshall's observation in the
latter part of November 1946, that, "...perhaps the time was propitious 
to tell the Generalissimo that the United States could not consider 
favorably a government dominated by his association with the military 
and CC reactionary cliques, that the United States could not align 
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General Marshall and Mr. Butterworth, 21 November 1946, ibid., 555.
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Member on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 5 January 1946, 
F.R., 1946, X, 810-811. (In this memorandum. Secretary of State Byrnes 
argued that, "The present plan might be construed as a projection of 
U.S. military power onto the Asiatic continent rather than as simply 
aid to China in modernizing its Army.")
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Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to the Chief of Staff, 21 
January 1946, ibid., 811-816. This memo included General Marshall's 
concurrence with the Secretary of State's views and assumptions about 
too large a military advisory group being sent to China, i.e., Marshall 
saw the negative political implications of a large-scale American mili­
tary presence in China (Ibid., 815). Wedemeyer, though, appears to 
have agreed with the need to reduce the proposed size of the group 
because the U.S. did not have sufficient military personnel to assign 
to operational levels. China and the Nationalist army was simply too
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large (Ibid., 812). Wedemeyer, however, appears to have been consider­
ably less concerned about the political questions involved in making a 
larger U.S. military commitment in China. He noted he was, "...not 
completely in accord with the Secretary of State's statement that the 
size and function of the Military Advisory Group could be construed as 
a projection of the U.S. military power onto the Asiatic continent. 
Even if so construed, I do not feel that our country would be criti­
cized in the premises. " Wedemeyer went on to argue that both the 
Soviets and the British understood the American relationship to the 
Chiang regime and would raise no objection to a larger U.S. military 
mission to China. (Ibid., 815).
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Directive to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, 25 
February 1946, ibid., 823.
27This series of political considerations concerning the size of 
the military advisory group is, in part, implied by the Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affair's interesting and revealing comment, that, 
"I consider it vitally important... that the control over the size of 
the Group remains in the hands of the President, not only because of 
the bearing on our international relations but also because of possible 
Congressional interest and inquiry in regard to the size and activities 
of the Group." Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs to the Secretary of State,’19 February 1946, ibid., 822.
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29The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the War 
Assets Administration, 6 August 1946, F.R., 1946, X, 756; The Acting 
Secretary of State to The Administrator of the War Assets Administra­
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This is a question which, in some respects, the remainder of the 
chapter will attempt to clarify at greater length. The point here is 
simply this, namely, that no policy decision in 1946 concerning China, 
and especially in the case of such an important one as instituting an 
arms embargo against the Nationalist government, can be understood 
except with reference to the whole complex of considerations bearing on 
the problem of how the Administration was going to be able to maintain 
a manageable presence in China with respect to the full range of Ameri­
can foreign policy requirements in the event of a civil war. When 
officials talked in terms of placing an embargo on arms shipments to 
the Nationalist government as being in the "best interests" of the 
nation, the use of such language can be understood only in this light. 
One major purpose of achieving a political settlement, in other words, 
was to avoid the spectacle of the United States backing a "reactionary" 
regime like Chiang's in a civil war.
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shall wrote at the special request of former President Truman, he 
(Marshall) recalled that through the early part of 1946, "I was making 
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them. This would not have been too difficult of accomplishment had it 
not been for the fact that both sides. Nationalist and Communist, 
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make a union among them and, without that, there was little hope of 
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being followed against the Communists. The essence of the plan was
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this: Marshall sought to have the public announcement of his appoint­
ment as Secretary delayed for a short period. In the meantime he would 
publicly criticize this hard-line group in the Kuomintang which 
Marshall calculated, "...would provoke heavy attacks on me by this 
particular group of men, who seeing me leave the Government service 
would feel perfectly free to direct their attacks at me without reser­
vation." Then, so the plan continued, the announcement of Marshall's 
appointment as Secretary would be made. In this way, the hard-liners 
would, "loose face" and hopefully be replaced within the Kuomintang 
party hierarchy by others not so militantly committed to a policy of 
force. Alas, as Marshall reports, his appointment leaked prematurely 
and the "plot" to discredit the hard-liners was foiled. Memorandum on 
China by General George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954, 
President's Secretary Files, Box 74, Truman Papers, HSTL.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CHINA AID BILL OF 1948:
IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY OF LIMITED ASSISTANCE
After the failure of the Marshall Mission, the key 
China policy question that emerged in 1947 was; when and how 
to give aid that would best enhance the prospects for the 
Nationalist government but not diminish the Administration's 
capacity to respond effectively to the full range of its 
foreign policy responsibilities? This remained the central 
issue in the Administration's China policy right up to the 
time of the Korean War, despite some variation of opinion 
among officials on how precisely both Chinese and American 
interests could be simultaneously, and yet effectively, 
served.
Decisions on the question of aid to China were 
made almost entirely in context of intragovernmental and 
interagency discussions concerning broad strategic and 
tactical foreign policy problems. With only slight excep­
tion, these decisions were made without regard to and 
despite the efforts by certain segments of the American 
public to pressure the Administration to develop policies 
toward China contrary to what officials thought were re­
quired. The Truman administration never seriously con­
sidered the possibility of entirely cutting off aid to
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Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Officials were never able to 
refute the importance of maintaining a program of limited 
assistance to the Nationalist government throughout the 
course of the Chinese civil war. Decision-makers remained 
convinced in the pre-Korean War period that the national 
interest required the continuation of American aid.
Nonetheless, considerable debate has developed 
over the years concerning the question of what public opin­
ion factors were compelling in the Truman administration's 
formulation of policy toward the Chinese civil war in 1947 
and early 1948. Of particular controversy has been the 
issue of what impact American public opinion had on the 
pattern of official thinking which, beginning in the Fall of 
1947, eventually produced the China Aid Bill proposal to 
Congress in the early part of 1948.
One side of this debate may be dismissed beyond a 
few brief comments. This view claims that in the absence of 
public and Congressional opinion favorable to Chiang Kai- 
shek, very little and possibly no aid at all would have been 
forthcoming because of State Department sympathy with the 
Chinese Communist cause. As noted in an earlier chapter, 
this interpretation is is advanced without corroborating 
documentary evidence.^
A more responsible variation of this argument 
generally perceives that the pressures of public and Con­
gressional opinion forced the Truman administration in 1947
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and in early 1948 to extend economic and military support to 
the Nationalist regime in China. Some go so far as to 
suggest that the Administration, based on its own better 
judgment of the situation, would never have given support to 
the degree it did, had it been able at the time to avoid the 
influence of public pressure.
There are several fundamental and interrelated 
assumptions upon which this interpretation is based. First 
is the contention that the Truman administration had long 
viewed the Nationalist government as corrupt and ineffi­
cient, administratively and militarily incompetent, and very 
likely to be defeated by a more effective Chinese Communist 
organization. Actually there is little to disagree with in 
this assumption though differences of official opinion in 
this regard are worth noting. For example, there was dif­
fering speculation on how long the Nationalist government 
could hold out, though in 1947 it was not generally believed 
defeat was imminent. Some assessments were more optimistic 
that American aid if given and administered properly might 
reverse the declining fortunes of the government in China. 
Some felt that only direct American supervision of aid would 
accomplish any positive good. Still others thought that 
aid, if combined with extensive internal reform of the 
Kuomintang party and the Nationalist government, might allow 
Chiang to stabilize his situation somewhat, perhaps even 
permanently in central and south China. Most officials,
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however, were inclined to believe Chiang unwilling or unable 
to carry through the necessary program of reform, assuming, 
as a result, that the Kuomintang ultimately had little or no 
chance of competing successfully with the vital and ener­
getic Chinese Communist organization. Officials at the top 
were inclined to believe the situation was nearly hopeless 
in the long run.
Be that as it may, there is a second and related 
assumption in this interpretation of Truman administration 
China policy, namely, that because the Administration be­
lieved the Nationalist situation nearly hopeless it was, by 
the Fall of 1947, casting about for ways in which to cut all 
American ties with the Chiang regime.
In view of the fact that in 1948 assistance to 
China was eventually forthcoming in the form of the China 
Aid Bill, the logic of these first two assumptions raised an 
inevitable question. If the Administration's view of Nation­
alist prospects was so pessimistic how could it, as a matter 
of fiscal - even ethical - responsibility, be justified in 
giving substantial sums of aid to a government doomed to 
defeat through its own ineptitude?
The logical, or possibly convenient, answer for 
this interpretation of China policy, and here is a third 
assumption, appeared to lie in the realm of public opinion 
and Congressional pressure. A substantial segment of public 
opinion since the war tended generally to be sympathetic
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toward Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang received praise as a loyal 
American ally who had waged an admirable defense against 
Japanese aggression during World War II. And by 1947, a 
sympathetic American press which commended him as a coura­
geous defender of democratic, even Christian, values against 
Soviet inspired communist aggression in China began to find 
ever larger public audiences in view of rising anti­
communist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the United States. 
In addition, the Administration's rhetoric of containment 
and the implications of the Truman Doctrine indirectly 
tended to encourage this favorable image of Chiang by sug­
gesting as it did that anyone, anywhere, who was fighting 
communism was engaged in a righteous enterprise.
On the basis of this pro-Chiang constituency in 
the United States there emerged in both houses of Congress a 
loosely knit group known as the "China bloc", the members of 
which, by late 1947 were desperate to find some means to 
involve the United States in a more extensive program of 
support for the Nationalist government. Their chance came 
in November when they threatened to impede the legislative 
process on the Administration's request for interim aid to 
Europe unless Chiang's regime also received further support. 
Fearful that delay in getting the European aid program 
through Congress might prove disasterous to an already 
critical situation in Europe, the Truman administration, 
against its better judgment and policy preferences, bowed to 
China bloc pressures.
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So as to obtain China bloc support, for Interim 
Aid to Europe, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the 
interpretation runs, tenatively suggested to Congress in 
November of 1947 that a sum of $300,000,000 in aid might be 
made available essentially for the purpose of helping to 
stabilize the declining economic fortunes of the Nationalist 
government in China. Then, for additional insurance, in 
February of 1948, the Secretary substantially exceeded his 
earlier suggestion by sending to Congress a $570,000,000 
proposal for aid to China in connection with the more gen­
eral European Recovery Program. Ultimately Congress 
allocated only $400,000,000 in a modified aid bill to China 
but still the Truman administration found itself tied 
indefinitely to a situation from which it greatly would have 
preferred to be dissociated.
This, then, in its broad outline is the thrust of 
the argument that sees American sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek 
in general and the China bloc in particular as having a 
significant effect on the very nature of Truman administra­
tion China policy. In some respects this view is correct. 
First, there is no doubt that Administration officials 
thought the situation in Europe to be extremely critical by 
the Fall of 1947. It was, in connection with the problem of 
containing Soviet power and influence, unavoidably the key 
foreign policy concern. It seemed clear to American 
decision-makers that if left to themselves Europeans would
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not be able to manage the enormous task of rebuilding 
economy and society so devastated by the recent war. Insuf­
ficient economic recovery, psychological exhaustion, social 
dislocation, as well as growing political instability simply 
could not be overcome without American moral and material 
aid.
The Administration feared that if these problems 
continued without quick relief, Europeans could be expected 
to turn increasingly to some more radical means of solution. 
The communist parties of Europe would be the immediate 
beneficiaries of this trend. Even more unsettling for 
Washington, however, was the Administration's belief that 
West European communists were properly obedient to instruc­
tions, from Moscow. Communist assumption of power in the 
West invariably would lead to a Soviet oriented, or even 
dominated, Europe. Moreover, the communist led insurrection 
in Greece might become more than a localized problem unless 
critical conditions in the rest of Europe received some 
relief. If any of this happened, it would produce a situa­
tion quite as dangerous to vital American security interests 
as had the spectre of a Nazi dominated Europe in 1941.
It was an emergency situation which required an 
emergency response. In order to avoid unnecessary delay it 
was important that the legislative process on the issue of 
European aid be expedited to the fullest extent possible. 
It may be conceded, therefore, that the Administration hoped
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the China aid proposal would mollify the China bloc and thus 
have the effect of ensuring expeditious action in Congress.
Still, this implies that the Truman Administration 
believed a China aid program was necessary because of what 
the China bloc could do if China aid proposals were not 
forthcoming. This seems little more than an elaboration on 
the argument that, all things being equal, the Administra­
tion would have preferred to have disassociated itself from 
the Chiang regime but was deterred from doing so because of 
China bloc pressures and the exigencies of getting a Euro­
pean aid bill through Congress.
While it may be conceded that China bloc pressures 
in 1947 and 1948 were a legislative nuisance, the view which 
sees this as the source of the Administration’s China poli­
cy, and specifically the China Aid Bill, ignores completely 
another whole level of analysis. By 1947 the Administra­
tion's calculations concerning policy in the case of China 
were being made increasingly in context of systematic for­
eign policy planning procedures based on a perceived need to 
correlate strategic priorities with respect to the problem 
of allocating properly and efficiently the nation’s resour­
ces.
Specifically, the view which sees domestic public 
opinion as decisive in forcing the Administration, despite 
its reticence, to continue its material support of the 
Nationalist government, fails to understand the relative
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importance in the global scheme of strategic planning which 
decision-makers continued to impute to the East Asian main­
land after the failure of the Marshall Mission. In fact as 
the Administration became increasingly alarmed about deteri­
orating economic and political circumstances in Europe in 
1947 and as American fears of Soviet aggression began to 
mount, the relative strategic importance of China actually 
began to increase in the views of policy-makers. Officials 
believed that what happened in China in 1947 and 1948 might 
have a significant, even decisive, effect on the opportunity 
for achieving a successful outcome of American policy in 
Europe. And, officials thought that events in China could 
have important consequences for Administration efforts to 
achieve a strategic balance with the Soviet Union. As the 
Assistant Chief of the State Department's Division of Chi­
nese Affairs, Philip D. Sprouse, noted while on special 
assignment in China in the Summer of 1947,
Externally, the Chinese Communist problem is 
highly complicated by the international aspects 
thereof —  that is, the problem of communism and 
the Soviet connection with the Chinese Communists.
Were these factors not present, the proper course 
of the U.S. would be to withdraw completely from 
China and allow the Chinese people to settle their 
own problems. However, faced with the apparent 
aims of the USSR...the U.S. cannot view with 
indifference -the spread of Soviet influence in 
this area---
Because Administration officials in 1947 never 
viewed complete dissolution of the American relationship to 
the Nationalist government as a feasible policy alternative.
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invariably the essential questions were: what sort of aid
would best serve to promote the successful realization of 
American foreign policy priorities and when would tactical 
necessity require it?^ What complicates the interpretive 
process is that the Truman administration failed to resolve 
this question of when and how to give aid to China prior to 
the Fall of 1947. Consequently, it became caught up in 
Congressional debate over the larger legislative issue of 
aid to Europe. Thus it appeared to some observers that the 
legislative problem of getting a European aid program 
through Congress eventually produced the China Aid Bill in 
the Spring of 1948.
This simply does not appear to be the important 
fact of the matter. The Truman administration already was 
prepared to give more aid to Chiang but at a time of its own 
choosing and in relation to the immediate necessities of the 
full range of foreign policy priorities. This was true 
quite apart from the pro-Chiang sentiments prominent in 
American public opinion and from threats to European aid by 
the China bloc.
A key point must be understood. American offi­
cials did not anticipate that China aid would invariably 
save the Nationalist government. Rather, aid might help 
Chiang Kai-shek to stabilize the situation for the time 
being. ^  The Administration believed his regime would quick­
ly collapse in the absence of American aid. Otherwise, he
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might be able to hang on for some indefinite period: at
least long enough, for the European Aid Program to take 
proper effect; to put Europe well on the track back to 
recovery. It is to be stressed, then, that officials never 
conceived the aid proposal of half a billon dollars as 
having significance for China alone. It was never consid­
ered in isolation of other foreign policy problems. Thus 
Administration officials viewed the significance of the 
China Aid Bill not only as an important extension of the 
European Recovery Plan but a necessary tactical maneuver in 
the effort to obstruct the expansion of Soviet power and 
influence.^
The whole of Administration policy reflected 
multiple considerations. For one thing, the Administration 
sought to play a rather delicate balancing act with regard 
to the perceived machinations of the Kremlin. In one re­
spect, the level of aid had to appear to the Soviets as 
though American officials continued to take a keen interest 
in the maintenance of the Nationalist government, though, it 
is to be added, not in a manner dramatically at variance 
with the nature of the American commitment since 1945.
The sense of the need to sustain the image of 
continuing American interest in the fortunes of Chiang's 
regime rested on certain Administration assessments of 
Soviet foreign policy. Officials believed that in relation
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to the extent/ and the consequences, of the American in­
volvement in China since the end of the Second World War, 
the Soviets had been satisfied, as a matter of their own 
advantage to maintain a low profile in East Asia and in 
China in particular. True, the Soviets were giving a good 
deal of moral support to the Chinese communists and undoubt­
edly considerable military advice as well. But, at the same 
time, intelligence reports conceded that the Soviets were 
contributing very little in the way of material or logisti-
O
cal support.
Generally, officials thought the Soviets were 
playing a waiting game to see what opportunities might 
develop out of the civil war in China. The Soviets had 
little to lose and everything to gain by playing all sides 
of the situation, waiting patiently for their best oppor­
tunity to extend Russian power and influence.
Washington believed that multiple factors deter­
mined this low Soviet profile. For one thing, although the 
Administration felt the Soviets never lived up to the stipu­
lations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, officials 
also believed the Kremlin had been careful not to appear too 
callous in this regard. Perhaps, Stalin, for propaganda 
purposes, wanted to avoid at this particular time the stigma 
of having a reputation for blatantly breaking treaty arrange­
ments. In a view which saw little good in Soviet maneuvers, 
Stalin, the most pragmatic of power brokers, was likely just
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preserving his options. If the Nationalist government 
should by some miracle emerge victorious, or stabilize 
itself in central or south China, then Stalin would be in a 
better position to make a bid for influence with that govern­
ment by claiming he never violated the letter of the Sino- 
Soviet Treaty. This, in addition to an unobtrusive Soviet 
relationship to the civil war, would serve to further en­
hance the Kremlin's opportunities by not arousing intense 
Chinese hostility to imperialistic meddling in China's 
internal affairs.
The Soviets could rest comfortably in other re­
spects as well. In the event of a divided China with the 
Nationalists in the south, the Soviets could still expect to 
exercise predominant influence over the Chinese Communists 
in the north. Despite the absence of Kremlin aid, where 
else could the Chinese Communists turn for post civil war 
aid but to the Soviet Union? Besides, if some form of 
political settlement were reached between the Nationalists 
• and the Communists and a coalition government established, 
the Soviets could still expect to exercise extensive influ­
ence in China's affairs. And, since the Kuomintang leader­
ship continued its refusal to recognize the imperative need 
to eliminate Party corruption in order to retrieve popular 
support, it was only a matter of time before the Communists 
would come to dominate a coalition anyway.
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Because the trend of events in China appeared to 
favor the Soviet advantage in the long run, in spite of the 
American commitment to Chiang’s regime, it also appeared to 
Administration officials by 1948 that the Kremlin could be 
expected to avoid any policy maneuver in East Asia which ran 
the risk of provoking a direct and costly confrontation with 
the United States. Stalin's sensibilities were such that he 
would never dream of compromising the value of a gift by 
paying for it.^
But in the American view, if conditions in China 
changed dramatically, there might also occur a commensurate 
shift in the Soviet approach to China. If it appeared, for 
example, that, in giving aid to China, the American govern­
ment was substantially "upping the ante", this might tempt 
the Soviets also to raise the stakes by granting overt 
material assistance to the Chinese Communists, to include 
the possibility of direct Russian military intervention.^ ^ 
Such a development surely would prompt the Soviets to apply 
greater pressure at other points in Asia so as to dissipate 
the effect of the American escalation in China. The result 
would be crises throughout Asia. If this happened, the 
Administration would be forced into making fundamental and 
far reaching decisions concerning the nature of the American 
commitment in Asia, which at this particular time, in view 
of the emergency need to expend limited American resources 
in Western Europe, it was quite unprepared to do and wanted 
to avoid if at all possible.
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Aid to China in 1947 and 1948 had to serve the 
purpose of helping Chiang to stabilize his situation long 
enough to allow some measure of success in the Administra­
tion's European policy. At the same time and for the same 
purpose, China aid had to be of a nature so as to reenforce 
the Soviets’ complacent confidence that time and a low 
profile in China would work to their advantage. If this 
tactic succeeded China would be neutralized as a catalyst 
for spreading crises in East and Southeast Asia, thus elimi­
nating for the time being the possible emergence of a major, 
even disastrous, distraction from tending to more critical 
problems in the West.
Conversely, an Administration decision not to 
extend aid to Chiang, to drop him in mid-stream, would have 
an equally negative effect on United States interests. 
Officials believed that no American aid might prompt the 
Nationalists to request Soviet mediation of their civil 
conflict with the Chinese Communists. The further assump­
tion was that the Soviets would agree to do so only on terms 
which eventually resulted in a communist takeover in China, 
in effect which would allow for extensive Soviet influence 
in Chinese a f f a i r s . I f  the Kuomintang chose to fight, on 
the other hand, or if the Soviets refused to mediate. Admin­
istration officials assumed the Nationalist government would 
not last very long. If the Administration wrote Chiang off 
completely, and the civil war contined, it would be open
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invitation to the Soviets actively to increase their support 
of the Chinese Communists. If the Communists were sure to 
win in the absence of American aid to the Nationalists, 
there would no longer be any need for the Soviets to play 
their waiting game. Withdrawal from China would be a simple 
confession that the Soviets could do there as they pleased 
without fear of an American reaction.
As outlined in the preceding chapter, American
officials projected that a Nationalist collapse in China
would produce a variety of further unwanted consequences. 
The precipitous fall of China would demoralize non-communist 
factions in Korea south of the demilitarized zone. Commu­
nist victory in China would enhance the prestige and pros­
pects of the Japanese Communist Party and with possible
adverse effects on the American position in Japan. The fall 
of China could have serious consequences for the French 
effort to deal with the Viet-minh-led insurgency in Indo­
china as well as make it all the more difficult for the
British to continue to maintain their position in Singapore 
and to resist communist guerrillas in Malaya. Even in the 
absence of a communist victory in China, Administration 
officials wondered about the capacity of West Europeans to 
hold on in Southeast Asia and feared that any additional 
pressures might force the latter to withdraw from the region 
altogether. Not only would this eliminate the preferred 
influences of Western civilization but would leave the area
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open to convenient communist penetration. Thus, policy­
makers foresaw that the whole southern rim of Asia and then 
the Near East would be exposed to further communist provoca­
tions. Few questioned the compelling decision-making con­
ception of the dynamics of international communism, namely, 
that one success merely would encourage the communists to
intensify their efforts to achieve another, and so on, in a
12simple and unabated chain of triumph and aggression.
In a related vien. Administration officials be­
lieved that a loss of the Southeast Asian colonies to 
communist-sponsored independence movements, would not only 
reduce further the West European morale and will to rebuild 
their war-torn societies but would enhance the prestige of 
the communist movement in Europe as well. It would elimi­
nate the raw resources and markets of Southeast Asia which
Europeans themselves viewed as vital to the process of
13reconstruction. American policy-makers also assumed that 
the potential for Japan's post-war economic development 
would be substantially reduced in the event that country's 
access to the material benefits of Southeast Asia were to be 
denied.
So, just as in the case of an escalation of the 
American presence in China, a United States withdrawal would 
have the effect of creating a volatile, unstable and highly 
uncertain situation in Asia. Even if this development did
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not lead to a direct Soviet American confrontation precipi­
tating a more general war between the two, and officials 
feared this might be the case, the Administration would be 
faced with the same undesirable scenario in Asia: besides
Europe a second critical front of competition with inter­
national communism requiring immediate and hard decisions 
concerning the extent of American commitments and use of 
available limited resources. In sum, though it may appear 
to be a paradox, officials believed some degree of support 
to the Nationalists was necessary in order to prevent a 
deteriorating situation in China from provoking an even 
greater potential strain on the Administration's capacity to 
deploy limited available resources in support of other 
foreign policy objectives.
There was another very important reason for con­
tinuing some form of support to the Nationalist government. 
A decision to withhold aid to Chiang and his regime would 
leave the Administration open to varied criticism. It would 
appear to many that the United States was capitulating, 
turning tail, to communism in China. The Administration 
could be charged with callously casting to his fate a loyal 
wartime ally and courageous opponent of communism just at a 
time when the going was beginning to get tough. All such 
criticisms would undoubtedly raise the more general question 
concerning the essential strength of character, the moral 
fiber, of the Truman administration. Even more ominously.
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the depth of the Administration's commitment to stand firm 
in the face of communist aggressions and provocations could 
be seriously questioned.
The Truman administration wanted to avoid dealing 
with just such a series of questions. Granted, the domestic 
political calculation in 1948 could not ignore the implica­
tions of such criticism for the upcoming presidential elec­
tion. However, there were larger and far more important 
considerations which derived from the fact that by the 
Summer and Fall of 1947, policy-makers saw the critical 
situation in Europe as more than anything else a problem of 
psychological dimensions. European recovery entailed not 
merely the objective task of rebuilding society and economy 
but as well the problem of regenerating cultural self- 
confidence and reconstituting shattered morale. Official 
conceptualization of the European Recovery Plan (ERP) inclu­
ded not only the intent to help rebuild Europe's cities and 
factories but also to aid in the resuscitation of her self­
esteem. Psychological recovery went hand and hand with 
physical recovery. Effectiveness of the ERP in one area had 
to be joined by success in another. Some years later, 
George Kennan wrote.
It was hard to overestimate, in those days of 
uncertainty and economic difficulty, the cumulative 
effects of sensational political developments.
People were influenced...not just by their desires 
as to what should happen but by their estimates of 
what would happen. People in Western Europe did 
not, by and large, want Communist control. But 
this did not mean they would not trim their sails
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and even abet its coming if they gained the impres­
sion that it was inevitable.
Kennan went on.
It had been primarily the shadows, rather than 
the substance, of danger which we, in contemplating 
the European recovery program, had been concerned 
to dispel.-^
The physical task of rebuilding was a compara­
tively straight-forward one. Direct aid, loans, credits, 
logistical support, effective administration, etc., these 
were the elements of recovery in the objective realm. 
However, the psychological task of helping in the process of 
reassembling European societal morale and self-respect, was 
a more complicated and delicate matter.
Ultimately it would be solved by granting American
aid. The general level of European confidence could be
reestablished by changing - rebuilding - the environment.
But it would take time to gear up the Administration's 
program of material assistance and more time for it to take 
proper effect. Meanwhile, an American capacity to help 
rekindle a European faith in the future would have to depend 
on substantially less tangible factors. The image or appear­
ance of the Administration's commitment to European recov­
ery, in other words, was for the time being far more impor­
tant than the actual material substance of that commitment. 
The long range goal of the material reconstruction of Euro­
pean society would be seriously jeopardized if the short
range goal of spiritual reconstruction could not be achieved 
17successfully.
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It was important enough to pass the European 
Recovery Program through Congress to establish a specific 
and concrete program to which Europeans could relate and 
derive a sense of security and optimism. But it was impor­
tant also how the ERP was passed. It was important that the 
legislative process of the ERP not seem to suggest divisive­
ness. It was important that the Administration itself 
project the image of firm commitment to its policy of Euro­
pean reconstruction. Thus, it was necessary to minimize 
grounds for questioning either the strength of the Admini­
stration's commitment to European recovery or its capacity 
to stand firm in the face of communist provocations.
If these criticisms of the Administration began to 
inundate the American political scene, Europeans might draw 
the wrong conclusions. Misapprehension on the part of 
non-communist Europeans might lead them to consider: if the
Truman administration was prepared to cut its losses for 
purely expedient reasons in China, might it not also be 
inclined to do the same if it should appear necessary in the 
case of Europe? If non-communists accepted this rationale 
as compelling, it might turn them in the direction of making 
some political arrangement with the communists. The result 
would be a rise in communist prestige, and, axiomatically, 
in Administration thinking, increased opportunity for a 
further penetration of Soviet influence. And there was 
equal if not greater danger that both European communists
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and Soviets would view the criticisms of the Administration 
as an accurate reflection of American irresolve and hence a 
proper cue to more aggressive action in the West. In any of 
these events, the prospect of success for the Administra­
tion’s European policy could be seriously diminished.
So, it was with regard both to the necessity of 
insuring unity of resolve in the ERP legislative process and 
of creating the appearance of unequivocal Administration 
commitment to European recovery that the question of aid to 
China took on significant proportions in 1947 and early 
1948. Officials hoped that the China aid proposal would 
quiet divisiveness and project the image of unity in Con­
gress. It reflected the Administration's desire to foster 
the idea that its commitments to friends and allies could be 
trusted in time of dire need, or, at least to avoid the 
appearance of being a regime prone to allowing its commit­
ments to collapse in the face of difficult circumstances. 
Success in this regard, not only would enhance the morale 
and confidence of West Europeans but as well reduce the 
potential for a successful communist subversion of European 
recovery. As a special inter-departmental policy planning 
committee reported in the Spring of 1947,
The security of the United States is concerned 
not only with the dangers which threaten a free 
country, but also with the effect which those 
dangers may have on other countries. If the U.S. 
supports a freedom-loving people whose independence 
is threatened, other nations may be stiffened in 
their determination to remain free; conversely, if
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the U.S. neglects to support such a free people, 
other nations may be profoundly dismay^ and may 
lose faith in the leadership of the U.S.
Officials did hope, therefore, that the China aid 
proposal would, in significant measure, soothe the tempers 
of pro-Nationalist American public opinion and the China 
bloc in Congress in particular. As a result, the legisla­
tive process on European aid would be expedited by defusing
the China bloc as a potentially disruptive force in the
19event some gesture to Chiang Kai-shek was not forthcoming. 
However the important point here is to understand that, 
despite some attention to pro-Nationalist opinion, the 
factor of this public sentiment had a clearly limited sig­
nificance in context of the full range of Administration 
assumptions concerning the necessities of the situation.
The demands of domestic politics would not have 
presented a major obstacle had the Truman administration 
really wanted to sever all ties with the Nationalist govern­
ment in 1947 or early 1948. The Administration would have 
been forced to undertake a publicity campaign in order to 
justify such a policy. That would have aroused pro- 
Nationalist public opinion and an open debate would have 
ensued. But, had the Administration publicly laid stress on 
Nationalist corruption and inefficiency while calling atten­
tion to the insensitivity of the Kuomintang leadership to 
the need for social and economic reform, it would not have 
been difficult to convince the American public that Chiang’s
-263-
regime was worth neither the time nor the expenditure of 
American resources and energies.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the China bloc to 
promote the Nationalist cause in the United States, public 
opinion in this country was not firmly in Chiang's comer. 
A good deal of criticism of the Kuomintang had existed since 
the end of the Second World War, and on this basis in 1947 
and 1948 there was considerable discussion between critics
and supporters of Chiang Kai-shek questioning the merit of
21giving aid to his regime.
The least compelling of the complaints came from 
left-wing or communist groups which denounced the Kuomintang 
as a "fascist" organization and therefore undeserving of 
American support. More important were those who suggested 
that the Administration could not afford to give aid in 
light of Nationalist corruption and maladministration. To 
continue to do so would constitute an unacceptable drain on 
^erican resouces. Some observed that the United States had 
no business giving support to such a patently undemocratic 
and authoritarian regime. Others continued to argue that 
the United States involvement in China was contrary to 
American anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist traditions, 
in violation of the principle of self-determination of all 
peoples, subversive of the spirit of collective action 
through the auspices of the United Nations and thus damaging 
to the prospects for post-war cooperation with the Soviet
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Union. The only appropriate course of action for the Admin­
istration in all these views, therefore, was for the United 
States to withdraw from China, cease all support to the 
Nationalist government and leave the Chinese to work out 
their own affairs.
However, despite the potential of the opportunity,
the Administration did not choose to tap this diverse reser­
voir of dissatisfaction with the Nationalist government. 
Actually, officials did not want to encourage open discus­
sion of the China problem and certainly did not want to 
become entangled in a public debate over the question.
Since it would be impossible to separate the issues of aid 
to China and Europe in a debate —  the China bloc in Con­
gress would never allow it —  it was, in part, important to 
avoid public exchange on the matter because of the possible 
damage which might result to the Administration's effort to 
project a proper image of commitment to European recovery. 
In this instance as well, and with the same unwanted conse­
quences, the Soviets and European communists might interpret 
debate as an indication of American domestic political
divisiveness and irresolve on the issue of foreign aid in 
general and specifically with respect to Europe. Public 
debate also might be interpreted by non-communist Europeans 
as a sign of American ambivalence about Europe's future. 
Europeans had only to recall United States isolationist 
tendencies of the pre-war years to be easily alarmed that
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Americans might again be persuaded to abandon the Old World 
to its fate.
However, there were other related reasons for 
avoiding public debate. Officials had already calculated 
the significance of aid to China in relation to the meaning 
and intent of the Truman Doctrine and the Administration's 
emerging policy of containment. Administration officials 
did intend that these related concepts should have global 
application. Since decision-makers believed that the Krem­
lin was involved in a coordinated worldwide program of 
aggression, it followed that only a planned and systematic 
American response ultimately could hope to achieve an effec- 
tive containment of Russian power and influence.
However, at the time, both the Truman Doctrine and 
the concept of containment were still largely statements of 
intent, goals yet to be achieved. The problem, therefore, 
was one of successful implementation and this required that 
officials deal with the specific administrative issue of 
what the United States was in a practical position actually 
to do about Soviet expansion. The limited resources avail­
able in support of foreign policy objectives raised several 
essential and related questions for decision-makers: where
and how should the available resources be spent, and, what 
was the chance of achieving success by expending those 
resources? In view of these requirements, the principal 
expenditure obviously would have to come in those areas of
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the world which officials perceived had a vital and direct 
relationship to the task of preserving the physical security 
of the United States and in 1947 and 1948 that meant Europe 
and the Mid-East. Given the condition of finite resources, 
though, an expenditure necessary to guarantee outcomes in 
foreign policy areas of primary importance invariably de­
prived less important areas to the point of not being able
24to ensure preferred results.
However, decision-makers also were compelled to
deal with this zero-sum factor involved in the process of
allocating resources on a world-wide basis in relation not 
only to their belief that Soviet aggression had global
proportions but that an American failure to respond effec­
tively to communist provocation in one part of the world 
would have negative effect in other areas. Consequently, 
despite the inability to guarantee policy preferences in 
certain areas because of a lack of resources, or, as in the 
case of China, also because no reasonable application of
resources appeared to have much chance of ultimately saving 
the situation, it did not follow that the particular area in 
question was devoid of importance, or that, despite not 
being able to guaranty preferred outcomes, the United States 
should avoid assuming the risks of involvement altogether.
Even though policy-makers were pretty well con­
vinced by 1947 and early 1948 that the Nationalist govern­
ment ultimately had virtually no chance of surviving, it was
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important to maintain the regime in power for the time 
being, to retard the situation in China from deteriorating 
further and to prevent a communist victory for as long as 
possible. The Administration in 1947 simply did not want to 
respond to all the new problems which a Nationalist collapse 
would create in addition to already having to deal with a 
crises-ladden international situation. The nation's resour­
ces were being strained to the limit as it was. Generally 
speaking, therefore, officials hoped that a limited expendi­
ture of American resources could stabilize the situation in 
China long enough until effective American counter­
strategies of containment could be developed and applied so 
as to render other areas on the Eurasian continent immune to 
the further penetration of communist power.
The logic of the European Recovery Program to stem 
the communist advance in Europe would have been signifi­
cantly less compelling in the event of an Administration 
decision not to aid Chiang Kai-shek's own fight against the 
Chinese Communist Party. This would have been especially 
problematic in view of the rhetorical generalizations con­
cerning communism contained in numerous Administration 
foreign policy pronouncements, especially manifest in the 
Truman Doctrine and, by late 1947 in George F. Kennan's 
"theory" of containment. It made little sense —  as pro- 
Chiang enthusiasts in Congress were quick to point out —  to 
argue that the danger of communist aggression was worldwide.
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as the Truman Doctrine and the theory of containment both 
did, and then proceed to treat that danger as though an 
exclusively regional problem. If communism was worth stop­
ping in Europe so was it also worth stopping in Asia.
But then the Truman administration was not in the 
need of being convinced on this score. There was no ques­
tion about the importance, in the words of Secretary of
State Marshall, of a "restoration of the balance of power
25in both Europe and Asia" (emphasis added) or of the neces­
sity to commit a level of American resources sufficient to 
maintain those areas in the Western Pacific deemed vital to 
American security interests. China was a different matter 
however. A policy of limited assistance to the Nationalist 
government was one thing. But officials refused to toy with 
the option of commiting an excess of American resources and 
manpower in an effort to defeat communism on the East Asian 
mainland. Policy-makers thought such an effort would be 
foolish and irresponsible on the basis of their conviction 
that American involvement in a Chinese civil war would have 
disastrous effect on the nation's capacity to respond effec­
tively to the full range of its foreign policy priorities. 
Some thought it possible that the United States eventually 
might be forced to take a firm stand against further commu­
nist expansion in Asia, but not in the unmanageable morass 
of the China situation as it existed in 1947 and 1948.
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Policymakers did not wish to discuss the U.S. 
world view in public for rather obvious reasons. The Admin­
istration did not want to reveal the particulars of its 
thinking on China or China's relation to Europe. A good 
deal of official thinking about the Nationalist government 
was highly critical. Policy-makers did not want to be 
forced into the position of justifying their desire to give 
aid to China despite their negative view of Chiang's regime 
and their belief in the apparent hopelessness of the Nation­
alist cause. Nor did the Administration want to reveal 
official thinking to the Chinese for fear of lowering Nation­
alist morale to the point of precipitating the regime's 
collapse. And officials did not want to advertise to the 
Soviets the complex of American calculations concerning the 
process of establishing a strategic balance between the two 
powers.
Generally, the problem for the Truman administra­
tion was that its own policy rested on a multiplicity of 
considerations which reflected the assumptions and arguments 
of neither the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek who desired 
greater American support to the regime nor his detractors 
who wanted the United States out of China altogether. This, 
in both respects, was precisely what officials wanted to 
avoid in terms of policy. The Administration did not want 
to be forced into making the decision to "fish or cut bait"
-270-
on the question of its China policy. Rather, decision­
makers hoped to maintain a middle course balanced in the 
seam between over commitment and under commitment to Chiang 
Kai-shek’s regime, which, in either of the latter two cases, 
officials perceived would produce unwanted consequences for 
other more vital sectors in American foreign policy. It 
was, in the words of the State Department's Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, a matter 
of the Administration maintaining sufficient flexibility so 
as to be able to continue its "efforts to contain the spread 
of Communism in China without becoming directly involved in 
the civil war---
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CHAPTER VII
CIVIL WAR IN CHINA, JANUARY 1947 - JUNE 1948: 
INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL DEBATE 
ON THE MEANING OF LIMITED ASSISTANCE
The issue of aid to China was not altogether 
devoid of controversy throughout 1947 and 1948 within the 
government. For example, it is generally true that the 
Departments of War and Navy, and after the National Security 
Act of 1947, the Department of Defense, frequently tended to 
view the requirements of China policy primarily in military 
terms. Somewhat differently, the State Department's assess­
ment of the question of aid to Chiang's regime, especially 
that of a military nature, often proceeded in the presence 
of a series of qualifying political considerations. However, 
neither State nor Defense ever transcended certain well 
recognized boundaries in arguing their respective positions 
on the issue of China aid, specifically, neither ever ques­
tioned in 1947 and 1948 the necessity of avoiding the 
liabilities of both a policy of under-commitment as well as 
over-commitment of American resources to the Nationalist 
government.
The essential questions on which State and Defense 
differed were: what amount and what type of assistance to
Chiang's regime could be rendered to prevent a Nationalist
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defeat but at the same time which would avoid the risks of 
over-commitment. And yet, in this regard, though Defense 
was more optimistic in stressing military-strategic consid­
erations while State was rather pessimistic in emphasizing 
those of a political nature, neither ultimately proved 
willing to ignore the implications of the other's arguments. 
Thus, while there was some measure of high level debate on 
China aid, it was less the result of a fundamental diver­
gence of opinion concerning the requirements of the situa­
tion in China, than it was the inevitable consequence of 
policy-making intercourse between interested government 
agencies, each with its own somewhat different advisory 
responsibilities in contributing to the decision-making 
process. In a word, there never developed within government 
circles a pronounced effort from any source to bring the 
Administration's approach to China in 1947 and 1948 in line 
with the more radical public suggestions that either the 
United States grant all out aid to Chiang's regime or get 
out of China altogether.
The Chief of the State Department’s Division of 
Chinese Affairs stated succinctly the general problem facing 
the Administration in formulating a policy toward China in a 
memorandum written in early February of 1947, "Uppermost 
must be the effort to prevent China's becoming a major 
irritant in our relations with Soviet Russia and to prevent 
China's coming under Chinese Communist c o n t r o l . H e r e i n
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existed the preferred parameters for American policy. The 
Administration would have to be concerned with ways in which 
it could help to sustain the non-communist position in 
China. Complete withdrawal simply was not a feasible alter­
native. Some measure of material support to the Nationalist 
government would be necessary. However, at the same time 
the Administration would have to be careful lest the nature 
of its commitment trigger a Soviet counter escalation pre­
cipitating either a direct confrontation between the two in 
China or else a general world crises requiring multiple and 
costly American responses to diversionary actions by the 
Soviets elsewhere in Asia or in the West.
Through the Winter and Spring of 1947, Administra­
tion officials continued to discuss the relative weight of 
multiple policy-making considerations on the question of 
giving aid to Chiang's regime. In the State Department, the 
Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter 
Vincent, suggested that the United States, "withhold mili­
tary aid to China in any form which would contribute to or 
encourage civil war." Vincent continued to emphasize the 
policy priorities of the Marshall Mission, arguing that the 
prospect of aid should be used to pressure the Kuomintang in 
the direction of a political settlement. He was not yet 
prepared to terminate efforts to promote the emergence of 
peace, unity and stability, in China —  still the most 
desirable alternative from the American point of view given
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the major United States interest in obstructing the further
2
expansion of Soviet power and influence.
Other State Department Officials, including Secre­
tary of State Marshall, do not seem to have been quite so 
concerned as Vincent to proceed as though a political set­
tlement in China remained a feasible option. Nonetheless, 
Vincent continued to press his view into the Summer of 1947 
primarily because the outside chance of a political settle­
ment, even if based on the miracle of a military stalemate, 
was clearly preferable to a continuation of the civil war 
which most Administration officials thought ultimately would 
end in a Communist victory.
The Service Chiefs, Secretary of War Robert P. 
Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, were 
even less inclined to think of China as a political problem. 
The Marshall Mission had failed. Civil war was the funda­
mental fact in China. There no longer existed any realistic 
basis for a political settlement. If the United States was 
to prevent the expansion of Soviet power in East Asia, it 
would have to be accomplished primarily through military 
means. Chiang Kai-shek's regime was the only non-communist 
military alternative to the Chinese Communists and so it 
followed that the United States would have little option but 
to sustain the Kuomintang's military effectiveness.^
State Department Officers, including Vincent, did 
not question the importance of maintaining Nationalist armies
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in the field so long as the civil war continued. The Direc­
tor of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs wrote in early 
February of 1947, "It would be manifestly unrealistic to 
withhold arms from National Government forces if such action 
condemned them to a degree of military anemia which would 
make possible a successful offensive by the Communist for­
ces . And it was this kind of thinking in the State Depart­
ment which, in the face of a deteriorating Nationalist 
military position, allowed the necessity of lifting in May 
the embargo on arms to China established during the Marshall 
Mission during the previous summer; of granting in June an 
opportunity to the Nationalists to purchase 130,000,000 
rounds of ammunition at 10% of the actual procurement cost; 
and, of leaving in China some 6500 tons of military supplies 
subsequent to the final withdrawal of American Marines in 
the Summer of 1947.^
However, Vincent, the Secretary of State and 
others in the Department, were not prepared to ignore the 
question of military aid to the Nationalists in light of a 
series of qualifying political considerations. For one 
thing, they thought that the extent of aid to China, espe­
cially that of a military nature, would have to be carefully 
calculated lest its excess produce the enormous costs and 
risks of a Soviet counter-escalation in support of the 
Chinese Communists.® They further believed that a program 
of military assistance would generate the unwanted image of
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American imperialistic interference in China's internal
7
affairs.
State Department officials remained convinced, 
moreover, that the central problem for the Kuomintang was 
not a lack of arms and ammunition but was one of inept 
military leadership and lack of troop morale. They assumed 
that so long as the regime continued to avoid fundamental 
reforms, the Kuomintang's corruption and maladministration 
of civil and military affairs made it inevitable that the 
greatest portion of any program of American assistance 
likely would be wasted. On this point, and short of direct 
American supervision of military aid, the military estab-
Q
lishment concurred.
State Department officials also worried about what 
effect too much United States assistance would have on the 
attitudes of those more "liberal and progressive" Chinese 
who were sure to be angry in their belief that infusions of 
military aid simply reinforced the stranglehold of the 
"reactionaries and the militarists" on the Kuomintang party 
apparatus and whose policy of force was destroying China and 
the Nationalist government. This group of Chinese also 
believed that an inverse ratio existed between the granting 
of American aid and the reformist inclinations of the Kuo­
mintang leadership, i.e., the greater the amount of aid the 
less likely the leadership would be to implement those
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reforms essential to the regime’s survival. If this impor­
tant segment of China's political and intellectual community 
were to become so dissatisfied with the nature of the 
American-Kuomintang association that they should begin to 
give active support to the Chinese Communists, then Chiang's 
regime would be all the more isolated from popular support 
and as a result that much closer to the imminent prospect of 
defeat.
The Service Secretaries, especially Forrestal, 
seemed less concerned that a more substantial program of 
military assistance to the Nationalist government was likely 
to prompt a Soviet reaction. And since the essential prior­
ity was containing the spread of Soviet power, the Secretary 
of the Navy also appeared less preoccupied with the question 
of Kuomintang cormption and maladministration or what 
effect American aid might have on the thinking and affilia­
tions of "liberal and progressive" Chinese. Under the 
circumstances of civil war, military expedience required 
that for the moment the Administration ignore the more 
unpalatable characteristics of the regime as well as the 
adverse effect which giving military aid might have on 
Chinese public opinion. In early June of 1947, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) underscored the position of those who 
favored greater military aid to China by generally advocat­
ing an expanded program of "carefully planned, selective and 
well-supervised assistance to the National Government, under
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conditions which will assure that that assistance will not
be misused---
But if the Service Secretaries and JCS were less 
inclined than the State Department to develop political 
reservations about the nature and extent of military aid to 
the Nationalist Government, it did not follow in their 
thinking that the alternative was an open-ended military 
commitment to Chiang’s regime. The JCS themselves were 
responsible for creating the most fundamental restrictions 
on aid to China. In late April of 1947, the JCS reported 
that "The assumption that the next war will be ideological 
and the thesis that current aid shall be given only in the 
interest of our national security places China very low on 
the list of countries which should be given such assis­
tance."^^ In ranking countries with respect to the question 
of their strategic importance to vital United States secur­
ity interests, on a numerical basis the JCS placed China 
fourteenth out of sixteen nations listed and in a strictly 
Asian context, second behind Japan. In a subsequent report, 
the JCS, concerned with the question of the importance to 
the national security of the United States and in terms of
urgency of need, ranked China fourteenth down the list of
12countries and behind Korea! In brief, the global- 
strategic assessments of the JCS actually had the effect of 
re-inforcing the relevance of the State Department's reser­
vations about military aid to China and thus merely served
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to sustain the questions of how much and what type of assis­
tance should be given.
In July, the Administration dispatched the Army's 
Director of Plans and Operations, General Albert C. Wede­
meyer to survey conditions in China, gather relevant infor­
mation, and to make recommendations on the question of aid 
to Chiang's regime. The Administration could not have 
chosen to head this mission an individual more sympathetic
to the Nationalist cause and yet one who could be expected
12ato render a responsible appraisal of the situation. On 
the basis of his trip, General Wedemeyer submitted his 
report to President Truman in mid-September.
General Wedemeyer's report urged a significantly
expanded program of American economic and military advice
13and assistance to the Nationalist government. He sugges­
ted that the economic aid program should be supervised 
directly by American personnel so as to ensure against the 
ill effects of Chinese corruption and maladministration. He 
further argued that the American military advisory role be 
enlarged to include direct United States training of Nation­
alist combat troops; in effect, an American supervision of 
the reorganization of Nationalist military forces; American 
supervision of Nationalist army logistics; and American 
advice on tactical matters at the field force level but with 
the caveat that United States personnel should continue to 
avoid any direct involvement in combat hostilities.^^
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In addition to these recommendations, however, 
Wedemeyer’s report also provided that any program of assis­
tance would have to be "an integrated element of our world­
wide policy of military assistance to certain nations". It 
also noted that the Chinese government would have to "take 
steps to reduce its military expenditures" while simultane­
ously undertaking vital reforms which would "increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the military establish­
ment."^^ Although not included in the report's list of 
"conclusions" or "recommendations", it also observed that 
the Nationalist government would have to eliminate as rapid­
ly as possible "the administrative inefficiency and corrup­
tion, which are paralyzing the economy and crippling China 
as a military power— " as well as to undertake "reforms to
improve the internal political situation  (and)  the
welfare of the people.
The Wedemeyer report did little to resolve the 
issues facing decision-makers on the question to aid to 
China. Like the Joint Chiefs, Wedemeyer argued optimistic­
ally that a well supervised and expanded program of American 
assistance would have the effect of helping Chiang's regime 
to stabilize its deteriorating military and economic posi­
tion and, as a result, to prevent the expansion of Soviet 
power in China. At the same time, however, the report 
acknowledged the importance of across-the-board Kuomintang 
reforms despite the fact that this was the very thing which
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the Nationalist leadership had been unable or unwilling to 
do in the years before the world war and since.
The arguments developed by the JCS and the Wede­
meyer report failed to reduce the stature of the risks and 
liabilities which the United States was sure to face by
significantly expanding its commitment to the Nationalist 
17government. So long as the Kuomintang leadership ignored 
the vital importance of reform, and by 1947 there was no 
firm basis for believing this attitude would change, the 
recommendations of the Wedemeyer report were bound to con­
tend with a fundamental and compelling question, especially 
in view of the policy-making necessity to commit limited 
American resources in a manner dictated by a system of 
global-strategic priorities which rated China near the 
bottom on the scale of importance. If it was imperative to 
conserve American resources for deployment in areas of the 
world far more vital to United States interests than East 
Asia, then how could it be argued that substantial American 
economic and military aid be committed in China where not 
only was it virtually assured that most of it would be 
wasted but where once having made the commitment the pres­
tige of the American government would be tied to a situation 
with the real potential to cause an interminable and danger­
ous drain of the nation's clearly limited resources?^^^
The reporting of the newly formed Central Intelli­
gence Agency (CIA) beginning in the Fall of 1947 appears to
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have reinforced the argument against a substantial expansion 
of the American economic and military commitment in China. 
In a series of "situation reports" beginning in September 
and extending through March of 1948, the CIA postulated that 
there was little possibility Chiang Kai-shek would undertake 
a genuine and far reaching program of reform because he was 
too much dependent on "right wing support". "Substantial" 
United States aid would check the Kuomintang's economic and 
military decline, the Agency went on, though short of in­
ternal reforms American aid would have only limited and 
short term effect. A large scale American commitment ran
the danger of a Soviet counter response which might cause a
"spiral of support and counter support" eventually "increas­
ing the possibility of a direct clash of interest" between
the two in China. But even if this did not happen and the
Kuomintang did carry out reforms, concluded the CIA, one to 
two billion dollars in economic aid plus the American train­
ing, equipping and supplying of thirty Chinese divisions 
could well be only the first of several installments over
the long term for the purpose of defeating the Chinese 
18Communists.
The CIA analysis also raised questions about the 
Wedemeyer report's essential hedge against Kuomintang corrup­
tion and inefficiency, namely, that American aid, both 
economic and military, to the Nationalist government be 
"closely supervised" by American personnel. Intelligence
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estimates doubted that the Nationalists would accept Ameri­
can supervision because of "normally acute Chinese sensi­
tivity with regard to national sovereignty and (because of) 
the ascendency of the reactionary CO clique, which now
permeates most of the Government's economic and financial 
19agencies." On the basis of his own frustrating experience 
in China, Secretary of State Marshall contributed the some­
what disdainful observation that the Chinese never displayed
much hesitation in accepting American advice so long as it
20did not interfere with plans to act as they pleased.
The Secretary of State did defer to the thinking 
of the Joint Chiefs and the recommendations of the Wedemeyer 
report. He agreed to fulfill earlier United States agree­
ments with the Nationalist government by completing the 
process of equipping thirty-nine Chinese divisions ("39 
Division Program") as well as eight and a third air groups 
("8-l/3rd Air Group Program") for the Chinese Air Force. He 
also agreed to allow the Army Advisory Mission to engage in 
the training of Nationalist combat troops at military cen­
ters located on Formosa, and later in other safe areas, and 
to aid in the reorganization and direction of Nationalist 
Army logistics. This, however, represented the extent of 
concession to the views of the military establishment. 
Given the failure of Defense to develop convincing arguments 
in support of a significantly expanded American commitment 
to Chiang's regime, the most compelling alternative which
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remained for decision-makers was to compose a policy of 
limited assistance based on those attitudes which continued 
to predominate in the Department of State.
State Department thinking on East Asia changed 
little throughout the course of 1947. Consistently cautious 
in assessing the situation in China, State Department Offi­
cials displayed little optimism in discussing what they 
reasonably expected could be done for Chiang’s regime. The 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter 
Vincent, was rotated out of that assignment to become Mini­
ster to Switzerland in July. Vincent’s replacement, 
W. Walton Butterworth, coming from the Embassy in China, 
brought with him no significantly altered views on the 
subject. The pessimism implicit in the CIA assessments on 
China tended generally to reinforce the somewhat fatalistic 
decision-making atmosphere at State, no better revealed than 
in a statement made by the Director of the Policy Planning 
Staff, George Kennan, in November, "In China there is not 
much we can do, in present circumstances, but to sweat it
out and try to prevent the military situation from changing
21too drastically to the advantage of Communist forces."
Short of withdrawing from China altogether which 
was entirely out of the question because of the demands of 
the situation in Europe and the requirements of containing 
Soviet power, preventing the situation from getting any 
worse became the Administration’s essential objective in
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China. Little more than a week after Kennan's bleak com­
ment, the CIA reported that "Continuing at the present rate, 
deterioration in the Nationalist Government's military, 
political and economic position would probably lead, within 
a year, to decisive communist military success and to actual 
disintegration of the Government. The extension of limited
amounts of U.S. aid to China would be unlikely to reverse
22the trend, but would slow it appreciably." It was with 
respect to the nature of this assessment and the goal of 
"slowing the trend", that officials beginning in late Octo­
ber of 1947 and continuing through January of 1948 undertook 
to develop the essentials of the China Aid Bill.
Officials at State were strongly disposed to avoid 
committing the United States to any overt or extensive 
program of military assistance to the Nationalist Govern­
ment. A major factor in their reasoning was that military 
aid, as opposed to economic aid so defined, would make it 
appear as though the United States sanctioned the Kuomin- 
tang's policy of force. It was for this reason that the 
State Department consistently objected to any suggestion 
that United States military advisers be assigned to opera­
tional or field levels in the Nationalist Army, the fear 
being that not only would this place increasing responsi­
bility on American advisers for tactical and strategic 
decisions —  in effect, for Nationalist conduct of the 
course of the civil war —  but, in doing so, would be likely
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to open a floodgate of pressures on the Administration to 
carry the Kuomintang through to a final military victory. 
On the other hand. State Department Officials argued that 
American prestige should not be directly tied into a situa­
tion which many, if not most, believed ultimately would
result in the defeat of Nationalists forces, irrespective of
2 3American military advice.
State Department officials were convinced that an 
excessive infusion of military aid was likely to create 
additional disadvantages for the American presence in China. 
It might prompt a Soviet counter escalation in support of 
the Chinese Communists, produce a convincing spectacle of 
American imperialitstic interference in China’s internal
affairs, and alientate those "liberal and progressive"
Chinese who believed that American military aid merely 
served to keep the "reactionaries and militarists in power. 
A program of economic assistance, on the other hand,
appeared less likely to run the risk of a Soviet counter­
response and since it could be justified as necessary to the 
welfare of the Chinese people, less subject to charges of 
imperialism and thus not as apt to produce a hostile public 
reaction in C h i n a . I n  sum, in State Department thinking, 
a program of economic aid would provide the greatest safe­
guard agaiqst the United States being drawn further into the 
civil conflict, but at the same time would provide maximum 
benefits for the continuing, though admittedly short term, 
fortunes of the Nationalist Government.
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To reiterate, this emphasis on economic as opposed 
to military aid, did not mean that State Department offi­
cials were insensitive to the obvious relationship between 
economic conditions and the military disposition of govern­
ment forces. A program of economic assistance would have to 
include allowances for the Nationalists to purchase neces­
sary military supplies. Officials also knew that pro-Chiang 
Kai-shek sentiment in Congress would never agree to any 
economic aid proposal unless it included such stipulations 
as would allow the Nationalist Government to obtain arms and 
ammunitions.
These considerations in addition to the need to 
ensure that the size of the aid proposal would prove suffi­
cient to retard the rate of deterioration of the Chinese 
economy, were uppermost in the minds of those in the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Division of Chinese Affairs, 
when they suggested in January of 1948 that Congress be 
asked to allocate a sum of $710,000,000 for use in China. 
In addition to stabilizing the Chinese economy for a time, 
the proposal would allow the Nationalist Government over the 
next year and a half to use roughly $120,000,000 of its 
foreign exchange reserves for military procurement. Under 
this plan, the Chinese would have, the needed military assis­
tance, but would themselves have the primary responsibility 
for obtaining it, thus the Administration would be able to 
avoid the pitfalls of an overt military commitment in 
China.
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with the exception of the military establishment, 
the State Department's China experts, in their $710,000,000 
proposal, proved to be the most generous with respect to the 
question of aid to the Nationalist Government. The Under 
Secretary's Office soon reduced this figure to the
$570,000,000 sum actually submitted to Congress in the form 
of the China Aid Bill in February of 1948. This action was 
not taken because of parsimonious attitudes internal to the 
Department of State but followed from the belief that Con­
gress would never agree to allocate so large a sum as
26$710,000,000. This proved to be a generally correct 
assessment of the mood of Congress, though the latter ulti­
mately demonstrated even less inclination to be magnanimous 
than State Department officials might have wished. On April 
2nd Congress passed the enabling legislation to include 
$463,000,000 in aid for China. President Truman signed the
China Aid Act on the next day. However, it was not until 
July 3rd that the United States and the Nationalist Govern­
ment signed the aid agreement and by that time the sum which 
had been authorized in the spring had been further reduced 
to a total of $400,000,000 by the House Committee on Appro­
priations .
Even before the conclusion of hearings by the 
Appropriations Committee on the final disposition of the 
China Aid Act in late June, events in China already were 
producing questions as to whether or not some significant
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alteration in the Administration's approach to China ought 
to be considered. The American Ambassador in China, John 
Leighton Stuart, in conjunction with the head of the Army 
Advisory Group, Major-General David G. Barr and Commander of 
United States Naval Forces in the Western Pacific, Admiral 
Oscar Badger, all were reporting by early June that the 
situation in China was critical; that substantial economic 
and military assistance was vital in order to halt the rapid 
decline of the Nationalist Government.
Arguing from the military, and practical, point of 
view. General Barr again raised the point that unless Ameri­
can supervisory personnel took over control of Nationalist 
military operations, to include training, logistics and 
planning, aid was sure to be wasted and the situation in all 
probability could not be saved. He suggested specifically 
that effectiveness of Chinese government forces would re­
quire American military advisers at the operational level to
assist in making tactical and strategic decisions. Admiral
28Badger and Ambassador Stuart agreed.
This was precisely the kind of expanded military 
commitment to the Nationalist Government which State Depart­
ment officials argued against in 1947 and which produced the 
Administration's decision to grant ostensibly only economic 
assistance in the China Aid Bill. This, however, did not 
deter the military establishment from continuing to argue 
throughout the course of congressional debate on the Bill,
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that a program of military assistance was just as important 
as economic aid. Even at the end of March, 1948, differ­
ences of opinion remained, reflected, for example, in the 
insistence by Army, Navy and Air Force representatives on 
the National Security Counsel (NSC) that their view of the 
necessity of military as well as economic aid be presented
separately from that of the State Department in a NSC report
29on the question of short term assistance to China. Only a 
few days later the Joint Chiefs observed that in view of the 
relationship between economic and military condition in 
China, it was meaningless to give economic aid in the ab­
sence of a level of military aid sufficient to stabilize the 
deteriorating position of Kuomintang f o r c e s . T h e  JCS also 
continued to argue pragmatically that implementation of a 
program of military assistance would have to be supervised 
by American personnel in order for it to have any positive 
effect on the situation. In early June, the Joint Chiefs
concurred in General Barr's recommendations concerning an
31expanded role for American military advisers in China.
There was no disagreement between the State and 
Defense Departments over the importance of military assis­
tance. It was essentially an argument over the degree of 
risk involved in an overt and extensive, as opposed to 
covert and limited, program of military aid. In contrast to 
the fears of State, it appears that Defense did not think 
that military aid, to include use of American advisers at
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operational levels in the Nationalist Army, would have the 
effect of generating the sort of pressures which might force 
the United States to assume an ever increasing responsibil­
ity for underwriting Nationalist military operations. Nor
did Defense appear to be as much concerned about a Soviet
32counter-escalation.
In any event, congressional approval of the enab­
ling legislation for aid to China in early April, ended 
discussion on part of the issue. The China Bloc did manage 
to gain sufficient support in Congress to have $125,000,000 
earmarked for the Chinese to use, in effect, for purchase of 
military supplies. Thus, the military establishment re­
ceived some gratification in its guest to obtain military 
assistance for Chiang’s regime though it was appreciably 
less than what the Department of Defense estimated the 
Kuomintang would require over the next year in order to hold 
its own against the Communists.
In their desire to link the United States more 
closely to Nationalist military fortunes, congressional 
supporters of Chiang Kai-shek also were able to attach to 
the enabling legislation the provision that expenditures of 
the $125,000,000 would be supervised directly by American 
personnel comparable to the United States military aid 
program to Greece and Turkey. Nonetheless, consistent with 
the State Department’s and the Administration’s desire to 
avoid the risks involved in assuming overt obligations in
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support of Nationalists' military efforts, the China Aid
Act, as finally worded and voted on by Congress, stated
ambiguously that the $125,000,000 grant would be used by the
Nationalist Government "on its option and responsibility"
and for those purposes decided on the Chinese themselves.
There was no mention whatsoever of the sum having military 
33significance.
Passage of the enabling legislation for the China 
Aid Act, however, did not quiet the issue of whether or not 
American supervision in disposing of the $125,000,000 ought 
to be required in order to insure that the grant be utilized 
effectively. In response to an inquiry on this matter by 
members of the House Appropriations Committee, on June 2nd, 
President Truman, in a letter to Secretary of State Mar­
shall, and forwarded to the Committee, outlined the proce­
dures by which the $125,000,000 would be made available to 
the Nationalist Government. The letter also defined the 
extent of the American role in assisting and advising the 
Nationalists in determining how the money should be spent. 
The presidential directive left the decision almost entirely 
up to the Chinese with the State Department designated to 
ascertain little more than that the accumulation of Chinese 
requests under the grant did not exceed the total authorized 
sum.^^
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still obsessed with ways to involve the United 
States more deeply in China's civil war, pro-Chiang enthusi­
asts in Congress were thoroqghly dissatisfied with the 
President's guidelines for administering the program of aid 
to China. Consistent with their intent, in early June, the 
China bloc again managed to attach the appropriations bill 
the proviso that the expenditures of the $125,000,000 ear­
marked for China be supervised by American personnel in a 
manner consistent with the Greek-Turkey military aid pro­
gram. Were this to pass, it meant that American military 
advisers would become involved with the Nationalist Army at 
the planning and operational level in the manner that was 
then being recommended by the heads of the military missions 
in China, General Barr and Admiral Badger, and concurred in 
by the Joint Chiefs.
By June of 1948 there was not a great deal of 
high-level support in Washington for committing United 
States military advisers to China. The State Department, 
while willing to display some flexibility in allowing that
expert advice on the problem of military procurement might
35be rendered to the Chinese in this country, remained 
adamantly opposed to any expansion of the role of the Mili­
tary Advisory Group in China. Secretary of State Marshall, 
without hesitation, advised that under no circumstances were 
American advisers to become involved in planning and opera- 
tions for the Nationalist Army. Secretary of the Army
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Kenneth C. Royall took a similar position, noting his gen­
eral agreement with President Truman's June 2nd directive 
concerning implementation of the China Aid Act. The Army 
Secretary even wondered whether the United States should
send any military supplies to China in view of the apparent
37hopelessness of the Nationalist cause.
In a somewhat related vein, General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer, still Director of Army Plans and Operations, 
noted his opposition to piecemeal military aid. If the 
United States was not going to give what was necessary to 
sustain Nationalist armies in the fight against the Commu­
nists (estimated by Defense at almost $1 billion for 1 year)
Op
then nothing should be given at all. With respect to the 
policy question at hand, however, Wedemeyer opposed any plan 
to place United States advisers with Chinese army units as 
was being done in Greece. He even opposed the suggestion 
that United States personnel be allowed to go into combat 
areas to make sure food and supplies reached Kuomintang 
troops in the field. Assuming that short of large-scale 
American military intervention a Nationalist defeat was only 
a matter of time, Wedemeyer's arguments rested essentially 
on his view that any expansion of the American military role 
would associate United States prestige too closely with "the 
final debacle" in China.
General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, agreed 
with Wedemeyer, suggesting that while the head of the Army
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Advisory Group in China was undoubtedly correct about the 
need for United States supervision of military aid in order 
for it to be used effectively, he could not agree to place 
American advisers as recommended by General Barr.^^ Wede­
meyer and Bradley both took the position that the Joint 
Chiefs ought to be asked to reconsider their support of 
General Barr's recommendations.^^ And, Wedemeyer and Secre­
tary of the Army Royall, agreed that in testifying before 
the House Appropriations Committee, they would argue that 
the Greek-Turkish proviso should be removed from the China 
Aid Act.^^
These high level discussions on the question of 
significantly expanding the American commitment to Chiang's 
regime which occurred in the late Spring of 1948 were the 
last of any significance. The discussions did not have a 
crucial importance, however, being largely a tired rehash of 
those same issues which had promoted intra-governmental 
debate on the matter during the previous year. Although a 
few like General Wedemeyer might lament that the situation 
could have been saved if only the United States had taken 
the initiative as he had proposed in the late Summer of 
1947, since that time events in China merely had served to 
vindicate the State Department's opposition to increasing 
American aid to China. Corruption and maladministration of 
civil and military affairs remained the hallmark of the 
Kuomintang's self-defeating political style. The Chinese
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economy continued to teeter on the brink of collapse while 
the government's military position rapidly worsened in the 
face of mounting Communist pressures.
Though long a dead issue, some will continue to 
opine that if the Truman administration had acted sooner and 
more forcefully, the defeat of the Nationalist government 
might have been prevented. And yet the success of this 
opinion would depend on dispelling State Department argu­
ments against becoming overly involved in China's civil war: 
that saving Chiang's regime would have required United 
States intervention on a significantly expanded scale to 
include American supervision of Chinese economic and mili­
tary affairs; that not only were Kuomintang leaders opposed 
to such supervision but that a direct assumption of respon­
sibility for the course of the war would have destroyed 
American prestige and credentials on the important anti­
imperialist issue; that even granting the regime could have 
been saved by American intervention, the ultimate cost of 
doing so would have been enormous; that not only would a 
major American intervention have run the risk of producing a 
costly confrontation with the Soviet Union but that even if 
it did not, the United States simply did not have sufficient 
resources in 1947 and 1948 both to save Chiang's regime and 
still respond effectively to the full range of its foreign 
policy problems, especially resolving the critical situation 
in Europe.
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In view of these multiple considerations, it is 
not surprising that the State Department's sense of policy 
necessity toward the East Asian mainland prevailed not only 
within the Administration but with Congress as well. In the 
latter part of February, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall 
appeared before an executive joint session of the House 
Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees to 
explain the Administration's position on the China Aid Bill. 
He candidly revealed the State Department's thinking in 
composing the aid proposal. It was designed, he noted, with 
the idea in mind that "our government must be exceedingly 
careful that it does not become committed to a policy (in 
China) involving the absorption of its resources to an 
unpredictable extent." But he said, "On the other hand we 
in the Executive Branch of the Government have an intense 
desire to help China," adding that, "It would be against 
U.S. interests to demonstrate a complete lack of confidence 
in the Chinese government and to add to its difficulties by 
abruptly rejecting its request for assistance.
The full measure of the Secretary's statement had 
the desired effect. Transcripts of the executive sessions 
on the China Aid Bill held by the influential Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reveal virtually no disagreement with 
the arguments presented by M a r s h a l l . T h e  China bloc twice 
failed to obtain a favorable vote on its efforts to attach 
the Greek-Turkish proviso to the China Aid Act, both in the
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case of the enablng legislation in April and the appropria­
tions legislation in June.^^^ Ultimately, the House and the 
Senate combined to provide $170,000,000 less than what the 
State Department had asked for initially!
Clearly, Congress was just as happy as the Admin­
istration to leave to the Chinese the essential responsibil­
ity to work out their own extraordinary problems. The 
Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee, Arthur H. Vandenberg, later revealed his own attitude 
on the matter, one about which the State Department’s Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs could not have been more pleased. 
Vandenberg noted his belief that "the overall problem was so 
big and complex that it was close to insoluble so far as the 
United States was concerned —  particularly in the face of a 
mounting crises in Europe." Though he did think it "desir­
able to continue our program of assistance to Chiang Kai- 
shek so long as such aid could be used effectively against 
communism", the Senator concluded that it was unwise, "to 
take any action that might involve the United States mili­
tarily on the mainland of Asia."^^
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Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse of the Division of Chinese 
Affairs to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, no date, 
early February 1947, F.R., 1947, VII, 786.
2
For Vincent's statement on withholding military aid for the pur­
pose of discouraging civil war and for a general understanding of his 
view as to the importance of continuing to encourage a political settle­
ment, see. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the 
Secretary of State, 7 February 1947, ibid., 789-793.
3
See, for example. The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, 
26 February 1947, ibid., 800-801.
4
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary 
of State, 7 February 1947, ibid., 791.
^For further documentation on State Department thinking concerning 
the importance of granting military aid to the Nationalist government, 
see, e.g.. Secretary of State Marshall's comments in a memorandum to the 
Secretary of War in early March 1947, that, "With reference to military 
matters, it would be manifestly unrealistic to withhold arms, or more
particularly ammunition, from National Government forces " The
Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, 4 March 1947, ibid., 806; 
Only days before, Marshall had written to Vincent, that, "The President 
this morning had one or two communications regarding the situation in 
China which apparently had disturbed him. He questioned me specifically 
as to whether or not the time had come when we must give the National 
Government ammunition.... I told the President that the situation in 
China was deteriorating, I thought, rapidly and that sooner or later we 
would have to act." Memorandum by the Secreatary of State to the Direc­
tor of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 27 February 1947, ibid.,
803-804; Dean Acheson made the following comment several days before 
leaving his State Department post as Under-Secretary of State. "It may 
be stated... forcefully that there is a moral obligation to assist the 
Chinese Government in obtaining.. .ammunition." Memorandum by the Under­
secretary of State to the Secretary of State, no date, late June 1947,
ibid., 855; See, also. Report by the Special Ad Hoc Commttee to the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on Policies, Procedures and Costs 
of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries, 21 April 1947, 
F.R., 1947, I, 726-727, 728.
^Concerning State Department thinking on the risks of a Soviet 
counter-escalation, see Footnote #10, Chapter VI, supra ; Also, see. 
Memorandum by the Director of Far Eastern Affairs for use in presenting 
to the President the problem of military assistance to the Chinese 
National armies, 27 June 1947, ibid., 859; See also the comment by the 
Assistant Director of the Division of Chinese Affairs, that, "Reasons 
against military aid are...the possibility of increased US-Soviet ten­
sions and of Soviet military aid, either openly or covertly, to the
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Chinese Communists which would result in making China a second Spain and 
might eventually lead to a third world war." Memorandum by Mr. Philip 
D. Sprouse to General Wedemeyer, 23 August 1947, ibid., 755.
^Concerning the necessity of minimizing grounds for criticizing
American China policy as imperialistic see the comments by W. Walton 
Butterworth, then Minister-Counsel of the Embassy in China, that, 
"...all-out aid to the present government at this time would...com­
pletely destroy the confidence of Asiatic peoples in American integrity 
and political objectives...." Memorandum prepared in the Embassy in 
China for the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy, 5 July 1947, ibid., 
224; See the comment by the Assistant Director of the Division of Chi­
nese Affairs, that, "Reasons against military aid are ...the moral 
position in which the US would be placed, with damage to its prestige, 
were it to take action which would be construed as intervention in or 
encouragement for civil war in China." Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. 
Srouse to General Wedemeyer, 23 August 1947, ibid., 755; See also Secre­
tary of State Marshall's observation, that, "With the passing of extra­
territoriality, it does not appear appropriate or desirable that United 
States forces be maintained ashore in China on a permanent basis for the 
avowed purpose of protecting American interests there." The Secretary 
of State to the Secretary of the Navy, 23 July 1947, ibid., 971; Though 
written some months prior to the time period being reviewed in this
chapter, a September 1946 report by Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel
to the President, is revealing on this point; "The United States should 
realize that Soviet propaganda is dangerous (especially when American 
' imperialism' is emphasized) and should avoid any actions which give an 
appearance of truth to the Soviet charge". A Report to the President by 
the Special Counsel to the President, no date, September, 1946, Ch. 6, 
p. 79, file 75/139B, DDRS.
g
See, for example. Memorandum for Use in Presenting to the President 
the Problem of Military Assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Armies, 27 
June 1947; F.R., 1947, VII, 853-854; Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy 
in China for the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy, 5 July 1947, ibid., 
222-223; Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy, 12 February 1947, ibid., 796; Memorandum of Conversation by the 
Secretary of State, 7 June 1948, F.R., VIII, 86; See, also, David E. 
Lilienthal. The Journals of David E. Lilienthal. Vol. III. The Atomic 
Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), 200-201.
9
For a good overview of the attitudes of this element in Chinese 
politics, see, Mr. Carsun Chang, Chairman of the Chinese Democratic 
Socialist Party to the Secretary of State, 1 November 1947, F.R., 1947, 
VII, 906-908; For Administration thinking on the matter of being careful 
not to alienate this segment of the Chinese political and intellectual 
community, see. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the 
Secretary of State, 7 February 1947, ibid., 791-792; Memorandum by the 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs for Use in Presenting to 
the President the Problem of Military Assistance to the Chinese National
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Armies, 27 June 1947, ibid., 853-854; Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. 
Sprouse of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Director of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs, no date, early February 1947, ibid., 787; The 
Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, 4 March 1947, ibid., 806; 
For a lengthy assessment of this policy-making factor, see. Memorandum 
by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse to General Wedemeyer, 23 August 1947, ibid., 
743, 750, 753.
^^Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee, 9 June 1947, ibid., 843-844; A memorandum by 
John Carter Vincent in the latter part of June 1947 noted the differ­
ences, from the State Department's point of view, between the attitudes 
of State and the military establishment on the question of "direct and 
substantial" military assistance to China. Memorandum by the Director 
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 20 June 
1947, ibid., 849; For a sense of the military establishment's greater 
inclination to de-emphasize political considerations while stressing 
those on the military side of the issue, see. The Secretary of War to 
the Secretary of State, 26 February 1947, ibid., 800; Memorandum by 
General Wedemeyer to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, 13 
October 1947, ibid., 892-893; Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 9 June 1947, ibid., 838-848; 
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, 20 
June 1947, ibid., 968-970.
^^See, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on United 
States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National 
Security, 29 April 1947, F.R.. 1947, I, 745.
^^Ibid.. 749.
12aIt may be worthwhile to dwell here a moment on the topic of the 
Wedemeyer appointment as it bears on the issue of the relationship 
between public opinion and Truman Administration China policy. Ques­
tions continue to exist on this episode. Some have suggested that 
Wedemyer was sent as a means to placate the China bloc in Congress. 
Even Wedemeyer himself thought this was the case. (See, Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, 304; Wedemeyer, Albert C. Wedemeyer Reportsi 
(New York: Henry Holt, Publ., 1958), 382, 388; Tang Tsou, America's
Failure, 452-454; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 260. 
Both Tang Tsou and Westerfield note Wedemeyer's claim that Marshall 
himself revealed that he had appointed Wedemeyer because of pressure 
from Congress, esp. from Walter Judd in the House and Styles Bridges in 
the Senate, and others. Judd also claimed this was the case. See, 
Tang, America's Failure, 454fn.) An early July 1947 memorandum by 
Marshall does appear to lend credence to this argument. In discussing 
sending Wedemeyer, Marshall noted "It so happened that during the past 
three days his name has been proposed to me by three different people 
outside of the Department representing the importance of doing something
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to clarify our situation with regard to China." Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State, 2 July 1947, F.R., 
1947, VII, 635. Ernest R. May, however, while not commenting on public 
pressure, has suggested that the Wedemeyer appointment may have had 
other origins. Possibly, Wedemeyer was sent as a means by which to out 
maneuver those within the Administration who then were favoring greater 
assistance to the Nationalists. If Wedemeyer, who was known to be 
sympathetic to Chiang, were to return with an objective report of the 
situation in China (which was very bleak), then it could be used effec­
tively by Marshall to oppose an excess of American assistance to China 
in context of intra-bureaucratic maneuvering on the issue. On the other 
hand. May also suggests that Marshall simply may have wanted more infor­
mation on the situation in China so as to be able to make the best 
decision on how to go about continuing to support the Nationalist gov­
ernment. May, The Truman Administration and China, 21. There is reason 
to believe that this latter condition, i.e., the need for greater infor­
mation, constituted, in effect, the origin of the Wedemeyer mission. On 
the request of former President Truman that he submit a brief resume on 
his 1946 mission to China, in 1954 Marshall included the following 
comment about the Wedemeyer mission: "In an effort to find some course
of action that might be taken to offset the Communist gains in China, 
General Wedemeyer was sent over to inquire into the situation. It was 
on my instigation that he was sent to China...." Memorandum on China 
from General George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954, Presi­
dent's Secretary Files, Box 74, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, 
Independence, Mo. Moreover, in his early July 1947 memorandum, Marshall 
observes that, although he had talked to "three different people outside 
the Department" about Wedemeyer "during the past three days", nonethe­
less "For about two weeks I have had in mind the probable desirability 
of sending Wedemeyer to China... to make a survey of the situation and to 
report back at as early a date as possible." Marshall noted this in 
context of observing that the situation in China was "critical" and that 
it was an "urgent" matter that the Administration decide what it was 
going to do. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secre­
tary of State, 2 July 1947, F.R., 1947, VII, 635. It is of considerable 
interest to note these comments by Marshall, especially his reference to 
having had in mind a mission for "about two weeks", in relation to a 
June 20th discussion between the Chief of the Division of Chinese
Affairs, Arthur R. Ringwalt, the Assistant Chief, Philip Sprouse, and 
the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent. 
In this meeting the three discussed the situation in China and the 
possibility that the Nationalists might succumb. Vincent noted the 
shortcomings of existing Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals concerning 
military assistance and accordingly suggested that a high ranking Ameri­
can official be sent to China —  Vincent wondered about Dean Acheson or 
Under Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett —  to discuss the situation 
with U.S. officials there, to hear the Chinese side of the case, and
then make a report to Washington. Memorandum by the Director of the
Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 20 June 1947, 
Department of State, File 893.00/ Manchuria/6-1947. Whether or not
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there is any connection between this Vincent memorandum and the Marshall 
decision to send a fact-finding mission to China, one thing seems clear, 
once again, in this instance as in others, public opinion appears to 
have been given too much weight as a factor influencing official deci­
sions on China in the years following World War II.
13For the essentials of General Wedemeyer's report to President 
Truman in September, 1947, see, China White Paper, 764-814.
^^Ibid., 813-814.
^^Ibid., 814.
^^Ibid., 779, 801.
^^^It is also instructive to note that the State Department re­
ceived information on the Wedemeyer mission from the Embassy in China 
that did nothing to enhance the chances of the report's recommendations 
being accepted as the basis for policy. See, for example, a letter from 
the Second Secretary of the Embassy in China to The Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, that, "The more places the General (i.e., 
Wedemeyer) visited and the more people he saw, the more despairing he 
became over this Government and over the possibilities of giving aid 
which could be effectively used to achieve our purposes and without 
being dissipated. Letter from John F. Melby to W, Walton Butterworth, 
25 August 1947, Box 2, Melby Papers, HSTL.
^^For Marshall's view on the insufficiency of Defense arguments in 
favor of greater military aid to Chiang's regime, see. The Secretary of 
State, to the Acting Secretary of State, 7 April 1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 
52-53.
17a
In 1954 in a brief resume of recollections about his association 
with China policy in 1946 and 1947, General George C. Marshall noted in 
1947, that, "One of the most difficult political reactions arose out of 
the fact that the Nationalist goverment of China was not able to procure 
quickly the military supplies it desired. These delays were charged to 
our Government. The facts were that our military reserves of modem 
equipment had been so reduced by allotments to various countries that 
the War Department could not afford further to diminish them. Even so, 
a direct purchase was rendered difficult because the money received by 
the War Department, for example, would have to be turned into the Trea­
sury and a new appropriation secured, with the possibility of failure. 
And then there would be the delay in the manufacture of the items, since 
there was no general market for such supplies. The War Department was 
loath to enter into the business of these purchases because of their 
effect on the national defense. Further, the complications in the 
matter could not well be made plain to the public in the midst of a 
vigorous political discussion, statements or debate." Memorandum on 
China from General George C. Marshall to Harry S. Truman, 18 May 1954,
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President's Secretary Files, Box 74, Truman Papers, HSTL; Having read 
the Wedemeyer report in 1947, Marshall observed that, "The feasibility 
of these recommendations will, of course, have to be considered particu­
larly in relation to U.S. commitments and possible future commitments 
elsewhere in the world." Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the 
President, no date, 1947, President's Secretary Files, Box 173, ibid. ; 
See, also, Marshall's letter to the President that, "I understand Gen­
eral Wedemeyer is presenting his report to you at noon today. It seems 
to me mandatory that we treat Wedemeyer's report strictly top secret and 
that no indication of its contents be divulged to the public. This will 
allow us time to review our policy in the light of the report, giving 
due consideration to it in balance with our policies in other parts of 
the world." The document also contains the handwritten comment, "I 
agree, HST". Memorandum for Mr. Connelly (Matthew J. Connelly, Presi­
dent's Secretary), 25 September 1947, President's Secretary Files, Box 
73, ibid.
18See, C.I.Â. Summary of the China Situation for the Period Septem­
ber 1947 to March 1948, Secs. 1, 2, 5, 6 & 7, file 75/10, DDRS.
19
See, C.I.Â. Situation Report, S.R. No. 4, 12 January 1948, pp. 
5-6, file 77/97A, DDRS; See also the comment by John Melby, then Second 
Secretary of the Embassy in China, that, "The Generalissimo has admitted 
to Dr. Stuart that he cannot allow his American ties to be too conspicu­
ous." Melby, Mandate of Heaven, 271.
20Marshall made similar comments on numerous occasions, e.g., see, 
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China, 28 November
1947, F.R., 1947, VII, 923; See, also. Memorandum of Conversation by the 
Secretary of State, 11 June 1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 92.
21Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the 
Secretary of State, "Resume of the World Situation", 6 November 1947, 
file 75/43C, DDRS.
22
C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 2, 14 November 1947, p. 6, file 
77/179B, DDRS.
23The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China, 9 February
1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 13.
24
See, Memorandum by Mr. Philip D. Sprouse to General Wedemeyer, 23 
August 1947, F.R., 1947, VII, 753, 758; Also, see. Memorandum by Mr. 
Robert N. Magill of the Division of Chinese Affairs, no date, January 
1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 450; Memorandum by the Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs to the Under-Secretary of State, ibid., 456-457.
25
See, Memorandum by Mr. Robert N. Magill of the Division of Chi­
nese Affairs, no date, January 1948, ibid., 448-449; Memorandum by the 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Under-Secretary of 
State, 21 January 1948, ibid., 454-457.
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26See, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs to the Secretary of State, 24 January 1948, ibid., 459-461; See, 
also, the record of conversation by the Chief of the State Department's 
Division of Investment and Economic Development, Hubert Havlik, that, 
"There followed a considerable discussion in which...(it was)...enç)ha- 
sized that in the case of aid to Europe, the US government expects the 
European countries to undertake steps of self-help...and that similarly 
we now desire to relate aid to a constructive program by the Chinese 
government.... (It was).. .pointed out there might be resistence to the 
Administration's proposals for aid to (the) Chinese in some quarters of 
Congress, and that resistence.. .might arise because of doubts as to the 
economic prospects of China...." Memorandum of Conversation by the 
Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development, 6 January 
1948, ibid., 452; See, also Secretary Marshall's statement, that,
"Dept... (einphasizes the) ...strong feeling Congress, Executive Branch 
and American public that U.S. aid to China, as for Europe, is predicated 
on vigorous self-help program...." The Secretary of State to the Ambas­
sador in China, 27 April 1948, ibid., 511; Also, concerning the presence 
in Congress of somewhat severe economic criteria in 1948 in judging the 
question of grants of aid to China, see, the "Princeton Seminar" discus­
sions between Dean Acheson, Philip Jessup, Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, 
Dean Rusk, et alia., in. Notes on China, 22 July 1953, Princeton Semi­
nars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
27For a brief, though concise, statement on the legislative history 
of the China Aid Bill, see. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1 July 1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 
104-107.
28Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 11 June 
1948, ibid., 91; See also. Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of 
the Division of Chinese Affairs, 15 June 1948, ibid., 256-257; For the 
position of the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in China, Admiral Badger, 
see. The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, 9 June 1948, ibid., 254-256.
29
See, Draft Report by the National Security Council on the Posi­
tion of the United States Regarding Short-term Assistance to China, 26 
March 1948, ibid., 44-50.
30National Security Council Report on Possible Courses of Action 
for the U.S. With Respect to the Critical Situation in China, 26 July 
1948, ibid., 119-120.
31See, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 11 
June 1948, ibid., 95.
32
For a sense of the tenor of Defense Department thinking convern- 
ing military assistance to China, see, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 9 June 1947, F.R.,
r3l4-
1947, VII, 838-848; Of course the general thrust of the Wedemeyer report 
of September, 1947, was predicated on the assumed efficacy of an ex­
panded program of military assistance despite the reservations raised by 
the State Department. See, China White Paper, 764-814; See also, the 
separate conclusions of policy options "a", "b", "c" & "d" by military 
members of the National Security Council in. Draft Report by the Nation­
al Security Council on the Position of the United States Regarding 
Short-term Assistance to China, 26 March 1948, F.R., 1948, Vlll, 46-50; 
See also, the relative lack of concern on the part of the military 
establishment over the possibility of U.S. naval forces actively assist­
ing the Nationalist government in the defense of the coastal city of 
Tsingtao in the event of a Chinese communist attack. In this regard, 
see the following documents: The Commander of United States Naval 
Forces in the Western Pacific to the Chief of Naval Operations, 3 May
1948, ibid., 310-311, Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense to the 
National Security Council, 21 May 1948, ibid., 314-316; For State De­
partment objections on this matter, see. The Secretary of State to the 
Secretary of Defense, 28 May 1948, ibid., 316-317; For rather severe 
criticism of the military establistoent over this episode see the com­
ments by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, e.g., Memo­
randum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 13 May 
1948, ibid., 312-313; Also, see, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of 
the Policy Planning Staff, 27 July 1948, ibid., 122-123. Actually, by 
way of clarification on this point, it would be a productive endeavor to 
read the entire, though short. Foreign Relations segment on the Tsingtao 
question, see. Ibid., 307-345.
33See, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China, 6
April 1948, ibid., 73-74; For a text of the China Aid Act of 1948, see,
China White Paper, 991-993.
34
President Truman to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1948, F.R.,
1948, Vlll, 79-80; The Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador, 28
June 1948, ibid., 100-101; The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassa­
dor in China, 3 April 1948, ibid., 485; See also. The Secretary of State 
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1 July 1948, 
ibid., 104-107.
35See, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 7 June 
1948, ibid., 85; The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 17 
June 1948, ibid., 99; Memorandum by the Under-Secretary of State, 9 June 
1948, ibid., 110.
36
See, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 11 
June 1948, ibid., 91-93.
37
Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 7 June 
1948, ibid., 86.
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84.
39Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 11 June 
1948, ibid.. 93-95.
^°Ibid., 95.
^^Ibid.. 98.
^^Ibid.. 96.
43
See, China White Paper, 382-383; Marshall's comments before this 
joint session of the congressional committees do not appear to have been 
mere rhetoric for public consumption. Almost a month earlier, in draft­
ing the Administration's position on a China Aid Bill, Marshall had 
written that, "The Chinese Government is in dire need of assistance to 
prevent irretrievable economic deterioration. However, the political, 
economic and financial conditions in China are so unstable and so uncer­
tain that it is utterly impossible to develop a practical, effective 
long-term overall program for economic recovery. Nevertheless, it does 
appear desirable for the United States Government to render certain 
assistance to China in her present critical situation, assistance to 
provide some help in arresting the present rapid program of economic 
deterioration in order to provide some help in arresting the present 
rapid program of economic deterioration in order to provide a breathing 
space in which the Chinese Government could initiate important steps 
towards her own recovery." Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 
29 January 1948, Box 16, Office Files of the Under Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs, HSTL.
44
See, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Session of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series, 80th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1948), 422-423, 433-442; See also. Senate Committees on Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services, Joint Hearings on the Military Situation 
in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess (1951), 1903, 2238-2239; U.S. 
Dept, of State, China White Paper, 351-353; Congressional Record, 80th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 3668, 3693; The Acting Secretary of State to the 
Ambassador in China, 6 April 1948, F.R., 1948, VIII, 73-74; Memorandum 
of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese 
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CHAPTER VIII
THE COLLAPSE OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLICY OF MANEUVER: 
REFORMULATING THE ESSENTIALS OF CONTAINMENT IN ASIA
Despite the Administration's desire in the early 
part of 1948 to avert the short-term collapse of the Nation­
alist Government, events quickly dispelled any lingering 
hopes as to the staying power of Chiang's regime. Though 
Administration officials did not fully realize it, the 
Kuomintang denouement had begun even before Congress fin­
ished its deliberations on the China Aid Act.
Only days after the high level decision in Wash­
ington in early June to expand the United States military 
role in China beyond the already existing and rather modest 
military advisory mission to the Nationalist Government, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that, short of 
American military assistance "on a considerable scale", the 
Nationalist Government was doomed. ^  In a report submitted 
to the National Security Council (NSC) in late July, Secre­
tary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, estimated that under 
the best of circumstances, the Nationalists would be able to 
forestall defeat for six months, though collapse could come 
as soon as three.^
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In this same report, and despite the early June 
decision, the Secretary of the Army again raised the issue 
of expanding United States military assistance to China. It
is not altogether clear why the Secretary submitted the
report, given the essence of his conclusions. It probably 
was an expression of anxiety, a reflection of the fact that 
by the Summer of 1948 decision makers sensed how near they 
were to responding to all those consequences which officials 
anticipated would follow in the wake of a communist victory 
in China. The potential calamity of this event, especially 
as it related to the problem of containing Soviet power, had 
long bothered the minds of policymakers. Thus, it was only 
natural that some would think it important to raise the
question of preventative measures one last time.
Whatever the case, the Army Secretary offered four 
options in his report. Two of them, increasing American aid 
"to the maximum extent feasible" along with that of with- 
drawing aid altogether, he rejected out of hand. A third 
proposition, that American recognition and aid might be
shifted from the Nationalist Government to some more effec­
tive regional regime subsequent to the collapse of the 
former, the Secretary simply postulated without any quali­
fication beyond observing that under the circumstances it 
was "contrary to the expressed policy of the U.S.".^  The 
remaining alternative, "continuation of U.S. aid on the 
basis of programs now authorized", the Army civilian chief 
appeared to endorse by suggesting that it,
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...would recognize the interest of 
Congress in continuing the EGA aid program 
as well as maintain, before the world, 
resemblance of adhering to announced U.S. 
policy toward China. Such a course could 
not produce the favorable decision re­
quired in the short time available to the 
Chinese national government; nevertheless, 
it would be in the nature of 'buying time' 
until theu overall world situation is 
clarified.
State Department officials quickly responded to 
Secretary Royall's report, implying that its content was 
little more than a tired rehash of issues which no longer 
warranted serious attention. The Deputy Director of the 
Policy Planning Staff (PPS) wondered what, if "any useful 
purpose— (was being served)...by raising the questions of 
increasing or withdrawing aid only to dismiss them and 
conclude that our present policy of aid is correct."® The 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs added that 
under the circumstances, and in view of the early June high 
level decisions on China, continuing United States assis­
tance to the Nationalist Government "on a basis of programs 
now authorized is naturally the only course open to the U.S.
n
at this time". (emphasis added)
In the first week of August, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) entered the exchange between State and Defense 
by reiterating an earlier view that direct United States 
supervision of expenditures under the China Aid Act was the 
only way in which assistance to the Nationalists could be
Q
usefully and effectively rendered. Yet, having made this
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statement, the Joint Chiefs concluded by agreeing that a 
continuation of aid to China on the basis of already autho­
rized programs, i.e., the China Aid Act, was the proper 
option to follow —  a course of action which, it had been 
decided, explicitly precluded the possibility of direct 
American supervision of aid to Chiang's regime!^
Though it is not finally clear what the Joint 
Chiefs and the Secretary of the Army had in mind in present­
ing their reports of late July and early August, if indeed 
they were merely testing the policymaking atmosphere in 
Washington to see whether in view of steadily deteriorating 
conditions in China the question of preventative measures 
might not find a more receptive audience, the American 
Ambassador in China, John Leighton Stuart, was far less 
oblique in his approach to the worsening situation. While 
candidly acknowledging the near hopelessness of the Nation­
alist cause. Ambassador Stuart continued to argue throughout 
August and into October in favor of the need to enlarge the 
American commitment in hope somehow of winning from Washing­
ton a last minute reprieve for Chiang's regime. In rummag­
ing through the possibilities, he even suggested that if the 
Administration was unable to expand the United States commit­
ment, then it might again consider resurrecting the option 
of encouraging the emergence of a coalition government, 
anything, the ambassador seemed to be saying, which would 
prevent a total elimination of the non-communist influence 
in Chinese politics.
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Even had they wanted to, there were few in Wash­
ington who were inclined to lend a sympathetic ear to such 
suggestions in view of the spreading disintegration of 
Nationalist armies in Manchuria and North China in the late 
months of 1948. Before the end of October, the CIA observed 
that "the military situation...has turned so clearly against 
the Nationalists that the position is not believed to be 
recoverable even if U.S. aid on an expanded scale were 
immediately a v a i l a b l e . B y  early November, even Ambassa­
dor Stuart had to concede that "no amount of military assis­
tance—  (will) —  save (the) present situation in view of its
advanced stage of deterioration   early fall of (the)
12present Nationalist Government is inevitable." The head 
of the Military Advisory Mission in China, General Barr, 
concurred.
As a result, by the end of November, what had been 
the major preoccupation of American China policy since the 
end of the Second World War, i.e., how to sustain the Nan­
king Government, or, in a more negative vein, how to delay 
its demise, no longer remained the relevant focus for deci­
sion makers. Instead, Administration officials began to 
turn their attention to a series of new policymaking issues 
implied by the more general question of how the United 
States was going to adjust to the collapse and elimination 
of the Nationalist Government. What Administration offi­
cials had understood they would probably have to deal with
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eventually, but which since 1945 they had worked to postpone 
for as long as possible, finally became by the end of 1948 
their central policymaking problem: the necessity of com­
posing American policy toward East and Southeast Asia in 
response to a Chinese Communist assumption of control 
throughout China and its presumed corollary, a significant 
extension of Soviet power and influence. By the beginning 
of 1949, the American effort to prevent Asia from becoming a 
second critical and expensive front in the worldwide con­
flict with the Soviet Union thus had run its course. The 
epicenter of the Cold War was in the process of shifting 
from the western to the eastern end of the Eurasian conti­
nent and American policies for containing Soviet power would 
have to be adjusted accordingly.
In context of this evolving situation, and with 
respect to existing American policy which was to continue to 
recognize and support the Nationalist Government, the Admin­
istration faced certain procedural problems of immediate 
importance, e.g., what type of controls should be exercised 
over the flow of American military and economic assistance 
to the mainland in view of the spreading collapse of Kuomin- 
tang resistance; should the United States diplomatic pres­
ence be retained in Communist controlled territories; should 
American citizens be evacuated from Communist held areas. 
However, the nature of the Administration’s decisions on
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these matters as well as in the case of other policy prob­
lems which would emerge over the next year and a half —  a 
topic which will be discussed in following next chapters —  
can best be understood by first dealing with the existence 
and resolution of a broader issue concerning the tenor of 
American China policy as a whole.
By the Fall of 1948, the Administration began to 
receive considerable public criticism that it had "no clear 
cut policy" toward China and that in view of the deteriorat­
ing Nationalist position it was imperative to develop a more 
positive approach to the s i t u a t i o n . O n  the basis of 
domestic press opinion along these lines, a controversy 
within the Administration finally came to a head. This 
debate revolved around the general question of just how 
precise the Administration's policy planning ought to be 
with respect to fast moving events in China and centered on 
the specific operational issue of whether or not the Admin­
istration should be prepared to offer economic and military 
assistance to regional forces in China which, subsequent to 
a collapse of the Nationalist Government, demonstrated a 
capacity to resist effectively further communist advances.
The Department of Defense, and specifically the 
Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, who agreed with the "no 
policy" complaint,argued that immediate decisions were 
necessary not only with respect to the broader strategic
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outline of policy but also to include needed specific tacti­
cal directives in relation to future contingencies. Of 
special interest to the military establishment was the 
question of assistance to regional forces. In regard to the 
important goal of containing a further expansion of Soviet 
power, Defense seemed to continue to hold out hope that 
further infusions of economic, and especially military, 
assistance to some regional alternative to the Nationlist 
Government still might save at least the southern region of 
China from Communist control, that it was important to do 
this if at all possible in order to create a buffer against 
communist expansion into Southeast Asia, and that from this 
base of operations, American backed efforts could be 
launched with the intent of liberating Communist held terri­
tories to the north.
State Department officials accepted the essential 
strategic purpose of American policy as the obstruction of 
further expansion of Soviet power. A National Security 
Council draft report of early November 1948 put it this way: 
"The United States should seek to prevent China from becom­
ing an adjunct of Soviet political - military p o w e r . T h e  
problem, though, was how these purposes might best be 
achieved. In opposition to Defense, the State Department 
suggested generally that, while strategic planning was 
appropriate, even necessary, tactical contingency planning 
was premature and unrealistic in view of the extreme fluidity
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and uncertainty of the situation in China. State's position 
also rested on the related assumption that the fundamental 
problem in formulating policy toward China under the circum­
stances in late 1948, and for the future, was political in
nature and that little or nothing could or should be done
17militarily beyond what was being done already.
Since this was the thinking that prevailed in 
determining the direction of Administration policy toward 
China throughout 1949 and into 1950, it is of considerable 
importance to look at the State Department's arguments. At 
the end of 1948, State officials were convinced that the 
United States could no longer influence the course of events 
on the mainland of China through continued programs of 
military and economic assistance. The defeat of the Nation­
alist Government was imminent and inevitable. And yet, 
until its defeat, officials did not question but that the 
United States would have to continue to recognize and sup­
port the Chinese government in the letter's hour of dire 
18need. Thus, it would be self-defeating of established 
policy and destructive of Nationalist morale and further 
will to resist for the Administration, by its actions, to 
encourage the emergence of some regional alternative to the 
Nanking government.
The Administration did require a policy, however, 
to compensate for the Nationalist collapse and for the 
purpose of containing Soviet power. And, with respect to
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what officials believed was an extremely uncertain and fluid 
situation in China, State argued in favor of a policy of 
unrestrained maneuver; a policy free of whatever constraints 
which would reduce the Administration’s capacity for taking 
advantage of any opporunities which might arise for obstruct­
ing further Soviet expansion. As the Director of the Policy 
Planning Staff, George F. Kennan put it, a policy that could 
be,
—  translated into action on a day 
by day basis in accord with the changes 
of the moment. It cannot be explicitly 
defined on paper in a form which can 
serve as a guide for months or years 
ahead. It is outstandingly a matter 
which calls, of or operational skill and 
flexibility.^^
State Department officials willingly agreed that 
it might be to the American advantage to support regional 
resistance to the Communists in some future situation and 
offered that the design of their proposed policy of maneuver
or flexibility would include the possibility of moving in
20this direction if a genuine opportunity should arise. 
However, the betting was that this would not prove to be the 
case. There was little, if any, reason to expect the emer­
gence now of some more effective anti-communist alternative 
to the Nationalist regime. Once the Government on the
mainland disappeared so would all effective resistance to
21Communist control.
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In China, Ambassador Stuart counseled against any 
preplanned eagerness to back anti-communist resistance. In 
late October he advised Washington that
Any direct military aid to resistance 
groups on the theory that we are fighting 
communism all over Üie world would seem to 
me unwise. It would only delay their 
ultimate liquidation and would meanwhile 
arouse increased anti-American sentiment 
and expose our nationals —  to danger. 
Transportation and other difficulties in 
reaching these resistance leaders and 
insuring proper use of our supplies would 
be enormous. The chief objection would 
perhaps be that this is one of negative or 
vacillating courses which we should at all 
costs avoid.
The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, W. Walton 
Butterworth, agreed, further adding that "Unsuccessful 
efforts to support remaining anti-communist elements would
be costly in terms of U.S. prestige and expenditure of
23further U.S. funds." In general. State Department offi­
cials argued that in this instance the Administration would 
face the same dilemma as it had in the case of giving assis­
tance to the Nationalist Government: on the one hand to
give aid to a regional regime without direct American super­
vision probably would be wasted, while, on the other hand, 
to become involved in this way would draw the United States 
into the conflict, possibly precipitating a strain on the 
nation's limited resources and creating a basis for the 
convincing charge of American imperialism.^^
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The State Department, moreover, was ready to 
accept the consequences of earlier policy decisions which by 
the end of 1948 were coming due. Administration support of 
the China Aid Act had been predicated on the associated 
assumptions that China was simply not as important to the 
American national interest as other areas of the world, that 
because of this the Administration would be able to grant 
only limited assistance to the Nationalist Government, and 
that, as a result, continuing civil war would end eventually 
with a Chinese Communist victory.
Although this was a thoroughly unsatisfying pros­
pect all along, the State Department had argued that there 
was no acceptable alternative, that China was not the place 
to commit American prestige in an effort to stem the commun­
ist advance. Thus in late November of 1948, a Policy Plan­
ning Staff Memorandum would state that.
While the growing power of the 
Chinese Communists represents an impor­
tant political development and a serious 
deterioration, from our standpoint, of 
the general situation in Asia, it is not 
likely to be c^as trophic to United 
States interests.
Because State officials believed everything possible had
been done to sustain the non-communist position in China, so
it followed that the United States would have to acquiesce
in the Communist control of China.
But there was another angle to State Department 
thinking based on the assumption of the inevitability of the
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Communist victory. Throughout the Fall of 1948 the view 
begin to develop that "preventing China’s becoming an ad­
junct of Soviet political-military power" might depend on 
the ability of the Administration to operate subtly and 
effectively to encourage potential animosities and possible 
divisions between the Chinese Communist Party and the Krem­
lin. This consideration would remain throughout 1949 and 
into 1950 at the core of all decision making activity con­
cerning the related questions of continuing American ties 
with the remnant Nationalist Government on Formosa and 
United States relations with the Communist regime on the 
mainland. Although these topics will be dealt with in 
detail in following chapters, it is important here to under­
stand several of the assumptions on which this thinking was
based and which began to emerge as key policymaking consid-
26erations even before 1949.
At the end of 1948 there was no question but that 
the Chinese Communists were firmly entrenched in the Soviet 
camp and that for an indefinite period a Chinese Communist 
victory would mean an extension to Soviet power. However, 
State Department officials believed it quite possible that 
the future course of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations 
might produce a significant opportunity to drive a diplo­
matic wedge between the two. Though State officials were 
not altogether sure as to the precise nature of this oppor­
tunity, a Policy Planning Staff memorandum of early September
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(and subsequently circulated as a National Security Council 
report) suggested the following scenario. The Soviet objec­
tive in China was to expeind its influence. However, because 
Stalin did not have "much faith in human nature" and because 
of the unedifying "truancy of Comrade Tito", Soviet influ­
ence meant, in effect, bringing the Chinese Communist Party 
under direct Russian organizational control. Only thus
would an endemically suspicious Kremlin feel secure in its
27relationship with a foreign communist organization.
Yet it should not be ignored, the memorandum went 
on, that the Chinese Communists had risen to power on the 
basis of their exploitation of intense nationalistic/anti­
imperialist public sentiment in China and indeed "had them­
selves been infected with Chinese patriotism". So long as 
the civil war continued the Chinese Communist Party leader­
ship could justify their close Russian connection as a vital 
ingredient in the Party's ability to carry on the struggle
to liberate China from "reactionary" and "imperialist" 
28control. Once the fighting was over, though, and if the 
Soviets moved to consolidate the control over the Chinese, 
thus intruding substantially into China's internal affairs, 
it could produce an explosive and exploitable situation. 
The Policy Planning Staff memo offered the following specu­
lation:
If the Chinese Politburo is revealed 
as subservient in any way to the Kremlin, 
the Chinese Communist leadership is in for
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difficulties from the powerful sentiments 
of nationalism and xenophobia, on the part 
of both the Chinese public and nationalist 
elements in the party.
It is a nice piece of irony that at 
precisely the time the Chinese Communist 
leadership was most likely to wish to 
conceal its ties from Moscow, the Kremlin 
is most likely to be exerting upmost 
pressure to bring the Chinese Communists 
under complete control. The possibilities 
which such a situation would present us,
provided we have regained freedom of
action, needs scarcely be spelled out.
There was, finally, another related aspect of
State Department thinking concerning the importance of a 
policy of maneuver. With respect to the prospect of a
Communist dominated China, a Departmental policy statement 
on China of late September observed,
We (will) have to decide whether our 
interests lie in excluding Communist China 
from important areas of world trade or 
whether more can be gained by encourag­
ing... China, without regard to political 
complexion, to participate in the inter­
national economy. The position of the 
United States in Japan, coupled with 
Japan's important pre-war reliance upon 
China, including Manchuria, for markets in 
raw materials, will give this issue more 
than ordinary urgency.
Only by maintaining flexibility of approach to events in 
China, State Department officials argued, would the Admin­
istration be in a position to decide this issue one way or 
another and in relation to the best interests of the nation 
at the time.
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Those in the public at large, in Congress, as well 
as within the Administration, who might have desired a more 
positive commitment to save Chiang's regime in late 1948 
were fated for disappointment. By the beginning of 1949, 
the arguments presented by the State Department had pre­
vailed in the "no policy" controversy concerning the Admin­
istration's approach to China. Strategic necessity preclu­
ded any genuine possibility of moving in another direction. 
The risks of any sort of expanded American commitment in 
China in the waning moments of 1948 were enormously greater 
than they had been earlier in the year and in late 1947 when 
the Administration had developed its cautious policy of 
limited assistance toward the Nationalist Government.
Thus, the National Security Council would propose 
in mid-January of 1949 that if it was the major goal of 
United States policy "to prevent China from becoming an 
adjunct of Soviet power" then two major strategic considera­
tions would have to be kept in mind while formulating policy. 
First, there was no question but that the decision makers 
would have to continue as they had all along to "regard 
efforts with respect to China as of a lower priority than 
efforts in other areas where the,benefits to U.S. security 
are more immediately commensurate with the expenditures of 
U.S. resources." In order to fulfill this requirement, 
however, while at the same time maximizing the potential for 
achieving American goals in China, the Administration would
-332-
have to, "make appropriate plans and timely preparations in 
order to exploit opportunities in China while maintaining
flexibility and avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one
31course of action or to any one faction." Although the 
wording of this latter NSC statement might appear as though 
something of a compromise between the positions of State and 
Defense, in fact, as it will be demonstrated, the Administra­
tion throughout 1949 and into 1950 clearly was inclined to 
stress the virtues of "flexibility" and "avoiding irrevoc­
able commitments" rather than "making appropriate plans and, 
timely preparations" in formulating policy.
A good measure of the desire of Administration 
officials to create those conditions which would allow them 
to sustain a policy of flexibility is to survey the intra- 
govemmental discussion in 1949 concerning the question of 
issuing a documented public explanation of United States 
policy toward China over the previous several years, the 
so-called China White Paper. A footnote in Volume IX of the 
1949 issue of the Foreign Relations series states that there
is no information concerning the origin of the proposal that
32a White Paper be published. However, there are strong 
indications that the sources were several.
First, the Policy Planning Staff in the Fall of 
1948 suggested that to gain flexibility the Administration 
would have to pay some attention to educating domestic 
public attitudes in the proper direction. A late November 
PPS Memorandum observed that,
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Of major importance at present in the 
problem of our relations with China are 
the confusion and bewilderment in the 
public mind regarding our China policy.
It is now less important to cover up the 
inade^acies of the Chinese government 
than it is to regain the understanding and 
confidence of the American public, without 
which ^  cannot effectively implement 
policy.
On the basis of this evaluation, the memo proposed that.
All of the facilities of the Execu­
tive Branch of the Government should be 
used to get before the public, and keep 
before the public, a uniform and consis­
tent presentation of the background of 
U.S.-Chinese relations. The Department of 
State should take the lead in preparing 
the necessary materials.
In response to these suggestions, however, the President was 
worried that a public revelation concerning the nature of 
past United States-Nationalist relations would have a nega­
tive effect on the situation in China, and that he did not 
want "to be responsible for (an) announcement that would, in 
effect, virtually destroy the influence of Chiang Kai-shek." 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall subsequently advised
that action on this aspect of the Policy Planning Staff memo
35would be delayed.
However, in early February of 1949, 51 Republican 
Congressman signed a letter to the President intimating the 
inadequacy of American China policy to date and demanding 
that an official investigatory commission be sent to China 
to survey conditions and to make a report. Though the 
Administration refused to sanction such a commission, the
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new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, did agree to meet with
the Congressmen in late February to chat with them about
36China policy and to answer their questions.
Unfortunately, the result of the meeting was not 
very edifying from an official point of view. Secretary 
Acheson told the Congressmen that they should not view a 
Chinese Communist victory in China as a serious reversal for 
American interests, that China was not a modern and well 
organized nation which could be expected to have a signifi­
cant material impact on the international power balance for
37a considerable time to come. Actually, the Secretary 
rather candidly was sharing one of the considerations which 
over a year before had contributed to the decision by policy­
makers to reduce the China area to a secondary level of 
importance in the scheme of global-strategic planning. 
However, the Secretary’s observation, made out of context, 
could not have made a very favorable impression on the group 
assembled, many of whom knew little or nothing about the 
full complex of the planning of China policy over the years; 
on those who for personal or partisan political reasons 
conveniently preferred to ignore the difficult, almost 
insoluble, dilemmas which the Administration faced in formu­
lating China policy; or on those, some of them "Asia- 
firsters" with a sentimental view of American Chinese rela­
tions , who were genuinely disturbed by the accumulating 
successes of ’’international communism” and by the prospect
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of yet cinother communist victory in a country which, at 
least in size and population, if not in location, appeared 
important.
It was also in this meeting in which Acheson made 
the subsequently well publicized remark that because of the 
uncertainty of the situation in China about all the Admin­
istration could do for the time being was to wait and "let 
the dust settle" to see what opportunities might arise. 
Again the Secretary was merely being frank about the Admin­
istration’s view as to the best policy for the moment,
though as he later admitted the comment had an altogether
38unanticipated and unwanted effect on the Congressmen. 
Apparently, many left the meeting further convinced of the 
accuracy of the "no policy" accusation against the Admin­
istration’s handling of the situation in China. On top of 
this, also in late February, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada 
introduced into Congress a bill calling for $1.5 billion in
aid to China, proposing as well that United States military
39personnel be assigned to command Nationalist forces.
Apparently it was in response to these two epi­
sodes that the Administration in late February or early 
March decided to reopen the question of going public on 
China, in the heat of the moment primarily as a means of 
countering the critics.
From the very first the White House was concerned 
to release an accurate and information rich publication.
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Only in this way could public criticisms of Administration 
policy be effectively answered. Any effort at subterfuge, 
whitewash, or excessive pro-Administration editorializing 
would work to the advantage of the critics. The documents 
clearly reveal a continuous White House concern for accuracy, 
the responsibility for monitoring the work falling to the 
Special Counsel to the President, Clark M. Clifford. There 
simply was a great deal of faith in the truth, a belief that 
if the real story were told the critics whatever their 
motives, would find it much more difficult to mount success­
ful attacks on Administration policy based on ignorance, 
misinformation, emotion or partisan politics. As the
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs stated the 
situation in reverse perspective.
It occurred to me that an approach 
might be made to Senator Vandenberg to the 
effect that, in the interest of preserving 
and possibly extending the area of bipar­
tisan foreign policy, if his party in 
Congress would refrain from ex parte 
attacks on the Government’s China policy, 
the issuance of the White Paper would be 
delayed indefinitely or at any rate until 
such a time as the National Government was 
no longer.functioning in an important area 
of China.
The truth, however, was important for a related 
reason. The public needed to be educated in the problems 
which the Administration had faced in formulating its China 
policy. The public needed to know why the Administration, 
as a matter of its public responsibility to promote the
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national interest, had declined to risk an excess of Ameri­
can manpower and resources in defense of such a corrupt and 
maladministered Nationalist regime and in context of a 
situation in China ultimately not subject to successful 
manipulation by outside influences. Thus, by satisfying the 
public as to the necessity and correctness of past policy, 
the Administration could proceed to implement and maintain 
its present policy of flexibility based on the legitimizing 
force of the White Paper. And, any future efforts by citi­
zens or Congressional groups to pressure the Administration 
into developing policies toward China, considered by offi­
cials to be unrealistic or irresponsible, could be countered 
more effectively.^^
Although this is a topic which will be dealt with 
in detail in the remaining chapters, it is pertinent here to 
make two important observations concerning the Administra­
tion's desire to implement a policy of flexibility and 
maneuver toward the uncertainty of the situation in China. 
First, the Administration's sense of necessity in establish­
ing a basis for such a policy was predicated on the belief 
that this would be the best way to obstruct any further 
expansion of Soviet power in Asia. However, it is important 
to understand that a major reason why Administration offi­
cials believed this to be true was their knowledge that, the 
United States still was not in a position to use force to 
prevent Communist success under any and all circumstances.
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Budgetary limitations, a resulting lack of available resour­
ces which could be deployed in support of foreign policy 
objectives and the need to apply the amount available in 
areas of the world more important to the national security 
than the Far East, continued until the Korean War to be very 
important considerations defining the American commitment in 
East and Southeast Asia.
Moreover, officials also continued to be reluctant 
to accept the liabilities which they believed an American 
military involvement on the Asian mainland would prove 
difficult to avoid. The Soviets, the Chinese Communists and 
others invariably would charge the United States with 
imperialism. The nation’s prestige and credibility as the 
champion of the principle of self-determination for all 
peoples could be compromised. More significantly, it would 
enhance Russian prestige, the credibility of Soviet anti­
imperialist rhetoric and sustain the basis for the inter­
national communist movement continuing to identify success­
fully with Asian nationalists and anti-Western sentiment. 
Not only would the United States find itself in an increas­
ingly unpopular, isolated and ineffectual position in Asia 
but, in that event, might start West European allies to 
wondering about the wisdom of maintaining close inter­
national affiliations with a nation willing to undertake 
such counter productive involvements, and to dissipate its 
strength, in an area of the world which was of lesser stra­
tegic importance.
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In one respect, therefore, the nature of the 
policy of maneuver may be characterized as having been a 
compensation for the Administration's inability and unwill­
ingness to risk limited American manpower and resources in a 
major confrontation with Soviet inspired international 
communism on the mainland of Asia. In the absence of an 
American capacity to do this, officials decided they could 
not commit themselves a priori to any particular course of 
action toward China.
The second major observation concerning this 
policy of flexibility and maneuver is that, despite official 
lip service to the possibility of driving a diplomatic wedge 
between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists as a means by 
which to reduce or eliminate Soviet influence in China and 
despite a desire to maintain, as a part of policy, some 
capacity for doing so, the fact of the matter is, policy­
makers never paid serious attention to this as a genuine 
policy option in 1949 and into the Summer of 1950. As later 
chapters will show there were multiple reasons for this, not 
the least of which was the belief that for the indefinite 
and undoubtedly distant future, the Chinese Communists would 
continue to act as reliable agents of Soviet inspired inter­
national communism. Thus, the Administration's assessment 
of the requirements for containing Soviet power in Asia 
meant, in effect, containing Chinese Communist power as 
well. From the American point of view, therefore, better
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relations with the Chinese Communists was a remote, virtu­
ally non-existent, possibility in the year or so prior to 
the Korean War.
With the above two observations in mind, the point 
to make here is that regardless of the more precise implica­
tions of the terms —  maneuver, flexibility, opportunistic 
—  which have been used to describe the nature of the policy 
which American officials conceived for dealing with those 
circumstances created by the collapse of the Nationalist 
Government in China in late 1948 and into 1949, in reality 
the Administration's actual capacity to maneuver was limi­
ted. Little opportunity existed for exploring the poten­
tially important option of developing better relations with 
the Chinese Communists because of strong inhibiting Admin­
istration presumptions against doing so. In other words, 
despite the implications of their purpose in developing a 
policy of maneuver. Administration officials were not able 
to translate the intent of that policy into specific opera­
tional procedures for taking advantage of all the opportuni­
ties which, it might be argued in retrospect, may have 
existed in 1949 and 1950 for containing or diminishing 
Soviet power and influence in East Asia and China.
However, with respect to this assessment, it is 
important to reemphasize that the perceived necessity of 
instituting a policy of maneuver in the first place, was 
predicated on the Administration's belief that it did not
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possess the option of making a major effort to obstruct 
forceably a further communist expansion in Asia without at 
the same time incurring what appeared would be enormous and 
unacceptable risks. In view of this crucial factor, there­
fore, it may be accurate to suggest in the presence of more 
objective criteria, that in developing their policy Admin­
istration officials were less interested in achieving a 
condition of maximum flexibility, if measured in absolute 
terms, than they were to insure relatively greater freedom 
of action than those individuals and groups in the public 
and in Congress wished to allow by advocating a further 
American commitment to China to include an exclusive and 
continuing program of support to a defeated and discredited 
regime —  a course of action which many in the Administra­
tion felt would minimize the American potential for contain­
ing Soviet power in Asia.
But the question remained, when and under what 
circumstances should the White Paper be released? There 
were several considerations on this score. Of considerable 
importance was the problem of what ii%>act publication of the 
document would have on the ability of-the Nationalist regime 
to continue to resist total communist control in China. 
Apparently, virtually until the time the White Paper was 
issued in early August, many in the State Department, in­
cluding the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
advised against release, arguing that it would have the
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effect of hastening the regime's collapse by implying that 
the end was near and that the United States was cutting its 
losses; that it would be better to delay publication until 
the Kuomintang was clearly crushed as a force on the main­
land.
Having been consulted on the question of the White 
Paper, some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­
tee agreed that its publication could have a critical impact 
on Chinese government and morale; and the ranking Republican 
member of the Committee, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, 
argued that it ought to be kept from public view for the 
time b e i n g . T h e  Joint Chiefs of Staff also displayed 
reticence on this score, expressing several further reserva­
tions against its hasty release. One was that the material 
contained in the White Paper should not have the effect of 
compromising the United States cryptographic security. 
The question was submitted to the responsible agency, the 
United States Communications Intelligence Board, which, 
after surveying the document, dismissed the objection. 
Another JCS concern was that the White Paper not be released 
until all intimations of United States strategic thinking
about future policy toward East and Southeast Asia were
48expunged from the text. It does not appear that any 
significant alteration of the report was undertaken on the 
basis of this recommendation.
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The JCS also raised the more general issue of 
whether or not the White Paper ought to be released at all. 
They voiced concern that its publication might result in 
restricting the Administration's freedom of action in re­
sponding to future opportunities and developing future 
policies "for containing or reversing the communist trend in 
China." Their thinking also related to the suggestion that 
because the document contained so much negative commentary 
about the Nationalist Government it might cause great resent­
ment in China and as a result eliminate any continuing basis 
for Chinese-American cooperation and, as well, produce such 
a derogatory image of the Chinese that the American public
might be disinclined to support any further policies toward
49the China area.
In addition to the JCS arguments, there had been a 
general reticence on the part of officials to release the 
report if it appeared that to do so might have adverse 
consequences for some critical series of events in China. 
For example, subsequent to Chiang Kai-shek's January 1949 
flight from the mainland, Li Tsung-jen had assumed the 
Presidency of the Nationalist Government in Nanking. Grasp­
ing at straws in the face of a steadily deteriorating situa­
tion and in the last ditch hope that successful negotiations 
might result in the retention of some non-communist influ­
ence in a coalition government, Li responded to a January 
eight-point peace proposal by the Chinese Communists by
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sending a delegation to Peking for discussions beginning in 
mid-February. In view of this effort by Li’s government 
American officials were careful that what the Administration 
did publicly with respect to the question of China policy 
would not have the effect of weakening the bargaining posi­
tion of the Kuomintang peace delegation. By the latter part 
of April, however, this situation no longer remained to 
deter Administration actions as the Peking discussions ended 
with the Communist crossing of the Yangtze River in a re­
newed offensive to consolidate their control in central and 
southern China.
The Administration also refused to consider publi­
cation for a time in the Spring of 1949 because of the
possible negative impact on Kuomintang resistance to a 
Communist occupation of the strategically and symbolically 
important Shanghai-Nanking area. However, with the Commu­
nists in full control of central China this problem no
longer remained and by mid Summer there was no particular
set of compelling circumstances in China which appeared to 
officials in Washington to warrant further delay.
Moreover, neither the President nor the Secretary 
of State desired further debate on the question of the 
White Paper’s release and by late July both were disposed to 
proceed in spite of the reservations posed by the Joint 
C h i e f s . T h e  necessity of establishing a basis for the 
policy of flexibility remained the foremost consideration in
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their thinking. In a memorandum to the President, the 
Secretary observed.
It is impossible to deny that there 
are certain risks involved in the publica­
tion of such a document. On the other 
hand, the basic necessity of informing 
Congressional and public opinion regarding 
the facts in order that future policy may 
be made on the basis of realism and com­
prehension of the situation is believed to 
outweigh the risks of the situation.
The only problem which remained was to insure that release 
of the White Paper not result in recriminations against the 
American Ambassador in China, John Leighton Stuart. Re­
straint would be necessary until his scheduled departure
52from the country in early August. With the Ambassador 
out, the White Paper was released on the 5th.
It is apparent that the President's sense of 
urgency to release the report at the time was determined 
almost wholly by the desire to deflect further domestic 
criticism of the Administration. By late July and early 
August the need to relieve public pressures on the Admin­
istration's conduct of policy toward East Asia simply over­
shadowed all other considerations in the eyes of the White 
House. From the beginning of 1949 criticism or implied 
criticism had continued unabated. Already mentioned were 
the February episodes concerning the unsuccessful Acheson 
meeting with the 51 Congressmen and the McCarran proposal 
for $1.5 billion in aid to China. Moreover, through the 
Winter and into the Spring of 1949, in addition to the one
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made in the letter from the 51 Congressmen, the Administra­
tion received a number of other requests that an investiga­
tory commission be sent to China and based on its findings 
to make a public report for the purpose of establishing the 
essentials for adopting a more "positive" policy toward East 
Asia.S3
In early April, the House Foreign Affairs Commit­
tee, long an active hotbed of attacks on China policy, 
issued a "Report of Minority Views" critical of the Admin­
istration’s and the State Department's handling of funds 
allocated under the China Aid Act of 1948. The report 
charged unnecessary delay in developing legal authorizations 
for procurement and then in delivering military supplies to 
China, implying that this delay at such a critical time 
might have been directly related to the Kuomintang's inabil­
ity to defend successfully against the advance of communist 
forces. Conveniently ignoring the mood of Congress in 
passing the China Aid Act in April of 1948, a mood which was 
clearly disinclined to allow the American military advisory 
group in China to become involved in a manner comparable to 
the combat active advisory status designated in the Greek- 
Turkish military aid program, the minority report blithely 
went on to complain that the State Department had deliber­
ately restrained United States military personnel, presuma­
bly from doing in China what the Congress had expressly 
prohibited in the first place.
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In late April the Republican Senator from Cali­
fornia, William F. Knowland, a member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, called for a congressional investiga­
tion of United States Far Eastern Policy. Within a few 
days. Senator Styles Bridges, also a Republican and a member 
of the Committee, made the suggestion that the State Depart­
ment ought to be investigated for having advocated policies 
designed to sabotage the Nationalist G o v e r n m e n t . T h e n  in 
the early part of May, General Claire L. Chennault, the 
retired former wartime Commander of the United States Four­
teenth Air Force in China, approached the State Department 
with the suggestion to expand the American commitment in 
China for the purpose of backing regional resistance in 
those areas of the country not yet under Communist con­
trol. Not satisfied with his gesture alone, however, and 
in hopes of bringing overwhelming public pressure to bear in 
support of his proposal, the General took his case before an
executive session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
5 7finally releasing the plan in detail to the press.
In view of these accumulating and unrelieved 
pressures and since it had become public knowledge that the 
Administration was preparing a background report on China 
policy —  in late July the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs urged its immediate release —  there was considera­
ble concern by some in the Administration, including the 
Secretary of State, that a decision not to publish would be
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interpreted as an Administration cover up and hence a cat-
58alyst to renewed attacks. Thus, it seemed by late July 
that there was no alternative but to go ahead with plans for 
publication. It is pertinent to note, however, a late July 
statement by the Secretary of State, that in making the 
decision to release the White Paper, "Consideration of this 
element (i.e., a decision not to publish would bring renewed 
attacks)...has not been allowed to outweigh the more basic 
factors indicated by the National Military Establishment. 
(parenthesis added)
As result of this several months of discussion 
concerning the release of the White Paper the Administration 
attempted to create a favorable political milieu for the 
successful implementation of its policy of maneuver in 
another way. In late July, on the floor of the Senate,
Senator Vandenberg called on the Executive to begin to
60consult more closely with Congress on Far Eastern policy. 
Taking up the suggestion as a possible means by which to 
reduce Congressional pressure on Administration policy, 
especially from the Republican party. Secretary of State 
Acheson sought advice from the Democratic Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connolly of Texas. 
The Senator suggested that indeed it would be a good idea to 
consult with the Congress, that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee would be an appropriate mechanism for doing so, 
and that generally it would be very useful, as he put it.
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"to get the Republicans in". From the very early Summer 
of 1948, then, the Administration did begin to display some 
greater willingness than before to talk with members of 
Congress about the nature of its policy towards East and 
Southeast Asia.
However it is important to stress that this ten­
dency to be more expansive with Congress should not be taken 
to imply that policy was being formulated on the basis of 
Congressional demand. Indeed the procedure of consultation 
must be understood not as a measure of the Administration's 
capitulation to Congressional pressure to move in some 
direction contrary to preferred policy but the means by 
which decision makers hoped to convince Congress of the 
necessity to accept their own policy of flexibility. The 
Administration, as it had since 1945, continued to display 
slight disposition to make any significant concessions to 
public sentiment concerning China in view of the multiple 
strategic considerations which eliminated the possibility of 
the type of American involvement in East Asia which pro- 
Chiang Kai-shek enthusiasts and Asia-firsters would have 
preferred.
-350-
^C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 6/48, 17 June 1948, p. 9, file
77/180A, DDRS.
2
P o ss ib le  Courses o f Action fo r  th e  U.S. w ith R espect to  th e  
C r i t ic a l  S itu a tio n  in  China, 26 Ju ly  1948, F .R ., 1948, V III , 121.
^I b id . ,  122.
^ I b id . , 122.
^ I b id . , 122.
^Memorandum by th e  Deputy D irec to r of the Policy  P lanning S ta f f ,  
27 Ju ly  1948, i b i d . .  124.
^Memorandum by th e  D irec to r o f th e  O ffice of Far E astern  A ffa irs  
to  the  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te , 2 August 1948, i b id . . 128.
g
Memorandum by the Jo in t Chiefs o f S ta f f  to  the  S e c re ta ry  o f 
Defense, 5 August 1948, ib id . , 132.
^ Ib id . ,  134.
^^See, fo r  example. The Ambassador in  China to the S ec re ta ry  of 
S ta te , 22 October 1948, ib id . , 505-508; th e  Ambassador in  China to  the  
S ecre ta ry  of S ta te ,  26 October 1948, i b id . , 518-520.
^^C.I.A. S itu a tio n  Report, S.R. No. 10/48, 20 October 1948, p. 9, 
f i l e  77/181A, DDRS.
12The Ambassador in  China to  the S ecre ta ry  of S ta te , 6 November 
1948, f i l e  75/86B, DDRS.
13General B arr reported  in  December o f 1948 th a t ,  " . . . t h e  N ation­
a l i s t  m il i ta ry  fo rces  w ill  be defeated  in  th e  immediate fu tu re  and the 
N ational Government forced  to  leave Nanking or be overthrow n." Barr 
went on, " . . . f u r t h e r  m ili ta ry  and economic a id  w ill  have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  
now or in  th e  f u tu re ."  D irec to r, J o in t  U nited S ta tes  M ilita ry  Advisory 
Group in  China to  th e  Department of th e  Army, 18 December 1948, F i le  
R/259C, DDRS.
^^By l a te  November 1948 the A dm in istra tion  c le a r ly  was concerned 
aboutpublic  confusion  regarding American China p o licy , see , fo r  example. 
The D irec to r o f th e  P o licy  Planning S ta f f  to  the S ecretary  o f  S ta te ,  26 
November 1948, F .R ., 1948, V III, 214; Memorandum by th e  S e c re ta ry  of 
S ta te  to  the  Under S ecre ta ry  of S ta te ,  26 November 1948, i b i d . ,  220; 
Memorandum by th e  D irec to r of the  P o licy  Planning S ta f f ,  24 November 
1948, i b i d . ,  211.
-351-
^^See, Millis, Forrestal Diaries, 517, 525.
^^D raft Report by th e  N ational S ecu rity  Council on United S ta te s  
P o licy  Toward China, 2 November 1948, F .R ., 1948, V III, 186.
^^Memorandum by th e  D irec to r o f th e  P o lic y  Planning S ta f f  to  th e  
S ecre ta ry  of S ta te , 30 November 1948, i b id . , 224-225.
18Memorandum by th e  S ecre ta ry  o f S ta te  to  the Under S ec re ta ry  o f 
S ta te , 26 November 1948, i b id . ,  220; The D ire c to r  o f the PPS, George 
Kennan wrote in  l a t e  November th a t ,  "The disappearance of the Chinese 
N ational Government, as now c o n s titu te d , i s  only a m atter of tim e and 
nothing we can r e a l i s t i c a l l y  hope to  do w i l l  save i t . "  D espite th i s  
un relieved  pessimism, however, th ere  was no q u es tio n  but th a t  "We should 
continue to  recognize th e  N ational Government as now c o n s titu te d ."  The 
D irec to r o f the P o licy  Planning S ta f f  to  th e  S ecre tary  of S ta te ,  26 
November 1948, i b id . , 214-215, 215fn; see , a ls o , M ill is ,  F o r re s ta l
D ia r ie s , 534.
19Memorandum by th e  P o licy  Planning S ta f f ,  23 November 1948, F .R . , 
1948, V III , 210-211.
^°I b id . ,  208-211.
21In  November th e  C .I.A . reported  th a t ,  "W ithin China i t  i s  u n lik e ­
ly  th a t  any a c tio n  taken  by th e  U.S. can rev e rse  an unfavorable t re n d ."  
C .I.A . S itu a tio n  R eport, S.R. No. 11/48, 17 November 1948, p. 2, f i l e
77/181B, DDRS. In  December th e  Agency suggested th a t ,  "  no s o lu tio n
can be foreseen  in  China beyond a gradual accommodation with Communist 
power." C .I.A . S itu a tio n  Report, S.R. No. 12/48, 16 December 1948, 
Summary, f i l e  77/181C, DDRS.
22The Ambassador in  China to  the S ec re ta ry  of S ta te , 26 October 
1948, in  U.S. Dept, o f S ta te ,  Foreign R e la tio n s  o f th e  United S ta te s  
(Washington, D .C., 1973), V II, 518. H erea fte r c i te d  as F .R ., 1948, V II.
23Memorandum by th e  D irec to r of the  O ffice  o f Far E astern  A ffa irs  
to  the Acting S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  3 November 1948, F .R ., 1948, V III , 
189.
24 I b id . , 187-189; see a lso . Memorandum by th e  P olicy  P lanning
S ta f f ,  23 November 1948, ib id . , 208-211.
25 Ib id . , 208; Such an a t t i tu d e ,  i t  should be emphasized, was no 
mere r a t io n a liz a t io n  a f t e r  th e  f a c t ,  bu t r e f le c te d  a genuine b e l ie f  th a t  
from a p u re ly  m i l i ta r y - s t r a te g ic  s tan d p o in t, th e  " lo ss  of China" would 
n o t have unacceptable consequences w ith re sp e c t to  v i t a l  U.S. in te r e s t s .  
The C .I.A . observed th a t  " . . . t h e  conversion o f China in to  an e f f e c t iv e  
c en te r  o f power assumes th a t  China possesses - in  unexploited  form -  th e  
fundamental a t t r ib u te s  o f a modern power. This assum ption is  considered
-352-
questionable." C.I.A- Situation Report, S.R. No. 11/48, 17 November
1948, p. 5, file 77/18IB, DDRS.
^^See Chapter XI.
27
Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 7 September 1948, F.R., 
1948, VIII, 148.
^^Ibid., 153.
^^Ibid.. 153-154.
30Department of State Policy Statement on China, 27 September 1948, 
ibid.. 620.
31
Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States 
Policy Toward China, 11 January 1949, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1974), IX, 475.
Hereafter cited as F.R., 1949, IX.
^^See, "Publication of China White Paper", ibid., 1365fn.
33
The Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary of 
State, 26 November 1948, F.R.. 1948, VIII, 214.
^^Ibid.. 215.
^^Ibid., 215 fn.
36
See, Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 347; In a 
February 15 meeting with the President it was decided Acheson would meet 
with the Congressmen in person rather than have the Administrative issue 
a public response. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 15 
February 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL; Acheson later revealed that 
the reason it was decided he should meet with the Congressmen privately 
was because of the fear that if the Administration went public on the 
matter it would hasten Chiang Kai-shek*s collapse. It was, Acheson 
observed, "...a problem which bothered General Marshall very much. That 
was, how did you solve the difficulty of trying to support a very weak 
and failing ally, who was failing chiefly because of his own incapacity 
and ineptness, how did you reconcile doing that with your duty to keep 
the people of a Democracy informed of the facts and informed of what was 
happening." Notes on China, 23 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson 
Papers, HSTI.
37See, Gaddis Smith. Dean Acheson. Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel 
Flagg Bemis. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 
Vol. 16 (New York: Cooper Square Publ., 1972), 112-113.
-353-
38Acheson said he intended the statement to mean that "as the great 
oak falls" you have to wait until the "dust settles". He did not intend 
that the statement would be taken as evidence that the Administration 
had a "do-nothing" policy on China. Notes on China, 23 July 1953, 
Princeton Seminars, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; The 
documentary evidence clearly supports his explanation of the intent 
involved in making the remark. In reading Acheson's comments to the 
Congressmen, which were written on a yellow legal pad, one can under­
stand, though, how his phraseology might have been misinterpreted by a 
generally hostile audience. Having observed that China was in a state 
of absolute "morass" and that a stable, unified China was several years 
away, Acheson concluded by saying "We cannot tell what the next step is 
until some of the dust and smoke of the disaster clears away and we can 
see where there (is) a foundation on which to build." Handwritten notes 
by Secretary of State Acheson, 24 February 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, 
HSTL.
39
See, Smith, Dean Acheson, 113-115; Westerfield, Foreign Policy 
and Party Politics. 347-350.
40
Acheson later claimed this was the case. Notes on China, 23 July 
1953, Princeton Seminars, Harry S. Truamn Library, Independence, Mo. ; In 
an oral history interview in 1974, Philip D. Sprouse (in 1949, Director 
of the Office of Chinese Affairs) claims that W. Walton Butterworth 
originated the idea of a "white paper" so that "you would have an objec­
tive story of American policy during this period, an objective picture, 
an honest picture, which had to stand up historically. The idea was 
that this would be published only well after the event, that is after 
the National Government's defeat and the Chinese Communist takeover. 
And Butterworth issued specific instructions that this thing had to tell 
the whole story objectively, hide nothing, because it had to stand up 
historically. It couldn't be a partisan, political, apologia for the 
Democractic administration of that day." Philip D. Sprouse, Oral Hist­
ory Interview, 11 February 1974, pp. 48-49, HSTL.
41
Acheson later confirmed that the White Paper was intended to tell 
as accurate a story of China policy as possible. "And I discussed the 
whole matter very fully with the President, and the President was clear 
that if I was satisfied that this document was a thorough, honest, 
scholarly document, it should be brought out." Notes on China, 23 July 
1953, Princeton Seminars, HSTL; See, Smith, Dean Acheson, 120.
42
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1373.
^^Although he obviously did not feel the White Paper a cure-all to 
the Administration's problem in this regard, John P. Davies, Jr., a 
member of the Policy Planning Staff, had the following observation to 
make on the subject of the White Paper in early July of 1949, "It is 
apparent that in the American public mind our policy toward Asia is
-354-
suffering from an acute case of negativism. That the objective situa­
tion in East and South Asia does not permit a wide range of solid action 
on our part is not adequately understood and, even if it were, would not 
satisfy the demand in the American nature for "positive action". The 
White Paper on China may do much to provide a rational explanation for 
our policy of disengagement in China. We have little to be ashamed of 
in that record and much of which to be proud. While the White Paper 
will go far toward justifying our policy toward China and quiet most of 
our critics, it will also probably provide some fuel for the more ex­
treme partisan critics of our policy in the Far East. Furthermore, the 
issuance of that paper will be, essentially, another negative act. The 
public may say, 'Very well, you were right in not doing anything, but 
where do we go from here? ' " So as to offset this potentially "negative" 
effect of the White Paper’s release and to give the event a needed 
upbeat tone, Davies then went on to suggest a series of proposals to 
include the one that, "The President should one day prior to the issu­
ance of the White Paper on China make a speech in which he points up the 
main conclusions to be drawn from the White Paper and sets forth in 
broad, affirmative, confident tones the future course of our policy with 
respect not only to China but also to East and South Asia." Paper 
Drafted by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff, 7 July 
1949, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(Washington, D.C., 1976), VII, 1148-1149. Hereafter cited as F.R., 
1949, VII.
44
See, Smith, Dean Acheson, 118; Notes on China, 23 July 1953, 
Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL; Memorandum by the Acting 
Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs to the Secretary 
of State, 25 July 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1383-1385.
45Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 
to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1948, ibid., 1373-1374.
46Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of 
Defense, 21 July 1949, ibid., 1378.
47
The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, 27 July 1949, 
ibid., 1387.
48
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of 
Defense, 21 July 1949, ibid., 1380.
49
Ibid., 1379-1380; See, also. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
to President Truman, 29 July 1949, ibid., 1389.
^^Acheson later revealed that Truman was extremely anxious to get 
the White Paper out by the end of July. Notes on China, 23 July 1543, 
Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL; In two late July 1949 memoran­
dums Acheson describes a very insistent President on the matter of 
releasing the White Paper, notwithstanding the reservations posed by the
-355-
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 
25 July 1949, and. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 29 
July 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL; See also. Memorandum by the 
Secreta^ of State of a Conversation with President Truman, 18 July 
1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1374; Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a 
Conversation with the President, 21 July 1949, ibid., 1377.
^^Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 29 July 
1949, ibid., 1389.
^^Ibid., 1390.
53See, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs to the Secretary of State, 7 February 1949, ibid., 485; Memoran­
dum by the Assistant Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State, 
4 April 1949, ibid., 509-511, 509fn. Most of these "commission" sugges­
tions came from persons or groups who hoped to force the Administration 
into greater support for the Nationalist Government. All were ignored. 
On the other side of the ledger. Representative John McCormick (Demo., 
Mass.) suggested a "fact finding mission" as a means by which the Admin­
istration might find "a way out that would not involve us in lining up 
either with a communist takeover or with further large-scale aid that 
might prove useless". Letter from Rep. John McCormick to President 
Truman, 28 March 1949, Box 173/China File-1949, Truman Papers, HSTL. 
Whether McCormick realized it or not, his suggestion put in a nutshell 
the already existing Administration policy. The President’s polite 
rejection of McCormick’s suggestion followed from Truman's observation 
that, "We must maintain a flexible position in which we can deal with 
the situation in China as it develops". Letter from President Truman to 
Rep. John McCormick, no date, early April (?) 1949, ibid.
54The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 13 April 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 513-515.
^^See, McClellan, David S. Dean Acheson: The State Department
Years, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1976), 190.
^^See, Transcript of Conversation, 11 May 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 
520-523.
^^See, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Executive 
Secretary of the National Security Council, 24 August 1949, ibid., 
540-541 ; For a transcript of Chennault's remarks to the House committee, 
see, U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings, 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1949.
58Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 29 July 
1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1389.
-356-
^^Ibid., 1389.
^^Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Congressional Relations, 19 July 1949, ibid., 1375.
^^Ibid., 1375,
-357-
CHAPTER IX
THE POLICY OF MANEUVER:
ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 
SEPTEMBER 1948 - JUNE 1950
A belief in the importance of continuing to recog­
nize and support the Nationalist government despite the 
spreading collapse of Kuomintang resistance provided the 
backdrop for the Administration's decision to dispense with 
the previous American policy of limited assistance to the 
regime and to replace it with a more flexible and opportu­
nistic approach toward the uncertain course of events in 
China and throughout the region. It is of considerable 
relevance to an understanding of the rather complicated 
nature of the Administration's China policy in 1949, how­
ever, to note that despite formulation of a policy which 
officials hoped would maximize their capacity for achieving 
Cold War goals in Asia in the wake of a Chinese Communist 
assumption of control throughout the country, the question 
of new and expanded programs of military assistance to China 
continued to be discussed throughout most of the year. 
Before turning to a discussion of the specific procedural 
problems which the Administration faced in implementing its 
policy of maneuver, therefore, it would be of some benefit 
first to deal with this rather involved subject.
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There were several reasons why the issue of new 
programs of military assistance to China continued to in­
trude into the policymaking environment in 1949. For one 
thing, demands in Congress and in the public at large that 
the Administration make a stand in East Asia against any 
further Communist advance kept the issue alive and vital. 
In late February Senator McCarran brought forward his $1.5 
billion proposal and a little more than two months later 
Claire Chennault approached the State Department and Con­
gress with his optimistic plan for preventing Communist 
control in South and Southwest China.^
Subsequently releasing it to the public, the 
retired air force general revealed a plan which again argued 
the feasibility of sending an American military advisory 
mission to mold remnant Nationalist and other indigenous 
forces into an effective fighting unit capable of denying 
further Chinese Communist victories. Fully responsible for 
supply and planning down to the company level, the military 
mission would be supported logistically by Chinese and 
foreign commercial airlines operating on the East Asian 
mainland. The plan further called for a program of full air 
support for ground operations plus continuing American 
economic assistance to those regions to be defended.
The Chennault plan found an important ally when in 
early September the commander of American Occupation Forces
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in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, made a series of pro­
vocative comments about China policy in a meeting in Tokyo 
with a group of visiting Congressmen. Quite inaccurately, 
the General suggested that the fighting ability of Chinese 
Communist forces was vastly overrated and that in reality 
little effort would be required in order to reverse the 
unfavorable trend of events in China. MacArthur proposed 
that the Administration first should make a "ringing" 
declaration that "the United States will support any and 
everyone who is opposed to communism." He then argued that 
the United States should allow American mercenaries, "volun­
teers", to form a fighting force to go to China, that 500 
fighter planes be placed under the command, as he put it, of 
"some war horse" like Chennault, and that surplus American 
ships be delivered to the Nationalist navy for the purpose 
of blockading and destroying Chinese coastal cities. These 
measures, MacArthur implied to the Congressmen, would be 
adequate to halt, even roll back, the Communist menace in 
China.^
MacArthur's rather simplistic assessment was soon 
followed by other public pressures on the Administration to 
formulate new plans for military assistance to China. 
During the general legislative debate concerning military 
assistance to foreign countries, the China bloc in Congress 
managed to engineer a negative vote on funds requested by 
the Administration for aid to the South Korean government.^
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In response, and, as Secretary of State Acheson revealed 
years later, for the express purpose of gaining Congres­
sional approval for the Korean funds, in early October the 
Administration agreed to include in the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Bill of 1949 a proposal that $75 million be made 
available for use "in the general area of China. What 
this did was to create for the first time since the China 
Aid Act of 1948 a pool of additional monies available for 
use in China, thus naturally renewing the question of devel­
oping new programs.
However, the issue of further military assistance 
to China remained a part of the policymaking environment in 
1949 for more significant reasons than the one of public 
pressure. Of central importance was the determination by 
both the State and Defense Departments of the necessity of 
undertaking extensive reviews of United States Far Eastern 
policy. It appears that between the two there existed some 
variety of motive in doing so.
On the part of State, the intent of the review was 
consistent with the Administration’s purpose in releasing 
the White Paper. Determined to recognize all possible 
options thus to remain flexible on the question of China 
policy, a special review committee was formed in the early 
part of August for the purpose of examining the full range 
of Far Eastern policy, past and present. Referred to as the 
Committee of Three, the group included Ambassador-at-Large
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Philip C. Jessup, Everett Case and Raymond B. Fosdick. The 
latter two had been retained by the State Department in late 
July as special consultants for the express reason that 
neither had any connection with past policy and thus would 
be more able to assess the various issues with a fresh 
perspective and without bias b o m  of previous association 
with the China problem.^
Consistent with this intent, members of the Com­
mittee therefore included as one among the objects of their 
study of American policy the alternative of a renewed pro­
gram of military assistance to China. Consequently, there 
was no question but that State would have to continue to 
monitor closely the situation on the mainland with an eye to 
the possible emergence of effective anti-communist resis­
tance sufficiently worthy of further infusions of American 
military (and economic) assistance.
Defense Department thinking on this question was 
somewhat different from that of State. As had been the case 
in 1947 and early 1948, many in the Defense Department, 
undoubtedly because of their analytic preoccupation with 
military matters in the policymaking process, tended to 
display considerable confidence in a more purely military 
solution to international problems and in this regard, 
continued to be more sancfuine than most State Department 
officials about the efficacy of a well conceived and well 
organized American military involvement in China.® Defense
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thinking about East Asia also included a somewhat more 
mechanistic assessment of the causal relationship between a 
communist assumption of control in China and subsequent 
events elsewhere in Asia. For example, a Joint Chiefs of 
Staff summary of the China situation in the early part of 
May 1949. included the following comments: "Communist China
means Communist Asia"; "When China is completely overrun by 
the communists, the communist conquest of all Asia will 
inevitably follow"; and "There can be no question but that 
all of Southeast Asia will rapidly go communist once China 
has fallen."^
From the unadorned logic of this type of thinking, 
it followed that if Southeast Asia was to be saved then if 
at all possible some stand would have to be made in Southern 
and Southwestern China for the purpose of creating a defen­
sive "belt" of territory to prevent the "inevitable" conse­
quences envisioned. This view in combination with the 
particular nature of the Defense Department's formal respon­
sibility in contributing its evaluation to the policymaking 
process, therefore, understandably produced in the military 
establishment a strong tendency to encourage continuing 
Administration attention to the question of military aid to 
China. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, 
in the Summer of 1949 made formal request to the National 
Security Council that a full-scale review of United States 
Far Eastern policy be undertaken (this request resulted in
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the NSC 48 Series which became the documentary basis for 
Asian policy at the end of the year) to include attention to 
the issue of military assistance to C h i n a . T h e  JCS were 
also instructed to undertake a study of possible problems 
which might be encountered in a renewed program of military 
aid in the event the Administration revised its assessment 
of the need and feasibility from becoming involved in 
China.
Another major factor may be identified not only as 
having reintensified interest in the issue of military aid 
to China but also as having reinforced the respective pur­
poses of both the State and Defense Department in under­
taking reviews of Far Eastern policy in 1949. In late 
August American intelligence reported what was believed to 
be the Soviet detonation of an atomic device, this several 
years in advance of existing United States estimates of the 
Russian ability to develop an atomic weapons capability. 
This unexpected development raised considerable anxiety in 
Washington coming as it did in such close proximity to the 
nearly complete Communist victory in China and in the pres­
ence of the increasingly prominent belief in decision making 
circles that the trend of international events appeared 
generally to be running strongly in favor of Soviet power 
and prestige. For example, with respect to the situation in 
East Asia, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had advised
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in the latter part of April that "The relative power posi­
tions of the US and the USSR have definitely changed in the 
USSR's favor"; that the Chinese Communist's victory over the 
Kuomintang constituted, "a defeat for the US in the 'Cold 
War' in Asia"; and that
The consequences of this reversal 
has been widespread and cannot be fully 
measured. It is certain, however, that 
the process of reestablishing a new U.S. 
position will be exceedingly complex and 
that the hope of making it a favorable 
one cannot be quickly realized.
With respect to what appeared to be the emergence 
of a major potential threat to the national security, within 
days after receipt of the news of the Soviet atomic explo­
sion, President Truman instructed the National Security 
Council to undertake a full-scale reappraisal of all exist­
ing United States foreign policy objectives to include a 
réévaluation of the state of the nation's military prepared­
ness. A special ad hoc group composed of representatives 
from both the Defense and State Departments and headed by 
the letter's Paul Nitze, who also became Director of the 
Policy Planning Staff upon George Kennan's resignation from 
that post in December, was charged with the responsibility 
for carrying through the White House directed study. Almost 
from the beginning this policy review seems to have been 
significantly influenced by an emerging view in Washington 
which laid considerably greater emphasis on the military 
component in the international balance of power with the
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Soviet Union than had been included in the Administration's 
sense of economic feasibility and strategic necessity since 
1945.13
This attitude, which envisioned the need to expand 
the existing level of military expenditures vastly beyond 
the post World War II $15 billion ceiling proposed by the 
White House and the Bureau of the Budget, received needed 
theoretical support from members of the Council of Economic 
Advisors. Since October of 1949, the Council had been 
headed by Leon Keyserling who repeatedly argued that govern­
ment expenditures could be substantially increased without 
causing inflation.!^ The ^  hoc policy review group shared 
this view as did its director, Paul Nitze, and the Policy 
Planning Staff generally agreed that military appropriations 
could safely triple beyond the precautionary $15 billion 
level.^3
The full essence and significance of this general 
foreign policy review is not a pertinent topic for detailed 
discussion here though a few observations concerning its 
content are important. The study was completed and for­
warded for presidential consideration in mid-April of 1950. 
Designated as National Security Council Report No. 68, the 
document was clearly a hard line assessment of Russian 
foreign policy and was based on the presumption that for the 
indefinite future the vital interests of the Soviet Union 
and the United States were unequivocally and fundamentally
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incompatible; that the advantage of one meant, in effect,
T A
the disadvantage of the other.
Ironically, it was the State Department, especial­
ly manifested in the active backing of Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, and not the Department of Defense which provi-
17ded the driving force in developing NSC 68. Consistent 
with the belief that the present ceiling on military expen­
ditures was no longer necessary, the study proposed the need 
for a dramatic expansion of the American military establish­
ment. The report argued in favor of significant increases 
in military and other expenditures for deployment in support 
of a much more active policy of containment. Indeed, with 
respect to the projected possibility of direct confrontation 
with the Soviets, NSC 68 amounted to an affirmation of the 
need for manpower remobilization to include a peacetime
draft and military rearmament to include the stockpiling of
18nuclear weapons and the development of the hydrogen bomb.
President Truman did not give approval to NSC 68 
prior to the North Korean attack on the South in late June 
of 1950. The crises in Korea, however, did trigger the 
increase of military expenditures and mobilization outlined 
in the report while the invasion thoroughly confirmed the 
view of American decision makers, as reflected in the report, 
that the international design of the Soviet Union was to 
seek "the complete subversion or forceable destruction of 
the machinery of government and the structure of society in
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the countries of the non-Soviet world— (and to replace
this)...by an apparatus and structure subservient to and
T9controlled from the Kremlin."
The point of the foregoing discussion concerning 
NSC 68 is to suggest the type of thinking which by the late 
Summer and Fall of 1949 had become increasingly prominent at 
the decision making level and as it relates to East Asia, 
the nature of the context in which Administration assess­
ments of the situation in China were being made. The policy 
making atmosphere in Washington was so charged with a sense 
of the need to reassess the direction of American foreign 
policy, in light of the Soviet explosion of an atomic device, 
that even had the State and Defense Department not earlier 
undertaken their own separate reviews of Far Eastern policy, 
it is reasonable to suggest that under the circumstances one 
would have been initiated anyway. As it was, the nature of 
the situation merely gave further sanction to those reviews 
of the China problem already underway.
Furthermore, the logic involved in the ongoing NSC 
68 study encouraged a reassessment of China policy. If 
Soviet possession of an atomic bomb meant a fundamental 
alteration of the international balance of power equation, 
and if, as certain important officials were arguing, the 
previously sacrosanct $15 billion ceiling on peacetime 
military expenditures should and could be lifted, then it 
followed that those strategic considerations, which, since
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1945 had imposed severe limits on the capacity of the United 
States to become involved in China, also might be altered in 
favor of some greater willingness to commit American resour­
ces and manpower, especially if it could be established that 
to do so would result in effective obstruction of any fur­
ther expansion of Soviet power and influence.
As outlined above members of the military estab­
lishment generally exhibited greater confidence in the 
efficacy of a well planned and well supervised military 
involvement in China and were prepared to stand and fight in 
Southern and Southwestern China in order to prevent what 
they considered would otherwise be an inevitable penetration 
of Soviet power and influence into Southeast Asia. However, 
it is important to understand that, commensurate with their 
analytic responsibilities in the policymaking process. 
Defense officials did not display unrestrained enthusiasm 
for any and all proposals for military assistance to China. 
The JCS categorically rejected the proposals made by the 
retired Air Force General, Claire Chennault, arguing that 
his plan assumed the existence of certain conditions in 
China favorable to effective anti-communist resistance which 
simply did not exist, that his operational and logistical
plans were too vague to permit proper analysis from the
20military point of view. The JCS also rejected an urgent 
mid-August plea by the Nationalist Government for a new
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program of military assistance to replace the nearly exhaus­
ted American commitment prescribed under the China Aid Act 
of 1948. Chinese arguments in support of the request, the
JCS advised, were insufficiently convincing to warrant
21serious consideration by the Administration.
In the latter part of October, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff did release a Joint Strategic Survey Committee study 
concerning the feasibility of aid to anti-communist forces 
in China, which, in accepting the assumption that "once 
China falls, all of Asia would, in all probability, eventu­
ally succumb to communism", recommended that, "A modest well 
directed program of aid to China would now be in the secur­
ity interest of the United S t a t e s . A n d  yet despite the 
positive nature of this recommendation, the JCS felt com­
pelled to observe that any program of assistance would be a 
"gamble" in the absence of a series of conditions, many of
which could not be expected to exist with any comfortable
23degree of assurance.
Given this equivocation on the part of the mili­
tary establishment, it is not surprising that the strong 
reservations of the State Department against any renewed 
plan of military aid to mainland China continued to prevail 
in the policymaking process toward East Asia throughout 
1949. The results of the Department's in-house review of 
United States Far Eastern policy by the so-called Committee
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of Three, merely confirmed the unanimous reticence of diplo­
matic officials both in Washington and in the Embassy in 
Nanking to commit American prestige and resources to contain 
communism in China.
While willing to admit that making a stand in the 
south of China might forestall the communist advance possi­
bly giving Southeast Asian nations time to prepare a defense, 
might result in the creation of an effective base of guer­
rilla operations against the Chinese Communists to the 
north, and might prove to be a source of inspiration for 
non-communists in Communist held territories. State Depart­
ment officials were convinced these prospects were at best
very slim and paled in comparison to the total sum of argu-
2 5ments against involvement. Thus, both toward the excited 
agitation of those outside the Administration desiring a 
further American commitment to China as well as those pres­
sures in this direction from within, State Department oppo­
sition followed along predictable and familiar lines.
The proposed feasibility of any new program of 
military assistance. State Department officials observed, 
would have to demonstrably offset the fact that over the 
past year there had been an unrelieved declined of effective 
Nationalist resistance to Chinese Communist control; the 
fact that "the conditions that enabled (the) Communist (to) 
win all (of) North China despite (a) preponderance (of) 
material and manpower on (the) Nationalist side, still
-371-
exists, if anything, in exaggerated form;" and the fact that 
no non-communist regional alternative with effective poten­
tial had emerged as the basis for new programs of American 
support.
In view of these fundamentally unpropitious cir­
cumstances, State officials argued further that because of 
the continuing incompetence of anti-communist forces, addi­
tional support eventually would find its way into Communist 
hands thereby contributing to the letter's effective power. 
Furthermore, any new American commitment on the mainland 
could be expected to "merely prolong (the) inevitable with 
(a) resulting prolongation (of) suffering (of the) Chinese 
people." It would "make (the) communist task easier by 
providing them with material to rally racial feeling in 
support of resistance to foreign intervention", thus "(add­
ing) renewed fuel to Chinese chauvinism", and generally 
"popularize the Chinese Communists within China by providing
at once a straw man which they can knock down and an excuse
27for their failure to solve internal problems."
Moreover, State officials warned that in view of 
keen Chinese sensitivity on the issue of imperialistic 
interference in their own internal affairs, any new program 
of assistance would, "only alienate (the) recipients from 
popular support because it would appear as though (they 
were) being propped up by (a) foreign power", while at the 
same time obscuring "with evidence of US intervention the
-372-
main issue of Soviet imperialism in China." In sum, State
officials suggested, without believing it possible, some
reliable assurance would have to be given that "the proposed
aid program will not be merely another ineffective U.S.
operation in China further dragging down U.S. prestige and
28further augmenting anti-American feeling in China. " In
the absence of this sort of assurance wrote the American
Consul-General in Peking, Edmund 0. Clubb,
It is the essence of political 
wisdom at (the) present time to maintain 
(a) policy of noninterference, that is, 
to continue (to) 'let (the) Chinese stew 
in (their) own juice' in conditions where 
they have nobody but themselves and the 
USSR to blame for their predicament.
In addition, a policy of open hostility to the
Chinese Communist Party would "mean rapid extinction of all
American interests in Chinese Communist held areas (while)
endangering American lives", as well as the elimination of
any short-term possibility of establishing any kind of
working relationship with the Chinese Communist govem- 
30ment. Indeed, a new program of overt assistance to anti­
communist resistance in China not only would have the effect 
of strengthening Chinese Communist ties with the Soviets, 
but also make useless any consideration of United States
recognition of a Chinese Communist regime (a topic dealt
31with in detail in a later chapter).
State Department officials advanced two other 
important considerations with respect to the question of an
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American commitment to save Southern China. First, such 
action on the part of the United States in all probability 
would have to be undertaken unilaterally. The Administra- 
tion would not be able to count on the support of its West 
European allies. The French generally acted with consider­
able caution in their relations with the Chinese Communists 
for fear that to arouse the letter's animosity would produce 
an active, and for the French position in Indo-China possi­
bly fatal, program of assistance to the communist-led Viet- 
32minh. The British operated on the assumption that their
economic investments in China as well as their politically
and economically important position in Hong Kong required a
British effort to achieve as much of a normalization of
relations with the Chinese Communists as the latter would 
33allow. As a Central Intelligence Agency report of mid-
October 1949 observed.
The nations of the North Atlantic 
Community...will tend to react according 
to widely divergent interests and opin­
ions on the best course of action to 
follow in regard to recognizing the new 
regime.
This being the case, the United States would find 
itself fighting alone on the basis of a decision to make a 
stand in Southern China. However, as noted before, the 
Administration was fully aware that the broad thrust of post 
World War II Asian nationalism rested on the strong desire 
to achieve national independence and that this aspiration
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constituted the more positive side of an all consuming goal 
which was to rid Asia of any vestige of European colonialism. 
Officials were extremely concerned, therefore, to refrain 
from policies which would have the effect of destroying the 
nation's credibility and prestige in the eyes of Asians by 
appearing as though the American presence in the region was 
simply another familiar round of western imperialism.
Information reaching officials in Washington
described in clear cut terms the difficulty which American 
policy faced. A January 1949 CIA report observed that in 
view of the importance of Southeast Asian resources to 
European prosperity.
The essence of the problem since 1945 
has been how to satisfy the nationalist 
aspirations of colonial peoples while at 
the same time maintaining the economic and 
political stability of European colonial
powers.
An April report expanded on the theme by explaining that, 
because West European nations were preoccupied with 
strengthening and maintaining their own domestic economies, 
they were generally reluctant "to meet Asian nationalist
demands except by methods of slow political evolution."
Consequently, Asian nationalists, with no apparent alterna­
tive, were "sometimes willing to accept Soviet communism as 
an ally." The nature of the situation, tlius posed consider­
able problems for the United States,
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...whose comprehensive security 
interests requires, on the one hand, that 
the power potential of Western Europe 
should be rebuilt, and, on the other, that 
strategic colonial areas should be stabil­
ized against Soviet communist exploita­
tion. ...
As the CIA saw it, the resulting dilemma was that,
US security is perpetually balanced 
between undermining a Western ally by 
supporting an Asiatic nationalist move­
ment, or destroying the remains of a US 
position on the continent of Asia by 
indirectly helping to suppress such aspi­
rations .
One principal, albeit rather ineffective, way in
which American policy planners sought to resolve this
dilemma was to encourage the European colonial nations to
initiate those political processes by which Asians would be
37able to move more quickly in the direction of self rule. 
Beyond this, it became a matter of contriving a policy 
toward Asia which, at the very least, would not prove to 
exacerbate the problem, and hopefully might even vitiate it 
somewhat. As explained in greater detail in an earlier 
chapter. Administration officials felt that the effective­
ness of American Asian policy would be significantly reduced 
unless the United States proved able to preserve its image 
as a nation historically opposed to the imperialist practi­
ces of the past and in favor of some more equitable and 
mutually respectful manner of interstate relations.
It was also important to maintain this image in 
order to distinguish clearly the character of American Asian
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policy from that of the Russians, which United States offi­
cials genuinely thought was of an expansionist form quite 
comparable to the more classical types of imperialism. With 
respect to this assessment, American policymakers further 
believed that if it could be demonstrated that Soviet for­
eign policy was no different than its imperialist predeces­
sors, then Asians would be duly influenced to develop their
38own internal animosity towards the Russians.
This is what Secretary of State Dean Acheson meant 
in a mid-January 1950 speech before the National Press Club 
in Washington, when, in suggesting guidelines for American 
Far Eastern policy, he explained that,
...what is happening in China is that 
the Soviet Union is detaching the (four) 
northern provinces...and is attaching them 
to the Soviet Union; ...this fact...is the 
single most significant, most important 
fact,...in Asia.;
What this means for the United States, the Secretary went
on,
...(is) that nothing we do and noth­
ing that we say must be allowed to obscure 
the reality of this fact. The only thing 
that can obscure it is the folly of ills 
conceived adventures on our part.__
Acheson concluded his remarks on this point by warning that,
... all who are thinking about these
foolish adventures —  ( should ) remember
that we must not seize the unenviable 
position which the Russians have carved 
out for themselves. We must not undertake 
to deflect from the Russians to ourselves 
the righteous anger, and the wrath, and 
the hatred of the Chinese people...(with
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respect to their ability to comprehend)... 
what the true purposes of the Soviet Union 
are and what the true function of commun- 
ism.^s an agent of Russian imperialism 
is!
Thus, both to insure the nation’s anti-imperialist 
reputation and in order to establish grounds for drawing a 
clear distinction between the foreign policies of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the Administration sought to 
avoid the type of involvement on the mainland of Asia which 
would require the United States to assume responsibilities 
similar to those of the colonial powers. This was precisely 
what since 1945 the Administration had determined would 
happen if the United States were drawn into China's civil 
war and in 1949 the liabilities were altogether apparent 
this would be the international interpretation placed on any 
American effort to save southern China from Chinese Commu­
nist control. For this additional reason, therefore. State 
Department arguments against a further commitment to the 
mainland were decisive in White House deliberations over 
China policy in 1949.
This is not to suggest, though, that the Admin­
istration was categorically opposed to any American involve­
ment on the Asian mainland to contain the further success of 
international communism. In fact, after the late Summer of 
1949, Administration officials increasingly were disturbed 
that this was what the United States might have to do. 
However, if the important anti-imperialist image was to be
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preserved, the question was "How?". The answer was certain­
ly convenient, possibly even inevitable, in view of the 
existence of the United Nations, the major feature of the 
post World War II system of international relations. It is 
not surprising, therefore, to find in an early December 
report to the President, the head of the State Department 
Far Eastern policy review group, Ambassador-at-Large, Philip 
C. Jessup, making the comment that "The United States will 
deal with any direct aggression against an Asian state 
through the machinery of the UN___
Policy planners believed that, based on an off­
shore occupation of strategic islands, including Japan, they 
could justify a reasonable United States presence in Asia, 
at least one which would not prove excessively alienating of 
Asian nationalist sentiment. In addition, it would be the 
type of presence which, in being centered offshore, would 
lend to a propaganda effort designed to highlight the perni­
cious implications of the Soviet imperialistic interference 
in the internal affairs of, for example. Outer Mongolia, 
Sinkiang and Manchuria.
This explains the purpose of Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson’s comments, also made in the January 1950 
National Press Club speech, concerning the American "defen­
sive perimeter" in the Western Pacific, comments which did 
not include mention of the Asian mainland, and most notably, 
Korea. What Acheson attempted to suggest in defining the
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"defensive perimeter" was that these were areas where, by 
any reasonable international standard, the United States had 
legitimate post World War II security interests; that these 
were areas in which a unilateral military presence would be 
maintained and which the United States would protect with 
armed force if n e c e s s a r y . T h e  mainland of Asia, though, 
was a different matter. Acheson went on.
So far as the military security of 
other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it 
must be clear that no person can guarantee 
these areas against military attack....
Should such an attack occur...the initial 
reliance must be on the people attacked to 
resist it and then upon the commitments of 
the entire civilized world under the Char­
ter of the United Nations which so far has 
not proved a weak reed to lean on by any 
people who are determined to protect their 
independence against outside aggression.
In sum, Acheson's comments must be understood as an effort 
to explain the Administration's preference for an inter­
national and multilateral, rather than a unilateral United 
States, response to future incidents of aggression on the 
Asian mainland and thus to associate any further American 
effort to contain communism in the region with the higher 
moral authority of collective security.
The last major objection posed by the State Depart­
ment in opposing new programs of military assistance to 
China in 1949 amounted to a . reaf fimation of the principal 
reason why the Administration had remained on the periphery 
of China's civil war since the end of the Marshall Mission.
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Notwithstanding the far reaching policy implications of the 
NSC 68 study underway after August, the fact of the matter 
was that the Administration had allocated only about $13.5 
billion to the military budget for the fiscal year ending in 
1950 - a situation which remained in effect until the Korean 
War. Indeed, prior to the Korean conflict, and despite 
gathering enthusiasm in Washington for substantially increas­
ing military expenditures, there remained a good deal of 
support for retaining existing budgetary limitations, e.g.,
the Bureau of the Budget and, somewhat surprisingly, the
45Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson.
Consequently, in 1949 and into 1950 the problem of 
limited resources, plus the need to apply them on a stra­
tegic priority scale which still ranked China as an area of 
secondary importance, continued to be a critically important 
calculation in determining the feasibility of an American 
commitment in China. In context of the ongoing discussion 
concerning military aid. Assistant Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, in the Spring of 1949, observed that,
"Our China policy must be fitted
into our capabilities and our other
responsibilities; the President and the 
Secretary of State must be able to deal 
with China in relation to other urgent 
and pressing matters." (italics in the 
original)
Even the October report of the Joint Strategic Survey Com­
mittee, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that a
"modest well directed" program of military assistance could
-381-
be argued to be in the national interest, included the
caveat that any decision to commit United States resources
in such a fashion would first have to be measured with
respect to its impact on "our national economy" and in view
of "the importance of aid to China relative to other nations
47in our overall aid programs."
The successful China bloc effort to force the 
Administration to include in the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Bill of 1949 $75 million in new monies for use in the "gen­
eral area of China" did nothing to enhance the prospect for 
initiating additional programs for China. As in the past, 
the efforts of pro-Chiang Kai-shek enthusiasts to force the 
Administration into undertaking a more extensive involvement 
in China’s internal affairs were unsuccessful. The section 
of the Defense Assistance Act under which use of the $75 
million was finally prescribed committed the Administration 
to no particular course of action. Funds were allocated for 
the "general area" of China and not stipulated for use in 
any one country, including China. The President was to have 
full discretion in this regard. The funds were not designa­
ted necessarily for use as military assistance nor was the 
President required to account for the expenditures, except 
for an accurate tally, if he deemed it inadvisable. As it 
turned out, consistent with State Department advice, the 
funds were used for the most part in Southeast Asia to train 
and equip internal security forces to combat "communist
AO
affiliated" insurgency movements.
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Having dealt with this broader issue of new pro­
grams of military assistance to China in 1949, it is now 
possible to turn to a more meaningful discussion of the 
several procedural problems which the Administration attemp­
ted to resolve in implementing its policy of maneuver. 
Besides the necessity of providing for the safety of Ameri­
can citizens and property and determining what sort of 
continuing official presence ought to be retained in China, 
of major importance was the question of implementing con­
trols on the flow of military and economic assistance to the 
mainland in view of the expansion of areas under Communist 
control. In mid-December 1948, the Secretary of Defense, 
James Forrestal, suggested that the National Security Coun­
cil (NSC) consider establishing guidelines for continuing 
military and economic assistance to the Chinese government 
as a result of the total disintegration and surrender of 
Kuomintang forces in Northern C h i n a . W i t h  respect to 
military aid, the State Department suggested that recommen­
dations be obtained from the head of the Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in China, General David G. 
Barr, as well as from the Embassy at Nanking and that once 
in possession of this information, the NSC should make a 
final determination on the matter, possibly to include the 
question of whether under the circumstances American mili­
tary aid allocated to China might not be more usefully 
employed in other theaters of American commitment.^®
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General Barr recommended that the flow of military 
aid (also economic) to China should be strictly controlled 
and that every effort should be made to prevent further 
shipments from falling into the hands of the Communists. 
However, he argued that while further military assistance 
would not prevent the final defeat of Kuomintang forces —  
an event he considered inevitable —  aid should not be 
stopped completely, "so long as the present govt, continues 
as such action would be widely condemned and would place the 
United States in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the 
world." He advised that further military aid be diverted to 
South China where it could be effectively utilized by Govern­
ment forces still capable of resisting the Communist advance 
or shifted to more secure areas located on Taiwan.
The American Ambassador, John Leighton Stuart, 
largely concurred in Barr's recommendations. Stuart argued 
that stopping munition deliveries would constitute final 
American disavowal of Chiang's regime and thus would, "dis­
courage those forces both within and without (the) govern­
ment desiring (to) continue resistance to communism." He 
recommended continuing the flow of aid, suggesting that it 
be stockpiled in the vicinity of Nanchang or Canton as the 
anticipated center of remaining Nationalist resistance on
the mainland. If it should become necessary, aid eventually
52could be shipped to Taiwan. On December 31, in accord 
with these and especially Barr's recommendations, the Admin-
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istration decided to continue munition deliveries to remnant
53forces of the Nationalist Government.
However, less than a month later, and only days 
before JUSMAG departed China —  its contintued existence no 
longer believed relevant in view of the irreversible deteri­
oration of the government’s military position —  General 
Barr advised Washington that because the Nanking-Shanghai 
area appeared to be in imminent danger of capture by the 
Communists, all American military assistance to Chiang’s 
regime should be suspended so as to insure that it not fall 
in the Communist h a n d s . O n  the basis of Barr's late 
January message, the Secretary of Defense requested immedi­
ate National Security Council consideration of the matter 
again to include the possibility of cutting off completely 
military aid to C h i n a . T h e  NSC advised the President that 
in view of the JUSMAG report, the Administration ought to 
suspend the bulk of military supply to China, "pending 
clarification and review of the situation, meanwhile permit­
ting only such selective shipments as can be properly and 
effectively used." The NSC also suggested that the Presi­
dent ought to consult with key members of Congress, 
especially those of the Senate Foreign Relations and House 
Foreign Affairs Committees.^®
Congressional attitudes differed little from the 
general thrust of thinking within the Administration, un­
doubtedly because there seemed to be little alternative
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under the circumstances. By February of 1949, policymakers
were convinced on the basis of reporting by the Embassy and
Military Advisory Mission in China that additional shipments
of military supplies (scheduled for delivery under the
provisions of the China Aid Act) would have little effect in
57preventing a Nationalist defeat. Officials assumed that 
further military aid to Government forces on the mainland, 
unless strictly controlled, eventually would find its way 
into Communist arsenals. And yet, formal cessation of mili­
tary assistance to the regime would constitute a startling 
reversal of existing American policy, in effect appearing as 
though the Administration callously was abandoning the 
Chinese to sink with their own ship. Such a move, moreover, 
would eliminate whatever remained of the Nationalist will to 
continue to resist a Communist advance.
Faced with this dilemma, and with respect to the 
Administration’s request for advice. Congressional leaders 
proposed a compromise solution. While opposed to an 
announced suspension of military aid because it would dis­
courage further Nationalist resistance to "communist aggres­
sion", they advised that if "aid could be delayed without
formal action until the situation is clarified it should be 
58done." In other words. Congressional leaders offered 
little more than an affirmative rephrasing of virtually the 
same advice which the National Security Council had for­
warded to the President only a few days before. Based on
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this similarity of opinion both within and outside the 
Administration, the President made his decision. On Febru­
ary 7, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, issued the 
directive that while military supply to the Nationalist 
Government would not be suspended, "wherever possible, it is
desirable that shipments be delayed where this can be done
59without formal action." The necessity of the decision 
only seemed confirmed, when at the end of February even the 
Chinese began requesting through the American Embassy in 
Nanking that deliveries to the mainland in some cases be 
delayed in view of the extreme uncertainty of the military 
situation.
Thus determined to fulfill remaining obligations 
under the China Aid Act of 1948, the Administration pro­
ceeded to institute certain precautionary procedures in 
order to control as much as possible the ultimate disposi­
tion of war supplies. Shipments by United States agencies 
were delayed, or, if continued, then allowed to stockpile at 
ports outside of China to be used when needed. By the 
beginning of March, substantial portions of those shipments 
already in the pipeline also were being diverted to the 
insular security of Taiwan while military aid that did reach 
the mainland went to ports not in imminent danger of falling 
under Communist control. As a general procedure, munition 
deliveries to the mainland were shipped in an amount roughly 
commensurate with demonstrated Kuomintang needs and ability
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to use. Consequently, after the Spring of 1949 American 
military supply steadily dwindled in direct proportion to 
the rapid decline of effective Nationalist resistance to 
Communist forces. On the other hand. Administration offi­
cials did not attempt to restrict Chinese commercial pur­
chase of materiel on the open market or to interfere with 
shipments to China carried in commercial vessels.
Evolving American policy with respect to another 
major procedural problem for Administration officials in 
1949 —  that of continuing to give economic aid to China —  
followed much along the same lines as in the case of mili­
tary assistance during this period of the Nationalist col­
lapse. The major issue produced by multiple Government 
reverses in the Fall of 1948 was whether or not the activi­
ties of the Economic Cooperation Administration (EGA), the 
agency responsible for administering American economic 
assistance in China, ought to be suspended in areas which 
came under Chinese Communist control. The Chief of the EGA 
mission in China, and in Washington, both the Director of 
the EGA China Program and the EGA Chief Administrator, 
argued that implementation of the aid program obligated 
under the China Aid Act should go forward without restric­
tion even in areas administered by the Communists. EGA 
thinking rested on the view that continuing to provide 
assistance would be the most effective way to counter Com­
munist propaganda which charged that United States support
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of chiang's regime did not include any concern for the 
welfare of the Chinese people but was merely an imperialis­
tic interference selfishly designed to save a reactionary 
and corrupt regime. EGA postulated that distribution of aid 
in Communist held territories might be accompanied by United 
States Information Service radio broadcasts giving full 
credit to the United States as the source of that aid and 
that if the Communists did attempt to interfere with the
distribution process then they could be blamed for depriving
62the Chinese people.
The American Ambassador in China and State Depart­
ment officials in Washington were strongly opposed to the
63EGA proposal. The Directors of both the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, W. Walton Butterworth, and the Policy 
Planning Staff, George F. Kennan, argued that American 
assistance should not be used in support of Communist 
efforts to create economic stability in areas under their 
control. Officials were not inclined to be generous in 
helping the Communists legitimize and solidify their rule in 
view of pronounced Communist hostility toward the United 
States and since it was certain the American government 
would not receive credit for the aid or its effect. The 
Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, a g r e e d . A s  one 
EGA official put it in early 1949 in describing State's 
unwavering attitude on this point,
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The State Department —  (is)... taking 
quite firmly the line that the Chinese 
Communists should be left to stew in their 
own juice, with no help whatsover from the 
U.S. for the people in areas controlled by 
them.**
State officials did allow that it would be unwise 
to attempt to recover that assistance already located in 
areas controlled by the Chinese Communists and conceded that 
goods presently located in those territories should be 
distributed as planned. To act otherwise, they agreed with 
ECA, would provide considerable propaganda leverage to the 
Communists by making it appear that American assistance was 
of an extremely self-serving nature and without regard to 
the welfare of the Chinese people. At the same time, no 
further aid should be allowed to land in Communist con­
trolled areas and all assistance en route should be diverted 
to friendly ports. On the other hand, State was sure that 
Congressional and public opinion would not support the 
rather sophisticated type of approach suggested by ECA 
officials.®®
Indeed, Congressional members of the "watch dog"
subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Economic
Cooperation appear to have been in complete accord with the
67state Department on this matter. And, consistent with 
State's position, on December 30, 1948, the President direc­
ted that economic assistance would continue to go exclu­
sively to the Nationalist Government, or to its legal and
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effective anti-communist successor, and that no economic aid 
would be given to any coalition government which included 
Communists. The White House also instructed that aid al­
ready in territories held by the Communists would be dis­
tributed but that supplies en route would not be allowed to
go
land. Though there was some continuing discussion between 
ECA and State Department officials on the issue of continu­
ing economic assistance to mainland China in the first weeks 
of 1949, a January 14th Cabinet level meeting reaffirmed 
that the President’s December 30th statement would remain as 
the basis for United States policy.
With respect to the problem of continuing economic 
assistance to the Nationalist Government, the State Depart­
ment generally took the position that further infusions of 
aid would not have any dramatic effect in upgrading Kuomin­
tang resistance on the mainland. And yet, officials were
7 0opposed to withdrawing aid altogether. Abrupt cessation 
of American assistance would cause the immediate collapse of 
the Government which the United States continued to recog­
nize. State officials believed that such an act would be 
interpreted at home and abroad as an unjustifiable abro­
gation of existing United States responsibility, thus call­
ing into question the nation’s reliability concerning its
71_international commitments to friends and allies.
Moreover, termination of economic aid would 
destroy Nationalist morale and will to continue to resist
-391-
further Communist advances. Although the Government’s 
defeat was a foregone conclusion in 1949, Administration 
officials still believed it was important —  to the extent 
continuing to disburse funds authorized under the China Aid 
Act of 1948 would allow —  to delay a final Communist vic­
tory and assumption of control throughout China for as long 
as possible. While policymakers were never clear as to 
precisely what advantages this might produce for American 
policy they remained convinced that pulling out of China at 
such a critical time, thereby precipitating an immediate 
Nationalist collapse, would work to the greater disadvantage 
of the Administration's policy toward Asia, and other areas 
of the world.
Finally, the State Department opposed formally 
cutting off economic aid to the Nationalist Government in 
1949 so long as some fight remained in the regime because to 
do so would have eliminated the basis for continuing to 
sustain certain economic aid projects on Taiwan. State’s 
interest in this regard was based on an estimate by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the military-strategic 
importance of the island —  a point which will be developed 
in some detail in the following chapter.
State Department officials resisted another sug­
gestion by the ECA that Congress be asked to allow for an 
increase in monies beyond that sum allocated in the China 
Aid Act of 1948, roughly $60 million to be used for selected
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economic projects (esp., rural reconstruction) in areas 
still under Nationalist control. State argued that it might 
be misinterpreted by the Chinese Government, possibly rais­
ing the false hope that it signaled a significant alteration 
in the Administration's policy. And since areas still under 
Kuomintang control could be expected to pass into the Chi­
nese Communist orbit within a relative short time, addition­
al economic aid to the Nationalists, in effect, meant that 
much more aid to the Communists and thus an easing of eco­
nomic problems in areas under their control.
On the other hand, because unobligated monies
still remained to be used and in all probability would not
be used in time, the State Department readily agreed to
support a ECA initiated proposal put before Congress for an
extension of the final date by which all funds allocated
under the China Aid Act of 1948 would have to be expended.
In addition to the need to sustain a basis for continuing
certain economic aid projects on Taiwan, State officials
recognized that allowing the China Aid Act to expire on
April 3rd, the terminal date specified in the original
legislation, would amount to the ending of an aid program to
a government which the United States continued to recognize,
again giving the appearance of reneging on the nation's
international responsibility to fulfill its contracted 
75obligations. Despite China bloc efforts to include in the 
requested legislation the stipulation that for the period
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allowed after April 3rd the Administration could deal only
with the Nationalist Government in expending the unobligated
funds, the new measure, passed on 19 April 1949, did no more
than vaguely commit the President to spend the "unobligated
balance" by 15 February 1950 "in areas in China which he may
76deem to be not under Communist domination."
In accord with the policy largely defined by the 
State Department, therefore, economic assistance continued 
to be sent to mainland China for the rest of 1949 and until 
no vestige of the Nationalist Government remained. However, 
throughout the course of the year, the level of economic aid 
steadily declined, inversely commensurate with the expansion 
of territory under Chinese Communist control. As the Direc­
tor of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Paul G. 
Hoffman, observed in a memorandum of early September,
The steady succession of territorial 
losses by the Nationalist Government has 
led to continuing contraction of areas 
accessible for aid, and, therefore, in the 
volume of aid provided. This basic condi­
tion, rather than any intention of reduc­
ing economic assistance to China, accounts 
for the fact that during the first year of 
the program it was not feasible to extend 
aid to China more than about three-fifths 
of the funds appropriated by Congress for 
the purpose during that year, and the 
further fact that contraction in the aid 
provided has continued during recent 
months until it ^ s  now reached a rela­
tively low level.
The Director went on to suggest that if by some 
chance the military and political situation should change in
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favor of the Nationalists, the ECA would not be adverse to 
again increasing the level of American economic assistance, 
but that under the circumstances, and in view of existing 
policy, the volume would have to be carefully monitored and 
reduced if necessary. He concluded by arguing that in the 
opinion of ECA, and if the Administration was interested, 
properly planned and well supervised agricultural, indus­
trial and commercial programs of assistance to Taiwan possi-
*78bly could help to make the island's economy "viable".
In addition to the question of continuing military 
and economic assistance to China, two other important and 
related procedural problems remained for American policy in 
the wake of the Nationalist collapse beginning in the Fall 
of 1948. One had to do with insuring the safety of American 
nationals and property and the concomitant issue of whether 
or not United States citizens ought to be evacuated from 
territories which came under Chinese Communist control. The 
other revolved around the question concerning what sort of 
official American presence ought to be retained in those 
areas.
In a manner similar to those decisions on the 
other procedural policy problems discussed above, in both 
these cases as well, Washington's view of necessity was 
determined by the Administration's desire to remain as 
flexible and opportunistic as possible in its response to 
events in China and throughout the region. Once again
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decisions followed directly from the calculation that main­
taining flexibility of approach to the situation in East 
Asia would maximize prospects for realizing the principle 
goal of United States , Asian policy which was to contain 
effectively any further expansion of Soviet power and influ­
ence in East Asia, and more specifically, "to prevent so far 
as is possible China's becoming an adjunct of Soviet politi­
cal military power."
With respect to the requirement of insuring for 
the safety of American lives and property, there was no 
question of the importance of continuing to provide the full 
range of official services in areas still affected by mili­
tary operations. So, for this purpose alone, the American 
diplomatic and consular presence would be maintained for as 
long as possible. Moreover, small contingents of Marines 
stationed offshore aboard American naval vessels stood ready 
in case it should become necessary to undertake emergency 
evacuations from coastal regions. Notices to United States 
citizens in areas of immediate danger were issued warning of 
the potential risks to life and property in the interregnum 
between the collapse of the Nationalist Government and the
Communist assumption of power and instructions were provided
7Qin case Americans wished to consider being evacuated. 
Beginning in the Fall and Winter of 1948 some precautionary 
evacuations of private citizens and dependents of American 
officials in fact were carried out in North and Central
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China when it appeared those areas might be attacked or
80besieged by Communist forces.
However, beyond this and to the extent circumstan­
ces and the Chinese Communist authorities would allow, 
officials in Washington generally preferred to sustain as 
much of a United States political presence in Chinese 
affairs for as long as possible and regardless of the group 
in power. And, in the absence of imminent danger to Ameri­
can lives, the Administration also hoped to maintain the 
bulk of American economic and cultural influences in China 
as well. A mid-January 1949 memorandum by the Acting Secre­
tary of State, Robert A. Lovett, noted that
Under present policy, existing dip­
lomatic and consular establishments in 
China will be retained, although areas in 
which they are located come under Commun­
ist control.
and that.
In issuing warnings to American 
citizens regarding evacuation, care has 
been taken not to suggest that key Ameri­
can personnel and commercial, industrial, 
religious and philanthropic enterprises 
should leave or that American citizens 
having substantial interests..in China 
should abandon those interests.
This remained the essence of American policy into the Summer
of 1949.
It appears that the desire to sustain American 
influence in China even under a Communist regime was present
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in Administration calculations prior to, though in anticipa­
tion of, the disastrous collapse in late 1948 of the Nation­
alist position in Manchuria and North China. Assuming the 
impending disappearance of Chiang Kai-shek's regime as an 
effective political factor on the mainland and as well that 
further American military and economic assistance would have 
no effect in preventing this event, a Policy Planning Staff 
memorandum of early September 1948 obseirved that "For some 
time to come China will be a chaotic and undependable factor 
on the Far Eastern scene," principally because the Kremlin's 
efforts to consolidate Soviet control over the Chinese Com­
munist Party were likely to run afoul of a series of compli­
cating problems including the major one of traditional 
Chinese resentment of foreign interference in their internal 
affairs. The PPS study speculated that this type of situa­
tion would provide fertile grounds for effective ideological 
competition with the Russians. Assuming that American 
influence would not be completely eliminated subsequent to a 
Chinese Communist takeover, the memo concluded that "In the 
battle for the mind of China the most effective application
of our strength will be through political, cultural and
82economic forms."
The essence of this PPS memorandum was eventually 
incorporated in a National Security Council report (NSC 34 
series) on China in mid-October of 1948 and subsequently 
authorized by the President as the guide for implementing
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83policy. Modified in late February of 1949, the second in 
this particular series of NSC reports included statements 
which reveal the basis of the Administration's thinking 
concerning the potential advantages of sustaining an Ameri­
can involvement in China. The report observed that
We shall —  find ourselves before long 
entering upon a period when the Kremlin 
and we shall find ourselves in reverse 
roles. The Kremlin is going to try to 
influence, probably moreg.than we, the 
course of events in China.
But, "It will not be easy as we can testify with feeling."
The Kremlin will have its problems and because of this.
We shall be seeking to discover, 
nourish and bring to power a new revolu­
tion, a revolution which may eventually 
have to come to a test of arms with the 
Chinese Communists, if it cannot in the 
meantime so modify the composition and 
character of the Chinese Communists that 
they become a truly independent govern­
ment,
that is, independent of the Kremlin’s influence and control,
and thus to exist "in amicable relations with the world
85community."
Without any precise expectation as to what the 
extent of the opportunities might be, but with respect 
either to the goal of nourishing a "new revolution" or that 
of encouraging the emergence of a "truly independent govern­
ment", the report recommended that the United States,
— while scrupulously avoiding the 
appearance of intervention,... should be
-399-
alert to exploit through political and 
economic means any rifts between the 
Chinese Communists and the USSR and be­
tween the Stalinists and other elements in 
China both within gand outside of the 
Communist structure.
However, the Administration's ability to accomplish this
would depend on the continued existence in China of the
United States "cultural and informational program, both
official and private, at the most active feasible level" and
"of course...so far as feasible (the maintenance of) active
0*7
official contact with all elements in China."
It is important to stress that the aforegoing 
should not be taken to imply that the Administration was on 
the verge of cutting all ties with the Nationalist Govern­
ment. In fact the same NSC report argued that the United 
States "should continue to recognize the National Government 
until the situation is further clarified."®® Nor for that 
matter should it be taken to imply that the Administration 
was anxious to move gratuitously in the direction of estab­
lishing better relations with the Chinese Communists. In 
this regard it is instructive to note that the report also 
specified the importance of continuing to look to the possi­
bility of renewed programs of military and economic assis­
tance to effective anti-communist resistance groups if this
O Q
sort of alternative by some chance should emerge.
However, consonant with their policy of flexibil­
ity, American officials wanted to be prepared to maneuver in
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whatever tactical direction promised to achieve best results 
in containing Soviet power. Since all visible forms of 
anti-communist resistance, Kuomintang or otherwise, appeared 
to be wholly unreliable as agents for achieving this primary 
goal of American policy, it remained to be seen what could 
be accomplished by other means.
If, for example, it appeared that it would serve 
the national advantage to develop better diplomatic contacts 
with the Chinese Communists, then efforts could be initiated 
to normalize relations with the Communist regime. But, if 
this did not prove possible, then with patience and with 
time, other means might be utilized to influence the Chinese 
to move in a path more amenable to the American interests. 
In the private sector the economic, political and cultural 
merits of the American democratic and "free world" alterna­
tive to Soviet "totalitarianism" would be argued by the 
missionary community and by American teachers in Chinese 
universities. The contrast would be further implied by the 
continuing activities of American philanthropic groups in 
China and by the potential reward of economic prosperity 
once the Communist regime was willing to develop mutually 
beneficial relations with American commercial and industrial 
enterprises located throughout the country. On the official 
level, the advantages of better relations with the United 
States would be extolled through whatever diplomatic and 
consular channels of communication might exist with the
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90regime. At the same time the United States Information 
Service, to include the Voice of America, would be concerned 
to inundate the country with information favorable to the 
cause of the "free world", while also attempting
—  to foster possible rifts between 
Chinese Communists and the USSR to empha­
size the imperialistic aims of the USSR in 
China as evidence in Manchuria, Sinkiang, 
and Mongolia and by destroying the fiction 
that the USSR is tl^ e champion and protec­
tor of nationalism.
The Administration's expectation, or hope, to 
maintain its options in China did not develop in the desired 
direction. By the end of 1949, the activities of Americans, 
official or private, were severely proscribed by Communist 
authorities. Those American diplomatic, consular and other 
official agency services which remained on the mainland had 
been reduced to skeletal and virtually non-operational 
levels. Private American activity was at a minimum and, 
though some stayed, many citizens, businessmen and mission­
aries, had agreed to be evacuated from the country. The 
prospect, as Administration officials saw it, of preventing 
"China's becoming an adjunct of Soviet political military 
power" existed only as a possibility in the distant future.
Thus, by the beginning of 1950 the Administra­
tion's policy of flexibility and maneuver had failed to 
sustain the United States presence and influence in China 
and hence also largely had failed to achieve at least for 
the time being the principal goal of American policy toward
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East Asia. But much of this is a subject that will be 
developed in greater detail in the next two chapters which 
focus on the matter of United States relations with the 
Chinese Communists in 1949 and 1950, in the context of the 
Administration’s continuing association with Chiang Kai-shek 
and his Nationalist Government located on Formosa.
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CHAPTER X
THE U.S. AND THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ON 
FORMOSA, NOVEMBER 1948 - JUNE 1950;
THE POLICY OF LIMITED ASSISTANCE REVISITED
Decision makers were deeply troubled by the 
ominous implications of the Communist victory in China. A 
National Security Council report of December 1949 referred 
to the existence of a Communist regime in Peking as "a 
grievous political defeat" for the United States and prog­
nosticated that if Southeast Asia also were to fall under 
communist domination "We shall have suffered a major politi­
cal rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout 
the rest of the world. A few weeks later the Central 
Intelligence Agency advised that the "urgent question" of 
1950 would be whether "Soviet-oriented, China based" commu­
nism would continue to succeed in identifying itself with 
the nationalistic and anti-Western aspirations of the peo­
ples of the region thus to "sweep into power by one means or 
another elsewhere in Asia" or whether the United States and 
its Western allies would be able to offset effectively 
communist efforts in this regard.
It was the Administration's overwhelming preoccu­
pation with developing effective means for responding to 
this critical situation (and the prospect of this situation).
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characterized by the fact that “Access or denial of access 
to the coastal regions of Asia are fundamental strategic 
objectives of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.”,^  that broadly 
determined the nature of American policy toward Formosa. 
Policy cannot, and should not, be distinguished from Admin­
istration efforts to develop "effective means" for obstruct­
ing a further expansion of communist power beyond China. 
The policy issue of Formosa, in other words, existed wholly 
in context of Administration deliberations concerning the 
requirements of containment in Asia. Thus, consistent with 
the Administration's presumption that policies of flexibil­
ity and maneuver would enhance the potential for achieving 
Cold War goals in Asia, officials sought to be as opportun­
istic as possible in formulating their approach to Formosa 
just as they had in the case of resolving those procedural 
policy problems discussed in the previous chapter.
However, it is also important to understand that 
the Administration's containment policies in Asia, including 
Formosa, continued to suffer from the same constraints in 
1949 and 1950 that had dominated the policymaking process 
toward the region since early 1946. For one thing, the 
unrelieved existence of budgetary limitations, as well as 
the continued lower ranking of the Far East on the scale of 
American global-strategic priorities, remained important 
factors in producing Administration decisions. Following 
from this, policy planners also continued to pay considerable
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attention not only to the question of what material impact 
but also what psychological effect the manner of the United 
States presence in the Far East would have on the various 
peoples and governments of the region as well as on vital 
American interests in theaters of international involvement 
elsewhere.
Policy necessity with respect to containment in 
Asia, êuid specifically toward Formosa, therefore, continued, 
in substantial measure, to be defined in accord with the 
larger demands of the global design of American foreign 
commitment. As a result Administration officials continued 
in their refusal to allow domestic public and congressional 
opinion to influence high level decisions on these matters 
just as they had on all Asian policy questions of strategic 
importance since the end of World War II.
Administration discussions concerning the problem 
of Formosa developed in the Fall of 1948 as a result of the 
Nationalist defeat in Manchuria and North China and the 
ensuing American presumption that this signaled the short­
term conquest of China by Chinese Communist forces. Because 
the Allied Powers decided at the Cairo Conference that the 
island properly belonged under Chinese jurisdiction, the 
imminence of a Communist regime on the mainland invariably 
raised the prospect of Formosa also coming under Communist 
rule. In early November of 1948 the State Department asked 
the Joint Chiefs with reference to the nation's Western 
Pacific "defensive perimeter" for an appraisal
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...of the strategic implications to 
U.S. security should Formosa and immedi­
ately adjacent islands, including the 
Pescadores, come under an administration 
which is susceptible of exploitation by 
Kremlin-directed communists---
Little more than two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs 
gave their preliminary reply. In time of war, the JOS 
argued, "enemy" control of Formosa would deny the island to 
the United States as a potentially important "base capable 
of use for staging troops, stragetic air operations and 
control of adjacent shipping routes". It would allow an 
"enemy" to disrupt vital sea routes between Japan and South­
east Asia while improving an enemy’s capability for success­
ful operations against Okinawa and the Philippines. More­
over, since Formosa could be used as a major source of food 
and raw materials for Japan, its control by an "enemy" under 
wartime conditions might render Japan "more of a liability 
than a potential asset". On the basis of these considera­
tions, therefore, the Joint Chiefs advised that it would be 
"most valuable to our national security interests" if Formo­
sa could be denied to "unfriendly control", assuming this 
definition would apply if Chinese Communist rule was estab­
lished on the island. The JCS concluded that "diplomatic 
and economic steps" should be taken to insure that Formosa 
remained under the control of a friendly regime. No mention 
was made of a possible American military defense of the 
island.^
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Accepting both the Joint Chiefs’ conclusions that 
Formosa should be denied to the Communists and the recommen­
dation that diplomatic and economic means should be used to 
support a friendly regime, in mid-January the State Depart­
ment raised a further question on the matter. Assuming that 
the Chinese by themselves would not be able to defend the 
island successfully against a Communist attack and since in 
their early December 1948 assessment the JCS had made no 
mention of using United States military forces to prevent 
Formosa from coming under Communist rule, the Under Secre­
tary of State, Robert A. Lovett, suggested that the.
Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested 
to reach a decision, in the event that 
the United States is unsuccessful by 
political and economic means in prevent­
ing Formosa from falling under Communist 
control, whether they regard Formosa as 
sufficiently vital to the United States 
national interest that they would be 
prepared to advocate that the United 
States go to war to prevent such a devel­
opment.
In their reply in the early part of February, the 
Joint Chiefs reiterated their previous consideration as to 
why Formosa should not be allowed to come under "enemy", 
Chinese Communist, control. They also reaffirmed their view 
that diplomatic and economic means be used to retain the 
island in the hands of a friendly regime. However, with 
respect to an actual Communist attack on Formosa and in 
spite of the strategic importance which they assigned to the 
island, the JCS advised that,
-418-
The current disparity between our 
military strength and our many global 
obligations makes it inadvisable to 
undertake the employment of armed force 
in Formosa, for this might, particularly 
in view of the basic assumption that 
diplomatic and economic steps have failed, 
lead to the necessity for relatively 
major effort there, thus making it impos­
sible then to meet more important emer­
gencies elsewhere.
The Joint Chiefs recommended therefore that a United States
military commitment to defend Formosa would be "unwise at
this time.
Though including what amounted to an obvious 
caveat to their counsel against the United States military 
defense of the island, the JCS did not clearly elaborate on 
what they meant by the phrase "unwise at this time." Conse­
quently, in a National Security Council meeting of early
March, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, asked the Joint
Q
Chiefs to clarify their position. Affirming all they had 
said before, the JCS revealed the meaning of their qualifi­
cation by noting that although they did "not believe that 
the strategic importance of Formosa justifies overt military 
action at this time...so long as the present disparity
exists between our military strength and our global obliga­
tions", they nonetheless felt.
It should be pointed out that there 
can be no categorical assurance that
other future circumstances extending to 
war itself might not make overt military 
action entirely advisable from the overg 
all standpoint of our national security.
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There the matter remained until early August when 
events prompted the State Department to raise the question 
once again. For several months, the American consulate in 
Taipei had been reporting the unrelieved deterioration of 
economic and political conditions on Formosa. Serious 
inflation, graft and corruption, and maladministration of 
the economic, political and military structures continued to 
characterize the practices of the rump Nationalist Govern­
ment firmly in control of the island. Masses of demoralized 
Chinese civilians, former officials of the Nanking Govern­
ment and their families and unpaid and exhausted Nationalist 
troops continued to flow onto the island. The danger of 
mutiny and consequent internal chaos appeared to be an 
imminent possibility.^^ In the face of this situation and
"since there now appears no certain assurance that these 
islands can be denied to Communist control by political and 
economic measures alone". State officials, desiring further 
assurance on the issue, proposed the following specific 
question be put to the Joint Chiefs for their consideration;
Under conditions short of war and on 
the assumption that in the absence of 
military measures Formosa and the Pesca­
dores will sooner or later come under
Communist control, do the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff regard these islands of sufficient
military importance to the United States to 
commit U.S. forces to their occupation?
The JCS reponded two weeks later affirming the
validity of their earlier judgment as to the strategic
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importance of Formosa. They further noted that their pre­
vious recommendation against a United States military com­
mitment to defend the island, was, if anything, even more 
relevant than before in view of the limited nature of the 
military budget already allocated for the fiscal year ending 
in 1950 and because of the prospective additional obliga­
tions which the United States would probably be undertaking 
in accord with the implications of the North Atlantic Treaty 
recently signed with the West European Nations. The Joint 
Chiefs, however, reminded the State Department that future
circumstances, and especially the critical one of war, might
12warrant necessary reconsideration of their opinion.
Thus, by the end of August 1949, the Administra­
tion, in large measure based on the strategic assessments of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was prepared to continue for as 
long as possible its policy of denying Formosa to the Commu­
nists by diplomatic and economic means. At the same time 
officials assumed, as the Central Intelligence Agency repor­
ted in mid-September, that in the absence of an American 
military commitment and because of low troop morale, malad­
ministration and intense native resentment of the burgeoning 
mainland Chinese population on the island, the regime on 
Formosa probably would fall of its own internal weaknesses
regardless of whether the Chinese Communists invaded the
13island or not.
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Despite some expressions of confusion by the State 
Department concerning the implications of the several re­
ports made by the Joint Chiefs on the question of Formosa in 
1949, the JCS remained fairly consistent in their thinking 
on the matter until the Korean War. It is true that in late 
December 1949 and amid further American intelligence specu­
lation that Formosa would fall to the Communists some time 
in 1950, the Joint Chiefs appeared to deviate somewhat from 
the position they had maintained throughout the year by 
proposing, in addition to "a stepped up political, economic 
and psychological program pursued energetically", that,
A modest, well directed, and closely 
supervised program of military aid to the 
anti-Communist government in Taiwan would 
be in the security interests of the 
United States---
Though State Department officials seemed to be surprised by 
the suggestion and while the proposal admittedly did repre­
sent an escalation of enthusiasm in extolling the merits of 
an open American military association with the regime in 
Taipei, the JSC actually were not moving in a direction 
wholly at variance with a pattern of their arguments since 
first addressing the issue of Formosa in the Winter of 1948.
This was not the first time the Joint Chiefs had 
argued in favor of some form of American military presence 
on Formosa. In their February clarification on the issue of 
Formosa's importance in which they had argued against an 
American defense of the island, the JCS had gone on to
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suggest that because of its stragetic significance, "some 
form of military support should be made available now for 
assistance and vigorous prosecution of the approved diplo­
matic and economic steps" for keeping a friendly regime in 
power. Though opposed to any involvement in combat activi­
ties by United States forces and while admitting that it 
would be politically risky, the JCS had suggested "the 
stationing of minor numbers of fleet units" at certain 
Formosan p o r t s . I n d e e d ,  at a December meeting between 
military and civilian officials, when asked by the Secretary 
of State as to whether the JCS were not arguing a completely 
new line by proposing that a military mission be sent to 
Formosa, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Omar N. 
Bradley, recalled this February suggestion of a "minor" 
naval commitment in defense of the consistency of JCS think­
ing.^®
It is also important to remember that the JCS had 
always hedged their recommendations against a military 
commitment to Formosa by suggesting with the use of quali­
fying phrases that "other future circumstances" might re­
quire a reassessment of their recommendations. Although the 
JCS never explicitly defined what they meant in this regard, 
the emphasis of the arguments present in their reports all 
along seems, at least, to imply something of what they 
intended. The primary reason the Joint Chiefs opposed a 
United States military commitment to defend Formosa against
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a Communist attack was because of the fact of limited re­
sources and the need to apply them in areas of the world
more important than Asia. On each occasion the JCS were
asked to assess the question this remained their fundamental 
reservation. This repetition in the JCS argument strongly 
suggests that if sufficient resources had been available 
both for meeting United States obligations elsewhere and for 
increased levels of deployment in Asia, then the Joint 
Chiefs would have advocated an American military commitment 
to defend Formosa in view of the strategic importance which 
they attached to the island.
This, of course, was not what the Joint Chiefs
were suggesting ought to be done by proposing that a mili­
tary advisory mission be sent to Formosa in December of 
1949. In the pre-Korean War period, the JCS remained true 
to their conviction that the limited availability of resour­
ces would not allow the United States to defend the island. 
In the early part of 1950, for example, the State Department 
again approached the Defense Department, specifically the 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on the issue of defending 
Formosa by posing the hypothetical question: What if the
State Department was to decide that saving Formosa was vital 
for political-prestige reasons, would the military estab­
lishment in that event be willing to sanction an American 
defense of the island? The response was consistent with 
past advice: Even if a political decision was reached along
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these lines, forces could not be made available for this 
purpose without upsetting general military-strategic plan­
ning with respect to the need to conserve resources for
17meeting other more vital obligations.
However, it appears that virtually from the point 
at which they first began to consider the question, the 
Joint Chiefs were extremely concerned with reconciling the 
policy dilemma which they had created by arguing, on the one 
hand, that Formosa was strategically important with respect 
to the American presence in the Western Pacific while, on 
the other, advising that, despite this importance, the 
United States could not commit itself to a defense of the 
island. It is suggested here, that by including, as a part 
of their counsel on the Formosa question, the qualifying 
consideration that "other future circumstances" might re­
quire a reconsideration of their objection to United States 
defense of the island, the Joint Chiefs hoped to establish, 
for the record, an opening by which this uncomfortable 
dilemma could be moderated to the extent that future oppor­
tunities would allow.
Keeping this in mind, it is important to observe 
that in two important respects "circumstances" had changed 
dramatically by the end of 1949 when the JCS made their 
recommendation of sending a military advisory mission to 
Formosa. Of major significance was the fact that the policy­
making atmosphere was different. Since the summer decision
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makers had been working under conditions characterized by a
sense of crises and urgency: crises b o m  of the Soviet
detonation of an atomic device and the loss of China and the
broad assessment that the international communist movement,
confidently aggressive on the basis of its recent success,
had taken the initiative in world affairs and, as a result,
that the security of a "free world" was under serious
attack; urgency b o m  of the fear that, in the face of these
dangerous circumstances, the general tenor of existing
United States foreign policy might not be adequate to meet
the challenge and that it was imperative to formulate more
effective means by which to thwart the further success of
T8international communism.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in context 
of this situation and as they pertained to Asia, four sep­
arate though related policy reviews had been undertaken in 
the Summer of 1949: the White House initiated full-scale
reassessment of United States foreign objectives - the NSC 
68 study; the Defense Department requested National Security 
Council re-evaluation of United States Far Eastern policy - 
the NSC 48 study; the in-house State Department review of 
Asian policy by the Committee of Three; and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff study on the feasibility of renewed programs of 
military assistance to save Southern C h i n a . B y  the end of 
the year all but the NSC 68 study had been completed.
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Taken together, the findings of these several 
studies painted an exceedingly ominous picture of conditions 
in the world and specifically in the Far East while at the 
same time presenting uniform consistency in their implica­
tions that dramatic new steps were going to have to be taken 
in order to deal effectively with the mounting dangers of 
Soviet aggression. Consequently, it was only natural that 
the Joint Chiefs would have developed some sense of urgency 
for the need to recommend new and and effective measures for 
dealing with deteriorating conditions in Asia. Besides, the 
JCS did not have to be convinced that with respect to the 
possibility of compromising vital American interests, circum­
stances in East and Southeast Asia had changed for the 
worse. Their own study concerning the feasibility of a 
program of American military assistance to defend Southern
China, which had been released in October, was predicated on
20this very assumption.
In addition to a dramatically altered decision 
making atmosphere which encouraged devising new means for 
wresting the initiative from the communists, it is also 
important to point out that increasing resources for moving 
in a more active policy direction either were already 
present or in the process of being developed. For one 
thing, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of October had
allocated a yet unspent 75 million dollars for use in the
21"general area of China". Moreover, one of the major
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interests of those responsible for the ongoing NSC 68 study 
was to establish, as a part of their— finished document, 
convincing argument in support of expanding military expen­
ditures vastly beyond the 15 billion dollar ceiling which
22had existed since the end of World War II.
Thus although the general problem of budgetary 
limitation still existed in 1949 (only 13.5 billion dollars 
had been appropriated for military use for the fiscal year 
ending in 1950 ), it is nonetheless significant to observe 
that the JCS proposal to dispatch a military advisory mis­
sion came in context of a situation characterized both by 
the actual availability of monies and by the possibility of 
further monies which could be deployed in support of new 
policy projects in the Far East.
In a word, it appears that what the JCS intended 
in December of 1949 in proposing a military mission to 
Formosa was, from a military point of view, merely to place 
their bid with respect to the question of how new monies, 
actual or prospective, could best be used to offset further 
Communist success in the Far East. The fact this alterna­
tive was rejected should not lead to the conclusion that the 
JCS, in making their December proposal, were either incon­
sistent in terms of the arguments which they had maintained 
all along or out of tune with respect to the nature of the 
policymaking environment which by late 1949 was extremely 
encouraging of the sort of suggestion they made.
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Be that as it may, the Administration's policy
toward Formosa was based on a good deal more than the re­
porting of the JCS as to the strategic importance of the
island. Although the Joint Chiefs' arguments in this regard 
were largely responsible for determining the goal of keeping 
the island from Communist control, it was State Department 
thinking on the matter which had the decisive impact in 
developing the general tenor of policy.
With respect to the problem of Formosa, State
Department officials accepted, without question, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff assessment, given in mid-November of 1948, 
that Formosa was of considerable strategic importance vis-a- 
vis the American position in Japan, Okinawa and the Philip­
pines, that it would be especially important to deny the 
territory to "enemy" control in the event of war, and that, 
in view of these considerations, it would be advisable for 
the Administration to initiate "diplomatic and economic" 
procedures designed to insure that the island remain under 
the control of a regime friendly to the United States. 
State officials also accepted the later JCS clarification of 
this November assessment that because of the limited level 
of resources available for deployment in support of foreign 
policy objectives, it would not be feasible for the United 
States to use armed force to defend Formosa, under the 
existing circumstances, without at the same time running the 
risk of being unable to meet American commitments in areas 
of the world more important than East Asia.
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On the other hand, had the Joint Chiefs argued, 
limited resources and obligations elsewhere notwithstanding, 
that Formosa was important enough to require a defense by 
American forces, controversy undoubtedly would have emerged 
over the issue. It is apparent that even before the end of 
1948 State officials had formed a series of political reser­
vations about establishing an American military presence on 
Formosa, in fact, doubts also about the advisability of 
allowing any sort of official presence on the island which 
appeared too visible.
State Department objections emerged amidst discus­
sion in 1948 on the issue of what to do about United States 
naval forces stationed in North China at the port City of 
Tsingtao in view of the Nationalist evacuation of the area. 
Some naval officers had argued that even with the National­
ists gone it was strategically important for the United
States to maintain a naval base in the North so as to offset
2 3the Soviet presence in Dairen and Port Arthur. The pre­
vailing view in Washington, however, was that with the 
Communists in control of the city an American military 
presence would run too great a risk of an armed clash with 
Communist f o r c e s . A s  a result, and in light of existing 
American policy which was to continue to recognize and 
support the Nationalist Government, from the military point 
of view there appeared to be two primary alternatives for
relocating the naval units from Tsingtao: either to station
2 5them at Amoy or on Taiwan.
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State Department officials generally argued 
against re-establishing another American naval station 
subsequent to the withdrawal from Tsingtao in accord with 
the decision that the Joint United States Military Advisory 
Group, commanded by General David G. Barr, probably would
have to be withdrawn from China altogether in the near
26future. On the other hand, while rejecting the option of 
Amoy because of the possibility the city would fall to 
Communist control within a relative short period of time 
thus producing the same conditions which had forced evacua­
tion from Tsingtao, State went on to propose that if, by 
chance, the Administration did reach the conclusion it was,
...desirable to maintain a U.S. 
naval installation in Chinese waters, the 
location of the installation on Taiwan 
would appear, in light of the progressive 
disintegration of the National Government 
position, much more tenable politically 
and econon^ally than —  any other main­
land city.
Nevertheless, this option of establishing an 
American naval presence on Formosa posed a series of prob­
lems which it would be preferable to avoid. For one thing. 
State officials argued, a United States military facility on 
the island undoubtedly would precipitate a mass influx of 
Chinese refugees seeking safe haven from the chaos of war on 
the mainland. Not only would this lead to unwanted pres­
sures on the United States b o m  of "the belief that they 
would be protected by the U.S. Navy" but a rapid increase in
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the numbers of the mainland Chinese "would inevitably in­
clude large numbers of predatory politicians and carpet­
baggers, could only increase the burden on the island’s
economy and exacerbate the present Taiwanese hatred of
28mainland Chinese." Such a situation also would be ex­
tremely conducive to Communist infiltration with the ironic 
result that "the stationing of U.S. naval forces on Taiwan 
would... facilitate rather than prevent the spread of Commu­
nism on the island." Moreover, it would lend "credence to 
Communist charges that we are preparing to detach the island 
from China" thus precipitating possible reprisals against 
American citizens and property in Communist-held terri­
tories.^^
Finally, and a consideration which throughout the 
course of 1949 and into 1950 would be recited time and time
again in State Department thinking about Formosa, officials
speculated that an American military presence on the island,
— would strengthen the position of
the Chinese Communists politically as
defenders of China's integrity against 
U.S. imperialistic aggression, and would 
tend to unite all Chinese regardless of
political affiliations or beliefs in a
movement for the restoration of Chinese 
territory. The U.S. would, in brief, 
have largely succeeded to the position of 
Japan.
At the same time, "Those forces opposing us throughout the
world would seize the opportunity thus presented to charge
us with imperialistic and predatory designs upon Taiwan.
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This is not to suggest that the State Department
was adamantly opposed to the use of force if it should ever
happen to be the only remaining option for achieving the
objective of denying the island to the Communists. In a
mid-January 1949 memorandum to the President, the Acting
Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, wrote that.
The Department of State fully recog­
nizes that it may be necessary at some 
stage for the United States to take 
military action if Formosa is to be 
denied to the Communists.
Envisioning the possibility that economic and diplomatic
steps could well fail to keep Formosa from Communist con­
trol, he suggested that, "The United States should, as it is
now doing, prepare...(to)...put itself in a position to
32intervene with force if necessary. " Despite the fact that 
the question of an American military commitment to save 
Formosa remained somewhat unsettled until early April when 
after two State Department requests - one in mid-January and 
the other in early March - the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally 
and specifically qualified the nature of their opposition to 
an American military defense of the island, at no time does 
it appear that State officials ever considered the option of 
supporting an overt, unilateral American effort to this end. 
Indeed, in the same mid-January memorandum. Acting Secretary 
Lovett went on to suggest that any United States use of 
force.
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—  should be publicly based not on 
obvious American strategic interests but 
on principles which are likely to have 
support in the international community, 
mainly the principle of^ self-determination 
of the Formosan people.
Warning that "the United States should go to great lengths 
to avoid crude and unilateral intervention", he proposed 
that once the Administration had exhausted all political 
means for saving Formosa and yet it still appeared the 
island was in danger of being captured by the Communists, 
then the United States might request United Nations inter­
vention in the matter.''"^
This remained the State Department's position on 
the matter until the Korean War although by the end of 1949 
and into 1950 there were an increasing number of State 
officials who were willing to consider a unilateral use of 
force in the case of Formosa as a symbol of the American 
commitment to resist further communist expansion in Asia. 
Nonetheless, the prevailing attitude was that unless Formosa 
could be denied to Communist control through some multilat­
eral action the political costs of unilateral intervention 
would not be worth the advantage gained by keeping the 
island out of Communist hands. The strategic assessments of 
the Joint Chiefs concerning Formosa never contradicted this 
view and with respect to the objective of denying Formosa to 
Communist rule, in the period prior to the North Korean 
attack, events never proved to encourage the Administration
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to pursue the option of placing the issue before the United 
Nations.
By the beginning of 1949, the Administration's 
sense of the requirements in formulating a policy toward 
Formosa was determined almost wholly in accord with what 
officials believed was necessary in order to contain the 
spread of communism beyond China. Observing that, "within 
China it is unlikely that any action taken by the US can 
reverse an unavoidable trend", in November of 1948, the 
Central Intelligence Agency suggested that "for the immedi­
ate future, US action in the Far East is probably limited to
the maintenance and - if possible - improvement of the US
35position in the peripheral areas." However, the nation's 
capacity for improving the American position in the "periph­
eral areas", the CIA argued in a following report, would be 
contingent on the degree to which the Administration's 
approach to the problem was successful in,
.. .persuading the peoples and the 
political authorities of the states in the 
immediate regions that their political 
aspirations and security interests can be 
satisfactorily identified with those of 
the US. This problem also includes that 
of developing a general conviction that 
aspirations will be forwarded and security 
protected simultaneously with the protec­
tion of US interests.
"Persuading the peoples" of the region, though, 
was a problem fraught with two fundamental complications
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reflected in the C.I.A.'s use of the terms "security inter­
ests" and "political aspirations". By Asian "security 
interests", the Agency meant that unless the Administration 
demonstrated some effective policy for obstructing further 
communist success in East and Southeast Asia, then the 
non-communist groups and governments in the region would 
never be able to generate much confidence in the utility of 
developing sustained defensive associations with the United 
States. The CIA observed in the same November 1948 report.
There is no doubt that US policy 
with respect to Nationlalist China has 
been watched with close attention - in 
particular that aspect of policy which 
apparently linked aid with checking 
Communist expansion. It is inevitable 
that the governments, parties and polit­
ically conscious groups in the states
bordering China should come to a negative 
conclusion about the effectiveness of
such a policy. This conclusion will 
probably raise serious doubts about the 
advisability of relying on US assistance 
as a counter-balance to the demonstrated 
success of Communist forces. The propa­
ganda advantage of this situation will 
certainly be fully exploited against the 
US and the need &ir a counter-effort is 
clearly indicated.
On the other hand, with respect to the category of 
"political aspirations" of the peoples of East and Southeast 
Asia, the Central Intelligence Agency continued in subse­
quent reports to outline the other complication which the
Administration would face in developing its Asian policy in
late 1948 and early 1949. The effective capacity of the
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United States to "check and reverse" the expansion of commu­
nist power beyond China, the CIA explained in a December 
1948 study, "is presently hampered by the US being in a
middle position between the demands of Asiatic nationalisms
38and the policies of Western European states." Little more 
than a month later the Agency expanded on the theme.
The essence of the problem since 
1945 has been how to satisfy the nation­
alist aspirations of colonial peoples 
while at the same time maintaining the 
economic and political stability of 
European colonial powers.
The report went on.
An adequate solution of the first 
part of the problem is essential to the 
protection of long-term US security 
interests in the Far East. An adequate 
solution to the second part of the prob­
lem is essential to the support of imme­
diate security interests in Europe.
In conclusion, warned the CIA,
US security interests in Europe and 
the Far East are in danger of appearing 
as mutually exclusive, when, in fact, the 
power position of the US vis-a-vis the 
USSR requins that they be pursued con­
currently.
Without compromising the interests of Western 
nations, American policymakers were convinced that unless 
the Asian end of this dilemma was satisfied, the Far East 
would become a wide open field for communist penetration. 
In this regard, officials believed that the containment of 
communist power was less likely to be effective in the short
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or the long run if based on the use of force in a manner 
comparable to that which had characterized the European 
presence in Asia over the previous century. Methods of 
coercion merely would fulfill the prophecy of communist 
propaganda concerning the historical malevolence of capital­
ist society. On the other hand, containment priorities 
would be much better served if based on concerted efforts by 
the United States, and other Western nations to persuade the 
people of Asia that their political and economic future 
would find greater advantage through continuing association 
with a non-communist West. Thus, and with respect to this 
need, the nature of American policy would have to remain, at 
all points of its application, sensitive to the predominant 
post-World War II aspirations of Asian peoples, namely, the 
desire to rid the region of all vestiges of Western imperi­
alism.^^
It is possible that this particular calculation 
might have had considerably less weight in the policymaking 
process toward Asia in 1949 had the Administration possessed 
sufficient economic and military resources to become more 
actively and coercively involved in the region without 
compromising the nation's ability to fulfill its foreign 
policy obligations elsewhere. Be that as it may, under the 
circumstances, dqyising means by which to satisfy the anti­
imperialist impulse continued to be a very important consid­
eration in the Administration's formulation of Asian policy.
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In sum, by the beginning of 1949, few, if any, in 
the Administration were willing to argue against taking some 
sort of action in the case of Formosa. As it happened, the 
various strains of inter-agency thinking, concerning the 
question of what was necessary to keep the island from 
Communist rule, were able to realize common grounds for 
agreement. The political caution of the State Department 
found a convenient conceptual ally in the military-strategic 
reservations expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff against 
any American military defense of the island. At the same 
time, the emerging official view that the United States 
needed to demonstrate an American capacity to obstruct 
further Communist success proved a likely companion to the 
JCS argument that while a military commitment would not be 
feasible, the strategic importance of Formosa nonetheless 
warranted the use of diplomatic and economic means to pre­
vent the island's coming under "enemy" control.
State Department officials argued that about the 
only way in which it would be possible to fulfill the vari­
ous objectives patched into Formosan policy would be to 
foster the emergence of an effective and efficient non­
communist regime on Formosa. Unlike the government in 
Nanking, the regime would have to be free of graft, corrup­
tion and maladministration. It would have to be reform 
oriented, sensitive to the needs of economic growth and 
social and political stability. And it would have to be
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attentive to the aspirations of the native Formosan popula­
tion.
Of fundamental significance in the Administra­
tion's concern about the nature of the regime was the fact 
that it would make little sense to attempt to defend the 
island by giving economic assistance unless officials could 
expect that the aid would be used properly and effectively. 
In a related vein, neither would American officials be able
to anticipate that their goal of delivering a sound politi­
cal defeat to the Communist momentum in Asia would prove 
successful unless the regime was reasonably honest and 
effective. Giving assistance to some facsimile of the 
Government in Nanking, on the other hand, would merely tie 
American prestige into another losing cause, thus, instead 
of deflating the bubble of its success, would make the
Communist band wagon only that much more attractive.
In addition, since there were limits to what the 
United States would be able to do unilaterally in providing 
for Formosan security, only an honest regime would have any 
good chance of itself assuming the principal responsibility 
for denying the island to Communist control. Moreover, the 
Administration wanted to avoid at all costs the spectacle of 
the United States giving active support to a corrupt and 
graft ridden regime which in the absence of foreign backing 
would likely fall of its own internal weaknesses. Finally, 
in the event diplomatic and economic means failed to achieve
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the desired objectives, and yet the Administration deter­
mined it would have to take further steps to keep the island 
under friendly control, it was also important to encourage 
the emergence of an honest regime so as to create a justifi­
able and credible basis for some future possible multi­
lateral use of force to this end.
Following from this general line of reasoning, in 
the latter part of January 1949, the State Department out­
lined in a report to the National Security Council the 
essential options which the Administration faced in formu­
lating a policy toward Formosa. First, the option of an 
outright United States reoccupation of the island was dis­
missed out of hand because it "would be cynically viewed by 
the international community" ; would be contrary to the 
principles of the United Nations; would provide a tremendous 
propaganda weapon to the Communists in China, in Asia and 
throughout the world; and finally would endanger American 
citizens and property on the mainland by inviting Communist 
retaliation.
The second option, that the United States nego­
tiate an agreement with the Nationalist Government to obtain 
base rights for the stationing of American military forces 
on the island. State officials also dismissed for much the 
same reasons as in the case of the first option, adding that 
for the purpose of protecting its own nationalistic credi­
bility the Government in Nanking could never accede to such 
a request. State officials went on,
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In any event, such concessions would 
be an illusory defense against Communist 
capture of power through penetration or a 
deal (with a regime on the island).
Military bases are not a sovereign remedy 
against Communist infection in a foreign 
country. As often as not they are an 
aggravating factor. U.S. national inter­
ests would only be served by Formosa's 
being controlled by a.^govemment not 
friendly to the USSR. (parenthesis 
added)
This particular option did remain alive throughout 
February on the basis of the mid-month Joint Chiefs of 
Staff's suggestion that "minor numbers of fleet units (be 
stationed) at suitable Formosan ports". However, the pro­
posal was rejected in early March in favor of the argument 
by the State Department that in addition to granting the 
Communists a propaganda leverage, any American military 
presence in Formosa, even if merely symbolic, "would gal­
vanize all mainland Chinese opinion in support of the Commu­
nists, the very thing we must avoid if our political warfare 
is to have any degree of success in C h i n a . I n  a National 
Security Council meeting on March 1, the Secretary of State 
expanded on this theme by suggesting that not only would all 
Chinese be united in their opposition to such a move, but as 
well it would leave the United States open to charges of 
imperialism and colonialism thereby reducing or eliminating 
the opportunity for the Administration to pursue effectively 
the propaganda line of accusing the Soviet Union of unwar­
ranted interference in the Chinese territories of Sinkiang,
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Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The Secretary observed gen­
erally that with respect to the question of United States 
military bases on the island.
We cannot afford to compromise an 
emerging new US position in China by 
overtly showing a pronounced interest in 
Formosa. It is a cardinal point in our 
thinking that if our present policy is to 
have any hope of success in Formosa, we 
must carefully conceal our wish to sen? 
arate the island from mainland control.
In any event, the third option posed by State in 
its January report to the NSC, that of aiding in the emer­
gence of a native Formosan regime, officials appeared to 
view as the ideal alternative, although impractical because 
"The Japanese prevented the development of native political 
life and the Chinese liquidated most of the developing 
native leaders in the abortive revolt in 1947", with the 
consequence in 1949 that "The indigenous population is 
without political experience, organization or strong leader­
ship." Nonetheless, State officials did go on to argue that 
"discreet" contacts be maintained with the native Formosan 
leaders "with a view at some future date of being able to 
make use of a Formosan autonomous movement should it appear 
to be in the U.S. national interest to do so."^^
The fourth option suggested by the State Depart­
ment, to support on Formosa the Nationalist Government, "or 
a rump thereof as the recognized Government of China" (ital­
ics in the original), appears to have been one of the least
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desirable from the State Department’s point of view. Offi­
cials clearly preferred, in fact thought it imperative, to 
separate the problem of denying Formosa to the Communists 
from the one of continuing United States association with, 
and recognition of, the Government in Nanking. State 
assumed that to follow this option would merely encourage 
the transfer to Formosa of all the deficiencies of the 
Nanking regime, and, as a result, all those same political 
liabilities which the United States faced in continuing to 
support the Nationalists on the mainland.^®
In fact, in a very real sense, the American desire 
to contain communism, to obstruct its success beyond China, 
also included the parallel hope of confining to China as 
well all the shortcomings and weaknesses which had charac­
terized the Administration's policy of supporting the 
Nationalist Government since 1946. The association with the 
regime had been extremely unsatisfactory from the American 
point of view, unsettling and controversial at times, dis­
tasteful in terms of giving assistance to a government which 
few in Washington liked and finally thoroughly unproductive 
with respect to the Administration’s priority of restricting 
and reducing Soviet power and influence in East Asia. In 
1949 with the Administration intent on formulating new and 
effective means by which to contain further communist expan­
sion in Asia, officials did not want to find themselves 
again tied into a situation comparable to the one which they
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had faced in China for the previous several years and this 
included Formosa. Indeed, Administration calculations 
concerning the requirements for successful containment of 
communism in Asia, specifically precluded any future Ameri­
can association with the sort of regime which from Nanking 
had consistently misgoverned China over the years. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that State Department officials 
strongly opposed the fourth option of supporting the Nation­
alist Government on the island, arguing that.
This would increase risks of immedi­
ate local instability, provide the most 
fertile environment for the growth of
communism, greatly complicate our posi­
tion on the mainland and hamstring our._ 
tactical flexibility toward China proper.
The fifth option, "to support continued local 
non-communist Chinese control", the State Department ad­
vised, appeared to be the best policy alternative under the
circumstances. While admitting there were definite limits
to what the Administration would be able to do by way of 
influencing the situation in the desired direction, State 
officials argued that this option "would permit greater 
freedom of U.S. action in China" and was the only one which 
appeared to have any chance of achieving American objectives 
on Formosa.
State suggested two essential courses of action 
with respect to this alternative and the essential goal of 
encouraging an emergence of an effective regime. First,
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local Chinese should be approached and advised that the 
United States could not be expected to give support to a 
regime characterized by any form of misrule or one insensi­
tive to the requirements of economic and political stability 
on the island. At the same time, it would be clearly indi­
cated that the United States was quite willing to render 
economic and diplomatic assistance in support of a local 
non-communist Chinese regime which showed promise of provid­
ing decent government for the island. Second, because "the 
U.S. has no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread to 
Formosa and the Pescadores", the State Department argued 
that it would be necessary to use American "influence
wherever possible to discourage the influx of mainland 
49Chinese." There were several reasons for this. For one 
thing the arrival of large numbers of mainland Chinese would 
have catastrophic effects on Formosan economy, leading 
especially to the condition of uncontrolled inflation, not 
to mention the multiple problems caused by mismanagement, 
graft and corruption. Also, since most of the refugees 
either were soldiers or officials of the collapsing Nation­
alist regime, unless the immigration was halted all the 
evils of the Nanking regime, political and social, as well 
as those economic, would be transferred to Formosa. The 
real danger, of course, was that unless the influx of Kuomin- 
tang Chinese was succssfully checked, it would be only a 
short period of time before they managed to consolidate
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their own authority on the island, thus eliminating the 
preferred policy option of encouraging the emergence of an 
effective local regime.
In early February the President ordered the 
National Security Council to develop a program of economic 
and diplomatic assistance to Formosa consistent with the 
general intent of this fifth option outlined by the State 
Department.^® Accordingly, plans were made to strengthen 
American representation in Taipei though with respect to the 
important directive that "in the initial stages every care 
should be exercised to minimize the appearance of United 
States official activities on Formosa...." Also, a "special 
high ranking" diplomatic officer would be sent to talk with 
local Chinese authorities, informing them that if they were 
willing to demonstrate an ability to provide effective 
government on the island.
The United States Government is 
prepared under legislation approved by 
Congress and by such other means as may 
be feasible, to give support —  designed 
to assist in developing and maintaining a 
viable,cTself-supporting economy on the 
island.
Having obtained such assurances, the Administration could 
then instruct the Economic Cooperation Administration to 
undertake a series of studies, not only with respect to 
reporting on the short-term needs of the island, but as well 
concerning the feasibility of initiating industrial projects 
in context of an "overall" program of economic assistance.
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At the same time, in addition to expanding its official 
representation in Taipei, the Administration would continue
to look for further opportunities to strengthen the position
52of the regime by diplomatic means.
Whatever chance such a policy had to succeed, the 
Administration's decision to encourage the emergence of a 
local non-communist and a non-Nationalist Chinese regime was 
doomed from the outset. On the same day the State Depart­
ment had submitted its January report on Formosa, the Cen­
tral Intelligence Agency reported, "The fact that Chiang 
Kai-shek's government was preparing a retreat on Taiwan has 
considerably changed the situation in this strategically 
important island." Acknowledging that "The most immediate 
security problem for the US rises in connection with Taiwan, 
for here a serious threat to the US strategic position in 
the Western Pacific can rapidly develop", the Agency went on 
to describe the problem, "The National Government has now 
provided for adequate military control of Taiwan and has 
well advanced its preparations for using this island as a 
safe haven for the last remains of Chiang Kai-shek's author­
ity. " As a result and fundamentally subversive of the State 
Department's policy proposal, the CIA report offered that.
It is now difficult to see what 
can be done to safeguard US strategic 
interests there that does not simultane­
ously raise the question of gçoromitments 
to a rump Nationalist regime.
-448-
Nonetheless, in early April, the State Department
designated the Counsellor of the American Embassy in Nanking,
Livingston T. Merchant, to proceed to Taipei as its "special
high ranking" diplomatic officer to consult with local
Chinese authorities concerning the question of American
backing for an effective non-communist regime on Formosa.
Actually, as a result of Merchant's advice, the State
Department had delayed sending him to Taipei in March, in
hopes that the political situation there might improve to
the point of making the Administration's task easier to 
54accomplish. American officials knew that the Governor of 
the island. General Chen Cheng, had been appointed by and 
was loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. So long as Chen remained in 
his post it did not appear that there was much chance of 
accomplishing policy objectives.
However, there was some continuing hope that 
Administration policy might succeed on the basis of a favor­
able resolution of factional infighting for control of the 
Kuomintang Party apparatus between Chiang Kai-shek and Li 
Tsung-jen who had assumed the Presidency of the Nanking 
Government subsequent to the former’s having fled to Formosa 
in January 1949. If the reformist oriented Li somehow 
managed to maneuver into a position of political prominence, 
thus eclipsing the Generalissimo's power, then it might 
prove possible, American officials thought, to remove the 
pro-Chiang governor of Formosa and replace him with a more
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responsible individual, preferably the American trained and 
liberally oriented General Sun Li-jen.^^
The State Department had hoped that the Sun Li-jen 
replacement as governor could be engineered in advance of 
Merchant's arrival. To no avail. Merchant was finally
instructed to proceed, carrying with him the knowledge that 
the expectation of a Sun appointment was a weak reed to 
stand on. Initial contacts with the island's governor
proved dis appointing, confirming Merchant's and the Admin­
istration's belief that so long as General Chen remained in 
his position there was little possibility of the local
regime moving in a reformist direction. The hope for a 
change of governors was also short lived. It was altogether 
apparent that Chiang Kai-shek was firmly in control on 
Formosa and had no intention of diluting this control by 
allowing any except his own local supporters to occupy
positions of importance in the island's administration.
Merchant's stay on Formosa was short. With Gen­
eral Chen continuing as Governor, and because of a rapid 
deterioration in political and economic conditions on the 
island, not quite four weeks after his arrival. Merchant 
reported in the early part of May that.
Whereas a month ago the possibility 
existed (that) Formosa might become 
autonomous and be run for (the) benefit 
(of) its people by (an) enlightened
governor, it is now almost certain that 
... it will be developed as a fortress 
which is not compatible with rational 
economic development of (the) island nor
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(the) application (of) measures necessary 
to secure popular support and^ (the) 
political development of Formosa.
As a result, the policy toward Formosa based on the option
of seeking to encourage the emergence of an honest and
effective regime for the island. Merchant concluded, was in
need of a full scale review and revision. Heeding his
advice, the State Department recalled Merchant to Washington
5 7on May 9 for consultation.
In view of the elimination of any immediate oppor­
tunity for creating effective government on Formosa, the 
Administration faced bleak policy prospects with respect to 
the hope of denying the island to the Communists. By the 
Summer of 1949 roughly 300,000 Kuomintang troops had arrived 
on Formosa. The soldiers were ill-paid and morale was low. 
They were defeated and disorganized. There was no well 
organized high command or effective central military plan­
ning. Their loyalty was in serious doubt and there was talk 
of mutiny. There was no assurance these military remnants 
would fight to defend the island and there was a good possi­
bility that wholesale disertions would occur with numerous 
units surrendering in the face of a Chinese Communist inva­
sion. Military leadership, for the most part, remained in 
the hands of those whose incompetence had been an important 
contributing factor to the steady disintegration of Nation­
alist armies in the mainland over the previous year.
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In addition, more than a million mainland Chinese, 
mostly supporters and officials of the Nationalist Govern­
ment, had emigrated to the island since the late months of 
1948. They brought with them all the political ills associ­
ated with the Nanking regime - to the extent that a govern­
ment structure existed on Formosa, to include the continuing 
practices of graft, corruption, and extortion. Besides 
their political and military presence, the social existence 
of large numbers of mainland Chinese on the island created 
intense feelings of animosity and bitterness on the part of 
native Formosans who wished to have control of their own 
internal affairs.
In order to maintain this burgeoning and essen­
tially unproductive Chinese population, more and more paper 
money was printed, thus producing drastically high rates of 
inflation. Despite considerable economic and financial 
resources on the island, moreover, the economic structure 
continued to be subject to administrative incompetence and 
mismanagement. Requirements for economic stabilization 
appeared to be virtually nonexistent, and Economic Coopera­
tive Administration officials were advising that other than 
marginal increments of American economic assistance either 
would be misused or else would contribute further to insta­
bility and i n f l a t i o n . O n  top of all this, since, in the 
American view, the regime headed by General Chen Cheng, 
"typified the unlightened leadership of the most reactionary 
element in the KMT" ... (so it followed that it was),
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—  incapable of providing Formosa 
with the sort of liberal government which 
alone could— build up political stabil­
ity on the island which would minimize,
if not eliminate, its susceptibility to
Communist infiltration and ultimate seiz­
ure of control from within.
Beginning in May, therefore, and extending through 
the Summer, the question of how the Administration should 
respond to this situation continued to be a major topic for 
discussion in Washington. Increasingly pessimistic about 
the prospects of being able to deny the island the Communist 
control by diplomatic and economic means alone, as outlined
above, in early August the State Department again approached
the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting a response to the 
question of whether, in view of the failure of economic and 
diplomatic measures, would they now "regard these islands of 
sufficient military importance to the United States to 
commit U.S. forces to their occupation?" The JCS response 
was familiar, that no, the United States did not possess the 
resources to defend Formosa through the use of military 
force, though, in their estimation the island was still of 
sufficient and strategic importance to warrant further 
economic and diplomatic efforts to keep it from Communist 
control.
In view of the Joint Chiefs’ reaffirmation of 
their earlier assessment and given the primary interest of 
decision makers in developing effective procedures for 
containing Communist power in Asia, nothing could have been
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more exasperating for American officials than the prospect 
of having to formulate a policy in response to the existing 
situation on Formosa. It appeared to be a microcosm of the 
one which policymakers had faced in monitoring the American 
commitment on the mainland since 1946 and the one which, 
along with all its strategic risks and political liabili­
ties, officials had hoped finally to be rid of subsequent to 
the final defeat and elimination of the regime in Nanking. 
Instead of enjoying the freedom to maneuver in new and more 
fruitful directions for the purpose of obstructing further 
Communist expansion, the Administration again found itself 
confronting on Formosa, just as it had in the case of China 
over the previous several years, a situation which, because 
of military-strategic considerations, required the United 
States to follow a policy characterized not by any realistic 
prospect of its being able to achieve successfully Cold War
objectives but one having as its major preoccupation that of
63devising ways to postpone failure for as long as possible.
Although there was some differing emphasis within 
the Administration as to which procedures the United States 
might follow with respect to the problem of Formosa, by 
early October of 1949 officials were more or less agreed on 
talking about four main options, none of which appeared very 
satisfying: (1) turn the issue over to the United Nations
for final resolution; (2) immediately cut all American ties 
with the regime allowing it to fend for itself; (3) expand a
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program of economic and military assistance to the regime to 
the maximum extent feasible though short of making any 
commitment to defend the island; and (4) maintain a low 
profile through implementation of a "moderate-sized" commit­
ment of economic assistance to Formosa while continuing to 
render diplomatic support to the regime.
The first option, that of turning the problem over 
to the United Nations, was not actually rejected but re­
tained as a possible future alternative should it ever prove 
feasible to move in this direction. Officials acknowledged, 
however, that there could well be a series of complicating 
factors to consider on this score. For one thing, success­
ful action by the United Nations would require considerable 
encouragement and support from the West European Allies. 
Indeed, from the point at which the option began to be 
discussed in Washington, the Administration presumed it 
especially important to consult with the British and, in 
response to American queries, as late as the end of May, the 
British Foreign office initially argued that because of the 
threat it would pose to the American position in the Philip­
pines and the European presence in Southeast Asia, "under no 
circumstances" should Formosa be allowed to fall into Commu­
nist hands.
However, by the early part of September and for 
much of the same reasons which had produced the Administra­
tion's own reassessment, the Foreign Office had changed its
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mind and saw no way that the island could be prevented from 
coming under Chinese Communist control. This opinion did 
not change and by early November British diplomats in Wash­
ington expressed their concern about continuing American 
shipments of military items to Formosa and the possibility 
that/ because the island was expected to fall under Commu­
nist rule, any further stockpiling of military supplies 
would have the effect of merely strengthening the Communist 
capacity to carry out offensive operations against Hong 
Kong.®^
It is not clear, though, for how long the British 
would have been able to see eye-to-eye with the United 
States on the question even had circumstances not been such 
as to lead both Washington and London to conclude simultane­
ously that Formosa could not be saved from Communist con­
trol. It is important to understand that already by the 
Fall of 1949 the British were waivering in the direction of 
extending recognition to the Communist regime. Despite 
American entreaties to the contrary, increasingly the 
British were of the belief that this was the only way in 
which they would be able to protect their rather substantial 
economic interests located in China as well as reduce to the 
maximum extent the threat to their extremely important 
political and economic position in Hong Kong. The ability 
to achieve these objectives, however, would have been fatal­
ly compromised by any British involvement in efforts to
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detach the island from mainland control, or, for that matter, 
even involvement in activities designed to confuse the issue 
of a Communist government’s legal right to claim sovereign 
jurisdiction over Formosa. Thus by the end of 1949 it seems 
unlikely that the United States would have been able to 
count on British support in attempting to attain United 
Nation's backing for a scheme to deny Formosa to Communist 
rule.
Moreover, the British were undoubtedly right in 
suggesting in a Foreign Office brief presented to the State 
Department in September that "The possibility of the Formo­
san case being submitted to the UN is unlikely and might 
even cause more harm than good if done." What the British 
had in mind was that United Nations' action could only be 
undertaken on the basis of a serious question being raised 
about the legal status of Formosa as Chinese territory and 
therefore properly falling under the jurisdiction of a duly 
constituted government in China.
American speculation about using the United 
Nations' option, in fact, was based on the view that the 
international legal status of the island, which had been 
declared by the Allied Powers at the Cairo Conference in 
1943 as belonging under Chinese jurisdiction would have to 
be altered in favor of creating grounds for arguing the 
necessity of a UN trusteeship leading to a plebiscite and 
eventually to Formosa's status as an independent nation.
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Any effort to do this not only would have involved a tor­
tured and dubious complex of legal doubletalk but as well 
invariably would have been opposed by the Soviet Union. 
This potential difficulty was what the British had in mind 
by including in the same September Foreign Office brief the 
observation that "There is no possiblity of the present 
legal status of Formosa being altered without Four Power 
agr eem ent .Be sid es,  since processing the issue through 
the UN, "would result in an undesirable time lag before any
positive action by the United Nations could be initiated",
70in the meantime Formosa might be lost for all the talking.
There were two other problems with the United 
Nations' option. First, there was little chance that the 
Chiang Kai-shek controlled regime in Formosa would ever 
agree to the question of the island's status being submitted 
to the United Nations. Since any future UN action would be 
contingent on ignoring the wartime declarations of the Cairo 
Conference in favor of developing a legal basis for estab­
lishing a trusteeship leading to a plebiscite, Chiang and 
his supporters could not have been too happy with the possi­
bility that elections - which would have included native 
Formosans who outnumbered mainland Chinese by a wide mar­
gin - might result in a vote unfavorable to the existing 
regime.
Moreover, it would have been impossible to under­
take a UN involvement in the internal affairs of Formosa
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without at the same time raising extensive questions about 
the nature and quality of the island's government. In other 
words, a United Nations' presence invariably would have 
included intense pressures for economic, political and 
social reform —  an ominous prospect for that particular 
complex of vested interests upon which Chiang Kai-shek's 
power continued to rest and whose political and economic 
habits could not afford the disruption which reform was sure 
to cause. Thus, as the State Department pointed out in a 
draft memorandum to the National Security Council in early 
June of 1949,
Another difficulty is the possibil­
ity that the Chinese authorities on For­
mosa might refuse to accept the decision 
of the United Nations and block the entry 
of a Plebiscite Commission, thereby chal­
lenging the United Nations and raising 
the question of backing the decision with 
force.
Since the prestige of the international organiza­
tion would be on the line, the possibility of having to deal 
with this contingency could not have helped but to make 
policymakers think twice about the advisability of submit­
ting the problem to the United Nations.However, American 
officials were deterred from this option for another very
important reason which related specifically to the question 
of UN military action either for the purpose of enforcing 
the organization's decisions on the Chiang regime, possibly 
even replacing it, or to protect the island from Communist
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efforts to seize control. In either case, American policy­
makers could not avoid being influenced by the fact that the 
United Nations had no peacekeeping forces in existence. 
Administration officials knew that the principal burden of 
creating such a force would fall directly on the United 
States both in terms of manpower and resources. In view of 
the military strategic focus of Administration thinking 
about the whole question of Formosa, therefore, decision 
makers involved in determining whether or not to place the 
matter before the UN could not have helped but to be affec­
ted by the implications of a statement made by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum submitted to the National 
Security Council in the latter part of August,
The suggested possibility of a fu­
ture joint or concerted Formosan action 
with other governments within or withôut 
the framework of the United Nations would, 
from the military viewpoint, have serious 
implications in that our own military in­
volvement in Formosa might differ little 
in degree from that envisione^ as a re­
sult of unilateral occupation.
To repeat, the UN option continued to be discussed 
in one form or another even in 1950, though there never 
developed any serious movement on the part of the Admin­
istration to turn the issue over to that organization prior 
to the Korean War. For the reasons suggested above, offi­
cials were never able to view it as a feasible alternative.
The second option policy, an immediate severance 
of all American ties with the regime in Formosa allowing it
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to fend for itself, was unacceptable from the Administra­
tion’s point of view for the simple reason that officials 
accepted the Joint Chiefs’ argument that the island was of 
sufficient strategic importance to United States' interests 
in the Western Pacific - even with Chiang's regime in con­
trol - to warrant the use of economic and diplomatic steps 
to prevent the island from coming under Communist rule. It 
is almost certain that the Administration would never have 
considered continuing its association with the remnants of 
the Nationalist Government on Formosa subsequent to its 
elimination as an effective force of resistance on the 
mainland had the JSC not given the particular assessment 
which they did. It seems equally clear that Chiang Kai-shek 
and his supporters were able to save themselves and to 
sustain American backing until the time of Korean War for no 
other reason than that the presence of the regime on Formosa 
happened to fit in with the operational design of American 
military strategic planning.
It is true that if the Administration had cast the 
rump Nationalist Government to its fate, leaving Formosa 
completely open to Communist assault, there would have 
followed a strong public outcry in this country. Officials 
knew this and their decision to support Chiang's regime - 
the details of which will be provided below - did conform 
rather conveniently to the general thrust of public prefer­
ences. The appearance of Administration compliance with the
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public demands to support the Nationalists on Formosa, 
however, was just that, mere coincidence with what constitu­
ted the real source of the official concern to deny the 
island to Communist control. This is clearly implied in a 
report to the National Security Council in early October 
concerning Formosa, in which the State Department, in refer­
ring to Chinese and American public opinion, noted that an,
...abrupt cessation of existing aid 
would damage the morale and prestige of 
the present Chinese administration. It 
would, in fact, be widely interpreted as 
reflecting lack of interest on the part 
of this government which is not in accord 
with the facts. (italics added)
In a word, the available documentary evidence 
gives absolutely no indication that the Administration would 
have bowed to public opinion in continuing its support of 
the Chiang regime had the American military establishment 
not assessed Formosa as having military strategic impor­
tance. Though domestic pressures in support of Chiang's
regime were greater in 1949 than ever before, so were the
reasons why the Administration could not bow to the public 
demand. In fact, because American officials were so con­
cerned to develop more effective ways to contain communism, 
there is every reason to believe that if circumstances had 
permitted the Administration to cut all ties with the Nation­
alists on Formosa, as a matter of their fundamental respon­
sibility to safeguard the national interest, policymakers 
would never have allowed public pressure to force them into
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continuing to support a regime which by 1949 had become one 
of their biggest liabilities in the task of achieving Cold 
War objectives in Asia.
The third policy option - short of a commitment to 
defend the island, expand the program of economic and mili­
tary aid to the regime to the maximum extent possible - the 
Administration also rejected as unsatisfactory. Generally, 
policymakers opposed this course of action because they be­
lieved it would exacerbate to the extreme all the problems 
which the Administration was going to have to face anyway in 
continuing to support the Chiang regime but which officials 
hoped might be minimumized by following in a more cautious 
direction. Decision makers were uncomfortable with this 
option for several reasons. In the first place, the Admin­
istration was not about to consider increasing economic and 
military aid to a regime which had a long and unrelieved 
history of mishandling American assistance in one way or 
another. The continuing practices of graft, corruption, 
hoarding and mismanagement by Kuomintang authorities pro­
duced in officials the foregone conclusion that it would 
serve no useful American interest to increase substantially 
the level of aid. Indeed, the Administration even presumed 
it would be counter productive to do so. A gratuitous 
increase in the American commitment would reduce any incen­
tive for the regime’s eliminating mismanagement and corrupt 
practices by implementing necessary internal reforms.
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Besides, the problem was not a lack of economic, 
financial or even military resources, substantial portions 
of which had been stockpiled on Formosa by the Chiang regime 
over the previous year. Rather, as American diplomatic 
officers in Taipei repeatedly observed, the weakness of the 
situation resided in the continuing demonstration of incom­
petence on the part of Chinese authorities in utilizing 
those resources. And, just as they had been doing for some 
time, representatives of the Economic Cooperation Admin­
istration continued to argue that the Formosan economy 
simply could not usefully absorb amounts of American assis­
tance beyond a rather modest level and that to attempt to 
undertake ambitious long-range development projects, e.g., 
capital investment programs, would actually contribute to 
even worse levels of inflation.
Sending greater amounts of assistance under these 
circumstances, moreover, not only would be a waste but as 
well would commit in a highly visible manner the nation’s 
prestige in support of an extremely risky situation. Be­
cause officials thought it was inevitable that the Chinese 
Communists would attempt to capture Formosa, and since, in 
that event the regime’s corruption and incompetence could be 
expected to deliver the island over to an invading force in 
short order, policymakers were convinced that if the United 
States were to become involved in this way, it would produce 
eventually a point at which the Administration either would
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have to decide to withdraw altogether or to escalate the 
American presence to the extent of assuming active responsi­
bility for the island's defense. Withdrawal would be inter­
preted by the world as another American defeat in the Cold 
War. Soviet prestige would soar. Escalation of the Ameri­
can commitment, on the other hand, would place the Admin­
istration in the position of doing precisely what the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff said the nation could not afford to do in 
view of limited resources and more important obligations 
elsewhere.
In either case, not only would the nation's pres­
tige be made to suffer, but its credibility as an effective 
and imaginative ally also would be called into question. 
Europeans and Asians alike would want to know what sort of 
logic would produce the decision to increase the American 
commitment to Formosa only to withdraw in the face of in­
creased Communist pressure. On the other hand, Europeans 
were sure to wonder why, in escalating its commitment, the 
United States would allow itself to be drawn into a waste of 
its resources and manpower to save a regime like the one on 
Formosa and in an area not nearly as vital to American and 
Western interests as other parts of the world. And South­
east Asian governments would question the wisdom of whether 
American resources might not be more usefully spent in their
behalf rather than by squandering them on the defeated and
76discredited regime in Taipei.
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There were other major reasons why this option was 
unattractive. For one thing, just as they had in the case 
of arguing against restationing the American naval presence 
in China from Tsingtao to Formosa in 1948, State Department 
officials continued to believe that nothing would be more 
likely to enhance Communist popularity in China than for the 
United States to expand its economic and especially its 
military presence on Formosa. As a National Security Coun­
cil report observed in October,
A program of aid of this nature would
greatly strengthen the suspicion among Chi­
nese, communist and non-communist alike, of 
U.S. 'imperialistic* design on Formosa, 
thereby consolidating Chinese public support 
behind the Chinese Communists....
Not only would a highly visible American intrusion 
into the island's internal affairs have the effect of making 
the Communist task of consolidating their power in the 
mainland immeasureably easier but any obtrusive American 
backing of a reactionary and unregenerate regime, whose past 
and continued existence clearly depended on support from a 
Western nation, could be expected to generate severe anti­
imperialist reactions from other Asian peoples as well. The 
Central Intelligence Agency spelled out the danger in this 
regard in a report in January of 1950,
Asiatic political leaders...consider
—  (the Communist government in China)__
to have a comparatively broad popular 
base and therefore to be qualified to re­
place the Kuomintang, which not only has
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been thoroughly discredited as an effec­
tive government but also— widely identic 
fied with Western intervention....
Significantly, the same CIA report went on to suggest that, 
if through its policies the United States were to leave 
itself open to an effective anti-imperialist propaganda 
blitz, it might well "prevent the newly independent govern­
ments of India and Pakistan from cooperating with the US in 
South Asia" while at the same time possibly work to "dimin­
ish US prestige and opportunities for leadership in the
UN."79
However, Administration officials wanted more than 
simply to avoid creating grounds for effective anti­
imperialist criticism of United States’ policies. As al­
ready indicated in this and previous chapters, they also 
wished to sustain the basis for criticizing Soviet involve­
ment in China along these same lines. Russian penetration 
of Sinkiang, and especially Manchuria, as well as their 
involvement in Outer Mongolia, officials believed eventually 
would lead to serious problems between the Soviets and the 
Communist regime in China on the basis of the latter’s 
nationalistic commitment to assert control over the whole of 
those territories historically Chinese. The longer the 
Soviets continued to interfere in China’s internal affairs 
the more likely this conflict was to occur.
The United States’ capacity to capitalize on this 
issue, however, would be severely reduced, even eliminated.
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if the American involvement on Formosa was such as to 
attract the charge of imperialism, thereby obscuring the 
basis for clearly differentiating between the policies of 
Washington and Moscow. As the Office of the Far Eastern 
Affairs pointed out in a June 1949 subject memorandum on 
Formosa, since "the Soviet position in Manchuria and Port 
Arthur has created irredentist issues which we can use to 
advantage", it appeared that, "To provide the Communists 
with an issue they can propagandize in irredentist terms
on
against us seems extremely unwise."
Policymakers did not know for sure what the full 
potential would be for exploiting conflicts between the two. 
However, the thinking was that it would be much more diffi­
cult to accomplish if the nature of United States policy 
appeared to the Chinese Communists as so contrary to their 
interests, thus forcing them to conclude that they had 
absolutely no choice but to continue their close association 
with Moscow. In a late December meeting between representa­
tives of the State and Defense Departments, in talking about 
the general tenor of American policy toward the recently 
established Communist regime in Peking, Secretary of State 
Acheson observed that,
—  in the Soviet effort to detach 
the northern tier of provinces in China 
(there) exists the seed of inevitable 
conflict between China and the Soviet 
Union. Mao is not a true satellite in 
that he came to power by his own efforts 
and was not installed in office by the 
Soviet Army. This situation. ..is our one
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important asset in China and it would 
have to be for a very important strategic 
purpose that we would take an action 
which would substitute ourselves for the 
Soviets- as the imperialist menace of 
China.
Later in the meeting the Secretary went on to make the 
related comment that.
If at this price we acquire an island 
essential to the defenses of the United 
States then it might be worth the price 
but there does not appear to be demonstra­
ted a claim that the los^.of Formosa 
really breaches our defenses.
Two weeks later the CIA put a slightly different slant on 
the matter by suggesting that the Chinese hostility genera­
ted by an expanded American commitment on Formosa might 
result in a situation in which,
The more doctrinaire Stalists lead­
ers among the Chinese Communists would 
advance their positions at the expense of 
such Communists as may be favorably dis­
posed toward an independent policy in in­
ternational affai% and an accommodation 
of Western powers.
In the case of developing policies toward Formosa, 
and having rejected all other options, officials finally 
settled on a course of action designed to maintain a low 
American profile on the island through implementation of a 
"moderate sized" program of economic assistance while con­
tinuing to render diplomatic support to the rump Nationalist 
regime. Though it appeared to be the best of the available 
policy options, officials were uncomfortable with their 
decision. The reason was simple, the course of action which
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they proposed to follow was a carbon copy in miniature of 
the Adminstration’s policy toward China since the end of the 
Second World War.
The policymaking environment was the same. 
Military-strategic priorities compelled officials to extend 
support to a regime seriously maladministered and which 
exhibited very little inherent potential for survival. For 
a variety of reasons stemming from the unpalatable nature of 
the regime, however, and because the United States possessed 
insufficient resources, the Administration would have to 
place definite limits on the extent to which it could go in 
developing a program of assistance. Once again, therefore, 
decision makers found themselves concerned with implementing 
a policy which promised to achieve little except to avert 
disaster for as long as possible, in the meantime "buying 
time" in the hope that events might prove to create a more 
advantageous situation in which to promote American inter­
ests .
Policymakers envisioned that a "moderate sized" 
program of economic assistance and diplomatic support would 
demonstrate that the United States was interested in Formosa 
remaining a part of the "free world". At the same time it 
would minimize the Administration’s liabilities in 
continuing to support the regime by placing on the latter 
the entire responsiblity for its own survival. In this 
regard, the Administration would make it clear to Chiang and
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his supporters that it had absolutely no intention of com­
mitting the United States' power to a defense of the island 
and that short of extensive efforts of reform had no inter­
est in giving more than marginal amounts of economic assis­
tance (primarily in the form of food imports and expendi­
tures in agricultural and rural reconstruction). Beyond the 
Administration continuing to allow government agencies to 
ship remaining military items under authorization of the 
China Aid Act of 1948, the Chinese would also have to assume 
full responsibility for the acquisition of further military 
supplies through commercial purchase on the open market.
By such means the Administration would ensure that
the Chiang regime not receive a false impression of United
States' purposes in continuing to grant economic aid. It
would sustain the regime's incentive to reform - the key to
self-preservation - while also granting some additional time
in which to do so. And, in this regard, it would help to
pressure the regime into a position of having to make bettier
84use of its existing resources. In a summary statement 
concerning this option, a June 1949 State Department memo­
randum to the National Security Council explained that it 
would be,
— essentially a policy of calcula­
ted inaction, providing a modicum of eco­
nomic aid but relying primarily upon the 
self-interests of the present Chinese 
governing group to safeguard our own 
strategic interests. The length of time 
that our interests and theirs will coin­
cide or that they will have the will and
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ability to resist any external or inter­
nal attack which the Communists may mount 
against them is unpredictable. It would 
safeguard our interests for, possibly, 
six months in which xÜme much can happen 
there and elsewhere.
The decision to maintain only "moderate sized" 
programs of economic assistance to the regime on Formosa was 
reinforced by subsequent official deliberations concerning 
United States Asian policy. As a part of the State De­
partment's in-house reappraisal of Far Eastern policy ini­
tiated in August 1949 by the special review group headed by 
Ambassador-at-Large, Phillip C. Jessup, a number of Asian 
specialists from all over the country were invited to Wash­
ington in October for discussions bearing on a series of 
problems which the Administration faced in Asia. Included 
among the several conclusions reached by this group of 
experts was the one that the United States' interest would 
be better served by not seeking,
...to detach Formosa from the Commu­
nist controlled mainland either by the 
application of force or seeking jurisdic­
tion over the island through a trustee­
ship arrangement on behalf of Formosan 
self-government, since such actions on 
our part would outrage all Chinese ele­
ments and as a resort to naked expediency 
would destroy our standing gWith the 
smaller countries of the world.
The results of the major NSC review of United States' Far 
Eastern Policy (NSC 48) series undertaken in the Summer of 
1949 and completed in December further supported the Admin­
istration's position by emphasizing that any.
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—  action by the U.S. to occupy For­
mosa would inevitably expose the U.S. to 
"charges of imperialism" and seriously 
affect the moral position of the U.S. 
before the bar of world opinion, particu­
larly in the Far East at a time when the 
U.S. is seeking to expose Sovietgimperi- 
alistic designs on other nations.
Thus satisfied with the confirmation of its deci­
sion, the Administration policy of continuing to render only 
modest economic assistance to the regime of Formosa remained 
unchanged until June of 1950. This was true despite the 
concerted efforts in late 1949 and in the early months of 
1950 by the China Bloc in Congress, joined for politically 
partisan reasons by more prominent members of the Republican 
Party, to pressure the Administration into undertaking a 
military defense of the island. And, in refusing to bow to 
these demands. Administration officials harbored no illu­
sions as to the future of the rump Nationalist Government on 
Formosa. Assuming that Chiang and his supporters even with 
another reprieve were no more likely than in previous years 
to initiate those reforms vital to a successful defense of 
the island, the same December NSC report on its review of 
Far Eastern policy conceded that it was "not believed that 
denial of Formosa to the Chinese Communists can be achieved 
by any method short of actual U.S. military occupation."®® 
Intelligence community estimates late in the year agreed
that Formosa would "probably succumb to the Chinese Commu-
89nists by the end of 1950." This view remained unchanged
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with the CIA reporting in mid-April of 1950 that the Commu­
nists would attempt an assault on the island some time after 
the beginning of June and before the end of the year.^®
In conclusion, in accord with the intent of the 
Administration's policy of maneuver and with respect to the 
official desire to remain as opportunistic as possible in 
responding to emerging opportunities to offset the negative 
repercussions of the Communist victory in China and to 
contain any further extension of Communist power in Asia, 
policymakers hoped to deny Formosa to Communist control by 
fostering the emergence of a regime which could be counted 
on to rule the island honestly and effectively. Interested 
in maximizing prospects for making an effective demonstra­
tion of containment, American officials not only were 
anxious to avoid the type of situation which they faced in 
formulating policy toward China over the previous several 
years, but in fact believed, that in order to achieve their 
objective of encouraging responsible administration of the 
island, it was imperative to find a non-communist Chinese 
group other than the one which controlled the government in 
Nanking.
Thus, in fulfillment of their purposes, the Admin­
istration clearly wished to end its troubled and unsatisfac­
tory association with Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters as 
soon as the situation on the mainland was such as to allow
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it to do so, namely, the point at which effective Nation­
alist resistance to the Communists finally was eliminated. 
Administration officials were convinced that the general 
process of containing Communist power in Asia would be much 
more difficult to accomplish so long as the United States 
continued its policy of recognizing the discredited and 
defeated Nationalist regime and that the particular task of 
denying Formosa to the Communists likely would be impossible 
under these circumstances.
Unfortunately, and much to the dissatisfaction of 
American officials, the Administration was not able to 
achieve its preferred objective of promoting the emergence 
of a non-Communist and non-Nationalist government on Formosa. 
By the Spring of 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters 
were firmly in control of the island’s administration. 
However unsatisfactory this development, officials nonethe­
less believed they had no choice but to proceed with the 
option of supporting the Chiang regime because of the stra­
tegic and political significance which had been assigned to 
Formosa.
Yet, the Administration was determined to maintain 
as much flexibility in the situation as possible, refusing 
to allow itself to be drawn into the sort of commitment 
which would eliminate its room to maneuver in a different 
direction should it become necessary to do so. And, offi­
cials were equally determined to reduce to a minimum the
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political liabilities involved in continuing to support an 
administration generally condemned in terms of the prevail­
ing criteria of Asian nationalism. Officials believed that 
both goals would be served best by extending only moderate 
amounts of assistance to the regime. In this way Chiang and 
his supporters and not the United States would have the 
essential responsibility for defending the island and, if 
they could not, then the peripheral nature of the United 
States' involvement would allow for a speedy withdrawal and 
with only minimal damage to the nation's prestige.
With few exceptions policymakers assumed the 
United States owed nothing to Chiang Kai-shek and his fol­
lowers. They had mismanaged the situation on the mainland 
inexorably in the direction of their own defeat despite all 
the assistance and advice given by the United States since 
1945 and in 1949 ensconced on Formosa showed no promise of 
being able to serve either their own or the American inter­
ests any better than in years previous.
With respect to this situation, officials defined 
their responsibility in formulating policy toward Formosa 
almost wholly in terms of expediency. And, because the 
Administration assigned strategic and political importance 
to the task of denying the island to Communist control, in 
1949 expediency meant supporting Chiang and his group on 
Formosa for want of another and preferred alternative. 
However, the unsympathetic logic of expediency worked both
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ways. Since most officials saw no value in supporting the 
rump Nationalist Government for its own sake, they were 
quite prepared to terminate all association with the regime 
at the moment at which it no longer appeared useful in the 
service of those objectives involved in keeping Formosa out 
of Communist hands. Had the regime failed to defend the 
island successfully against a Chinese Communist invasion and 
had the Korean War not intervened to save Chiang and his 
supporters, Administration officials were poised, in fact 
expected to have to look elsewhere for more promising oppor­
tunities in the effort to contain communism in Asia. And, 
as a matter of their strong sense of commitment to achieving 
victory in the Cold War, they would have done so despite 
increasingly intense public pressures which in 1949 and 1950 
sought to force the Administration into a full-scale program 
of support for the regime on Formosa regardless of the cost, 
as officials saw it, to the nation's overall strategic 
capability or the consequences to American prestige and 
credibility.
The Administration's policy of maneuver seems to 
have worked reasonably well in the case of Formosa - though 
granted, not under the best of circumstances - and also with 
respect to those various procedural problems which developed 
in the course of continuing to support the Nanking govern­
ment after the Fall of 1948 and throughout the period of its 
rapid decline and final elimination by the Communists as a
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political force in Chinese politics. However, if the cen­
tral purpose of the policy of maneuver was to place the 
Administration in the best possible position from which to 
take advantage of emerging opportunities for containing 
further communist expansion in Asia as well as to develop 
means by which to neutralize and eventually reclaim those 
areas already dominated by the Kremlin directed inter­
national communist movement, then the same thing cannot be 
said in the case of the Administration's formulation of 
policy on the question of relations with the Chinese Commu­
nists. Administration officials did not prove to be very 
flexible on this issue in 1949 and in 1950 prior to the 
Korean War.
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CHAPTER XI
THE U.S. AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS,
MAY 1949 - JUNE 1950;
THE POLICY OF HOPEFUL PESSIMISM
Administration officials believed that they were 
going to have to be as opportunistic as possible in their 
dealings with the new Communist masters of China. Only in 
this way, policymakers idealized, would the United States be 
able to work successfully to neutralize the ill effects of 
the Communist victory. It would be especially important to 
remain flexible on the question of developing a better 
relationship with the Chinese Communists for the purpose of 
eliminating what officials believed was a pervasive Soviet 
influence in Chinese affairs.
However, as indicated previously, the Administra­
tion despite its intent did not prove very flexible in this 
particular policymaking area. The reasons were multiple, 
but it is important to stress at the outset that domestic 
public and congressional opinion did not play a significant 
role in creating the inflexibility. The nature of the 
United States-Chinese Communist relationship, or lack of it, 
was rather the result of the response by American officials 
to a series of situations in 1949 and 1950 the manner of 
which was determined almost entirely by increasingly rigid
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Cold War assumptions concerning the requirements of dealing 
with a presumed agent of the Kremlin-directed international 
communist movement.
Earlier chapters have demonstrated that, given the 
condition of limited resources and the need to conserve them 
for application in more important areas of the world, Ameri­
can Asian policy in 1949 and 1950 may be understood as con­
sisting of two essential impulses which officials attempted 
to balance in formulating procedures for dealing with vari­
ous specific policy problems. On the one hand, it was 
important to convince Asian peoples that the United States 
could be trusted to act in accord with their quest to 
achieve self-rule and national independence —  that the 
meaning of the American presence in Asia was not to be 
compared to the Western colonial involvement in the region 
over the previous several centuries. At the same time, 
however, it would be necessary to demonstrate to all that in 
the face of communist provocations the United States could 
not be pushed around —  that it was not a "paper tiger" as 
the Chinese Communists alleged in 1949 in referring to 
American activities in Asia —  and that the nation was 
capable of mounting a successful counter offensive conducive 
not only to deterring further communist inspired aggressions 
but of encouraging other Asian peoples to develop sustained 
political affiliations with the United States^.
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The Administration sought to balance these two 
tendencies in approaching the policy question of relations 
with the Chinese communists. The result, though, probably 
would have to be classified a failure. In brief, the belief 
in the importance of making a successful appeal to Chinese 
nationalistic sentiment, was overwhelmed by the Administra­
tion's sense of the need to demonstrate to the Chinese 
Communists that the United States could not be pushed 
around. In this regard, policymakers early came to the 
view, that so long as the Chinese Communists remained 
hostile and aggressive toward the United States, the Admin­
istration had no choice but to respond forcefully and firmly 
until the Chinese Communist Party clearly revealed a capac­
ity to respect American interests and accept the "normal 
rules" in their conduct of international relations and until 
it proved capable of acting independently of Soviet influ­
ence.
In the period prior to the Korean War, therefore, 
and especially after the Summer of 1949, officials remained 
of the opinion that better relations with the Chinese Commu­
nists would not be possible for an indefinite period of 
time. In view of this, officials also believed that the 
Administration would do more to further the cause of inter­
national communism and to harm the nation's prestige by 
recognizing the Communist regime in Peking than it would by 
refusing to do so until the Chinese demonstrated a willing­
ness to act decently.
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Nonetheless, in 1949 and 1950 the Administration 
was prepared, at least theoretically and in accord with the 
purposes of the policy of maneuver, to consider the option 
of developing a closer relationship with the Chinese Commu­
nists . In this regard there were a series of related rea­
sons why policymakers thought it wise to keep their eye on 
the possibility and to maintain a flexible capacity for 
moving in this direction if and when a genuine opportunity 
for doing so should ever arise.
As it turned out, officials never relinquished 
their belief that the ties between the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Soviet Union were extremely close and would 
remain so for a considerable period of time, perhaps for 
decades. Despite this close affiliation, however, the 
Administration was convinced that potential existed for 
creating critical rifts between the two. Official expecta­
tions included the general belief that given time a latent 
Chinese nationalism would emerge to force out of power any 
ruling group which continued indefinitely to allow the 
peoples and resources of China to be used merely in the 
service of the interests of a foreign power. Short of this, 
the regime eventually would have to demonstrate its capacity 
to act independently of foreign influence.
Officials assumed that this would happen in part 
because the Chinese Communists had developed their own power 
base without outside assistance (they, like the Yugoslavs
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would only grudgingly give up the pride of their indepen­
dence and if pushed too far would rebel to reclaim the 
reward of their hard-earned effort); in part because of 
traditional Chinese xenophobic sensitivity concerning out­
side interference in their internal affairs; and, in part 
because of the fundamental incompatibility between the 
centripetal political aims of the Kremlin-directed inter­
national communist movement and the centrifugal political 
tendencies inherent to the phenomenon of nationalism.
By the beginning of 1949, the simple fact of the 
policymaking environment with respect to China was that, 
with the exception of continuing to give modest and largely 
symbolic amounts of assistance to the dying remains of the 
Nanking government, no available means remained open to the 
Administration for striking a fatal blow at the vital center 
of the Soviet Union's capacity for sustaining its power and 
influence in Asian affairs other than the one of maneuvering 
so as to be able to exploit this potential conflict between 
the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists. Thus the Admin­
istration ideally preferred to develop the sort of policy 
which included procedures for enhancing the prospect of 
Chinese deviationism.
Nothing, officials conceived, would be more damag­
ing to Soviet prestige and to the vitality of the inter­
national communist movement than defection of the major 
Soviet satellite. In a policy study of early February 1950,
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the Director of the State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff, Paul H. Nitze, suggested that,
The national deviation of Tito, we 
know, was a severe reverse for the Krem­
lin. Nationalist deviation on the part 
of Communist China would threaten the 
structure of the Soviet imperialist 
system. Similarly, national deviation 
elsewhwere would reverse Soviet gains in 
Eastern Europe, jeopardize Soviet oppor­
tunities in Southeast Asia and Moscow's 
use of foreign Communist Parties as 
instruments of Soviet foreign policy.
In other words, if China could be induced to sever its 
affiliation with Moscow, it could start a chain reaction of 
similar tendencies elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain with 
potentially devastating consequences for the relative power 
position of the Soviet Union in world affairs.^
Previous chapters have indicated how this consid­
eration entered into the Administration's resolution of a 
series of procedural policy problems attendant to the col­
lapse of the Nationalist government in late 1948. However, 
one very important procedural problem which also developed 
at this time —  the one concerning American trade contacts 
with the Chinese Communists —  has not been discussed until 
now because it is a topic highly illustrative of the nature 
of official thinking about relations with Peking. As much 
or more than in any other policy area. Administration deci­
sions in this matter clearly revealed the desire of offi­
cials to remain flexibly poised to exacerbate, whenever 
possible, animosities between the Soviets and the Chinese
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Communists; or, at the very least, to avoid taking any 
unnecessary action toward China which would have the effect 
of retarding or reversing the anticipated intensification of 
Chinese hostility to the Kremlin.
A National Security Council draft report of late 
February 1949 concerning the question of trade with the 
Chinese Communists, which several days later the President 
authorized as the basis for policy implementation, observed 
that.
In the absence of an effective 
instrument in China, the United States 
support of which could bring about defeat 
or containment of Chinese Communism, the 
primary immediate United States policy 
objective —  prevention of Soviet domina­
tion of China for strategic ends —  might 
be sought initially through either of two 
essentially alternative policies.
The first of the two alternative policies, "to 
combat openly" the Chinese Communists through a program of 
economic warfare designed either to force them away from a 
continuing association with the Soviets or to isolate and 
bring about the collapse or overthrow of a Communist regime, 
the NSC report dismissed as unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. First, a policy of economic sanctions and blockade 
would necessitate united front cooperation from the Western 
nations, something which American officials thought would 
not be possible, especially in view of important British 
commercial and investment interests in China and Hong Kong, 
the safety of which London had indicated to Washington would
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require establishing some sort of working relationship 
between the British and a Communist regime.®
Second, the NSC report suggested that if the exam­
ple of the Bolshevik's capacity to establish their own 
control in Russia in 1917, despite severe economic hardships 
in part caused by external embargos and blockades, was any 
measure of what a "determined and ruthless leadership” could 
do, then in the case of China such a tactic probably would 
be even less likely to succeed. In this regard, the study 
observed that
China's relative economic self- 
sufficiency at traditionally low standards 
of consumption should enable a disciplined 
and militant Communist regime to makeshift 
in the face of economic restrictions and 
embargos. Indeed, by painting itself in 
the role of defending China against for­
eign persecution, the Communist leadership 
might turn our action to its advantage and 
win to itself greater internal support.
Third, American initiated economic warfare against 
the Chinese Communists would make it exceedingly difficult 
for the Japanese to re-establish their important trade ties 
with North China and Manchuria, "thereby offering the pros­
pect of indefinite support of the Japanese economy by the 
United States." Fourth, such a policy likely would produce 
an immediate retaliation gainst United States property and 
citizens in areas under Chinese Communist control, undoubt­
edly with the further result of a full scale expulsion of
Q
Americans from China.
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But the last two consequences of a harsh trade 
policy were, in the view of the NSC report, those which it 
would be especially well to avoid if at all possible. 
Fifth, and with respect to the possibility of a Communist 
seizure of American property and expulsion from China of 
United States citizens, the study suggested that.
While such consequences for American 
interests in China would not, in them­
selves, constitute an important strategic 
set-back to the United States, they would 
represent the loss of opportunities for 
maintaining a flow of useful information 
on China and for continuing American 
cultural influence in China.
However, sixth, and most importantly, the report noted that
a policy of economic warfare
.. .probably would compel the Chinese 
Communists to eliminate any divergencies 
of opinion within the party and tend to 
drive the regime into a position of com­
plete subservience to the USSR, thus 
making impossible of attainment the pri­
mary objective (i.e., "prevention of 
Soviet domination of China for strategic 
ends") towards which it (i.e., this par­
ticular trade policy option) was direc­
ted. (parenthesis added)
In contrast to the alternative of open economic
warfare the NSC study went on to argue in favor of a policy
that would not have the "serious strategical shortcoming of 
inflexbility", or, to put it in more positive language, a 
policy which "would retain for the United States the degree 
of flexibility necessary to cope with the uncertain situa­
tion which lies ahead." The essence of this "uncertain
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situation" to which the report referred did not question but 
that the Chinese Communists were "doctrinaire Marxists, 
politically hostile to the United States and other western
nations, and predisposed to cooperate with the USSR "
However, the study also listed certain circumstances which 
contained the potential to cause tensions between the two. 
For one thing, the fact that the Soviets were materially 
involved in territories historically a part of China would 
have to contend with the countervailing fact that the 
Chinese "collectively have a deep seated resentment of
foreign domination " Also, the fact that the Chinese
Communist Party existed as a political and military power 
independent of Soviet support had far reaching implications 
with respect to the likelihood of the two, over time, always 
maintaining a community of interest on all matters. The 
betting was that it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
for both to sustain a concensus in the long run. Moreover, 
the report noted, the Chinese Communists were very much 
interested in the successful economic development of China 
and this, combined with the fact that the Chinese "are by 
nature highly acquisitive and opportunistic", could well 
produce a strong tendency to look to the best possible 
source of external assistance especially, as American offi­
cials thought was likely, if the Soviets, because of inade­
quate resources of their own, proved unable to meet Chinese 
requests and needs.
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Thus, by arguing in favor of a policy generally 
characterized as having a "degree of flexiblity", the NSC 
report foresaw the importance of the United States being 
able at some point to take advantage of those "forces as 
might operate to create serious rifts between Moscow and a 
Chinese Communist regime." With respect to developing this 
capacity, the study suggested a policy in which the United 
States would continue to trade with China, while encouraging 
Japan and other Western nations to do the same, but with the
restriction of developing adjustable export controls on all
high priority strategic "items of direct military utilty",
so as to avoid re-export of such materials to other commu-
12nist countries, but especially to the Soviet Union.
The NSC report concluded.
This policy would permit so far as 
the United States is concerned, restora­
tion, under essential security safeguards, 
of ordinary economic relations between 
China on the one hand and Japan and the 
western world on the other. It might 
enable... the acquisition from China of 
commodities important to Japanese self- 
support, and some continued operation in
China of private American interests.
If the Chinese Communists did not make this policy "unten­
able" by their actions, then it could come to pass over time 
that
—  the importance to the Chinese 
Communists of trade relations with Japan 
and the west might foster serious con­
flicts between the Kremlin and Chinese 
Communist policy and thereby tend to 
produce,^n independent Chinese Communist 
regime.
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In any event, even if circumstances did not prove 
to allow the Administration by such a policy "to exploit 
frictions between a Chinese Communist regime and the USSR", 
the United States would not have really suffered anything by 
trying. Besides, such an approach would not compromise the 
nation's capacity, if it became necessary, "to adopt a 
restrictive trade policy if the Chinese Communists were to 
demonstrate their determination to follow a course inimical 
to United States strategic interests.
Indeed, in view of worsening relations with the 
Chinese Communists and because of developing alarm in Wash­
ington over the apparent gathering momentum of the inter­
national communist movement, by the late Summer and early 
Fall of 1949, there was increasing talk of developing a more 
restrictive trade policy toward China. The Department of 
Defense especially was worried that continuing to trade in 
low priority strategic items, or even in some non-strategic 
goods so defined, would have the ultimate effect of enhanc­
ing the Chinese Communist, and in the view of Defense, also 
the Soviet, capacity to carry on aggressive activities more 
easily than if they had to produce these low or non- 
strategic materials themselves. In mid-September the White 
House also conceded that the NSC study which had existed as 
the basis for trade policy implementation since late Febru­
ary was in need of review and possible revision.
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In addition to the Defense Department's belief 
that for strategic reasons trade with the Chinese and the 
Russians ought to be curtailed as much as possible, the 
willingness of officials to discuss the possibilty of imple­
menting a more restrictive trade policy toward the Chinese 
Communists appears in significant measure to have been the 
result of the view that, as a matter of reciprocity and for 
the purpose of generating an appropriate great power image, 
the Administration might have to get tough with the Chinese
in view of their sustained hostility toward the United 
17States.
The more prominent argument on this score, though, 
was that the United States would be wise further to restrict 
trade with the Chinese Communists because to do so would put 
a tremendous strain not only on the Chinese but especially 
on their Soviet friends. The logic of this view was simple. 
The regime in China was going to require substantial outlays 
of assistance in order to achieve successful rehabilitation 
of the economy and to undertake a program of industrializa­
tion. In support of these objectives it was certain the 
Chinese would look to the Soviet Union for assistance but 
they also could be expected to solicit actively as much aid 
as possible from the West as well. To the degree this was 
provided by the Western nations, it would reduce by the same 
amount the strain on Soviet resources.
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However, if the Western nations managed to agree 
on a united front policy of limiting economic contact with 
the Chinese, the Russians would be faced with deciding on 
one of two essential options. On the one hand, if the 
Russians complied with Chinese requests and attempted to 
underwrite Chinese economic growth, it would detract from 
the overall Soviet capability in world affairs while causing 
a significant strain on the resources of the communist-bloc 
countries in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, if the 
Soviets were to admit to the Chinese that they did not have 
sufficient resources to make a sustained and meaningful 
contribution to China’s economic development —  which Ameri­
can officials believed to be the case —  then after a time 
either the Chinese people would lose faith in their commu­
nist leadership and bring the regime down or else the pre­
dominant pro-Soviet faction in the Chinese Communist Party 
would be eliminated and replaced by another willing to take 
the country in whatever direction promised to achieve the 
important goals of industrialization. In either case, the 
consequences of a Soviet decision would serve to promote the 
interests of the "free world".
In addition to these emerging suggestions that 
some greater American advantage was to be gained by modify­
ing, even scrapping, the existing trade policy toward China, 
it is also important to point out that by the late Summer of 
1949, the Administration retained no expectation of being
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able to develop a better relationship with the Chinese 
Communists. That the Chinese were a solid and loyal satel­
lite of the Russians, officials assumed, was a fundamental 
and compelling fact of the policymaking environment on China 
at least for the time being and the indefinite future, 
probably for decades. By the Fall of 1949, the available 
documentary evidence simply does not include much indication 
of official interest in discussing the merits of using a 
moderate, or conciliatory, trade policy for the purpose of
luring the Chinese Communists away from their presumed close
19Soviet connection.
Consequently and in context of serious questions 
being raised about the adequacy of the existing and moderate 
United States trade policy, in early November the State 
Department submitted a memorandum to the National Security 
Council reviewing the course of that policy since its imple­
mentation earlier in the year. Willing to concede that 
adding restrictions on certain lower priority strategic 
items would be appropriate, and that the flow of such goods 
should be closely monitored with the possibility in mind of 
establishing further limits, might it appear wise to do so, 
the State Department memorandum nonetheless generally con­
cluded that, "Although the effect of recent developments in 
China on American nationals has been a cause of much con­
cern, it has not been such as to alter the basic assumptions 
and concept of NSC 41." (the NSC number identification for
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the late February study which was the existing basis for 
United States trade policy toward China).
In late December the State Department's view that 
the broad essentials of American trade policy should remain 
the same received additional confirmation from the final 
report of the National Security Council's full-scale review 
of United States Far Eastern policy begun in the previous 
Summer (NSC 48), In this report, the NSC reasoned that if 
the object of United States trade policy was "to contain or 
tum-back Soviet-Communist imperialism", then it would be 
counter productive to implement an exclusively harsh trade 
policy toward the Chinese Communists, and certainly one 
which exceeded, in its severity, the restrictive economic 
measures being applied in the case of the Soviets them­
selves. While also agreeing that new restrictions on cer­
tain items of trade might be necessary, NSC 48 suggested 
that it would not be advisable to limit goods "destined for
normal civilian uses in China " Singling out the Chinese
Communists for economic punishment, the report implied, 
should be avoided so that the Administration might retain 
its future option of being able to,
—  exploit, through appropriate
political, psychological and economic 
means, any rifts between the Chinese 
Communists and the USSR and between the 
Stalinists and other elements in China, 
while scrupulously avoiding the appearance 
of intervention.
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Despite the admitted loss of any prospect for 
accomplishing one of the major objectives for which the 
policy hopefully had been designed in the first place, by 
the Fall of 1949 State officials began arguing the impor­
tance of retaining the existing American trade policy, NSC 
41, not because they had any hope of immediately being able 
to "exploit rifts" between the Chinese and the Russians, but 
because of their desire to avoid the negative consequences 
which they perceived would be the result of following a more 
aggressive course of action in commerical dealings with the 
Chinese Communists.
Of major significance was the continuing realiza­
tion by policymakers that there would be no possibility of 
developing a concensus among Western nations concerning 
trade with China. As already indicated, the British 
especially refused to agree with any policy which might 
endanger their future access to important economic interests 
in China and Hong Kong. Thus, State Department officials 
concluded that if the United States were to apply more 
restrictive trade sanctions against the Chinese Communists, 
the latter would have no difficulty in obtaining those 
restricted items from other Western nations. The effect in 
this regard merely would be to penalize American businessmen
by eliminating their opportunity for continuing to compete
22in the China market.
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Also, in the absence of consensus, any American 
effort to implement a harsh trade policy likely would pre­
cipitate considerable bickering on the matter between the 
Western nations with the result that instead of projecting 
the important image of Western strength and solidarity in a 
critical period of international communist aggression, it 
would suggest the provocative picture of "impotence and 
disunity" among the "free nations". Besides, tightening the 
screws on China trade would mean limiting as well Japanese 
opportunities for re-establishing a commercial relationship 
with the Chinese. Not only was this likely to have an 
adverse effect on Japan's ability to develop economic self- 
sufficiency but, in that event, would have the further 
result of producing an indefinite Japanese economic depen­
dency on continuing infusions of American aid.^^
In sum, the State Department argued that the 
projected potential advantages of following a harsh trade 
policy toward the Chinese Communists were not sufficient to 
offset the negative effect which such an approach would have 
on American and other "free world" business operations in 
China or on the nation's and the North Atlantic community's 
image in world affairs. Moreover, since no greater advan­
tage was to be gained by following an appreciably more 
severe trade policy, the fact that no immediate prospect 
existed for driving a wedge between Moscow and Peking thus 
did not exist to invalidate the presumption that, so long as
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circumstances permitted/ the Administration had nothing to 
lose and eventually something to be gained by maintaining a 
policy which, in its moderation, continued to include as a 
part of its design the latent ambition of someday being able 
to disrupt the existing close relationship of the Chinese 
and the Russians.Consequently, and in accord with the 
arguments of State, although there was continuing inter­
agency and intra-govemmental discussion on the question of 
revising American trade policy through the first half of 
1950, the thrust of NSC 41, reinforced by the conclusions of 
NSC 48, remained as the general guide on trade matters until 
the Korean War.
In the first half of 1949, the available documen­
tary evidence does not reveal any significant movement in 
the direction of better United States relations with the 
Chinese Communists. On the basis of reporting from the 
Embassy in Nanking, the Communists were viewed, whether 
accurately or not, as being in an extremely confident, even 
arrogant, mood, and little disposed to discuss seriously 
with any of the Western nations, let alone the United States, 
the issue of their legal status in the eyes of the inter­
national community. Although Communist authorities were 
reported to make constant reference to the fact that they 
lacked any sort of official relationship with the United 
States, the comments were interpreted by the Embassy not as 
feelers with respect to the possibility of establishing
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contacts with American officials for the purpose of discuss­
ing the question of better relations but rather as a "hack­
neyed excuse" for treating United States consular officials 
in Communist held areas in a rather heavy handed way in 
retaliation for the Administration’s pro-Nationalist poli­
cies.
Under these circumstances, the Administration 
clearly was reluctant to move too far or too quickly in 
broaching the question of establishing relations with the 
Communists. It is true that in early April the State Depart­
ment did authorize Ambassador Stuart to make preliminary 
contact with high Communist officials with the idea of 
initiating discussions on the topic. Nothing substantive 
came of the directive, however, until the latter part of 
June.
During 1949 there appear to have been three major 
opportunities —  two in the late spring and early summer and 
one in the fall subsequent to the formation of the Communist 
government in Peking —  for serious Chinese Communist Party- 
American exchange and more cordial relations. The first 
occurred in late May when the Communists, or at least a 
faction within the Chinese Communist Party —  American 
officials were not certain at the time whether the effort 
had higher Party approval —  approached the Administration 
suggesting that grounds indeed might exist for developing 
closer relations with the Western nations and with the United
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States in particular. Operating through an intermediary, 
Chou En-lai, then a member of the Party’s Central Committee 
and the Politburo, on May 31 indicated to the American 
Consul-General in Peking, O. Edmond Clubb, that the Chinese 
were going to have to look to the West, especially the 
United States and Great Britian, for sufficient aid if they 
expected to be able to have any realistic chance of achiev­
ing a successful rehabilitation of China's wartom economy. 
Although Chou "emphasized" that he did not speak for the 
Party as a whole, he explained that a "liberal" faction did
exist and was genuinely interested in establishing better
2 7relations with the West for this purpose.
In mid-June, the Communists then made a second 
significant gesture. On the eighteenth, the Party's Direc­
tor of the Office of Alien Affairs in Nanking, Huang Hua, 
made a suggestion to the American Ambassador, John Leighton 
Stuart, that he might want to consider traveling to Peking
for the purpose of talking with Chou En-lai, even Mao Tse- 
28tung himself. Ten days later the Ambassador was given a
29formal invitation to do so. It is significant to note 
that Huang Hua's mid-June suggestion, that the Ambassador 
might consider going to Peking, followed little more than a 
week after the last of two meetings in which Stuart had 
outlined to Huang what from the American point of view 
constituted the requirements for a normalization of rela­
tions between the United States and the Chinese Communists
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Subsequent to these two episodes, the third possi­
ble opportunity in 1949 for developing better relations with 
the Chinese Communists came in the period after the creation 
of the People’s Republic in early October. On October 2, 
Chou En-lai, newly appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
transmitted a formal statement to the American Consul- 
general in Peking, 0. Edmond Clubb, in which he indicated 
his view of the necessity "that there be established normal 
diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China
and all countries of the world." Chou requested that the
31Consul-general pass his message along to Washington.
A little less than a week later, Clubb advised the 
State Department of his belief that the Chinese Communists, 
for related political and economic reasons, probably were 
quite anxious to obtain formal diplomatic recognition from 
the West. Politically, Clubb suggested, the Chinese, and 
also the Soviets, were desirous that the recognition process 
go through successfully because otherwise "Communist China’s 
political usefulness...would be reduced for (the) USSR if 
China (was) unable (to) win acceptance in (the) inter­
national arena, so as to vote for (the) USSR." Economical­
ly, the Consul-general believed, if the Chinese expected to 
achieve rehabilitation of their society within a reasonable 
period of time, they were going to require better relations 
with the West so as to be able to obtain sufficient resour­
ces for the task. Moreover, Clubb went on to state, the
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Soviets probably would agree with this because of their
desire to avoid too great a strain being placed on their own
32scarce resources.
The Consul-general further noted several days 
later that since October 1 virtually all anti-American 
propaganda had been eliminated from the Communist controlled 
press. Although willing to equivocate that there might be 
more than one reason for this, Clubb proposed that the 
relative absence of anti -American comment could be interpre­
ted as "some real shift in (the) Communist propaganda line 
to aid the People's Government's bid for recognition." He 
concluded that while nothing was assured in this regard, he 
nonetheless advised that "There seems good reason (to) 
believe (the) Communist leaders truly desired American 
recognition and regularization (of) relations for both 
political and economic reasons, which this office has previ­
ously outlined.
With respect to the possibilities inherent in this 
situation, in November the Central Intelligence Agency 
revealed that Chou En-lai had made further comments in late 
October comparable to those he earlier had transmitted to 
Edmond Clubb in late May” Speaking to a "source", Chou 
reportedly had implied that the Chinese Communist Party was 
allied with the Soviets in substantial measure because it 
needed allies and that so long as the United States contin­
ued its association with "Chiang and the reactionaries" the
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Chinese Communists had no choice but to continue to look in 
the Soviet direction. Although the "source" of this infor­
mation relayed that Chou was,
— quite unwilling to risk (the) loss 
of Soviet friendship by making overtures 
to the United States and is further con­
strained from this course by the presence 
of the pro-Soviet Chinese Communist Party 
faction.,
he nonetheless was further quoted as saying that the 
"...American Government... can expect that the Chinese 
Communist Party will not always be anti-American.
It is not finally clear whether any of these three 
instances actually included substantive opportunities for 
developing better United States relations with the Chinese 
Communists. Whatever the potential involved, in the case of 
Chou En-lai ' s demarche of late May, American efforts in the 
latter part of June to transmit a reply were twice rejected, 
thus ending the matter. Although it is not known for sure 
why Chou refused to receive the American message, recent 
scholarship appears to confirm that the Soviets found out 
about the demarche and in placing enormous pressure on the 
inner councils of the Chinese Communist Party forced the 
latter to break off all contacts with the United States.
With respect to the potential of the situation in 
October, as will be shown later in the chapter, if nothing 
else, by the Fall of 1949, the American attitude had so 
hardened on the issue of better relations with the Chinese
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Communists, that, regardless of the opportunities which 
might have existed, there probably was little or no possi­
bility of moving in this direction. Besides, the hiatus in 
anti-American propaganda was short-lived and by the end of 
October and early November the Communist press was again 
filled with an anti-American diatribe and United States 
consular officials were reporting that on almost all matters,
whether official or private. Communist authorities appeared
36to be making it especially difficult for Americans.
It was somewhat different in the case of the 
Stuart invitation to visit Peking. Although it appears this 
was the most promising of the three opportunities —  Ameri­
can officials at the time thought it a more significant 
Communist gesture than the Chou demarche —  the invitation 
finally was rejected by the Administration. The reasons for 
this were multiple and will be discussed in some detail 
below. However, as recent scholarship indicates, in this 
particular instance. State Department officials in Washing­
ton seem to have opposed Stuart’s traveling to Peking party 
because of their concern that, besides causing a great 
public furor in the United States, it would have greatly 
complicated the Administration’s effort beginning in June to 
obtain favorable congressional consideration on two impor­
tant matters: confirmation of W. Walton Butterworth to fill
the newly created position of Assistant Secretary for Far 
Eastern Affairs and passage of the Administration’s request 
for economic and military assistance to Korea.
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It is of considerable interest, moreover, to 
observe that on July 1, the same day on which Secretary of 
State Acheson notified Ambassador Stuart that "under no 
circumstances" was he to proceed to Peking, the Secretary 
also sent a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Tom Connolly of Texas, promising that 
the Administration would consult with Congress before making 
any decision regarding the recognition of a Communist govern­
ment in China. The message to Connolly was in response to a 
letter forwarded to the White House a week before and signed 
by twenty-one Senators (16 Republican and 5 Democratic) 
demanding that the United States not extend recognition to a
Communist regime before consulting with Congress on the 
37matter. Although Acheson’s directive to Stuart on the 
same day as the Connolly letter undoubtedly must be viewed 
as coincidence, it cannot be denied that, if the American 
Ambassador had traveled to Peking for consultations with 
Chou and Mao, it would have been widely interpreted as 
preliminary to improved relations between the United States
and the Chinese Communists, possibly to include formal
38recognition of a Communist regime.
It is important to stress, however, that while the 
official desire to avert public furor and to avoid difficul­
ty in the legislative haggling over Butterworth’s confirma­
tion and Korean aid were important considerations in the 
Administration's particular decision in late June of 1949
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not to allow Ambassador Stuart to travel to Peking to talk 
with Communist leaders, this should not be taken to imply 
that public opinion had become a decisive factor in prevent­
ing the Administration from moving in the direction of 
better relations with the Chinese Communists, to include 
extending recognition to their regime after October of 1949.
It is certainly true, that in the process of
developing their policy toward the situation in China,
officials received intense pressure from pro-Nationalist
groups in Congress and from the public-at-large in the year
and a half prior to the Korean War, though especially during
and after the Summer of 1949. Nor can it be denied that, at
least on the surface, the total complex of pressures on
decision makers would appear to suggest an influential
relationship between the heavy weight of those pressures and
the course of the Administration's China policy in 1949 and
1950. It is not surprising, therefore, that many observers
have assumed that Administration officials were deterred
from maneuvering in the direction of better relations with
the Chinese Communists, because of their desire to avoid
provoking an even greater storm of protest than that which
39already existed.
There is no doubt that enormous pressure would 
have been brought to bear on the Administration had it moved 
to recognize a Communist regime and that such a decision 
clearly would have run counter to a preponderance of public
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opinion.^® In view of this, it may be conceded that, all 
other considerations aside, the factor of public opinion by 
itself would have been a significant deterrent to the Admin­
istration's recognizing a Communist government. On the 
other hand, had officials been convinced that recognition 
was in the best interests of the nation, that establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Communist regime was vital to 
the process of effectively containing Soviet power in Asia, 
it is equally possible the Administration would have made a 
major effort to counter its critics and to educate the 
American public to its point of view.
These are largely academic considerations, how­
ever, for, the fact of the matter was, decision-makers be­
lieved the opposite to be true, namely, that recognition was 
not in the best interests of the nation and that containment 
priorities would be poorly served in such an event. The 
documents clearly reveal that, from the point at which the 
issue began to be discussed early in 1949, though especially 
beginning in May and after, at no time during 1949 or in 
1950 prior to the Korean War did policymakers ever consider 
it feasible to develop a friendlier relationship with the 
Chinese Communists for a variety of reasons which had 
nothing to do with public opinion or with the pressures 
caused by the Administration's China policy critics.
Although all contributing factors must be under­
stood as inter-related, it is possible for the purpose of
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explanation to divide Administration thinking on this ques­
tion into two broad categories. There existed, on the one 
hand, a number of problems at the diplomatic level which the 
United States and the Chinese Communists were never able to 
resolve in 1949, problems which any two nations would have 
had to work out in order to establish the basis for a nor­
malization of relations, e.g., would the new government 
honor existing American treaties and agreements with China; 
what would be the regime’s attitude toward American property 
and citizens; what sort of treatment would be accorded to 
United States diplomatic and consular representatives?
The fact that no Communist government formally 
existed which the United States could recognize until Octo­
ber of 1949 —  a situation which American officials repeat­
edly referred to as a factor in their unwillingness to 
extend recognition until that time —  also could be included 
in this category.However, it can only be assumed that on 
this level, the lack of a basis for ^  jure recognition 
would not have constituted much of a problem for the Admin­
istration in developing some sort of legal association with 
the Communists in view of the unalterable fact that by the 
Summer of 1949 they were in facto control of nearly all 
of China. In other words, if the Administration really had 
wanted to recognize the existing condition of Communist 
authority in China, the legal procedures for doing so were 
available.
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The second constraint on the Administration in 
dealing with the Chinese Communist Party was concern about 
the Soviet Union. The policy problems for resolution were 
several; what approach was most likely to result in an 
effective containment of Soviet power in Asia, how best 
could the Kremlin's influence in China be reduced and elim­
inated, how could American prestige in Asia and the world 
best be maintained and enhanced; what sort of procedure 
would favor the American advantage in the strategic scheme 
of international power politics and which one would work 
best to promote the disadvantage of the Russians and the 
international communist movement? As the U.S. Charge 
d'affaires in Moscow stated the problem in a memorandum in 
late June of 1949, the "China policy of (the) West must be 
based not on China alone but upon our relationship with 
(the) entire Soviet-dominated communist world.
Despite the Administration's desire to retain as 
much of the United States' influence in China as a counter 
to that of the Soviets, the American position, official and 
private, deteriorated steadily throughout 1949. It is 
difficult to see how it could have been otherwise in view of 
the Administration's policy of recognizing and supporting 
the Nationalist government. So long as this policy remained 
in effect there was very little, if any, chance for the 
United States and the Chinese Communists to develop a closer 
relationship.
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On the other hand, however much the lack of oppor­
tunities in this regard may be traced to the continuing
Washington-Nanking-Taipei association, it is of some inter­
est to note that newly; released documentary evidence in 
combination with the results of recently completed scholarly 
research raises very compelling questions as to just what 
policy options realistically were available to the Chinese 
Communists. Two observations are pertinent. First, a
bitterly anti -American and pro-Soviet faction in the Chinese 
Communist Party not only appears to have been in the ascen­
dancy in 1949 but as well seems to have had firm control 
over the military wing of the P a r t y . I n  contrast, a
pro-Western faction that centered on Cho En-lai and which 
may have favored closer ties with the United States, as 
Edmund Clubb expressed it, "controls no troops and unless 
his views have (the) support (of) important military ele­
ments he and other potential Titos would assuredly lose out 
in any attempt (at a) palace coup.
Second, the Soviets appear to have been able to 
bring enormous pressure to bear on the Chinese, not only on 
the basis of the intra-party predominance of the pro-Russian 
faction but also because of the presence of a puppet regime 
in Manchuria over which the Soviets exercised a deciding 
influence. The Chinese Communist leadership simply could 
not afford to lose access to the resources and heavy indus­
trial potential of the area if they hoped to engage in a
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successful program of economic development for China as a 
whole. In other words, the province, in effect, existed as 
a hostage to the continuing loyalties of Peking and thus 
constituted a significant impediment to any Chinese move in 
the direction of friendlier relations with the United 
States.
In any event, and irrespective of the Soviet 
induced curbs which might have existed on the freedom of the 
Chinese to pursue the option of better relations with the 
United States, the fact remains that American policy preclu­
ded this possibility in its own right. The Consul-General 
at Shanghai, John M. Cabot, put his finger on the problem of 
the United States pursuing a policy poised ambiguously 
between attempting to win Chinese Communist respect while at 
the same time answering Chinese hostility in kind. In an 
early July dispatch Cabot observed that "in our China policy 
we cannot have it both ways." If the Administration's 
intent in maintaining the various levels of American involve­
ment in China, public and private, had as one of its primary 
purposes conserving the nation's capacity to exercise influ­
ence in Chinese affairs, then in his opinion the decision 
not to allow Stuart to travel to Peking was "disastrous" 
since by this decision the United States had
...rejected (an) opportunity to place 
(the) foreign viewpoint and problems before 
(the) top Communists and to establish some 
local working contacts which are so needed
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and so lacking in (the) present ominous 
situation. We may also have placed those 
Communists favoring better relations with 
(the) West in (an) impossible situation and 
(the) general resentment at our rebuff may 
aggravatea) dangerous situation develop­
ing here.**
Thus Cabot implied, either get on with the effort 
to develop some influence with the Chinese Communists, an 
option which he preferred, or with the more aggressive 
approach, in which case he advised that American citizens 
should be evacuated from China even if it meant compensating 
them for lost property. This, he believed, would be cheaper 
in the long run than having to pay the costs of those inci­
dents involving Communist pressure on American citizens and 
property which were sure to occur in the course of pursuing 
"a positively antagonistic policy.
Whatever the merit of these views, the ambivalence 
in policy remained, ultimately to the point of its own 
resolution on the side of increasingly bitter American 
attitudes toward the Chinese Communists, created by the 
accumulation of those very incidents involving United States 
citizens and property which Cabot had warned would occur by 
continuing the existing policy. With only brief respite in 
1949 Chinese Communist propaganda was continuously hostile, 
frequently singling out the United States for especially 
vituperative condemnation as the chief "enemy" of the 
Chinese people. In this context, American commercial firms 
faced increasing difficulties in carrying on with the normal
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course of their business operations. Restrictions imposed 
by State monopolies limited businessmen to the point of 
their having to clear virtually all the activities of their 
firms with Communist authorities. Plans were announced for 
imposing taxes on the profits of foreign owned commerce. In 
the absence of police intervention, Chinese laborers be­
sieged their American employers, not allowing them to leave 
their offices until agreements were reached on labor con­
tracts, allowances made for severance pay, and until other 
demands were met. In many instances, exit visas were denied 
to "skilled technicians" until they agreed to instruct the 
Chinese in their special skills, and to executives and 
managers as well until the affairs of their firms were 
settled. Indeed, there were threats to hold Americans until 
all future claims against their companies were settled to 
Communist satisfaction.^^
On the diplomatic side, the Communists repeatedly 
underscored their refusal to be bound by any existing Ameri­
can multilateral or bilateral treaties and agreements with 
China, more than thirty in all if several from the pre-1911 
Imperial period were included. Just as in the case of those 
limitations imposed on the activities of citizens in the 
private sector. Communist authorities in 1949 increasingly 
curtailed American diplomatic and consular operations as 
well. Restrictions were placed on the movement of American 
officials. In some instances they were placed under virtual
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house arrest. Communist officials increasingly refused to 
have any contact with American representatives on the 
grounds that formal diplomatic relations did not exist 
between the two. Exit visas were denied and police refused 
to intervene in the siege of consular and embassy buildings 
by mobs of Chinese who refused to allow any contact with the 
outside. Radio communications were increasingly limited and 
in some cases finally discontinued as a diplomatic courtesy. 
Outright physical intimidation of American consular officers 
occurred including several instances of beating and injury. 
There were violations of official quarters by Communist 
soldiers including an early morning entry in late April into 
the bedroom of the American Ambassador in Nanking. By the 
end of the summer the Communists had eliminated all United 
States Information Service activity in areas under their 
control. Indeed, in all respects official American opera­
tions declined to such an extent that by the end of 1949 
only the consulates in Nanking, Shanghai and Peking contin­
ued to function with all official personnel being evacuated 
finally in late April of 1950.^^
Although these cumulative episodes were in them­
selves galling enough, what really produced American intran­
sigence in the matter of dealing with the Chinese Communists 
was their arrest and detention of United States citizens and 
representatives. Since October of 1948 Marine Sergeant 
Elmer C. Bender and a civilian engineer, William C. Smith,
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both members of the American naval headquarters at Tsingtao,
had been held by the Chinese Communists on charges of spy-
52ing. They were not released until May of 1950. In early
July, the American Vice Consul at Shanghai was arrested,
beaten and jailed for a short period of time under the
53threat of being tried for espionage.
However, it was the in-house detention of the
entire staff of the Mukden consulate also since October of
1948, which the Administration viewed as being especially
serious, so serious in fact that it was included, along with
the Smith-Bender case, as a factor automatically precluding
American recognition of a Communist regime in nearly all
official discussions on the matter in the year or so prior
54to the Korean War. Even more ominously, the October 1949 
arrest, imprisonment and trial of the Mukden staff so in­
furiated the President that he talked in terms of blockading 
the China coast from Tientsin to Shanghai and sinking any 
Chinese vessels not heeding American w a r n i n g s . H e  even 
requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pass on the feasibil­
ity of a plan for sending military forces to rescue the 
consulate staff. The JCS advised against any such effort.
The failure to resolve these multiple points of 
diplomatic friction, and, as a result, the ensuing intensi­
fication of American bitterness and hostility toward the 
Chinese Communists, must be traced, in substantial measure.
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to the second of the above described categories of consider­
ations which entered into Administration thinking on the 
question of relations with Peking, to wit, those considera­
tions which revolved around the fundamental policy question 
in 1949 and 1950: what sort of approach to the Chinese
Communists would best serve to shatter the momentum of the 
international communist movement thus to contain and eventu­
ally force a retreat of Soviet power and influence in Asia 
and the world?
Although some discussion on the question of recog­
nition of the Chinese Communists did occur in Washington in 
the early months of 1949, it was not until the latter part 
of May that the matter began to receive close attention. 
Already, in the latter part of April, the Central Intelli­
gence Agency, on the basis of the belief that the Nation­
alist cause was hopeless, had reported that "China has
ceased to be a calculable factor in relation to US secur- 
57ity." One month later, with all of central China lost to
the Communist control, the CIA advised that
The most pressing current problem for 
the US and other foreign powers is that of 
deciding the nature of their future diplo­
matic and commercial relations with the 
new regime which the Communists will 
certainly^ establish within the next few 
months."
Accordingly, Administration officials began to elaborate and 
clarify the criteria by which they hoped to be able to judge 
and to act on the requirements of the situation.
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Administration thinking from the outset generally 
consisted of two essential guidelines: one, that the United
States itself should refrain from any implication of being 
willing to move gratuitously in the direction of recognition 
and, second, that the United States and the West European 
nations should develop a "united front" policy on all mat­
ters relating to the i s s u e . T h e  Adminstration never 
relinquished this position prior to the Korean War, though 
the hope to maintain a "united front" with the Europeans was 
frustrated before the end of 1949 with the British making it 
clear that their interests in China and Hong Kong required 
establishing formal relations with the Communist government 
in Peking.
Theoretically, American policy was one of "wait 
and see", of not moving "precipitously" until the Chinese 
Communists were willing to deal with the United States in a 
manner which officials deemed fair and equitable. For one 
thing, the Communists would have to demonstrate in their 
relations with other nations a capacity to abide by the 
nomal and accepted rules of international conduct. Already 
in early February of 1949 Secretary of State Acheson had 
established that any possibility of the United States and 
the Chinese Communists developing a friendier relationship 
would depend on the degree to which the latter proved capa­
ble of respecting treaty obligations with the United States 
and other foreign powers.
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However, on the basis of the shabby treatment of 
American officals and citizens by Communist authorities in 
areas under their control, by mid-1949 American officials 
were virtually certain that the Chinese could not be expec­
ted to abide by the "normal rules" of international conduct. 
The Chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese 
Affairs, Philip Sprouse, argued that "if (Chinese Communist) 
acceptance (of their international responsibilities) is not
obtained prior to recognition we fear that it would probably
62be impossible to obtain even this subsequently." Several 
weeks later, the Acting Secretary of State, James E. Webb, 
clearly outlined the Administration's position on the matter 
when he directed that the American Consul General in Peking 
pass along the following reply to the late May Chou En-lai 
demarche :
While we welcome expressions (of) 
friendly sentiments, he must realize that 
they canot be expected to bear fruit until 
they have been translated into deeds 
capable of convincing (the) American 
people that Sino-US relations can be 
placed upon (a) solid basis (of) mutual 
respect and understanding to (the) benefit 
(of) both nations.
Although American policy ideally allowed that the 
Chinese Communists should be given the opportunity to demon­
strate their independence, in fact, at the top levels of the 
Administration, also by the Summer of 1949, policymakers had 
come to accept the irrefutable truth that the Chinese asso­
ciation with Moscow was extremely close —  the implications
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of the Chou demarche and the Stuart invitation notwithstand­
ing. It was axiomatic in official thinking, therefore, that 
the Chinese inevitably were to be counted among those forces 
in the world aggressively determined to undermine and to 
ultimately destroy Western society and culture. In a word, 
Peking's presumed ties with Moscow created a condition, 
which, by definition in the American way of thinking, meant 
that the Chinese simply were incapable of abiding by the 
normal rules of international conduct. The very meaning of 
the category "aggressor" precluded that the entity to which 
the label was attached had the ability to act responsibly 
and peacefully in world affairs.
Here was the bottom line for American policymakers. 
The Chinese Communists had to prove, without a shadow of a 
doubt, that they had the ability to act as a sovereign 
government and as a nation fully independent of the Krem­
lin's influence or control. In the absence of this, in 1949 
and in 1950 prior to the Korean War, there existed not the 
shred of a chance that the Administration would consider 
recognition of a Communist regime. Though discussion did 
continue throughout 1949 and into 1950 concerning the ques­
tion of a possible split between the Chinese Communists and 
the Soviet Union, decision makers never perceived more than 
the vague outline of circumstantial evidence pointing in 
such a direction. Indeed, the evidence seemed overwhelming 
that the Chinese were not calling their own plays.
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In view of this, there always remained the persis­
tent suspicion that any and all Chinese Communist feelers to 
the United States on the matter of better relations were 
made, not in accord with a genuine desire to develop a 
healthier relationship, but on the basis of ulterior and 
self-serving motives, a tendency American officials always 
felt comfortable in assessing against the presumed insidious 
potential of the communist c h a r a c t e r . A s  a result, Ameri­
can officials could only conclude, as casually expressed by 
the Charge' of the Moscow Embassy, that, in the matter of 
better relations with the Chinese Communists, the "long view 
is the only view" and that "Mao is not for sale now.
In the meantime, waiting was the only plan for 
encouraging conflict in the Moscow-Peking axis. In fact, 
the thrust of official speculation on the matter appeared to 
suggest that any active American effort to encourage Chinese 
deviation in the immediate setting might prove more a lia­
bility than an asset to American interests. In the process 
of reiterating its opinion that the "uncertainties of CCP- 
USSR relations are uncertainties of the future and not of 
(the) present", the Embassy in Moscow proposed that in their 
deviousness the Soviets themselves might have encouraged all 
the "Titoist" talk about the Chinese Communist Party as a 
device by which to weaken Western vigilance.
Although this was probably not the case in 1949, 
in the latter part of July, the Consul-General in Peking,
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Clubb, raised a more compelling possibility by reporting a
conversation with some of his Chinese contacts in which they
had warned that a United States touting of Mao Tse-tung as a
potential Asian Tito, and certainly by treating him as such,
would have the effect of putting enormous pressure on Mao
who as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party had no
choice for the time being but to maintain a proper attitude
67toward the Soviet Union. Several months later the in­
creasingly isolated American Embassy in Nanking relayed to 
Washington its
—  impression— that Titoism arose in 
Yugoslavia not because of an action or 
failure to act on (the) part of (the)
Western Powers, but as direct results of 
actions injurious to Yugoslav political 
independence and economic reconstruction.
We consider estrangement between China and 
(the) USSR will probably arise in (the) 
same way and our recognition at this time 
could contribute little or nothing to this 
development.
It is significant to note that by mid-Summer of 
1949 the policymaking belief that United States recognition 
of a Chinese Communist regime would have no beneficial 
impact on American efforts to undermine Soviet influence in 
China or to contain international communism in Asia had been 
joined by the thinking of some in the State Department that 
United States interests in Asia might be better served by 
taking a hard-line policy toward the Chinese Communists. It 
was not a policy orientation accepted by the Administration 
in the period prior to the Korean War, though it was an
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attitude which found increasing popularity side by side with 
the less overtly hostile approach which remained in effect 
until mid-1950.
Anger at being pushed around by the Chinese Commu­
nists was underscored by the more rational assessment that 
passivity in the face of aggression would beget further 
aggression and that by its very nature aggression required a 
firm response. In this view, it would be necessary for the 
United States to take some action to dispel the label of 
"paper tiger" being used by the Chinese Communists to de­
scribe the American presence in Asia and to offset any hint 
of the image that the nation might not have the capacity for 
effectively reversing the communist momentum in Asian 
affairs.
As a measure of this hard-line attitude, it is 
important to cite several examples. In early July, the 
Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, 
George Kennan, suggested in a memorandum that in view of the 
fact there seemed little chance of denying Formosa and the 
Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through a continuation 
of existing policy, it seemed to him there were two essen­
tial policy options. The first would entail some sort of 
multilateral action designed to keep the islands from Commu­
nist control. The second he suggested,
...would be to announce a temporary 
unilateral reassertion of authority over
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the islands on the grounds that subse­
quent events had invalidated all the 
assumptions underlying the Cairo Declara­
tion and that U.S. intervention was re­
quired by the interests of stability in 
the Pacific area as well as by the inters 
ests of the inhabitants of the islands.
While admitting that all available information 
would appear to indicate that both options "should be rejec­
ted" and that the United States should reconcile itself as 
to the eventual fall of Formosa, Kennan went on to say that,
I personally feel that if the second 
course were to be adopted and to be car­
ried through with sufficient resolution, 
speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance, 
the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done 
it, it would be not only successful but 
would have an electrifying effect in this 
country and throughout the Far East, I
have nothing -to support this view but my 
own instinct.
Kennan conceded any such policy would entail
enormous risks, it would "provide the Kremlin and Chinese
Stalinists with a welcome propaganda foil", and it "would
involve a considerable amount of pushing people around,
which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral
71conflicts within our own people and government." Nonethe­
less, the PPS Director proposed that the matter might be 
taken up in the National Security Council and with respect 
to the consideration "that our situation in the Far East 
will not permit further inaction in areas where our military
and economic capabilities would be adequate to meet the
7Ppossible commitment flowing from intervention___ " He
-530-
concluded that if the NSC would agree to this sort of action, 
despite the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
commit military forces to defend Formosa, “then my personal
73view is that we should take the plunge.”
In a late August memorandum, John P. Davis, Jr., 
then a member of the Policy Planning Staff, established that
Never in the history of U.S. rela­
tions with China has the predominate 
regime of that country viewed us with such 
uncompromising enmity. Never has the 
prestige of the United States in China 
been so low. And never have we been so 
apparently at a.loss to make our influence 
felt in China.
However, even more alarming, Davies thought, was the fact 
that there,
... is the mistaken evaluation by the 
dominate faction in (the) Chinese Commu­
nist leadership of international realities 
and power relationships in the world. The 
Communists’ victory over the Nationalists 
armed with American weapons, their humili­
ation of the British Navy in the lower 
Yangtze and their ignorance of the real 
significance of air power have resulted in 
the thesis that the U.S. is a "paper 
tiger". The U.S.S.R. certainly has no
interest in disabusing the Communists of
this mischievous fancy.
And, Davis lamented, "For our part, it must be admitted, we 
have done little to belie the role of 'paper tiger' attribu­
ted to us."^^
Davis believed this to be a "risky" and "explo­
sive" situation, one in which the "initiative lies in the
reckless hands" of the Communists who, because they were
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•'unaware of power realities in the world and uncurbed by any 
manifestation of effective counter-force", could be expected 
on the basis of their "fanaticism", therefore, to "feel free 
to engage in the dangerous game of mounting provocation." 
This "intolerable state of affairs" could only be remedied, 
he argued, by the United States making unequivocally clear 
to the Communists that "we have both the ability and the
7 A
will to do compelling damage to their vital interests."
While acknowledging that any American action taken 
in this regard could not have as its objective the "utterly 
quixotic" one of the "unconditional surrender" of the Commu­
nists, nor for that matter one calculated "to create a 
formal state of war" with them, Davies suggested "The only 
feasible aim is a limited and flexible one —  coercion by 
punitive action or the threat thereof. " By advocating the 
procedure of "coercion by punitive action", he proposed that 
the Defense Department and the National Security Council be 
asked to consider the option of American air power being 
brought to bear through the use of "hit and run, attritive 
raids" against selected targets throughout China and on a
severely reciprocal basis -- a bombing mission in response
77to each serious incident of Chinese provocation. Davies 
conceded that this sort of American escalation might lead to 
serious problems with the Soviets, and yet, he observed.
The question must arise some place in 
our relations with the U.S.S.R. —  and it 
will probably be in Asia —  whether we can
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afford to follow indefinitely a policy of 
avoiding risks of c^flict with them at 
whatever cost to us.
Here was the man, John P. Davies, Jr., who in the early 
1950's the congressional Red baiters and McCarthyite extrem­
ists would accuse of being soft on communism!
Finally, in addition to the Kennan and Davies 
contributions to the emerging hard-line position in the 
State Department, one must consider the manner of thinking 
present in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs only weeks 
before the outbreak of the Korean War. Proposing that "The 
United States faces a new and critical period in its world 
position", a memorandum first written by John Foster Dulles 
and subsequently endorsed by the recently appointed Assis­
tant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, 
argued that.
The loss of China to the Communists 
who, it now seems will work as junior 
partners of Soviet Communism has had 
tremendous repercussions throughout the 
world. It has marked a shift in the 
balance of power in favor of Soviet Russia 
and to the disfavor of the United States.
While that basic fact is generally 
accepted, no one is yet quite sure as to 
the precise extent to which that power 
relationship has been shifted. Throughout 
the world, in Europe, the Mediterranean, 
the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, 
governments and peoples are intently 
watching for the next move which will 
provide a measure of the extent of the 
power shift, so that they^gan orient their 
own policies accordingly.
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Having noted a series of pertinent considerations, the 
memorandum went on to argue that in view of the fact that 
"peoples are intently watching for the next move", the 
United States was going to have to take specific steps to 
demonstrate its competence to neutralize, even reverse, the 
recent "shift in the balance of power in favor of Soviet 
Russia.
As this situation related to the problems of 
Formosa, the Assistant Secretary continued his memo by 
conceding that there was little question but that a decision 
to withhold the island from Communist control "would involve 
spreading of our own military force, and possibly some 
actual losses" and that "a strong stand...would involve a 
slightly increased risk of early war." However, these 
considerations were only of a "secondary order" in context 
of the time and the need to take decisive action for the 
purpose of offsetting the momentum of the international 
communist movement. The fall of Formosa, he believed, not 
only would constitute a profound embarrassment to the nation, 
but at the same time it would "not leave a good taste if we
allow our political problems to be solved by the extermina-
81tion of our war allies....'' With respect to the possibil­
ity that a "strong stand" on Formosa might result in a more 
general escalation of hostilities, the memorandum concluded 
with the thought that "sometimes such a risk has to be taken 
in order to preserve peace in the world and to keep the
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national prestige required if we are to play our indispens-
82able part in sustaining a free world."
Mao Tse-tung’s shopping trip to the Soviet Union 
in mid-December of 1949 merely confirmed the official belief 
in the close Moscow-Peking connection while at the same time 
serving to convince the hard-liners in the Administration of 
the importance of the United States implementing a more 
aggressive containment policy —  a notion given extensive 
and needed conceptual support by the release of NSC 68 in 
April of 1950. On the other hand, there was, at the time, 
some discussion of the possibility that Mao's pilgrimage 
would not be successful; that the Soviets would fail to come 
through with adequate aid to offset China's economic prob­
lems, therefore to trigger Peking's presumed latent prag­
matic capacity to look elsewhere for assistance; or, that 
Stalin would attempt to exact too many concessions from his 
East Asian compatriots, thus to violate Chinese nation­
alistic sensibilities.
As a result, officials were able to add one more 
rationalization to their already extensive list of reasons 
for not recognizing a Chinese Communist regime. The Admin­
istration would do well, so the reasoning went, to wait and 
see if the Kremlin possessed sufficient "wisdom and flexi­
bility" to deal with the Chinese differently than the heavy 
handed way in which they had moved to dominate the East 
European satellites. If the Soviets proved inept in this
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regard, then opportunities, to include use of the recogni­
tion issue, might develop for exacerbating conflicts between 
the two.®^
But few in the Administration expected much, if 
anything, in this regard and it was no surprise when, within 
several weeks after Mao’s departure, the Central Intelli­
gence Agency warned in mid-January 1950 that,
Soviet penetration of key units of 
the Peiping administration is now in 
process and the USSR, capitalizing on the 
Sino-Soviet alliance and China's request 
for assistance, is installing itself 
solidly in China, thus reducing the chanc­
es for Chinese "Titoism"....
The late February State Department assessment of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty, concluded at mid-month on the basis of Mao's
stay in Moscow, confirmed the CIA prognosis by concluding
that, while there might be some "public rumbling" in China
over the perceived insufficiency of the agreements, there
was little doubt that all such expressions of disappointment
would be "quelled forceably by the Stalinist faction within
the... Party, whose position has been greatly strengthened
85by their conclusion."
As though Administration officials needed to be 
reminded about what this meant, the same January CIA report 
had observed that since the Moscow-Peking relationship could 
be expected to remain close, there was every reason to 
believe that China would continue to "be a reliable instru­
ment of Soviet foreign policy" for some time to come. Since
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there was no question but that the Soviets would attempt to 
expand their power and influence beyond China, the CIA could 
only assume, therefore, that.
The chief threat China will pose to 
US interests in Asia will be as a base 
from which to carry onggrevolutionary 
activity elsewhere in Asia.
In fact, the Agency revealed that "As of January 1950 a kind
of Cominform of the Orient has been set up in Peiping"
operating under the guise of the communist-dominated World
Federation of Trade Unions and that in the immediate future
its initial efforts probably would be directed toward exacer-
87bating the deteriorating French position in Indochina. A 
month later, the CIA expanded on the implications of this by 
adding that.
In view of (the) recognition of 
Vietnam by the US and UK, the total defeat 
of the French and Bao Dai would cause 
Western influence to sink to a new low 
throughout the Far East.
Moreover, the February report continued that "If Indochina 
fell into Communist hands, the way would be paved for Commu­
nist control over Thailand and Burma", with Indonesia not 
far behind.®^
These CIA assessments in the early months of 1950 
described the very situation which American officials long 
had anticipated probably would develop once a Communist 
regime came to power in China and was another reason why the 
Administration had refused to consider recognizing a Chinese
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Communist government in 1949, because, in the words of the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, W.
Walton Butterworth, recognition "by the Western Powers would
90cause adverse reactions in Southeast Asia."
Actually, the American position did not reflect 
the thinking of most Asian governments on the matter which, 
with the exception of Thailand’s opposition to recognition 
and the Philippines' willingness to follow the United 
States' lead, by the late months of 1949 definitely leaned 
in the direction of establishing diplomatic relations with 
the Chinese Communists. Besides the fear of being politic­
ally isolated and of missing the bandwagon and the view that 
economic interests would be better served, the arguments in 
support of recognition were several: it would produce in
the Chinese a willingness to abide by their international 
obligations; it would mute Chinese Communist hostility and 
deflect their intention to support subversive activities 
designed to overthrow other governments ; it would allow 
other governments in the area to better protect their inter­
ests while putting them in a better position to have a 
moderating influence on the Peking regime; by providing 
contrary influences to those of the Soviets it would hasten 
the emergence of "Titoist" tendencies in the Chinese. By 
the end of 1949, West European countries also were coming
around to this point of view, especially behind the British
91lead on the question.
-538-
It will be recalled that in October of 1949 the 
State Department had invited an assembly of experts on Asia 
from around the country to contribute their views to the 
in-house review of United States Far Eastern policy begun in 
August by the special review group, the Committee of Three, 
headed by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup. The conclu­
sions of this congregation of experts had anticipated the 
probability of international divisiveness on the question of 
recognition by explaining that if other nations did extend 
recognition to the Peking government it would leave the 
United States somewhat isolated in the matter and with the
unwelcome prospect of being "forced into temporizing with a
92situation beyond its ability to control."
On the other hand, the experts also argued that in
terms of American interests a fine line existed between
recognizing a Chinese Communist regime too late and in doing
so too early, that if the Administration should avoid being
left behind neither should it precipitously and gratuitously
move to grant recognition prior to a Chinese willingness to
honor its international obligations. If this were to happen,
the experts believed, the United States "would appear to be
93engaging in a panicky retreat in all of Asia...."
This last piece of advice closely resembled the 
weight of official opinion. Policymakers agreed with none 
of the arguments advanced by those favoring recognition and 
were convinced that it would fail to achieve any of the
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results which Asians and Europeans anticipated. But there 
was more to it than this. Assuming that the Peking regime 
would continue to operate for some time to come as an agent 
of the international communist movement, officials believed 
that American recognition simply would remove one further 
obstacle to a more convenient Chinese Communist penetration 
into Southeast Asia affairs. The Chief of the State Depart­
ment’s Division of East European Affairs, Charles W. Yost, 
elaborated this point in a late August 1949 memorandum to 
Ambassador-at-Large Jessup by arguing that
Prompt recognition of the Communist 
regime by the Western powers would be 
interpreted throughout the Far East, 
including China, as a clear sign that we 
are ready to accommodate with the commu­
nists. Elements of resistance in China 
and governments of neighboring countries 
would consider that they had no alterna­
tive but to accommodate and their accommo­
dation would almost certainly go much 
further than ours, amounting in some cases 
to total capitulation---
Non-recognition, in other words, was a symbol of American
opposition to communist expansion into Southeast Asia, a
symbol which, so long as the Peking regime remained tied to
the aggressive designs of the Kremlin, had to be sustained
as a means for boosting anti-communist morale and as a point
around which the forces of resistance to communism in Asia
could rally.
In retrospect, it is clear that in 1949 and until 
June of 1950 at no time did policymakers perceive the exis­
tence of substantive opportunities for developing better
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relations with the Chinese Communists. At no time in this 
period did officials consider that it would serve the Ameri­
can interest to accord diplomatic recognition to a Chinese 
Communist government. Even those, whose advice leaned most 
in the direction of assuming that the United States realis­
tically could not postpone recognizing a Communist regime 
indefinitely, were not prepared to argue that conditions 
were right in the year or so prior to thé Korean War. 
Although the State Department’s in-house Far Eastern policy
review group, the Committee of Three, advised in a mid-
October memorandum that "The U.S. Government should now 
decide that in due course it will recognize the Communist 
regime" and that "We should avoid an extended period of
non-recognition or any other unilateral approach to the 
problem", nevertheless, the memo added, it would be neces­
sary for the Chinese first to meet "the criteria we apply to 
new r e g i m e s . A  few days later a member of the Committee, 
Raymond B. Fosdick, observed that while it had to be admit­
ted that in retrospect "the unilateral participation of the 
United States in the Chinese civil war was a misfortune", it 
did not follow that the United States could rectify the 
mistake by hasty recognition of the Communist regime in
Peking. It would first have to demonstrate willingness to
discharge its international obligations.^^
Moreover, the October assembly of experts on Asia
called to contribute their opinions of Asian policy, one
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State Department official reported, so took the desirability 
of recognition for granted that virtually no time had been 
spent in discussing the justification for doing so. And 
yet, the experts, with few exceptions, also had agreed that 
recognition could only "be granted at a certain time and
0*7
under certain conditions." Thus both in the case of the 
advice of the experts as well as in that of the Committee of 
Three —  two members of which, Raymond B. Fosdick, head of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, and Everett Case, President of 
Colgate University, had been called in expressly for the 
purpose of bringing a fresh perspective to Far Eastern 
policy questions —  the best outside counsel available to 
government officials never contradicted in any meaningful 
fashion the unrelieved opposition to recognition which had 
existed within the Administration since the beginning of 
1949.
In sum, the perceived requirements of containing 
Soviet power simply overwhelmed all other considerations 
concerning the particular issue of United States - Communist 
Chinese relations. For their own part, and whether despite 
or because of the American display of Cold War intransigence 
in the matter, the Chinese Communists never provided more 
than highly equivocal evidence that they might be willing to 
consider seriously developing better relations with the 
United States and no evidence that a closer relationship 
between the two would facilitate in any way the Administra­
tion's containment objectives. The only way that the
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Chinese, as avowed "communists", could have demonstrated to 
the Administration's satisfaction that their international 
intentions were honorable and "normal" would have been for 
them to offer positive proof of an ability to think and act 
independently of Soviet influence. This was not possible at 
the time, it now seems clear, and neither was American 
recognition.
-543“
^See, for example, Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the 
Policy Planning Staff, 24 August 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 536.
2
See, Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 7 September 1948, 
F.R., 1948, VIII, 148, 153-154. (This PPS memorandum became the con­
ceptual basis for the NSC 34 series "United States Policy Toward China" 
which the President approved on 4 February 1949, see, ibid., I47fn; see 
also. Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States 
Policy toward China, 2 November 1948, ibid., 185-187; Note by the Execu­
tive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council, 11 
January 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 474-475; Memorandum by the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council to the Council, 4 February 
1949, i ^ . , 484-485.
3
Study Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul 
H. Nitze, 8 February 1950, F.R., 1950, I, 146.
4
On this point of winning the Chinese Communists away from the 
Soviets, see the comments by the Counselor of the Embassy in China, that 
the "fundamental" U.S. policy toward China "...should be to prevent 
China from becoming (a) reenforcement to Soviet power. To achieve this 
end, we must wait for (the) development of (a) Chinese form of "Titoism", 
meanwhile doing nothing to encourage (the) growth of (a) strong Commu­
nist China. Policy of outright hostility toward (the) rulers of China 
and overt support of subversive activity against them, while it undoubt­
edly would hinder consolidation (of) CCP power, would be unlikely to 
contribute toward (the) detachment of China from (the) USSR because it 
would conflict with, rather than make use of Chinese chauvinism." The 
Counselor of the Embassy in China, 3 September 1949, in U.S. Dept, of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1978), 
VIII, 520. Hereafter cited as F.R., 1949, VIII. (This particular 
memorandum apparently had considerable impact on State Department think­
ing in Washington. See, Ibid., 521fn; Also, see, George Kennan's
comments in, Report by Mr. Charles W. Yost, Special Assistant to the 
Ambassador-at-Large, 16 September 1949, F.R., 1949, VII, 1206.
^Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States 
Policy Regarding Trade with China, 28 February 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 
828.
^Ibid.. 828.
^Ibid., 828-829.
4bid., 829.
^Ibid., 829.
-544-
^°Ibid., 829.
T^Ibid., 830.
^^Ibid., 833-834.
13Ibid., 833; In addressing a meeting of experts on Asia assembled 
by the State Department in October of 1949, General George C. Marshall, 
made this comment: "I don't think you can call the Japanese-Chinese
trade exactly a "must" but it comes pretty close to being that. We are 
not going to go on forever providing the goods, the foods, and the money 
that has been necessary to keep Japan afloat." Minutes of the Meetings 
of the "Roundtable Discussions" of 6, 7 & 8 October, President's Secre­
tary Files, Box 174, Truman Papers, HSTL.
14
Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States 
Policy Regarding Trade with China, 28 February 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 
833.
^^Ibid., 833.
^^Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with 
President Truman, 16 September 1949, ibid., 878; White House dissatis­
faction over the existing U.S. trade policy with China apparently had 
begun to develop some time earlier, see. Memorandum by Mr. Livingston T. 
Merchant of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Chief of the Divi­
sion of Chinese Affairs, 24 August 1949, ibid., 870-871.
^^As already indicated, this view was always a latent part of 
American trade policy toward the Chinese Communists. See, for example, 
W. Walton Butterworth's comments in a conversation with British offi­
cials in Washington in September of 1949 that one of the essential 
objectives of U.S. trade policy was, "...to disabuse the Chinese Commu­
nists of their preconception that western nations are necessarily, by 
virtue of their capitalist and imperialist societies, bound to accept a 
passive role in their economic relations with Communist China." Butter- 
worth went on to argue in favor of a common British American trade 
policy, "...not with the idea necessarily of arbitrarily preventing the 
flow of such goods, but as a symbol of our ability to take punitive 
measures against the Chinese Communists if such action should be made 
necessary in the future." Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Robert N. 
Magill of the Division of Chinese Affairs, 9 September 1949, ibid., 872; 
See also, The Counselor of the Embassy in China that "Conciliatory 
gestures now of (an) economic or diplomatic nature would not only be 
opposed by (a) large portion of (the) American public but would simply 
be interpreted by (the) CCP as bearing out (the) Communist theory of 
(the) inner weakness of (the) USA." The Counselor of the Embassy in 
China to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 
520.
-545-
18
For a good example of this line of reasoning see, The Charge in 
the Soviet Union to The Secretary of State, 1 November 1949, F.R., 1949, 
IX, 888-889.
19See, for example, the State Department's November 1949 report on 
U.S. trade policy with China, Memorandum by the Department of State, 4 
November 1949, ibid., 890-896.
2°Ibid.
21
A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the 
Position of the United States with Respect to Asia, 30 December 1949, 
F.R., 1949, VII, part 2, 1219.
^^Memorandum by the State Department, 4 November 1949, F.R., 1949, 
IX, 895.
Z^Ibid., 895.
24
On this point, a November 1949 Acheson memorandum of conversation 
with the President is particularly revealing. (Acheson and the Presi­
dent are discussing the letter's consultation earlier in the day with 
members of the State Department's Committee of Three then involved in 
reviewing United States Far Eastern Policy). "I said to the President 
that if we had had a little more time this morning I should have liked 
to have had the discussion center on what seemed to me to be a pretty 
basic issue of policy on which I thought the Consultants minds were very 
clear. Broadly speaking, there were two objectives of policy: One
might be to oppose the Communists regime, harass it, needle it, and if 
an opportunity appeared to attempt to overthrow it. Another objective 
of policy would be to attempt to detach it from subservience to Moscow 
and over a period of time encourage those vigorous influences which 
might modify it. I pointed out that this second alternative did not 
mean a policy of appeasement any more than it had in the case of Tito. 
If the Communists took action detrimental to the United States it should 
be opposed with vigor, but the decision of many concrete questions would 
be much clarified by a decision as to whether we believed that we should 
and could overthrow the regime, or whether we believed that the second 
course outlined above was the wiser. I said that the Consultants were 
unanimous in their judgment that the second course was the preferable 
one. The President thought that in the broad sense in which I was 
speaking that this was the correct analysis and that he wished to have a 
thorough understanding of all of the facts in deciding the question. He 
believed that today's meeting had greatly helped him." Conversation 
with the President, 17 November 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
25
The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 29 April 1949, 
F.R., 1949, IX, 12-14; The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of
State, 3 May 1949, ibid.. 14-15.
-546-
26
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China, 6 April 1949, 
r.R., 1949, VIII, 230-231.
27The Consul General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 1 June 
1949, ibid., 357-360. The intermediary who passed the Chou En-lai
message along was an Australian journalist, Michael Keon, employed n 
China by United Press, see. The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of 
State, 7 June 1949, ibid., 373. Actually, Keon gave the message to 
Colonel David W. Barrett, Assistant Military Attache to the American 
Consulate at Peking who then turned it over to Clubb, see, ibid., 357.
28
The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 30 June 1949, 
ibid., 766. (Ambassador Stuart first reported the earlier informal
suggestion made by Huang on the 18th of June, in this dispatch on the 
30th.)
^^Ibid., 766-767.
30See, The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 14 May 
1949, ibid., 745-746; The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 
8 June 1949, ibid., 752-753.
31The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 2 Octo­
ber 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 93-94.
32
The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 8 Octo­
ber 1949, ibid., 112-115.
33The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 11 
October 1949, ibid., 121-122.
34Memorandum by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 21 
November 1949, file 77/261D, DDRS.
35Buhite, Russell D. "Missed Opportunities? American Policy and 
the Chinese Communists, 1949" Paper delivered before the Missouri 
Valley History Conference, March, 1979. Scheduled for publication in 
Mid-America in October 1979; See also. The Consul-General at Shanghai to 
the Secretary of State, 10 August 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 478-479. (In 
this memorandum, the Consul-General reported that he had received infor­
mation from "well informed Chinese contacts" that Mao Tse-Tung's "Lean­
ing to One Side" speech on 1 July had resulted directly from strong 
Soviet pressure and that the Soviets generally had the capacity to bring 
pressure to bear on the Chinese Communist Party apparatus because of the 
pro-Soviet faction within the Party and because of powerful Soviet 
military forces on the Chinese border. With respect to having been 
forced to make the 1 July speech, Mao was reported to have been "indig­
nant", to have "sulked", and to have been "actually sick"); More specif­
ically with respect to the Chou En-lai demarche, see. The Consul-General 
at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 18 August 1949, ibid., 496-498.
-547-
(In this memorandum, Clubb reported that Michael Keon, the Austrian 
journalist who had initially relayed the demarche, had later talked with 
Chou En-lai's personal secretary who had revealed to Keon that the 
Soviets had placed great pressure on the Chinese Communists having 
learned of Chou's contact with the Americans.)
36
See, for exançle, the series of dispatches in "The Embassy in 
China After Occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists", F.R., 1949, 
VIII, 843-859; See also. Memorandum by Troy L. Perkins of the Office of 
Chinese Affairs, 5 November 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 168-170; See, also, 
the series of dispatches, "Evacuations of Americans From China", ibid., 
1356-1364.
37Buhite. "Missed Opportunities"; See also. Memorandum by Mr. John 
P. Davies, Jr. of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the 
Staff, George Kennan, 30 June 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 768-769; The 
Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, 28 June 1949, ibid., 
766-767.
3 8
Smith, Dean Acheson, 122.
39Of the more recent volumes in this regard, see, Purifoy, Harry 
Truman's China Policy, McLellan, Acheson: The State Department Years;
Tang Tsou’s seminal work on U.S. China policy during the Truman years 
assumes that the Administration, despite its preferences, found itself 
unable to disassociate from the Nationalist Government on Formosa be­
cause of pro-Chiang Kai-shek pressure from Congress. As a result, Tang 
Tsou argues, the Administration faced a situation in which it was 
"impractical" to consider recognition of the Chinese Communists. Tang 
Tsou, America's Failure, 500-519.
40See, Steele, The American People and China, 35-36.
41See Dean Acheson's comments several years later in. Notes on 
China, 2 July 1953, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
^^Ibid.
43
The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 27 June 
1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 399-400.
4 4
Buhite. "Missed Opportunities".
45
The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 18 
August 1949, in U.S. Dept, of State, Foreign Relations (Washington, 
D.C., 1978), VIII, 496-498; The Consul-General at Shanghai to the Secre­
tary of State, 14 November 1949, ibid., 592; Memorandum by the Ambassa­
dor to China to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs, 28 November 1949, ibid., 612.
-548-
^^The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secretary of State, 2 June
1949, ibid., 363.
^^Buhite. "Missed Opportunities".
48
The Consul-General at Shanghai to the Secretary of State, 30 June 
1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 1263.
^^Ibid.. 1263.
^^For a documentary overview of the steady increase in Chinese 
Communist induced restrictions on all private American activity in China 
in 1949 and 1950 and the consequent decline of American influence in 
this regard see the section on "Evacuation of Americans in China," 
ibid., 1210-1364.
^^For a documentary overview of increasing Communist restrictions 
placed on all American Embassy and consulate activities in China in 1949 
and 1950 see sections "The Embassy in China after occupation of Nanking 
by Chinese Communists"; "Increasing difficulties of the Consulate at 
Dairen due to actions of Soviet and Chinese Communist authorities"; 
"Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese 
Communists," F.R., 1949, VIII, 723-1327.
52
See, for example. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul- 
General at Peiping, 14 June 1949, ibid., 384-385, 384fn.; The Secretary 
of State to the Consulate General at Peiping, 22 March 1950, F.R., 1950, 
VI, 321-322.
53
For documentation on this episode, see, F.R., 1949, VIII, 1199-
1222.
54For documentation on detention of the American consulate in 
Mukden in 1948 and 1949, see "Problems of United States Consulates in 
areas occupied by the Chinese Communists: Mukden Consulate General",
ibid., 933-1051; For a concise "history" of the Mukden episode, see. The 
Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the 
United Nations, 10 November 1949, ibid., 1007-1008; As to the nature of 
the impact of the Mukden situation on the issue of United States-Chinese 
Communist relations, see also. Notes on China, 22 and 23 July 1953, 
Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
^^Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State on a meeting with the 
President, 14 November 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 1008.
^^Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defense, 18 November 1949, ibid., 1011-1013; The State 
Department also opposed a blockade on the grounds that it would not have 
any appreciable impact on the Chinese economy; it would give the commu­
nists a propaganda leverage; it could not be applied legally against the
-549-
shipping of other nations; and it would be inconsistent with the princi­
ples of the United Nations* charter. Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State to the President, 21 November 1949, Presidential Secretary Files, 
Box 173, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^^C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 4/1949, 20 April 1949, p. 7, 
file 77/281B, DDRS.
CO
C.I.A. Situation Report, S.R. No. 5/1949, 17 May 1949, p. 9, file 
77/281C, DDRS.
59The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offi­
cers, 6 May 1949, F.R., 1949, IX, 17; These general priorities of Ameri­
can recognition policy remained consistent through the Summer and into 
the Fall of 1949. Compare, for example, the above cited Acheson memo­
randum of early May to the remarks concerning U.S.-Chinese Communist 
relations - which are very similar - made by the Under Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs, W. Walton Butterworth, to the early 
October 1949 "Roundtable" State Department gathering of Far Eastern 
experts. Minutes of the Meetings of the Roundtable Discussions of 6, 7 
& 8 October, President's Secretary Files, Box 174, Truman Papers, HSTL.
^^For documentation on evolving Brtish attitudes on the question of 
recognition, see "Policy of the United States with respect to the ques­
tion of recognition", ibid., 1-260; especially see, 149-260.
^^The Secretary of State to the Consul-General at Peiping, 3 Febru­
ary 1949, ibid., 11.
^^Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Wallace W. Stuart of the Divi­
sion of Chinese Affairs, 10 June 1949, ibid., p 37.
63
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul-General at Peiping, 
14 June 1949, F.R., 1949, VIII, 384-385.
64
Even the American Consul-General in Peiping, Edmund Clubb, who 
appears to have been concerned more than most to keep an eye peeled to 
the possibility of developing better relations with the Chinese Commu­
nists as a means to win the latter away from their Soviet connection, 
refused to be very sanguine about the potential inherent to the Chou 
En-lai demarche. Clubb thought it a "good possibility" that the Chou 
gesture had "high" Party sanction, that it was primarily an effort, 
based on a Chinese knowledge of the Soviet inability to extend suffi­
cient assistance, to obtain aid to offset serious economic problems. He 
did not think it represented any intent to cut political ties with the 
Soviets and even speculated that the latter may have encouraged the 
Chinese effort to obtain American aid so as to take the pressure off 
scarce Russian resources. The Consul-General at Peiping to the Secre­
tary of State, 2 June 1949, ibid., 363-364.
-550-
^^The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 27 June
1949, ibid., 400.
*^The Charge in  the S o v ie t Union to  th e  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te , 19 
A pril 1949, i b i d . ,  249-251.
^^The Consul-G eneral a t  P e ip in g  to  the  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te , 19 Ju ly  
1949, i b i d . , 443-444.
68The Second S ecretary  o f th e  Embassy in  China to  th e  S ecretary  o f  
S ta te ,  15 November 1949, F .R ., 1949, IX, 193; With re sp e c t to  the ques­
t io n  o f re c o g n itio n  of the Chinese Communists, s e v e ra l years l a t e r ,  Dean 
Acheson re c a l le d  th e  importance o f th is  type o f assessm ent a t  the tim e, 
" . . . I  remember various p o in ts  o f  Yugoslav h is to ry  (were) d iscussed in  
th is  connection  -  people p o in tin g  out th a t  i f  we had taken any ac tio n  to  
encourage T ito ism , i t  would have been s e l f - d e f e a t in g . . .and th a t  th e re ­
fo re , app ly ing  th a t  analogy, i f  you took any a c tio n  to  t r y  to  tu rn  Mao 
in to  T ito ,  i t  would probably be s e l f - d e f e a t in g . . . . "  Notes on China, 23 
Ju ly  1953, P rin ce to n  Seminars, Acheson P apers, HSTL.
^^Memorandum by the D irec to r o f the P o licy  Planning S ta f f ,  no d a te , 
e a r ly  Ju ly  1949, F .R ., 1949, IX, 357.
^^I b id . . 358.
^^I b id . ,  357-358.
^^I b id . ,  358.
^^I b id . . 358.
74Memorandum by Mr. John P. D avies, J r . ,  o f th e  P o licy  Planning 
S ta f f ,  24 August 1949, ib id . , 536.
75lb id . , 536.
7*I b id . , 537.
7?I b id . ,  537-538.
^^I b id . , 539.
79For the  memorandum as subm itted  by D u lles, se e . Memorandum by Mr. 
John F o s te r  D u lle s , C onsultant to  the  S ecre ta ry  o f S ta te ,  18 May 1950, 
F .R ., 1950, I ,  314-316; As subm itted  to  Rusk, se e . E x tra c t From a D ra ft 
Memorandum by th e  A ss is ta n t S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  F a r E astern  A ffa irs  
to  th e  S ec re ta ry  o f S ta te , 30 May 1950, F .R ., 1950, VI, 349-351.
-551-
*°Ibid., 349-350.
G llb id .,  351.
^^I b id . ,  351.
83Dean Acheson l a t e r  re c a l le d  th a t ,  " . . . t h e  q u estio n  was, d id the 
Kremlin have enough p o l i t i c a l  wisdom and f l e x i b i l i t y  to  handle th is  
Chinese th in g  in  an e n t i r e ly  d if f e r e n t  p a t te rn ,  from th e  p a tte rn  on 
which they handled th e  o th er s a t e l l i t e s . " ;  " . . .y o u  c o u ld n 't  be sure  th a t  
the  Russians might no t use th e  heavy hand and thereby  c re a te  opportuni­
t i e s  fo r  u s ." ;  p o ss ib ly  even " in c a rc e ra te  Mao". Notes on China, 23 Ju ly
1953 ; P rin ce to n  Sem inars, Acheson P apers , HSTL.
84C .I.A . S itu a tio n  R eport, S.R. No. 1/50, 18 January  1950, p. 4,
f i l e  77/283A, DDRS.
85S ta te  Department R eport, "A ppraisal of th e  S ino-S ov iet T reaty", 
21 February 1950, f i l e  R/755B, DDRS.
86C .I.A . S itu a tio n  R eport, S.R. No. 1/50, 18 January  1950, p. 5,
f i l e  77/283A, DDRS.
G ^Ib id ., 5.
88C .I.A . S itu a tio n  R eport, S.R. No. 2/50, 15 February 1950, p . 4, 
f i l e  77/283B, DDRS.
G^I b id . ,  4.
90Memorandum of C onversation, by th e  D irec to r of th e  O ffice  of Far 
E aste rn  A f fa i r s ,  9 September 1949, F .R ., 1949, IX, 77-78; See a lso . 
Memorandum o f  Conversation by th e  D irec to r of th e  O ffice  o f Chinese 
A f fa ir s ,  8 November 1949, ib id . , 185; Memorandum by the  A ss is ta n t Secre­
ta r y  o f S ta te  fo r  Far E aste rn  A ffa irs  to  th e  S ecre ta ry  of S ta te , 5 
December 1949, i b id . , 214.
91For docum entation on th e  views of the various European and Asian 
n a tio n s  on q u estio n  of re c o g n itio n , see "Policy  of th e  U nited S ta tes  
w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  question  o f reco g n itio n " , i b id . , 149-260.
^Memorandum by Mr. Gerald S try k er of the O ffice  o f  Chinese A ffa irs , 
2 November 1949, i b id . , 157.
S ^ Ib id ., 157.
94Memorandum by Mr. C harles W. Yost of the  D iv ision  o f E ast Euro­
pean A f fa ir s ,  29 August 1949, f i l e  R/359E, DDRS.
-552-
95R eport by the Committee o f Three, "Halted S ta te s  P o licy  in  the 
Far E a s t" ,  18 October 1949, f i l e  R/438C, DDRS.
^^Memorandum by Raymond B. Fosdick  of th e  Committee o f Three, 25 
October 1949, f i l e  R/538D, DDRS.
97Memorandum by Gerald S try k e r  o f the O ffice of Chinese A ffa irs , 2 
November 1949, F .R ., 1949, IX, 157.
-553-
Conclusion
American policy toward China after World War II 
cannot be understood without reference to the effort to 
establish the sort of relationship with the Soviet Union 
that would prove satisfactory to perceived Americn interests 
in Ai a and elsewhere in the world. In the months immediate­
ly following the war, the Truman Administration tended to 
define this task primarily in regional terms. Postwar 
problems in East Asia, officials hoped, could be resolved by 
mutual agreement on the basis of cooperation and negotiation 
between those parties with a stake in the area.
By the Winter and Spring of 1946, however, this 
expectation had given way to the view that the Russians 
generally could not be trusted on international matters and 
that the United States and the Soviet Union probably would 
not be able to cooperate in solving postwar problems. 
Whether rightly or wrongly, policymakers assumed that the 
Kremlin could be expected to take advantage of whatever 
opportunities might arise for furthering Russian interests 
and expanding Soviet power and influence. Thenceforth and 
until the Korean War, American China policy remained inex­
tricably a part of the more general effort by the United 
States to devise ways in which to eliminate, or, at least, 
minimize the opportunities for Soviet aggrandizement and to 
develop the most effective means by which to contain the 
expansion of Soviet power and influence in world affairs.
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with respect to this broad priority of American 
foreign policy in the postwar period, an important question 
emerges: was the Truman Administration's China policy
between 1945 and 1950 a success or a failure? This is not a 
question which permits a simple response. Obviously, the 
answer will depend on the nature of the criteria by which 
the policy is measured. If the criteria are clear-cut and 
relatively one-dimensional as, for example, in the case of 
those who have argued that the United States should have 
done what was required in order to save the Nationalist 
Government and to keep China free of communist control, or 
those on the other side of the issue who have maintained 
that by foolishly intervening in China's Civil War the 
United States drove the Chinese Communists into a much 
closer association with the Russians than probably would 
have existed otherwise, then American China policy must be 
judged a failure. The Truman Administration neither ab­
stained from "imperialistic meddling" in China's Civil War, 
nor, by its policy, prevented China's coming under communist 
control. But this study never intended to address directly 
the long-debated tactical issue of whether the United States 
should or should not have become involved in the Chinese 
Civil War or whether or not some greater American effort 
should have been made to save China from the communists.
Indeed, the documents reveal that after 1945 
Truman Administration officials decided rather quickly that
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they were not in any position to establish the sort of 
well-tailored goals toward China which could be expected to 
prove very satisfying to some more decisive measure of 
foreign policy. Ideally, the Administration might have 
preferred to avoid dealing with the internal problems of 
China altogether, or, if this were not possible in context 
of the Cold War, certainly it would have wished to save the 
Nationalist Government and to deny China to the Chinese 
Communists whose victory American officials were sure would 
place the Soviets in a convenient position to expand their 
power and influence in Southeast Asia.
But, in rejecting the option of pulling out of 
China because of the belief that it would have disastrous 
consequences for United States' interests. Administration 
officials also knew that in staying with the problem they 
would not be able to apply sufficient resources to ensure 
the ideal objective of saving the Nationalist regime. 
Notwithstanding the failure to achieve a peaceful settlement 
of China's internal difficulties in 1946, policymakers were 
convinced of the importance of continuing to assist the 
Nationalist Goverment in its resistance to the Chinese 
Communists, but always within well-defined limits —  limits 
imposed by a variety of interlocking considerations but 
essentially created by the fact that the Nation's finite 
resources could not be squandered in a region of the world
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where American interests were not vitally involved or in an 
area not worth the risk of a more general war.
Thus, after the failure of the Marshall mission, 
China policy took on the attributes of a makeshift, if not 
pragmatic, approach designed to achieve what officials 
believed was the realistic goal of keeping Chiang Kai-shek's 
regime afloat for as long as possible. There was always the 
outside chance that Chiang and his followers would use the 
time given them by American assistance to carry through 
those civil and military reforms which decision makers 
thought imperative in order for the Nationalist Government 
to compete effectively with the Chinese Communists. Ulti­
mately, only the Chinese could save themselves.
However, since Administration officials doubted 
the Kuomintang leadership were either willing or able to do 
what was necessary to survive over the long run, the essen­
tial American expectation in extending aid after 1946 was 
that it would buy time, thereby allowing emerging Cold War 
strategies to take hold. While hoping for the best, deci­
sion makers settled on a policy of limited assistance, not 
because they thought it had even a good chance of preventing 
an eventual Nationalist defeat, but because they believed 
this policy would have the most favorable impact on a series 
of other Cold War objectives while avoiding for as long as 
possible the anticipated adverse consequences of a communist 
victory in China. Specifically, the Administration hoped
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that the tactic of continuing to aid the Nationalist Govern­
ment would promote the American global-strategic advantage. 
The goals were to deter Soviet aggressions elsewhere by 
helping to create the image of American resolve in support 
of anti-communist resistance around the world; to bolster 
non-communist morale in the rest of Asia; and, at an 
especially critical time in the war devastated West, to 
demonstrate to Europeans the American determination to 
support friends and allies in time of need. Even after the 
remnant Nationalist government was forced to flee to Formosa 
in 1949, American policy continued to balance between over 
commitment and under commitment to the island regime for the 
purpose of serving essentially similar global-strategic 
priorities.
It is, of course, useful to argue that the Truman 
Administration made a serious error in refusing to commit 
sufficient American resources to the task of defeating 
communism on the East Asian mainland, or, from the opposite 
perspective, that the Administration made a serious error in 
continuing to intervene in China's internal affairs after 
1945. However, since policymakers were convinced that it 
would prove highly detrimental to American interests to 
follow either of these two courses of action, it would 
appear to be more useful to criticize China policy from 1945 
to 1950 on the Administration's own terms. On this level of 
assessment the essential questions are: Did Administration
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China policy succeed or fail in its intended purpose to 
advance other American foreign policy objectives in the 
developing global confrontation with the Soviet Union? Was 
China policy correct in its underlying assumption that the 
best way to ensure the American advantage in the global 
competition with the Soviet Union was to follow a course of 
"restrained intervention" in China?
These are not questions which the present study 
can answer definitively. But they cannot be ignored either 
because the nature of the Truman Administration's involve­
ment in China established the general pattern for a continu­
ing American involvement on the East and Southeast Asian 
mainland which would last until the early 1970's and would 
include a United States participation in two Asian wars.
Available documents indicate that the same essen­
tial assumptions that carried the Truman Administration into 
China after 1945 continued to prompt American interventions 
on the Asian mainland after 1950. These involvements, 
especially as manifested in the military efforts in Korea 
and Vietnam, rested on the belief that the United States 
would need to sustain a presence in the region because the 
process of maintaining world peace, or avoiding world war, 
was an "indivisible" one; that what happened in Asia, depend­
ing on the nature of developments there, would have either a 
favorable or adverse effect on continuing efforts elsewhere 
to neutralize and moderate the aggressive ambitions of Soviet
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foreign policy. And yet, commensurate with the precedent 
set by the Truman Administration in China, later policy 
toward East and Southeast Asia also would include the paral­
lel idea that there were limits beyond which United States 
commitments could not go for fear that too extensive an 
involvement would have unacceptable consequences for other 
more important foreign policy interests.
Under these circumstances, it is no accident that 
American intrusions into Asian affairs since World War II 
have created more domestic public controversy than any other 
area of United States foreign policy. The limited commit­
ments in China, Korea and Vietnam have not proven compatible 
with many of the nation's values. For one thing, it may be 
argued that the nature of these involvements have run dia­
metrically counter to strongly ingrained cultural beliefs 
concerning the process of problem solving. It has been 
difficult for many Americans to accept policies not aiming 
directly toward the goal of "victory".
Eric Goldman has written that,
"We are a people whose history has 
made us the land of the swift, total 
solution, brought about by ourselves 
alone. We faced a wilderness; we 
hacked it down. We were vexed by 
slavery; we cut it from our system. We 
fought Britishers, Mexicans, Spaniards,
Germans, Germans plus Japanese and 
licked them all in short shrift."
Consequently, Goldman suggested, Americans were inclined to
believe in the "quick, total solution" of all international
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problems. They also tended to perceive the world through 
their on politico-economic experience, assuming it almost a 
"law of history" that the course of human development had 
been a "long slow swing toward a world consisting entirely 
of middle-class democracies." From time to time, "trouble" 
occured when an "evil leader" forced some country "along a 
road forbidden by the law of history". The American solu­
tion followed from the perception of the problem. "If the 
natural swing of the world was toward peaceful, democratic 
middle-class ways," Goldman concluded, "how could foreign 
policy be a problem requiring anything except the occasional 
surgical removal of an unnatural growth?"
After three and a half decades of sustained United 
States global involvement and responsibility Americans may 
understand better that definite limits often do exist on the 
nation's capacity to influence profoundly complicated trends 
in international affairs and that patience may be one of the 
most effective diplomatic techniques that a global power 
will possess in its relations with a culturally various 
world. But, if public opinion came rather slowly to this 
realization, policymakers understood it well as early as 
1945; and policy toward East Asia reflects this fact. As a 
result, there were bound to be domestic repercussions when 
officials were so far ahead of their public.
Involvement in Asia created additional problems 
because the overwhelming majority of Americans, until fairly
-561-
recently, have had only minimal social, intellectual, philo­
sophical, religious and racial affiliations with that part 
of the world. What is more, the United States historically 
has had relatively few tangible material interests in the 
region. With the exception of off-shore insular involve­
ments, American economic ties to East and Southeast Asia 
have been slight. It is significant to note that even 
toward Europe where all of these cultural and economic 
associations have been present and reciprocal, Americans 
have historically questioned, even in critical situations, 
the extent to which it actually was in the national interest 
for the United States to become politically involved. It is 
small wonder then that, in a region of the world where 
extensive and concrete interests did not seem to exist, the 
nature and objectives of the Nation's commitments since 
World War II have not appeared altogether appropriate to 
most Americans.
Because the policy objectives in the region have 
been largely psychological in nature, that is to say con­
cerned largely with creating an image of American initiative 
and effectiveness in international affairs, government 
officials over the years have been reticent to share candid­
ly with the public the reasoning behind their decisions for 
fear that a public discussion of the issues involved would 
negate the political-strategic goals of the particular 
commitment. When conjoined with the seemingly inconclusive
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results of those commitments, such secrecy, however neces­
sary, has done a great deal to erode further the public's 
confidence in the wisdom of their leaders on these matters. 
Thus, for this reason alone it would be well to ask whether 
the sort of limted involvements— "restrained inverventions" 
— on the Asian mainland which have characterized American 
policy toward the Far Eas since World War II have had a 
demonstrably favorable or unfavorable impact on United 
States interests elsewhere in the world. The answer, this 
study argues, not only must be founded on a clear understand­
ing of the objectives which policymakers sought to achieve, 
but must begin with a careful assessment of the Truman 
Administration's policy toward China after 1945.
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